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Mapping the Mind of the Strategist 
A Quantitative Methodology for Measuring
the Strategic Beliefs of Executives
This study is about mapping the mind of the strategist – quantitati-
vely measuring the core beliefs that executives have about the best
way to approach strategic issues. The objective is to develop a reliable
instrument for measuring these strategy beliefs, which can be reused
across a broad range of cognitive studies. The intention is to create a
Hofstede-like universal instrument for quantitatively capturing strategic
beliefs of executives across any range of industries and cultures. 
To achieve this, a comprehensive conceptual framework is presented
consisting of ten distinct dimensions along which executives can have
differing cognitive preconceptions. For each of the ten dimensions,
the opposite poles (referred to as strategy perspectives) are qualita-
tively described and then translated into quantitative measurement
scales. During the study, these twenty scales were brought together
in a web-based survey instrument, the Strategy Profiler, which was
used to quantitatively map hundreds of individual executives’ strategy
beliefs.
The study concludes with some exploratory research into the factors
correlated with specific strategy beliefs. It is found that contextual
variables such as functional and national background are significantly
correlated with a large number of strategic beliefs. This suggests that
further research into the impact of executives’ environments (functio-
nal area, organization, industry and national context) on their strategic
beliefs seem very promising. 
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Chapter 1 
 
THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Are you socially progressive or more conservative? Are you an economic liberal or inclined 
to support stronger government intervention? Do you favor a secular state or should religion 
be given a more prominent role in government affairs? Would you characterize yourself as an 
internationalist or do you lean more towards national autonomy? What stance do you take on 
defense issues – are you a hawk or a dove? And on ecological matters, are you a green or do 
you place more emphasis on economic growth? By answering these questions, you will have 
painted a rough picture of your political views and how you would like to see government 
policy issues approached. On the basis of this general political profile your probable voting 
behavior at the next elections might even be predicted.  
 Now characterize your views on business policy issues. Which preferences do you 
have when it comes to developing a strategic course of action for companies? Which 
approach will you probably favor next time your organization needs to make an important 
strategic decision? What is your business strategy profile that will predict the type of strategic 
behavior you are likely to exhibit? 
 Almost all business executives whom I have asked these questions have looked 
somewhat puzzled. Generally their answer has been that business strategy depends on the 
situation, not on any inherent preferences. While they acknowledge that their political choices 
are based on a particular worldview, they argue that business strategy choices are based on 
the specific circumstances in which they find themselves. In other words, their governmental 
policy choices might be based on a certain predisposition, but business policy choices are 
situational.  
 Yet, this does not sound very convincing. Why would peoples’ worldview influence 
some policy choices and not others? Why should there be political ideologies and not 
business ideologies? Could it be that people are just more aware of their political views, 
because public debate has articulated differing opinions and forced individuals to specify 
their preferences? Could it be that in business there is less explicit debate between and within 
companies to identify differing perspectives on how to develop business strategy?  
 Different strategy perspectives might be equally difficult to recognize for executives 
as different cultural perspectives. Executives usually do not see their own behavior as 
typically French, Indian, American, Japanese, British or Brazilian, unless they are confronted 
with people brought up with different beliefs, values and norms. Only in such an international 
context do executives become acutely aware of their own cultural ideology and how it 
20
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conflicts with the views and preferences of others. It then becomes clear that their culture has 
a strong dispositional impact on their management choices (Hofstede, 1980; Trice and Beyer, 
1993). In the same way, executives might only acknowledge their distinctive strategy views 
when confronted with a different business ideology. 
 But is there reason to believe that there are significantly different strategy 
perspectives that predispose executives to particular types of strategic behavior? In the 
strategic management literature there has been relatively little research done into the 
existence of different ‘strategy paradigms’ among executives (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; 
Clarke and Clegg, 1998). Would it be worthwhile to research possible differences in strategy 
perspectives? Three arguments can be put forward to support the assumption that the answer 
should be affirmative.  
First, the strongly growing managerial cognition literature has provided a large body 
of evidence relating executives’ cognitive maps to their strategic choices (e.g. Day and Lord, 
1992; Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1992; Porac and Thomas, 2002; Thomas et al., 1993; 
Tyler and Steensma, 1998). The central theme in this literature is that executives do not 
approach strategic issues tabula rasa, but impose existing mental templates to interpret 
events and take action (March and Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1995). These cognitive 
representations of reality are based on past experience and are used to structure new 
situations ‘top-down’ (Abelson and Black, 1986). Nisbett and Ross (1980) refer to this 
dominant form of mental information processing as theory-driven, as opposed to a data-
driven approach, where new mental models are formed to deal with novel situations. So, 
while executives might think that they are fully open to all external stimuli and only ‘make up 
their mind’ once all the evidence is in, in practice their cognitive maps direct their 
perceptions and appropriate actions are generally selected from an existing repertoire of 
strategic responses (Dutton, 1993; Stubbart, 1989). As these cognitive maps are formed over 
time in interaction with other group members, a shared understanding often evolves that 
further strengthens joint beliefs and preferences (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986). What can be concluded from the managerial cognition literature is that 
strategic choices are not only strongly influenced by existing strategy perspectives (in the 
form of cognitive maps), but that strategy perspectives vary from group to group, and even 
from person to person (this point will be further developed in chapter 2). 
A second indicator pointing to significant differences in strategy perspectives among 
executives can be found in the diversity of views expressed in the strategic management 
literature. In this literature the variety of perspectives is overwhelming, often to the bewilder-
ment of executives searching for a commonly accepted best practice. Much to their chagrin 
they find that for most analyses and prescriptions given by researchers and theorists, other 
writings can be found that argue quite the opposite (De Wit and Meyer, 1994; Whittington, 
1993). Some of this theory diversity has been traced back to differing disciplinary 
assumptions, for instance between economists, sociologists and psychologists (Bailey & 
Johnson, 1992; Mintzberg, 1990). Yet some of the variety seems to reflect the differences in 
strategy perspectives found among executives. As the diversity of views within the strategic 
management literature shows no sign of declining, it must be concluded that no universally 
accepted best practice has emerged as common paradigm, neither among strategy theorists, 
nor among strategy practitioners (this point will be further developed in chapters 3 to 12).   
 The third reason to suspect that executives have different strategy perspectives that 
shape their strategic choices is practical experience. Any executive, researcher or consultant 
with an interest in strategy development within firms will recognize that no two people will 
look at the same information in the same way. Actually, a large part of the strategy process 
revolves around the resolution of conflicting interpretations of strategic issues and the 
formation of a common point of view on how the organization should move forward. The 
21
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more varied the participants in the process – by background, function, industry or nationality 
– the larger the differences in worldviews (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). This experience suggests that different people not only ‘speak another language’, but 
also have different beliefs, values and norms, that lead them to take a different perspective on 
how strategy should be developed. So, this ‘face validity’ check also points to the existence 
of researchable differences in strategy perspectives among executives. 
 Taken together, these three arguments have provided the impetus to launch a research 
program directed at identifying differences and similarities in strategy perspectives among 
business executives. The ambition has been to move beyond the recognition of differences, 
toward the development of a means for actually capturing the differences on some type of 
scale. The result has been the creation of a strategy perspective measurement instrument, 
which quantifies the strategy perspective of each individual executive.  
In this chapter the details of this research project will be presented, starting with an 
exploration of the research context (section 1.2), definition of the research question (section 
1.3) and clarification of the research objective (section 1.4). Subsequently, the research 
process will be described (section 1.5), leading up to an overview of this book (section 1.6).   
 
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
This research project is directed at examining executives’ cognitive maps within the context 
of strategic decision-making1. In figure 1.1 a simplified view is presented of the overall 
strategy process, whereby the general relationship between executives’ cognitive maps and 
the strategy process is identified. This representation of the strategy process deviates from 
other major research traditions within the field of strategic management in its emphasis on the 
information-processing aspects of the strategic decision-makers. Executives are seen as 
‘information workers’ (McCall and Kaplan, 1985), absorbing, manipulating and dissemina-
ting information about strategic issues facing their organizations. They must make strategic 
decisions within ‘information worlds’ that are extremely complex, ambiguous and munificent 
(Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Schwenk, 1984), while their capacity to acquire, process and store 
information is severely limited (Simon, 1947; Miller, 1956). To deal with this situation the 
human mind uses past experience to construct a cognitive map (or knowledge structure) as a 
simplified representation of the world, which is applied as a template to comprehend new 
situations and to guide behavior. Hence, when executives engage in strategic decision-
making they bring in their existing cognitive maps and attempt to make sense of the strategic 
decision situation based on this understanding of the world. The actual decision made will be 
the outcome of many influencing factors, but a significant part of the decision-making 
process consists of comparing various executives’ interpretations of the situation and building 
a common understanding of the most appropriate organizational course of action. This 
interaction, as well as the experience resulting from the actual organizational action and 
performance, will in turn have an impact on the further development of the executives’ 
cognitive map (see dotted arrow). 
This ‘cognitive’ view implies a major departure from rational decision theory, which 
has been the implicit assumption of much of the earlier work in the field of strategic 
management. In this ‘rationalist’ literature, organizational action is based on a factual 
evaluation of situational variables, such as industry structure, competitor behavior, consumer 
                                                     
1  As the terms ‘manager’, ‘leader’ and ‘strategist’ all seem to carry unintended connotations, in this 
book the more neutral term ‘executive’ will be used throughout to refer to functionaries whose 
tasks include setting organizational strategy.  
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demands, firm resources, distinctive competences and current positioning (e.g. Andrews, 
1987; Porter, 1980). Strategic decision-making is viewed as an analytical procedure, whereby 
the internal strengths and weaknesses of the firm and the opportunities and threats of the 
environment largely dictate the optimal strategy. Occasionally this literature admonishes 
executives to ‘use their creativity’, but it is not specified what creativity is or how the 
strategic decision maker might invoke this illusive capability. For better of for worse, the 
‘mind of the strategist’ remains a black box. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
The Strategy Process and Managerial Cognition 
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The cognitive view, on the other hand, fits within the behavioral decision theory tradition and 
is complementary to the rich literature describing strategic decision-making in political and 
sociological terms. Politically-oriented work emphasizes the importance of conflicting 
interests, diverging goals and differing power bases, while explaining decision-making in 
terms of coalition building, internal and external negotiations, and open conflict (e.g. 
Pettigrew, 1993; Pfeffer, 1992; Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). Sociologically-oriented work 
emphasizes the importance of social rules, legitimacy and group acceptance, while explaining 
decision-making in terms of institutionalization and social pressure to conform (e.g. Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). While in some of this literature the strategic decision 
maker remains a black box, caught up in the political and social dynamics of the decision-
making process, much work has been done on how political and social processes shape 
cognition and vice versa (Chattopadhyay et al., 1999; Eden and Spender, 1998; Fiske and 
Taylor, 1984; Ginsberg, 1995; Levine et al., 1993; Weick, 1995).   
 While much of the work on managerial cognition and behavioral decision-making 
deals with operational issues, there has also been considerable attention paid to strategic 
decision processes. The research in this area has made advances on four different fronts (see 
figure 1.1): 
 
 Content of cognitive maps (B). The starting point of most research is to empirically 
identify the actual content of executives’ cognitive maps. Much of the work in this area is 
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emic in approach, as opposed to etic2. For instance, Dutton et al. (1989) analyze Port 
Authority executives’ orientations to strategic issues, Cossette and Audet (1992) describe 
the cognitive map of a small business owner, while Axelrod (1976) outlines the beliefs 
held by British cabinet members deciding on their Middle East policy. Other researchers 
go a step further by comparing the cognitive maps of two or more executives or groups of 
executives. For example, Reger and Huff (1993) contrast competitive positioning beliefs 
held by executives in the financial services industry, while Porac et al. (1989) show how 
executives in the Scottish knitwear industry share a joint map of the industry structure. 
However, there seems to be no research directed at finding differences and commonalities 
in cognitive maps across a wide variety of different executives.  
 Relationship between cognitive maps and strategic decision-making (B→C). A second 
interesting avenue of research has been directed at linking executives’ cognitive maps to 
their actual strategic behavior. Much of the research in this area has also been emic, 
working with cases to show how certain beliefs held by executives lead to particular 
strategic decisions and organizational action. A classic is Allison’s (1971) analysis of the 
Cuban missile crisis. Other examples include Starbuck and Hedberg (1977), who 
reviewed Facit Corporation’s failure to respond to the threat of electronics to their 
mechanical calculator business, Narayanan and Fahey (1990), who studied the decline of 
the Admiral Television Company over a 15-year period, and Johnson (1988), who 
described a British retailer’s inability to match industry developments. There has also 
been some multi-case and large sample research as well. For instance, Day and Lord 
(1992) mapped the key beliefs held by various executives in the machine tool industry 
and found that these explained some of the variance found between their organizations’ 
strategies. Another example is the research by Thomas et al. (1993), who showed that the 
scanning and interpretation behavior of 156 hospital executives predicted the strategic 
action and performance of their organizations three years later. 
 Relationship between strategic decision-making and cognitive maps (C→B). While the 
previous category of research can be summarized as ‘cognitive map use’, there has also 
been significant work done on ‘cognitive map development’ (Walsh, 1995). In this area 
the emphasis is on the feedback loop from strategic decision-making (and organizational 
action and performance, see figure 1.1) to the executives’ cognitive map. In other words, 
how do executives learn and adjust their cognitive maps over time? Again, most of the 
research is case based. An interesting example is a study by Barr et al. (1992) that 
outlines how the cognitive maps of executives at two railroad companies developed over 
a 25-year period, based on experience and active experimentation. Another example is an 
investigation by Isabella (1990) into the learning process by executives of a financial 
services firm, who changed their cognitive maps in response to major organizational 
events, such as an acquisition and a restructuring.   
 Relationship between individual attributes and cognitive maps (A→B). The fourth 
category of research is also interested in where cognitive maps come from, yet is not 
concerned with learning as determinant, but rather with executives’ personal and 
                                                     
2  In cultural anthropology emic (or idiographic) research focuses on a deep understanding of the 
unique characteristics of a particular culture (Hofstede, 1980; Trice and Beyer, 1993). This type of 
research takes a holistic view of the culture being studied and paints a rich picture of the 
idiosyncrasies encountered. The basic assumption is that cultures can only be understood as 
wholes (Gestalten), not in pieces. The research methodology favored for an emic approach is case 
work. Etic (or nomothetic) cultural research, on the other hand, searches to identify marked 
similarities and differences across cultures on the basis of a limited number of basic characteristics 
or dimensions. The intention is to uncover general classifications or laws (Gesetze).  
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functional traits. This research attempts to link the individual attributes of executives – 
such as age, gender, nationality, education, functional background and work experience – 
to the content of their cognitive maps. This type of research is by nature etic, requiring 
large-scale sampling. While there has been some general (non-strategic) research in this 
area, few studies have linked individual attributes to strategic beliefs. An interesting 
example is Tyler and Steensma (1998), who found a relationship between top executives’ 
technical education and their views on potential technological alliances. In this study they 
also found an experiential effect on executives’ cognitive maps, as past organizational 
success at technological alliances was linked to a positive view of their potential. Another 
example is a study by Hitt et al. (1997), which contrasts the strategic orientations of 
Korean and American executives, and finds nationality to be an important influence on 
the executives’ cognitive maps. Similarly, Markóczy (1995) compares some strategic 
beliefs of Hungarian and American executives, finding nationality to be an influence on 
long-term versus short-term profitability horizons.  
Actually, there is also a fifth category of research in this area, linking individual attributes to 
strategic decision-making behavior (A→C). In this work it is usually recognized that 
individual attributes do not directly influence behavior – individual attributes are related to 
executives’ cognitive maps, which in turn influence decision-making behavior. However, it is 
assumed that easily observable individual attributes are systematically related to difficultly 
measurable cognitive maps, so that factors such as age, gender, nationality, education, 
functional background and work experience can be used as proxy measures of executives’ 
beliefs. This approach has been particularly popular among top management team researchers 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), who have a strong interest in 
the demographic composition of top management teams and the relationship between team 
diversity and strategic decision-making. These researchers have found correlations between 
individual attributes and/or top management team composition on one side, and strategic 
action (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Grimm and Smith, 1991; 
Hambrick et al., 1996; Michel and Hambrick, 1992) and organizational performance (Keck, 
1991; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; O’Reilly and Flatt, 1989; Smith et al., 1994). However, 
the value of this research must be questioned, as it does little to explain how top management 
team attributes have an impact on organizational action and performance, but only that there 
is some indirect correlation. An example of a more promising avenue of research in this 
context is the recent paper by Knight et al. (1999), that links top management team diversity 
to group decision-making processes and then to the development of shared top management 
team cognitive maps (in terms of the above coding, A→C→B).  
 What this broad scan of the managerial cognition literature within the field of 
strategic management makes clear is that the operationalization of the cognitive map 
construct is particularly challenging. It is one thing to acknowledge that executives hold 
strategically relevant beliefs that shape their perceptions and predispose them to a particular 
course of action, but it is quite another to actually capture these mental models empirically. 
Most researchers have dealt with this issue by taking a case approach, in which they were 
able to qualitatively describe executives’ worldviews in all their richness and complexity. 
Some researchers working with a larger sample of executives have focused on measuring a 
small subset of beliefs, specific to a certain strategic issue, while ignoring the executives’ 
overall cognitive maps. Others yet have avoided measuring executives’ cognitive maps 
altogether, opting to use individual and group attributes as proxy measures. What is lacking is 
a means of measuring key strategy beliefs across all groups of executives. There is a strong 
need for a mapping instrument that could identify the most important strategic assumptions in 
executives’ cognitive maps and could be used across all organizations, industries and nations. 
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As Porac and Thomas (2002) state in their contribution to the Handbook of Strategy and 
Management: “It is very clear that we need to identify mapping methods with a less 
qualitative researcher-driven orientation and with a design which can prove to be applicable 
and reliable across a range of cognitive studies.” Such a universal strategy perspective 
measurement method would need to quantify executives’ strategy beliefs along a limited 
number of dimensions, to make individual and cross-group comparisons simple.  
 It was probably such a mapping method that Hitt et al. (1997: 165) had in mind when 
they called for “a Hofstede-like study on strategic orientations of executives in North 
America, South America, Asia, Western Europe, and Eastern bloc countries”. However, 
while they would like to see a cross-cultural measurement of strategy perspectives, this 
research project is directed at a more universal strategy perspective measurement instrument, 
that could be used across a variety of groups. It has been the ambition of this research project 
to develop a means for uncovering the ‘strategy ideology’ held by individual executives, top 
management teams, organizations, industries and even nations, allowing researchers to 
compare and contrast their beliefs. The belief on which this project is based is that such a 
measurement tool will greatly facilitate further research into the aforementioned areas. 
 
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
One of the key difficulties in measuring executives’ cognitive maps is the sheer complexity 
of these knowledge structures. Probably the most detailed methodology for mapping 
executives’ mental models is that employed by Eden (1988, 1992). This mapping technique 
allows the researcher to draw causal lines between variables in a two dimensional space as a 
reflection of the beliefs held by an individual or a group. Such an exercise, even when 
directed at one specific strategic issue, can produce a map with dozens of variables and 
hundreds of relationships. Any attempt to capture an individual’s entire cognitive map would 
be a mission impossible, as researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and expert 
systems have found out in the past. 
 The ambition to identify the strategic beliefs of executives across a variety of settings 
can therefore easily lead to an empirical nightmare. It must be accepted that it is not practical 
to measure and compare executives’ cognitive maps in a fine-grained manner. It is imperative 
to find a limited number of measures that capture the executives’ key strategic assumptions. 
Only a method based on a small set of measurement dimensions will be practical in the field.  
However, this limitation is not only practical. Focusing on the key underlying 
assumptions influencing executives’ approach to strategic issues also encourages the identifi-
cation of the fundamental differences between executives’ worldviews. While individuals 
may have divergent opinions on many different details in many different circumstances, it is 
often much more enlightening to acknowledge on which principles they disagree. In other 
words, it is valuable to know on which basic ‘laws of strategy’ executives agree and where 
they adhere to a different set of principles. In this way we can avoid getting caught up in the 
rich details of executives’ strategic views and get a sharper picture of their more overarching 
strategic beliefs.   
Where executives use general mental principles or rules to understand and respond to 
the strategic challenges they encounter, it can be said they have a ‘strategy theory-in-use’ 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978). For each distinct type of strategic issue, experienced executives 
will have a strategy theory that will help them to comprehend the situation and take 
appropriate action. Here, such an issue-specific mental strategy theory will be referred to as a 
strategy perspective. Stated differently, a strategy perspective is a way of looking at, and 
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making sense of, a particular strategic issue. A strategic issue is an aspect of a general 
strategy problem facing executives.  
Hence, each executive’s cognitive map holds a number of strategy perspectives, 
which offer a template for approaching strategic issues. This leads to the following definition 
of the research question: 
 
How can the similarities and differences in the key strategy perspectives held by 
business executives be made measurable?  
 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
This research project was undertaken with three complementary constituencies in mind, 
namely the scientific community, the business community and the public policy community. 
Finding an answer to the stated research question should serve the interests of all three 
stakeholder groups. In the following sections the relevance of this research for each group 
will be discussed in further detail. 
 
1.4.1 Scientific Relevance 
As outlined above, this research project takes an etic approach to the study of strategy beliefs, 
searching for a number of key dimensions along which important differences in strategy 
perspectives can be measured. As such, this research moves beyond the still dominant emic 
tradition within managerial cognition research, which is focused on a fine-grained 
understanding of strategy beliefs within specific groups. The advantage of such a rough-
grained etic approach is that the highly complex strategy belief structures of executives can 
be reduced to a limited set of measurable variables, making comparisons between individuals 
and groups much easier.  
 Having an instrument to map ‘strategy theories-in-use’ on a few key measures should 
contribute to our understanding of strategic thinking and strategic behavior in three related 
ways (see figure 1.1 for the coding employed):    
 
 Identifying cognitive similarities and differences (B). First and foremost, having a 
general-purpose strategy perspective measurement tool should facilitate comparisons 
between individuals, units, organizations, industries and countries, revealing similarities 
and differences between these groups. At the level of individuals, the measurement 
dimensions should uncover different ‘strategist profiles’, making clear what level of 
cognitive heterogeneity exists within a group of executives. It might be that various 
‘clusters’ of like-minded strategic thinkers can be identified within an organization, with 
large ‘ideological’ differences separating them. Alternatively, it could become clear that a 
high level of cognitive homogeneity exists within the executive team. Similarly, at the 
level of units, such as departments, business units, regions or hierarchical levels, strategy 
perspective mapping could be used to reveal differing group strategy perspectives. At the 
level of companies, the ‘dominant strategic logic’ (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) in one 
company might be quite distinct compared to the ‘strategy style’ (Goold and Campbell, 
1986) of other firms. The same could also be true at the level of industries, where 
strategic beliefs prevalent in one industry might be different than in other industries. 
Finally, at the level of countries, the measurement tool might reveal different strategy 
perspectives being more dominant in some nations than in others.     
27
Chapter 1: The Research Project 
11 
 Providing independent variable for strategic decision-making research (B→C). At all of 
the abovementioned levels, gaining insight into the heterogeneity of the population and 
being able to segment the group into a number of ‘cognitive communities’ (Porac et al., 
1985) is valuable in itself. Yet, when considering strategy beliefs as an influencing 
variable in strategic decision-making models, having a quantifiable measure is essential. 
Some researchers have developed some situation-specific measures to capture strategy 
beliefs (see section 1.2), but few of these can be generalized for use in different research 
settings. The unattractive alternative that is all too often employed is to use personal 
attributes as proxy measures for strategy beliefs or to ignore strategy beliefs all together, 
treating executives as a homogeneous group of rational decision-makers. The strategy 
perspective measurement tool should provide a useful method for integrating strategy 
beliefs into strategic decision-making models.  
 Detailing dependent variable for strategy perspective research (A→B; C→B). Research 
into the factors influencing the development of executives’ strategy perspectives should 
also benefit from the identification of key measurement dimensions. Being able to 
quantify strategy perspectives (the dependent variable) makes an analysis of the variables 
shaping them much easier. This should facilitate research into the personal attributes that 
influence the development of specific strategy beliefs (A→B), as well as the influence of 
strategic decision-making, organizational action and performance on changes in the 
strategy theories-in-use (C→B).  
 
1.4.2 Managerial Relevance 
The second core constituency of this research project is the business community. From the 
outset, it has been the intention to pursue an avenue of research with direct relevance to both 
executives and consultants – and to report the results in a book readable to the educated 
businessperson.  
 What most businesspeople know from experience is that in strategic decision-making 
processes the ‘facts’ do not speak for themselves. Interpretation and judgment are essential, 
making discussions between executives (and potentially their consultants) a necessary means 
for forming a robust view on a specific strategic issue. Consequently, executives spend a 
significant amount of time exchanging analyses, assumptions, insights and ideas, to build a 
picture of the situation at hand. Throughout this process they must deal with the subjectivity 
of their own ‘interpretive filter’, as well as with the cognitive biases inherent in their 
counterparts’ belief system. Having a means for efficiently uncovering one’s own strategy 
perspectives, as well as mapping the strategy perspectives of the relevant others, is therefore 
valuable to both executives and consultants. Although a strategy perspective measurement 
instrument does not give a rich representation of a person’s strategy theories-in-use, it should 
provide a first general insight into the person’s strategic worldview. 
 Understanding the cognitive heterogeneity of a group can be useful to recognize and 
deal with two common types of problems in strategic decision-making: 
 
 Dysfunctional conflict within a group. Conflict within organizations can have many 
sources, one being significant differences in strategy perspectives. Where various 
stakeholders in a decision-making process hold widely divergent strategy beliefs, the 
potential for conflict and polarization is large. Identifying where individuals, departments, 
businesses, regions, or management levels have contradictory strategy theories-in-use can 
be a first step to resolving differences of opinion within the group (Parker-Follett, 1924; 
Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000).  
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 Stifling consensus within a group. The opposite of ‘paralyzing diversity’ is ‘ossifying 
uniformity’. Where all key decision-makers within an organization share the same 
strategy perspectives, chances are larger that they will fall prey to systematic bias – in its 
extreme form referred to as groupthink (Janis, 1989). Such a lack of cognitive 
heterogeneity can also lead to a narrower set of strategic options and less strategic 
innovations. Identifying the company’s dominant strategic logic can be a first step to 
bringing in other strategic views, to challenge the existing orthodoxy within the group 
(Astley & Van der Ven, 1983; Johnson, 1988).   
More in general, having an instrument to map strategy perspectives should help executives 
and consultants to structure the strategic decision-making situation in a more favorable way. 
Two design variables are of particular importance: 
 
 Process design. Having knowledge of the diversity of strategy perspectives within the 
group can be used to engineer a fruitful strategy dialogue between the participants. The 
level of cognitive heterogeneity will determine where conflicts can be expected and 
‘bridging’ activities will be needed, or alternatively, where alternative perspectives could 
add value to the process.  
 Group design. It can also be productive to establish whether a group is too heterogeneous 
or homogeneous to function properly, and adjust the mix of participants accordingly. This 
might lead to unexpected insiders being brought into the process, or a clearly defined role 
for external consultants.  
Of course, this type of strategy process and group design can also be applied to strategic 
decision-making involving two or more companies. Knowing the level of ‘strategy culture 
fit’ with a potential partner organization (or acquisition candidate) could be used to design 
joint strategy decision-making processes and determine group composition. 
 
1.4.3 Societal Relevance 
The third constituency that this research project is intended to serve is the public policy 
community. Given the central role of business organizations in our society, a large part of 
public policy is directed at influencing the behavior of decision-makers within companies. 
Government bodies and agencies try to regulate, stimulate, entice or coerce executives to 
exhibit behavior in line with the political objectives of the current administration. All of this 
influencing activity is based on assumptions about the way companies determine their 
behavior. In particular, public policy makers have preconceptions about the manner by which 
executives develop their strategies. Yet, without the ability to recognize the diversity of 
strategy perspectives within the business community, it is very tempting to treat executives 
and companies as homogeneous groups of rational decision-makers and to develop public 
policy accordingly.  
 To be able to design rules, regulations and programs that do have the intended impact 
on companies’ strategic behavior, public policy makers require a detailed understanding of 
how executives actually engage in strategic decision-making, and where opportunities for 
influencing are strongest. It must be recognized that companies with different strategic beliefs 
will respond differently to influencing activities and that policy initiatives should be designed 
to accommodate this diversity. 
 The strategy perspective measurement instrument is too general in nature to help in 
the design of specific public policy initiatives – for such purposes it is necessary to measure 
the issue-specific beliefs held by executives. Still, the strategy perspective measurement 
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instrument should serve the broader purpose of sensitizing public policy makers to the variety 
of worldviews common within the business community. And as a first way of segmenting 
companies into cognitive communities, this tool should provide some overarching 
distinctions useful for understanding the diversity of strategic behaviors that public policy-
makers witness. 
 
 
1.5 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
Understanding the differences in strategy views of executives has been a research theme that 
I have pursued, together with my colleague Bob de Wit, for approximately the last ten years. 
This work has resulted in a number of books and articles, the most recent of which (Strategy 
Synthesis, 1999, 2005) has formed the springboard for this research project. Much of the 
conceptual framework to be discussed in chapters 3 through 12 was developed together with 
Bob de Wit in Strategy Synthesis and has been liberally used to provide building blocks for 
this book. It has not been my intention to recycle ‘old material’, but rather to extend a 
promising conceptual framework into an empirically useful measurement tool, which does 
require the revisiting of a number of elements already discussed in our previous work. 
However, I am confident that readers already familiar with Strategy Synthesis will still 
appreciate the reacquaintance with these concepts and arguments.3 
 The approach taken in this research project has been to take the ten dimensions, along 
which strategy perspectives can differ, as identified in Strategy Synthesis, and to expand them 
into a full-fledged conceptual framework suitable for operationalization. This conceptual 
framework, based on an extensive study of the strategic management literature, was 
subsequently used to construct a first questionnaire-type strategy perspective measurement 
instrument. After testing and refinement, a final version of the measurement instrument was 
derived.   
 In the general design of this research project two important choices have been made 
that determine both the benefits and the limitations of the final results. The chosen research 
approach is: 
 
 Etic vs. emic. As described earlier, in cultural anthropology etic research is directed at 
making comparisons across a large number of individuals or groups on a limited number 
of dimensions, to identify similarities and differences in the beliefs, norms and values 
held within the total population. The objective is to derive classification schemes 
(typologies) or to establish general causal relationships between a number of variables 
within the population (models). As such research usually involves studying large 
populations, quantitative methods are the tools of preference. The benefit of etic research 
is that it reduces the complexity of reality, allowing for underlying structures to be 
recognized in the form of typologies and models. General ‘laws’ can be uncovered that 
‘govern’ the functioning of the subject under study. Emic research, on the other hand, is 
not interested in generalizations about populations, but in rich understandings of separate 
entities. By focusing on a limited number of individuals or groups, they can be studied on 
a large number of dimensions, in all their complexity. As the objective is to discover the 
full interplay of multiple variables, such single or multiple case research usually leans 
heavily on qualitative methods. The benefit of emic research is the opposite of etic 
                                                     
3 As not to exhaust the reader with constant self-references, chapters 3-12 will not explicitly refer to 
my previous work with De Wit. In general, the overall conceptual framework as outlined in table 
2.4 has been taken from Strategy Synthesis (1999, 2005).   
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research – by not reducing complexity, but rather by recognizing it, a much more detailed 
picture of reality emerges, allowing for the understanding of complicated dynamics 
within the subject under study. While it is a recurrent theme, both in the field of cultural 
studies, as in strategic management, to debate which research approach is more valuable, 
it seems clear that the two approaches offer complementary insights and therefore should 
both be supported (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Lee, 1999). In this research 
project, however, a clear choice has been made for an etic approach, precisely because so 
much of the research so far has been emic in nature and a general framework for 
measuring and classifying strategy perspectives is absent. The inherent limitation in this 
choice is that whichever dimensions are used to map strategy perspectives, they will 
never offer a rich representation of the actual strategy beliefs held by any individual – as a 
Myers-Biggs score does not give a detailed understanding of a person’s true personality 
or a Hofstede score does not bring detailed insight into the intricacies of a nation’s 
culture.     
 Deductive vs. inductive. A second important choice characterizing the research project is 
that a deductive, or theory-driven, approach has been employed. To arrive at the 
dimensions along which the strategy perspectives could be measured, the strategic 
management literature was used to construct a conceptual framework. On the basis of this 
framework the measurement tool was conceived. The benefit of this deductive approach 
is that the researcher can be more goal-oriented, knowing what to ask and why. As the 
researcher knows what (s)he is looking for, questions can be sharply formulated and 
comprehensive. An inductive approach, on the other hand, would have started in the field, 
detailing the actual strategic beliefs of a small sample group.  Using the strategy beliefs 
unearthed, a conceptual framework could be constructed that could be tested on a larger 
scale. The benefit of such an inductive, empirically-driven, approach is that the researcher 
is less blinded by what (s)he wants to see, letting ‘the data speak for themselves’. As the 
researcher has fewer preconceptions about what to find, chances are smaller that a 
framework will be imposed upon reality, while the chances of a framework emerging 
from the data will be greater. Yet, while recognizing the advantages of strongly inductive 
approaches such as grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), in this research project a 
largely deductive approach will be employed. The reason is that the emphasis here is not 
on the exploration of new phenomena, but on the testing of assumptions brought forward 
in previous research. The inherent limitation of this choice is that the key measurement 
dimensions derived from the literature may not coincide with the empirical practice, 
either by misrepresenting or ignoring important dimensions.        
 
1.6 THE RESEARCH REPORT 
 
The research process just described has resulted in this book, which consists of 16 chapters, 
divided into three main parts (see figure 1.2):  
 
I. Recognizing Different Views: Studying Strategy Perspectives. After chapter 1, this part of 
the book continues to set the stage for the research project. The next step is set in chapter 
2, where the key concepts employed are defined. Subsequently, a typology of strategy 
perspectives is presented that forms the main structure of the measurement instrument. 
II. Exploring Different Views: Identifying Strategy Perspectives. In part II the ten dimensions 
of the strategy perspective typology are worked out into more detail, each in a separate 
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chapter. Each chapter is concluded with a structured overview of how that dimension can 
be operationalized in a measurement instrument. 
III. Capturing Different Views: Measuring Strategy Perspectives. In part III the construction 
of the measurement tool is explained and it is evaluated on the basis of reliability and 
validity. Furthermore, some exploratory research is conducted in to the factors that might 
have an influence on the strategy perspective of executives. This part is concluded with a 
review of the results and an analysis of promising research directions.    
 
FIGURE 1.2 
Structure of the book 
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As it is the stated ambition of this book to appeal to academics, business people and public 
policy makers, an attempt has been made to establish a presentation style devoid of overly 
cumbersome scientific jargon and formulations, while doing justice to useful scientific 
terminology and conventions. It is up to the reader to determine whether this intention to be 
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relevant to multiple audiences has been successful, or whether this book is ‘stuck in the 
middle’.  
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Chapter 2 
 
STRATEGY PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The intention of this research study is to develop a means for measuring the strategy 
perspectives of executives. In the previous chapter a number of working definitions were 
introduced to clarify key concepts. A perspective was defined as a way of looking and a 
strategy perspective as a way of looking at a strategic issue. A strategic issue was defined as 
an aspect of the general strategy problem facing executives. These definitions are rather 
broad and require further refinement before they can be used for designing a measurement 
instrument. Therefore, this chapter will start (section 2.2) with a clarification of the concepts 
of strategic problem, strategic issue and strategy perspective. 
 The objective of this chapter is to arrive at a typology of strategy perspectives that can 
form the basic structure of the measurement instrument. To achieve this goal, the first step 
will be to determine the principles on which a typology of strategy perspectives should be 
based (section 2.3.). The second step will be to disaggregate the concept of a strategy 
problem into a logically consistent category system of ten strategic issues. This typology of 
strategic issues will be presented in section 2.4. The third and last step will be to use the 
identified strategic issues to define twenty archetypical strategy perspectives that can be used 
for developing the measurement instrument (section 2.5).   
 
 
2.2 DEFINING STRATEGIC ISSUE AND STRATEGY PERSPECTIVE 
 
At the basis of this research study are two key concepts – strategic issue and strategy 
perspective. This section starts by defining the two concepts separately, after which they be 
linked to one another in an integrative framework. 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Strategic Issue 
According to Ackoff (1980) the first challenge for executives who are intent on determining a 
strategic course of action is to define the mess in which the organization finds itself. A mess 
is a complex and confusing situation, which at the surface seems disorderly. For the executive 
to be able to formulate a strategy for the organization, it is necessary to unravel the various 
aspects of the mess and to find the underlying structure. To achieve this, executives must 
analytically disentangle the different strands of a messy situation, identify the key issues at 
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the heart of the matter, and understand how the key issues are related to one another. 
Ackoff’s conclusion is that defining a mess requires both analysis, to see the parts, and 
synthesis to recognize relationships between the parts.  
Similarly, Mason and Mitroff (1981) speak of the need to understand the wicked 
problems faced by executives. Reaching back to Rittel and Webber (1973) they argue that 
strategy making rarely focuses on tame problems – clear, common problems with a limited 
set of measurable solutions. More often executives must deal with outright wicked problems, 
that are essentially unique, difficult to define, have no exhaustive list of possible solutions 
and are never definitely solved. In line with Ackoff’s reasoning, Mason and Mitroff argue 
that solving wicked problems requires both disaggregating the whole into its component 
parts, as well as integrating the various elements into a holistic understanding.  
What Ackoff calls a mess, and Mason and Mitroff call a wicked problem, shall here 
be referred to as a strategic problem. Stated in terms of a formal definition:  
 
A strategic problem is a complex, multi-facetted real-life situation confronting an 
organization that requires resolution if the organizational objectives are to be met.  
 
This definition emphasizes four important characteristics of strategic problems: 
 
 ‘Complex, multi-facetted’. Strategic problems are bundles of interlaced issues, linked 
together in complicated ways. 
 ‘Real-life situations’. Strategic problems are not theoretical constructs (e.g. a transaction 
cost economics problems or a dynamic capabilities problems), but actual challenges 
encountered by an organization. 
 ‘Confronting an organization’. Strategic problems are not limited to individuals or 
departments, but concern the entire organization. 
 ‘Requires resolution if the organizational objectives are to be met’. Whether a situation is 
a strategic problem depends on the goals the organization is striving to achieve. 
 
Both Mason and Mitroff, and Ackoff, argue that due to the complex, multi-facetted nature of 
strategic problems, they cannot be effectively addressed without dissection into a number of 
more manageable sub-problems. In other words, to be made understandable and solvable, 
strategic problems must be broken down into a number of component parts, which shall be 
referred to as strategic issues. Stated in terms of a formal definition: 
 
A strategic issue is an analytically distinct sub-system of a strategic problem, 
pertaining to a specific topic.  
 
A strategic issue is in itself decomposable into component questions and sub-questions 
(Kramer and De Smit, 1985). Viewed in this way, a strategic issue is a highly inter-connected 
cluster of strategic questions, which must be answered in a closely coordinated way. While in 
a strategic problem all questions are interwoven, some clusters of questions are more closely 
linked together than to other questions (see figure 2.1).  
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FIGURE 2.1  
Strategic problems, strategic issues and strategic questions 
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2.2.2 The Concept of Strategy Perspective 
Simply put, a perspective is a way of looking. Taking a particular perspective means viewing 
an object, topic or event from a certain angle. By extension, a strategy perspective can be 
defined as a way of looking at a strategic issue. A strategy perspective is a point of view on 
how a specific strategic issue can be understood and dealt with. 
To further clarify the concept of strategy perspective, it is best to first explore the 
closely related notions of ideology and paradigm. Both ideology and paradigm refer to a 
general set of ideas that help people to make their world comprehensible and meaningful, 
while providing direction for their actions. The term ideology is particularly well known in 
the field of political science, where it is used to describe such broad ‘idea systems’ as 
liberalism, socialism and communism, as well as more local variations such as Gaullism, 
Zionism and Apartheid. In cultural anthropology, the concept of ideology is also common, 
referring to the web of socially constructed meanings and preferences at the heart of a culture 
(Trice and Beyer, 1993). From these roots the term has found its way into the strategic 
management literature (e.g. Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1993; Wartick and Wood, 1999), 
although the negative connotation of ideology as ‘fanatical political beliefs’ has probably 
limited the term’s more wide spread adoption, in favor of the term paradigm.  
Introduced by science historian Kuhn (1970), paradigm was originally employed to 
describe a scientific ideology – “a constellation of concepts, values, perceptions and 
practices” shared by a community of scholars. Since then, the term has spread to other areas, 
including strategic management (e.g. Porter, 1990; Prahalad and Hamel, 1994). Besides 
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ideology and paradigm, sometimes the German term Weltanschauung – literally, worldview – 
is used to communicate the same meaning. Whichever term is adopted, the intention is to 
describe an overarching system of ideas for understanding and dealing with the world. 
Trice and Beyer (1993; 33) give an insightful definition of ideologies as “shared, 
interrelated sets of beliefs about how things work; values that indicate what’s worth having or 
doing; and norms that tell people how they should behave”. What this definition makes clear 
is that an ideology or paradigm can be subdivided into three strongly related elements: 
 
 Beliefs. To be able to make sense out of the barrage of stimuli reaching the brain, humans 
construct cognitive maps that explain how the world works. These cognitive maps are 
mental representations of how phenomena in the environment are linked through cause 
and effect relationships. As ‘mental models of reality’, they are the beliefs that offer 
understanding about things and events – a type of implicit theory about the functioning of 
the world around us. In the management literature the set of beliefs central to a person’s 
worldview is variably known as cognitive map (McCaskey, 1982; Weick & Bougnon, 
1986), mental model (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 1992; Knight et al., 1999; Mintzberg, 
1973), knowledge structure (Lyles and Schwenk; Walsh, 1995), construed reality 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), cognitive schemata (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Ireland et 
al., 1987; Sims and Gioia, 1986) and belief system (e.g. Noorderhaven, 1995; Smircich 
and Stubbart, 1985). 
 Values. While a belief system is a template for explaining and interpreting events, values 
determine the meaning of events for individuals or groups. Values determine what is seen 
as important (Hofstede, 1980; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). A value is a 
deeply held preference, determining what is viewed as good, just or beautiful. As such, 
the values that a person holds will influence what is seen and how it is interpreted. Values 
direct attention and determine which developments are seen as a priority, while others are 
viewed as insignificant. Values also act as the principles for ordering consequences and 
alternatives according to their desirability (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
 Norms. A paradigm not only provides descriptively oriented schemata for comprehending 
reality, but also prescriptively oriented sets of norms for responding to events. These 
norms outline the type of behavior that is seen as appropriate and/or acceptable under 
particular circumstances. Norms can be broadly formulated rules and regulations 
delimiting legitimate behavior, but can also be behavioral templates prescribing the best 
way to deal with certain problems.   
While a useful analytical distinction, in practice beliefs, values and norms are blended 
together into a holistic way of perceiving and responding to the world. In a paradigm, beliefs, 
values and norms support each other to uphold a consistent logic for dealing with reality. 
  In the context of this research project, a number of important characteristics of 
paradigms need to be reviewed, before the step can be made of relating the concept of 
paradigm to that of strategy perspective. It must be noted that paradigms have the following 
characteristics: 
 
 Directive. People’s set of beliefs, values and norms shapes both their understanding and 
their behavior. The process by which people’s worldview colors what they see can be 
referred to as perceptual filtering or screening (England, 1967; Starbuck and Milliken, 
1988). A perceptual filter influences both what is noticed and how it should be 
understood. The process by which people’s worldview directs their actions can be 
referred to as behavior channeling. Potential responses can be drawn from an existing 
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repertoire (also referred to as scripts or recipes) or new responses can be generated that fit 
within normative boundaries. 
 Socially constructed. People’s view of reality is not developed in relative isolation, but 
quite oppositely, in interaction with one another (McCaskey, 1982; Smircich and 
Stubbart, 1985). People tend to construct a shared understanding of the world by 
interacting with each other within a group over an extended period of time. By 
exchanging interpretations of what they see, they enact a shared reality (Daft & Weick, 
1984; Walsh, 1995). When new members join a group they undergo a process of 
socialization, in which the collective beliefs, values and norms are passed on. To cultural 
anthropologists this is the very essence of culture – “culture represents the system of 
socially constructed meanings and preferences a group develops as it collectively 
negotiates environmental forces and the complexities of internal integration” 
(Geletkanycz, 1997).   
 Overlapping. As individuals can belong to different groups, they can be influenced by 
different paradigms simultaneously. As members of a national culture, their worldview 
will to a certain extent be influenced by the beliefs, values and norms dominant within the 
nation. As employees of a company, their worldview will also be affected by the beliefs, 
values and norms common within the firm and the industry. In the same manner, people 
can be impacted by the professional community to which they belong, their religious 
affiliation, their political party and any other groups in which they interact with others 
(Hambrick et al., 1993; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998). Due to the mutually inclusive nature 
of group membership, an individual’s beliefs, values and norms will be a complex 
combination of elements taken from different group-level paradigms. While the 
paradigms on which an individual draws can be complementary, or overlapping yet 
consistent, it is quite possible that inconsistencies arise (Schein, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 
1993).   
 Largely tacit. As paradigms develop over time through interaction and are passed on 
through socialization, they remain largely tacit. Generally, people are unaware of the 
assumptions at the basis of their thinking. The beliefs, values and norms of a group are 
literally ‘common sense’ – sensible to a common group of people. Most of the learning 
done in a group is not explicit, but implicit (Nonaka, 1991; Schwenk, 1984). However, 
where members of different groups come into conflict with one another, or where an 
individual needs to deal with the inconsistencies brought on by multiple group 
memberships, paradigms can become more articulated. Different behaviors, based on 
different paradigms, will often lead to the identification and codification of beliefs, values 
and norms, either to protect them or to engage in debate with people with other views. As 
paradigms become more articulated, they also become more mobile, making it possible to 
transfer ideas to people without direct interaction.  
 Stable over time. While people have the impression that they are constantly learning, they 
are largely learning within the bounds of a paradigm. Once a coherent frame of reference 
is in place with which to interpret the world, it is extremely difficult to displace. This 
stability over time is due to a number of factors. First, as a paradigm is largely tacit, it is 
difficult to challenge. It is like a pair of glasses – looking through them shapes your 
perceptions, but you cannot see that you have them on. Second, where signals that 
contradict the paradigm are received, the mind generally resists them. This cognitive 
rigidity is due to humans’ need to keep a grip on reality (Schwenk, 1984). Allowing one’s 
beliefs, values and norms to be challenged on a continual basis would be exhausting and 
disorienting. As McCaskey (1982) puts it, the mind “strives mightily to bring order, 
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simplicity, consistency, and stability to the world it encounters,” and is therefore reluctant 
to welcome the ambiguity presented by contradicting data. Third, as a paradigm is 
socially constructed, individuals have great difficulties in developing ideas that sharply 
differ from the group. Not only do they have no ‘intellectual sounding board’ for teasing 
out new ideas, but their deviation might also have adverse social and political 
ramifications within the group (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). Taken together, these 
arguments make clear why the old proverb is: ‘old ideas never change; they eventually 
die out’ (Kuhn, 1970). 
As an individual’s beliefs, values and norms will be a mix of elements taken from various 
groups, it is important to make the ‘level of analysis’ distinction clear in the terminology as 
well. While the literature offers the distinction between individual and team mental models 
(Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994) and individual and collective cognitive maps (Axelrod, 
1976), these terms have a focus on beliefs, while leaving out values and norms. Therefore, I 
opt to refer to the group level beliefs, values and norms as paradigms, while referring to an 
individual’s overall beliefs, values and norms as worldview (see figure 2.2). 
 
FIGURE 2.2  
Paradigms and Worldview  
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In practice, paradigms, like theories, come in many shapes and sizes – some closely 
related to the group in which they were developed, while others, such as political ideologies 
and management philosophies, have spread beyond an interacting group. Some paradigms 
have a restricted area of application, while others shape views on a wide variety of topics. All 
have in common that they offer an overarching logic for interpreting events and a framework 
for action. 
While the concept of paradigm is easily ‘captured’ in words, identifying actual 
paradigms ‘in the wild’ is a totally different matter. As paradigms are largely implicit and 
socially constructed, researching paradigms is wrought with methodological difficulties, 
which has bedeviled scientists for decades (Walsh, 1995). Some of these methodological 
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questions will be revisited in chapter 13, but here it is sufficient to note that paradigms are 
hard to nail down in practice. 
When it comes to strategic problems, as defined in section 2.2.1, there are many 
paradigms that suggest how they should be understood and reacted to. However, it is not the 
intention of this research project to study broad ranging strategic problems and equally broad 
ranging paradigms. The focus of this study is to see whether there is a variety of views on 
how to understand and react to more specific strategic issues. Such a view on how to 
comprehend and deal with a particular strategic issue, I refer to as a strategy perspective.  
According to this definition, a strategy perspective is much narrower than a paradigm. 
While a paradigm gives an overarching view on dealing with strategic problems, a strategy 
perspective is a point of view, focused on dealing with one strategic issue. Both are idea 
systems, but a strategy perspective has a more limited scope, confined to understanding and 
responding to a particular cluster of strategic questions. In other words, a strategy perspective 
can be characterized as a ‘mini-paradigm’ or, better yet, as a ‘strategic issue specific set of 
beliefs, values and norms’. Stated in terms of a formal definition: 
 
A strategy perspective is a coherent set of beliefs, values and norms, offering 
an internally consistent view for explaining and reacting to all aspects of a 
specific strategic issue.  
 
While a strategy perspective is narrower than a paradigm, it is broader than a single strategy 
idea – it is a system of ideas. A strategy idea provides understanding and insight into an 
individual strategic question or sub-question, but a strategy perspective offers a logic that 
transcends the individual strategic question. A strategy perspective offers a frame of 
reference for comprehending and responding to a cluster of related strategy questions – it is 
an internally-consistent view for explaining and reacting to all aspects of a specific strategic 
issue. This ‘hierarchical’ relationship between paradigm, perspective and idea is illustrated in 
figure 2.3. As can be seen in this figure, both strategic issue and strategy perspective are 
‘mid-range’ concepts, neither at the highest or the lowest levels of aggregation.  
 As executives need to respond to many different strategy issues, they will have an 
equally large number of strategy perspectives as part of their worldview. It is my assumption 
that these strategy perspectives will share many of the characteristics of paradigms – they will 
steer perceptions and channel behavior, will be socially constructed and largely implicit, and 
will be fairly stable over time. As suggested in chapter one, knowing people’s strategy 
perspectives will make it easier to predict the direction of the strategic choices they will 
make, while simultaneously making it easier to challenge their strategic choices, by 
questioning the very beliefs, values and norms on which their preferences rest. 
The concept of strategy perspective as advanced here has not yet been developed 
within the strategic management literature, although there have been initial steps towards this 
goal. Much of the work done in the area of ‘the strategist’s view’ so far has studied firm or 
top management team paradigms in general (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986). However, recently there have been a number of publications dealing with the 
issue-specific logics employed by individual executives. For instance, Tyler and Steensma 
(1998) measure the cognitive orientations (i.e. strategy perspectives) used by executives 
when assessing technological alliances, while Hitt et al. (1997) report on the differences in 
Korean and U.S. executives’ strategic orientations (i.e. strategy perspectives) with regard to a 
number of key strategic questions. Unfortunately, none of these authors define their key 
concept to any depth.    
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FIGURE 2.3  
Positioning the Concept of Strategy Perspective  
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2.2.3 Unraveling Strategic Problems 
As it is the intention of this study to develop a means for mapping ‘the strategists’ view’, 
measures must be created to track executives’ strategy perspectives on key strategic issues. 
This means that it is necessary to take two steps. First, it is necessary to unravel strategic 
problems into their constituent parts – strategic issues. Second, for each strategic issue the 
variety of possible strategy perspectives should be identified. In other words, wicked strategic 
problems should be structured according to figure 2.4.  
 Because the measurement instrument envisioned should be universally applicable, the 
‘strategic problem’ to be unraveled into strategic issues cannot be specific, but must be 
generic. In the following sections a typology of strategic issues will be proposed as the 
general framework for the measurement instrument. Subsequently, a number of principles 
will be introduced, which will be used to identify the various strategy perspectives in the 
following ten chapters. An overview of the key strategy perspectives on each of the generic 
strategy issues will be given at the end of this chapter. This will be the strategy perspective 
typology on which the measurement instrument will be based.  
 
2.3 TOWARDS CREATING A TYPOLOGY 
 
Before designing a strategy perspective typology, it is important to acknowledge existing 
typologies in the field of strategic management and to assess whether they offer a basis for 
the task at hand. This evaluation of the typologies in the strategy literature will be given in 
section 2.3.1. Subsequently, in section 2.3.2 a number of typological principles will be 
identified to guide the categorization process further on in the chapter. 
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FIGURE 2.4 
Structure of Strategy Perspective Typology  
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2.3.1 Typological Antecedents 
As in any field of study, strategic management is awash with typologies. A typology is a 
framework for dividing phenomena into a logically consistent category system. Since in 
research there is always a grave danger of reinventing the wheel, it is important to review the 
most important typologies, to see whether they offer input for creating a strategy perspective 
typology.  
In table 2.1 a meta-typology is presented, based on the categories of the conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 1. In this meta-typology, a number of classic strategic 
management typologies are given as examples. It should be noted that most of the typologies 
current in the literature are of a contractive nature and therefore have not been included in 
this overview. A contractive typology is a categorization intended to isolate the specific 
phenomenon under review and to set it apart from others (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1996). This kind of typology is limited in scope and hence of limited use for this research 
project. A comprehensive typology, on the other hand, is more ambitious, offering a broad 
framework for distinguishing all phenomena in a certain area. For the comprehensive 
typology being devised here, such comprehensive typologies might be informative and 
therefore will be evaluated. Of particular interest are the two middle categories, strategic 
decision-making and strategic views, as we might expect to find useful leads for respectively 
a strategic issue typology and a strategy perspective typology.  
When looking at comprehensive typologies of strategic decision-making, the question 
is whether these typologies can be of use for the construction of the strategic issue typology 
at the base of the strategy perspectives measurement instrument. To answer this question, a 
further distinction must first be made between those typologies focusing on the steps or 
phases in the strategic decision-making process, and those dealing with the different issues or 
topics needing to be decided upon:  
 Strategic decision-making steps typologies. Typologies based on steps break the entire 
strategic decision-making process down into a number of less complex sequential phases 
(i.e. recognition, analysis, formulation and implementation). In each phase a number of 
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distinct activities are generally identified that need to be carried out by executives, before 
the desired organizational performance can be realized. These typologies are especially 
popular in ‘strategy manuals’ and strategy textbooks, as they structure complexity 
chronologically for executives, helping them to move ‘one step at a time’. However, 
while in wide spread use, these typologies are quite instrumental, focusing on the 
‘operational’ activities of the strategist, as opposed to the strategic issues that strategists 
must decide upon. Therefore, they do not offer a basis for the strategic issue typology 
being pursued here. 
 Strategic decision-making issues typologies. Typologies based on issues break strategic 
decision-making down into a number of less complex topics, by splitting strategic 
problems into a number of component parts. There have been just a few comprehensive 
strategic issue typologies proposed in the research literature (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Ketchen et al., 1996), although textbooks also occasionally present an 
implicit classification of strategic issues (e.g. Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991; Hill and Jones, 
2000). Obviously, these are exactly the typologies that will be of value when devising a 
comprehensive typology of strategic issues in section 2.4. 
 
TABLE 2.1 
A Typology of Strategic Management Typologies 
 
When looking at comprehensive typologies of strategic views as inputs for a typology of 
strategy perspectives, it can be noted that these can also be separated into two distinct 
categories – those focusing on the differing strategic views of executives and those dealing 
with the differing strategic views of researchers: 
 
 Strategy perspectives/paradigm typologies. To my knowledge there are no typologies of 
strategy perspectives covering two or more different strategic issues. However, recently 
there has been a strong interest in identifying different types of management paradigms 
(Bennis et al., 1994; Clarke and Clegg, 1998; Collins and Porras, 1996; Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994). Yet, most of these frameworks do not move beyond a distinction 
between the ‘old’ straw man and the ‘new’ utopia (e.g. Cannon, 1996; Hall, 1993; Hames, 
1994; Maynard and Mehrtens, 1996; Tapscott and Caston, 1993). While of general 
CATEGORY EXAMPLES 
Typologies of Strategy Contexts: 
 Internal contexts (organization) 
 External contexts (environment) 
 
Mintzberg, 1975; Miller, 1991  
Porter, 1980; Emery & Trist, 1965 
Typologies of Strategic Views 
 Perspectives / paradigms (executives) 
 Schools of thought (researchers) 
 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Clarke and Clegg, 1998 
Mintzberg, 1990; Whittington, 1993 
Typologies of Strategic Decision-Making 
 Decision-making steps (phase) 
 Decision-making issues (topic)  
 
Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990; Christensen et al, 1987 
Pettigrew, 1992; Ketchen et al, 1996 
Typologies of Strategic Behaviors 
 Strategy process (change)  
 Strategy content (choices) 
 
Chaffee, 1985; Stebel, 1992 
Hedley, 1977; Miles & Snow, 1978  
43
Chapter 2: Strategy Perspectives  
27 
interest to the task of drawing up a strategy perspective typology, these paradigm 
typologies are too broad (and too poorly defined) to be of direct use. 
 Schools of thought typologies. A different category of contributions to the literature has 
been the typologies distinguishing different schools of thought within the strategic 
management research community. These typologies focus on the variety of views among 
researchers, not the variety of views among executives. In these typologies strategy 
researchers are divided into streams of like-minded thinkers, either on the basis of their 
core scientific discipline, or on the basis of shared theoretical underpinnings. The most 
influential contribution is by Mintzberg (1990, 1998). His ten schools of thought have 
been summarized in table 2.2 to emphasize that they have little to do with strategy 
perspectives – knowing the assumptions on which theorists base their work says nothing 
about the assumptions executives employ when approaching a strategic issue. Therefore, 
schools of thought typologies are only of indirect value to this research project. 
Unfortunately, strategy perspectives and schools of thought in strategy are occasionally 
seen as similar concepts, requiring extra emphasis on their radically different typological 
bases.     
 
TABLE 2.2 
Mintzberg’s Ten Schools of Thought in Strategic Management  
(adapted from Mintzberg, 1998) 
 
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ‘THOUGHT’ ‘SCHOOL’ 
Design School Strategies are formed as a result of internal and external evaluation (Conception) Economics 
Planning School Strategies are formed as a result of formal planning models (Formality) Economics 
Positioning School Strategies are formed as a result of strategic positioning (Analysis) 
(Industrial) 
Economics 
Entrepreneurial School Strategies are formed as a result of a single leader (Vision) 
Psychology, 
Sociology 
Cognitive School Strategies are formed as a result of the cognitive mind (Mentality) Psychology 
Learning School Strategies are formed as a result of experience (Emergence) Psychology 
Power School Strategies are formed as a result of politics (Negotiation) 
Political Science, 
Sociology 
Cultural School Strategies are formed as a result of the organization’s mind (Collectivity) Anthropology 
Environmental School Strategies are formed as a result of the challenging setting (Reactivity) Biology 
Configuration School Strategies are formed as a result of a complex interplay of factors (Transformation) Many 
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From a methodological point of view, it is interesting to note that the literature on schools of 
thought in strategy is not a particularly strong benchmark to use for this study. For instance, 
in his work Mintzberg has not made the logic underlying his categorization of schools of 
thought explicit, which makes it seem a rather haphazard checklist, instead of a 
comprehensive typology. The categorization criteria seem to be partially historical (assumed 
development phases of the strategic management field), partially disciplinary (distinguishing 
contributions from different mono-disciplines), and partially opportunistic (unless the 
creation of separate category for himself was intended tongue-in-cheek). In follow-up 
seminars and publications (e.g. Volberda and Elfring, 2001) new ‘species’ of schools have 
been reported, but the typological principles and criteria underlying these efforts have at best 
been weak. The conclusion must be that any typology is only as sound as the foundations on 
which it is based. 
 
2.3.2 Typological Principles 
Every typology is a reflection of the principles and categorization criteria employed to 
construct it. While the categorization criteria used to distinguish the various strategic issues 
and strategy perspectives will be discussed in the following sections, it is important to make 
clear what the underlying principles should be when designing the typology. 
The basic assumption is that there is not one best kind of typology, but that a typology 
should be fit for purpose. In this case, the purpose is to develop a strategy perspectives 
measurement instrument. This has lead to the adoption of the following four principles: 
 
 Validity. First, and foremost, the typology must be valid. In practice, this means that the 
typology must be consistent with the established theory in the field of strategic 
management (construct validity) and that it must be unambiguous in its definitions and 
the categorization criteria employed (content validity). 
 Simplicity. As the strategy perspective typology will form the basis of the measurement 
instrument, it cannot be too extensive and complex. To remain practical as a measurement 
tool, the measurement instrument needs to be relatively compact and comprehensible, 
placing a premium on a typology that is short (limited number of categories) and easy to 
use (clearly distinguishable categories). 
 Relevance. Since the measurement instrument is intended to measure the views with the 
highest impact on the executive’s strategic decision making, only the most influential 
strategy perspectives need to be included in the typology. Focusing on the important has a 
higher priority than being complete.  
 Difference. Finally, the typology should highlight the major differences in views, while 
paying less attention to issues on which more consensus exists. The focus should be on 
contradictory assumptions and conflicting norms. In other words, only the aspects with a 
high discriminatory value should be considered.  
These four principles will be used to guide the categorization in the following section and 
will return in section 2.4.6 as evaluation criteria to check whether the strategic issues 
typology presented meets the stated ambitions. 
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2.4 A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIC ISSUES 
 
The backbone of the strategy perspectives measurement instrument consists of three broad 
categories – strategy process, strategy content and strategy context – which will be introduced 
in section 2.4.1, after which each category will be further sub-divided in the following three 
subsections. In section 2.4.5 a final strategic issue – organizational purpose – will be 
described, after which the entire typology will be summarized and evaluated in section 2.4.6. 
 
2.4.1 Strategy: Process, Content and Context 
In the literature there have been a few influential contributions on how to dissect a strategic 
problem into a number of logically distinct, yet related, strategic issues. All of these writers 
suggest the same distinction, namely between strategy process, strategy content and strategy 
context. Pettigrew & Whipp (1991) were the first to argue that each strategic problem can be 
divided into process, content and context aspects. In their view, disentangling strategic 
problems into these three components can facilitate the understanding of a complex strategic 
situation. In their terminology, process, content and context should be seen as the dimensions 
of a strategic problem. In a subsequent article, Pettigrew (1992) actually warns of the danger 
of reductionism, if the dimensions of a strategic problem are seen in isolation. He emphasizes 
that while distinguishing between these three dimensions can be insightful, retaining a three-
dimensional view of problems is required to actually understand and solve them. 
 Independently, De Wit and Meyer (1994) also arrived at the distinction between 
strategy process, strategy content and strategy context, which they used to classify strategic 
issues. Their description of these categories is as follows: 
 
 Strategy process. The manner in which strategies come about is referred to as the strategy 
process. Stated in terms of a number of questions, strategy process is concerned with the 
‘how’, ‘who’ and ‘when’ of strategy – how is, and should, strategy be made, analyzed, 
dreamt-up, formulated, implemented, changed and controlled; who is involved; and when 
do the necessary activities take place? 
 Strategy content. The product of a strategy process is referred to as the strategy content. 
Stated in terms of a question, strategy content is concerned with the ‘what’ of strategy – 
what is, and should be, the strategy for the organization and each of its constituent units? 
 Strategy context. The set of circumstances under which both the strategy process and the 
strategy content are determined is referred to as the strategy context. Stated in terms of a 
question, strategy context is concerned with the ‘where’ of strategy – where, that is in 
which organization and which environment, are the strategy process and strategy content 
embedded? 
Figure 2.5 illustrates this distinction and emphasizes the comprehensiveness of the three 
categories. To solve a strategic problem a strategy (content) is made (process) under certain 
conditions (context) – and all three are variables with which executives must deal. Executives 
must determine whether to accept or defy the strategic context, must establish how to engage 
in a strategy process and must determine which strategy content to pursue. Obviously, each of 
these three basic clusters of questions is still very broad and needs to be split up further, as 
will be done in the following sections.  
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FIGURE 2.5 
Strategy Process, Content and Context  
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This typology has since gained more currency (e.g. Ketchen et al., 1996) and especially the 
distinction between strategy process and strategy content has been widely acknowledged, as 
can be judged by special issues of the Strategic Management Journal on both subjects and 
the use of the distinction for structuring the tracks of the Strategic Management Society 
annual conferences. 
 
2.4.2 Strategy Process: Thinking, Formation and Change 
While the strategy process has been widely acknowledged as a category of strategic 
management issues, there have been few typologies of strategy process issues. All of the 
relevant typologies identified in section 2.3.1 are of a decision-making steps sort (i.e. 
recognizing, analyzing, formulation, implementation), and shed little light on the different 
issues at the heart of the strategy process.  
For this reason, De Wit and Meyer (1998) proposed to disaggregate strategy process 
issues by identifying the major subjects undergoing a process – individuals, strategies and 
organizations. This is a classification based on units of analysis, each engaged in a different 
aspect of the overall strategy process, and each encountering a different type of strategic 
issue. This leads to the following categories of strategic issues: 
 
 Strategic thinking. This strategic issue is at the level of individuals. Individual executives 
undergo a cognitive process, which is referred to as strategic thinking. Throughout the 
strategy process the mind of the strategist is in motion and strategic notions are under 
development. The strategic issue is what successful strategic thinking should be like. 
What kind of strategic reasoning leads to the best results and what should an executive do 
to become a superior strategic thinker?  
 Strategy formation. This strategic issue is at the level of strategies. Each strategy 
undergoes a creation process, which is referred to as strategy formation. Not only are 
strategic intentions formulated into plans, but actual patterns of behavior are also realized 
in practice. The strategic issue is how successful strategy formation should take place. 
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How should such activities as recognition, analysis, formulation and implementation be 
carried out, and who should be involved when, to attain the best performance? 
 Strategic change. This strategic issue is at the level of organizations. Strategic units 
undergo a transformation process, which is referred to as strategic change. Organizations 
alter their structures, processes and cultures to order to be better aligned with the 
opportunities and threats in the environment. The strategic issue is how successful 
strategic change should take place. How can an organization overcome inertia and ensure 
that the necessary changes are carried out in an adequate and timely manner? 
Similar to the warning expressed by Pettigrew, it must be recognized that these three strategic 
issues are interrelated, and therefore cannot be resolved in isolation. Yet, on the other hand, 
these three issues are analytically distinct enough to be separately considered and to be 
worked on one at a time. Each issue has its own cluster of questions and sub-questions that 
are strongly intertwined, while together these three strategic issues cover the most pressing 
strategy process questions raised in the literature. 
 
2.4.3 Strategy Content: Business, Corporate and Network Level 
When it comes to strategy content issues, the distinction between business and corporate level 
strategy issues has been relatively well developed (Hax & Maljuf, 1984; Porter, 1987). These 
two levels of aggregation are often cited as the domain of strategic management, setting the 
field apart from strategy issues at the functional level (operations strategy, marketing 
strategy, financial strategy, etc.). Strategy at the business level requires the integration of 
functional level strategies for a distinct set of products and/or services that are intended for a 
specific group of customers. Where a company operates in two or more businesses, a multi-
business or corporate level strategy is required, that aligns the various business level 
strategies. 
A logical extension of this classification is to explicitly recognize a level of 
aggregation higher than that of the individual firm, for which strategies also need to be 
developed (De Wit and Meyer, 1998). This multi-company or network level strategy is 
illustrated in figure 2.6. Most multi-company groups consist of only a few parties, as is the 
case in strategic alliances, joint ventures and value-adding partnerships. However, networks 
can also have dozens, even hundreds, of participants. In some circumstances, the corporation 
as a whole might be a member of a group, while in other situations only a part of the firm 
joins forces with other organizations. In all cases, when a strategy is developed for a group of 
firms, this can be labeled a network level strategy. 
This distinction between levels of strategy allows for a classification of strategy content 
issues to be proposed that is based on a categorization criterion similar to the unit of analysis 
criterion used for the strategy process issues typology. Here too, three main strategic issues 
can be identified, each corresponding to a different unit (level) of analysis: 
 
 Business level strategy. The strategic issue at the business level is found in how each 
business unit should relate to its environment. The challenge is to develop a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis other powers in a business, on the basis of which above-average 
performance can be achieved. How an appropriate set of resources should be built up and 
how the firm should be positioned within the business in such a way that it will have an 
advantage over competing forces, is the essence of the strategic issue.  
 Corporate level strategy. The strategic issue at the corporate level is found in how each 
business unit within a company should relate to other business units. The challenge is to 
48
Part I: Recognizing Different Views 
 
32 
develop a corporate configuration, on the basis of which above-average performance can 
be achieved. How a constellation of business units should be assembled and how they 
should be related to one another and managed, is the essence of the strategic issue. 
 Network level strategy. The strategic issue at the network level is found in how each 
company should relate to other companies. The challenge is to develop an appropriate 
array of inter-organizational relationships, on the basis of which above-average 
performance can be achieved. Which companies should collaborate, in which areas, and 
in what way, is the essence of the strategic issue.  
 
FIGURE 2.6 
Levels of Strategy 
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For this classification the same must be said as for the former – while these three strategic 
issues are distinct enough to be reviewed and worked on separately, they are intertwined 
enough to require a holistic view of strategy content issues.   
 
2.4.4 Strategy Context: Organizational, Industry and International 
When it comes to classifying the conditions under which strategies are formed, the most 
fundamental analytical distinction in use is between the internal and external context (e.g. 
Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). This dichotomy between organization 
and environment is very well established and forms the conceptual basis on which much of 
the strategic management literature has been built. Porter’s well-known opening statement in 
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Competitive Strategy (1980), that strategy “is about relating the firm to its environment”, 
articulates the widely accepted view that for executives it is imperative to understand the 
internal and external contexts, and to align the two to each other.  Actually, this dichotomy 
has become so engrained in the cognitive maps of most executives and academics, that some 
researchers feel the need to point to the fact that the distinction between the organization and 
its environment is a socially constructed reality, not a physical one. What is seen as internal 
or external is in the eye of the beholder – and even then it is often blurry what is seen as 
belonging to the organization and what is categorized as the environment (Weick, 1979; 
Stubbart and Smircich, 1985).  
However, despite the lack of an unambiguous dividing line between the internal and 
the external context, the distinction is still useful for differentiating between two clusters of 
strategic questions: 
 
 Organizational context. The strategic issue in the organizational context has to do with 
the extent to which the strategy process and strategy content are deterministically formed 
by the internal dynamics of the organization. The challenge is to understand where the 
internal context will shape the direction of the organization and where a strategizing 
executive can actively impact the organization’s strategy process and content.  Where is 
the organization malleable to the executive wanting to lead and where will the 
organization follow its own logic, with little room for an executive to influence 
outcomes? 
 Industry context. The strategic issue in the industry context has to do with the extent to 
which an organization’s strategy process and strategy content are deterministically 
formed by the external dynamics in the environment. The challenge is to understand 
where the external context will force the organization to adapt itself to the unfolding 
industry conditions and where the organization has the liberty to shape its own strategy 
process and content. Where is the industry malleable to the organization wanting to lead 
and where will the industry follow its own logic, with little room for an organization to 
influence outcomes? 
Clearly, both strategic issues share the same fundamental theme – who shapes whom? In the 
organizational context the issue is whether the executive can shape the firm, and in the 
industry context the issue is whether the firm can shape its industry. The distinction between 
these issues, as well as their similarities, has received considerable attention in the literature 
(Astley and Van der Ven, 1983; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985).  
 A second major distinction in the strategy context with implications for a typology of 
strategic issues is along the lines of geography. Here the most pronounced distinction is 
between the domestic and the international context. As companies move beyond their 
national context into the international arena, the strategic issue is what impact this should 
have on the strategy process and strategy content of the firm. The challenge for firms is to 
understand the level of diversity and integration within the international context and to 
determine in which regions they want to develop which activities, and the extent of 
standardization and coordination that is required across borders. This strategic issue resulting 
from exposure to the international context is referred to as the issue of international 
configuration. 
 In principle, many other strategy contexts can also be identified with a significant 
impact on strategy process and strategy content. For instance, Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) 
make a distinction between the entrepreneurial, mature, diversified, professional and 
innovation contexts, convincingly arguing that each context has an important influence on the 
what and how of strategy. Another well-known typology is by Porter (1980), who pays 
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specific attention to various generic industry contexts, namely fragmented, emerging, mature, 
declining, and global industries. Yet, I have limited my set of key strategy contexts to three – 
the organizational, industry and international context – for two main reasons. First, for the 
sake of simplicity. Too many strategic issues would make a measurement instrument overly 
complex. Second, and more importantly, for the sake of relevance. In the strategic 
management literature fundamentally differing views have been expressed on how to deal 
with the organizational, industry and international contexts, suggesting that executives might 
also have strikingly different views on these matters. In the case of other contexts the 
differences of opinion in the literature are much less profound and therefore do not hint at 
significantly divergent strategy perspectives among executives. 
 
2.4.5 Organizational Strategy and Organizational Purpose 
If strategy is a course of action for solving strategic problems with the aim of achieving the 
organization’s purpose, then determining the organizational purpose is strictly speaking not a 
strategic issue, but a supra-strategic issue. Analytically, it could be argued that deciding on 
the organization’s raison d’être should precede strategic decision-making and therefore could 
easily be separated from the field of strategic management. In reality, however, determining 
the organization’s purpose is intrinsically wrapped up in most strategic problem solving. 
Typical for the wickedness of strategic problems is the fact that many organizations do not 
have a clear purpose, try to serve partially contradictory purposes or have different parties 
pursuing conflicting purposes, all of which only surfaces symptomatically during the strategy 
process. As executives struggle to answer the who, what, where, when and how of their 
strategy, invariably the issue of why also surfaces. Hence, determining the organization’s 
purpose is in practice an integral part of the strategy making process.  
 Moreover, it is a ‘strategic issue’ on which views can be extremely divers, as the 
literature on the topic makes clear (see chapter 12). Therefore, as organizational purpose is 
both a highly relevant strategic issue, as well as one on which there are significant 
differences, it has been included in the list of major strategic issue on which the strategy 
perspectives measurement instrument will be based. 
 
2.4.6 Summary and Evaluation 
The intention of this section has been to create an analytically coherent categorization of 
generic strategic issues, which could constitute the general framework on which the strategy 
perspectives measurement instrument could be based. An overview of ten strategic issues 
identified in the preceding discussion is given in table 2.3. 
 
TABLE 2.3 
The Major Strategic Issues 
 
Strategy Process 
Strategic Thinking 
Strategy Formation 
Strategic Change 
Strategy Content 
Business Level Strategy 
Corporate Level Strategy 
Network Level Strategy 
Strategy Context 
Industry Context 
Organizational Context 
International Context 
Organizational Purpose 
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At the end of the previous section four criteria were outlined to guide the disaggregating of 
generic strategic problems into a set of generic strategic issues. These four criteria can now 
be employed to evaluate the resulting list: 
 
 Validity. In discussing the validity of this typology, a distinction must be made between 
construct validity and content validity. When looking at construct validity, it has been 
argued in the previous pages that the distinctions on which the typology has been based 
fit well with established theory in the field of strategic management. In the following ten 
chapters of this work, each of the ten strategic issues will be further explored and linked 
to the existing strategy theory to further validate the constructs employed. As for content 
validity, the preliminary testing outlined in chapter 1 has indicated that the ten strategic 
issues are clear enough to be directly recognized by executives and distinct enough to be 
seen as separate issues. There were also no other strategic issues that were systematically 
identified as missing in the typology. While these initial tests did not involve rigorous 
content validation methods, they did provide sufficient confidence to take the strategic 
issue typology as the basis for the development of the strategy perspective measurement 
scales (this topic will be discussed at greater length in chapter 13). 
 Simplicity. It seems odd to commend a typology for being simple – at first glance one 
would expect validity to be the only important quality of a typology. However, in 
developing a measurement instrument to gain an overview of the most important ways of 
looking at strategic problems, a highly valid yet fine-grained typology would create 
practical difficulties. An overly detailed typology would bring along exponential 
complexity in designing, administering, processing and interpreting the research. 
Furthermore, to paraphrase Churchill, an extensive typology would by its very 
complexity guard itself against the threat of being used in practice. Just as the strength of 
a good model lies in its ability to simplify, so too a good typology must create categories 
that are not too specific. It is from this point of view that the division of strategic 
problems into ten key strategic issues should be considered a workable level of 
disaggregation. Whether this simplicity extracts a high price in terms of validity will be 
further discussed in chapter 13.  
 Relevance. Besides validity and simplicity, the strategic issue typology should also 
capture all of the strategic issues that are viewed as important in organizational practice. 
Where relevance is taken as a key criterion, no elements should be included in the 
typology that are marginal to the strategic behavior of executives, while no elements 
should be left out that are central to their strategy making. As reported in chapter 1, a 
main focus of the preliminary research was to establish the relevance of the strategic issue 
typology and to adapt it to arrive at the current categorization. Based on this research it 
can be concluded that the strategic issue typology described here meets the criterion of 
relevance, both in the estimation of fellow researchers and business executives.  
 Difference. The final criterion employed for drawing up the strategic issue typology was 
to emphasize those aspects on which views were anticipated to differ most. This criterion 
was operationalized in two ways. First, the diversity of views expressed among 
researchers on how to approach strategic issues was taken as indicator of a potential 
variety of perspectives among business executives. Hence, strategic issues that have been 
hotly debated in the literature were inferred to be differentiating in business practice as 
well. This variety of strategy perspectives in the strategic management literature will be 
further detailed in the following ten chapters. Second, in the preliminary field research the 
ten strategic issues were tested to see whether they provoked a wide variety of responses, 
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which indeed they did. Hence, both methods underline the discriminatory value of the 
strategic issue typology. 
Taken together, this evaluation sheds a favorable light on the use of the ten strategic issues as 
a basis for a strategy perspective measurement instrument. Hence, the next section will 
proceed to identify strategy perspectives based on this typology.  
 
 
2.5. A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGY PERSPECTIVES 
 
The research question posed in chapter 1 was ‘how can the similarities and differences in the 
key strategy perspectives held by business executives be made measurable?’. In the 
discussion on the research methodology used in this project it was argued that there are 
basically two general ways in which the researcher can attempt to answer this question. On 
the one hand, the researcher can work inductively, heading into the field and recording as 
many different views as possible, to later categorize them into certain strategy perspectives. 
On the other hand, the researcher can work deductively, deriving categories of strategy 
perspectives from the literature, to later test them in the field. For this research project the 
latter methodology has been selected, requiring a typology of strategy perspectives to be 
proposed, based on the literature and preliminary research.  
 In the following ten chapters the strategy perspectives that correspond with the ten 
strategic issues will be discussed in detail. In each chapter one strategic issue will be 
dissected, with a focus on uncovering the differing strategy perspectives held on the topic. 
The order of the chapters will follow the order of the strategic issues as outlined in table 2.3. 
 Yet, before moving to this detailed analysis, it should be made explicit that a specific 
method will be employed to categorize the variety of strategy perspectives. Instead of 
attempting to obtain a complete and fine-grained typology of strategy perspectives for each 
strategic issue, it is the intention to identify just two strategy perspective archetypes per 
chapter (twenty in total). These two archetypes will be the two extreme positions along the 
key dimension dividing opinions on each strategic issue. How the key dimensions, along 
which views differ, have been identified, is discussed in section 2.5.1. How these dimensions 
have led to the definition of the twenty strategy perspective archetypes will be described 
more fully in section 2.5.2. This chapter concludes with an overview in table 2.4 of the 
typology of strategy perspectives employed in drawing up the measurement instrument. 
 
2.5.1 Identifying Strategy Tensions  
On each strategic issue a multitude of views can exist, that can differ on a wide variety of 
criteria. If a fine-grained strategy perspective measurement instrument were being developed 
for just one strategic issue, then a detailed analysis and categorization of the various views 
expressed in the literature would be appropriate. In particular, it would be valuable to identify 
the different dimensions along which the views were distinct from one another. Such an 
extensive review of the literature and classification of strategy perspectives along multiple 
dimensions would be a Herculean task, but an excellent contribution to the field. As it stands, 
there have been few such efforts to generate a taxonomy of strategy perspectives for a single 
strategic issue. Where literature reviews are presented they generally deal with different 
approaches and schools of thought among researchers, as opposed to different strategy 
perspectives that could be adopted by executives. 
Here it would be folly to pursue such an extensive review of all strategic management 
literature to uncover the full richness of strategy perspectives on ten strategic issues. What 
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few have achieved on one strategic issue, cannot be accomplished on ten strategic issues 
simultaneously. Consequently, a fine-grained strategy measurement tool, distinguishing 
multiple dimensions of potential disagreement on each strategic issue, must be dismissed as 
overly ambitious. Instead, a more rough-grained approach has been selected in which only 
one dimension of potential disagreement has been identified per strategic issue. In other 
words, a conscious simplification has been applied to the mapping of different strategic views 
– instead of a complete, yet complex, measurement of all criteria explaining the differences in 
worldviews between strategizing executives, this research project limits itself to mapping 
differences along ten key dimensions, one per strategic issue. 
 However, the self-imposed limitation to focus on just one dimension of potential 
disagreement per strategic issue has not implied that any dimension will do. The objective 
has been to identify the most crucial aspect dividing opinions on each strategic issue. In 
almost all cases this key dimension around which strategy perspectives differ has already 
been pointed out in the literature, yet in a few cases it has been indirectly derived from the 
conflicting points of view expressed in the field.  
 In searching for the main dimensions of disagreement, the focus has been on looking 
for the key trade-off in each strategic issue, as different executives can be expected to 
understand and weigh such trade-offs differently. Management in general, and strategy in 
particular, is fraught with conflicting demands that can not be fully met at the same time, 
requiring executives to make difficult trade-off decisions. As executives are confronted with 
such conflicting, or even contradictory, demands, they must weigh the relative importance of 
each factor and strike some sort of balance between them. In practice, executives usually do 
not consciously wrestle with these trade-offs every time a strategic decision needs to be 
made, but will develop a preference, or even a recipe, for dealing with such situations. Over a 
period of time they build-up an understanding of how a particular trade-off should be seen 
and which behaviors constitute an appropriate reaction. This predisposition to view a trade-
off in a specific way forms their strategy perspective. However, other executives with other 
values and other experiences are likely to view such a crucial trade-off differently, leading to 
different strategy perspectives. 
 Such trade-offs confronting executives shall here be referred to as strategy tensions. 
Stated in terms of a formal definition: 
 
A strategy tension exists where an organization is confronted with two conflicting 
strategic pressures or demands that need to be dealt with simultaneously.  
 
While every organization will have its own portion of idiosyncratic strategy tensions, there 
are a number of universal strategy tensions that all organizations need to deal with. For 
instance, every organization needs to determine whether to be cooperative or competitive in 
its relationships towards others, and every organization needs to determine whether they will 
change through evolution or revolution. As these fundamental strategy tensions are universal, 
most experienced executives will have an explicit or implicit view on how to grapple with 
them, but these views are often dissimilar. 
  Hence, the objective of the second phase of this research study, as described in 
chapter 1, has been to review the strategy literature to determine the most pressing strategy 
tensions, and to analyze whether they are at the root of the most fundamental differences of 
view as expressed in the writings in the field of strategic management. The result has been 
the identification of ten key strategy tensions, one per strategic issue, on which strategy 
perspectives in the literature differ greatly. These ten strategy tensions form the key 
dimensions along which important differences in views can be mapped.  
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2.5.2 Identifying Strategy Perspective Archetypes 
Once it has been determined along which dimensions the differences of view will be 
measured, two strategy perspective archetypes can be described that fit at the two poles of 
each measurement dimension. These two extremes, or pure forms, constitute the ‘book ends’ 
between which all other points of views can be found. In some cases these polar positions are 
quite rarely expressed in the literature, while in other instances these extremes are rather 
popular.  
For the purpose of constructing a measurement instrument a thorough description of 
these two strategy perspective archetypes has been selected over a description of the various 
‘shades of gray’ in between. The reasons for this choice of two strategy perspective 
archetypes over a more extensive typology consisting of various strategy perspectives along 
each dimension, have been to achieve clarity and simplicity. Defining various categories of 
strategy perspectives along each dimension is fraught with taxonomic difficulties – ‘how 
many categories should be recognized?’, ‘where should the exact dividing lines be drawn?’, 
‘can the same principles be applied to all dimensions?’ – while the task of measuring who 
belongs in which category would make a measurement instrument overly complex. The 
alternative is to avoid the temptation of defining a typology of strategy perspectives, in favor 
of measuring each executive’s strategy perspective on a continuum between the two extreme 
archetypes. It is for this reason that in the coming ten chapters no comprehensive 
classification of strategy perspectives will be given, but instead each chapter will outline the 
two extreme positions on the key dimension of disagreement (see table 2.4).  
In overview, to arrive at the strategy perspective archetypes on each strategic issue, 
the procedure in each of the next ten chapters will be as follows: 
 
 Review strategic issue. First, every chapter will start with an overview of the major 
questions comprising the strategic issue. The focus of this initial analysis is to uncover 
conflicting demands on the business executive, around which differences of opinion can 
arise.   
 Identify key strategy tension. Second, the most important strategy tension at the heart of 
each strategic issue will be identified. The focus of this analysis is to determine the nature 
of the conflicting pressures and to explore their influence on the strategic decisions that 
executives need to make. 
 Describe the two extreme strategy perspectives. Third, a detailed description of the two 
extreme positions at both poles of the dimension will be given. The focus of this analysis 
is to discover the main points of contention, conflicting assumptions and differing values 
between the two strategy perspective archetypes. 
After each strategy perspective archetype has been described, the discussion will be 
concluded by the formulation of 12 perspective-specific statements that will form the basis of 
the measurement instrument. How the measurement instrument is subsequently constructed 
will be explained in part III of this book. 
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TABLE 2.4 
The Strategy Tensions and Strategy Perspective Archetypes 
 
STRATEGIC ISSUE STRATEGY TENSION STRATEGY PERSPECTIVES 
Strategic Thinking Logic vs. Creativity Rational Thinking vs.  Generative Thinking 
Strategy Formation Deliberateness vs. Emergence Strategic Planning vs.  Strategic Incrementalism 
Strategic Change Revolution vs. Evolution Discontinuous Change vs.  Continuous Change 
Business Level Strategy Markets vs. Resources Outside-in vs.  Inside-out 
Corporate Level Strategy Responsiveness vs. Synergy Portfolio Organization vs.  Core Competence 
Network Level Strategy Competition vs. Cooperation Discrete Organization vs.  Embedded Organization 
Industry Context Compliance vs. Choice Industry Evolution vs.  Industry Creation 
Organizational Context Control vs. Chaos Organizational Leadership vs. Organizational Dynamics 
International Context Globalization vs. Localization Global Convergence vs.  International Diversity 
Organizational Purpose Profitability vs. Responsibility Shareholder Value vs.  Stakeholder Values 
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Chapter 3 
 
STRATEGIC THINKING  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
What goes on in the mind of the strategist? How do executives think, what influences their 
thinking and how does their thinking have an impact on their actual choices and behaviors? 
An intriguing question that is easy to ask, but difficult to answer. Yet, a question that is 
important for this study in two ways – as the broad research context in which this study is 
embedded and as one of ten strategy issues on which strategists can have a view.  
As the research context, managerial cognition in general and strategic thinking in 
particular, is the theoretical field in which this study is situated. As outlined in the previous 
chapters, this study focuses on one aspect of strategic thinking, namely the potential existence 
of preconceived views used by executives when looking at strategy issues. To understand the 
nature of these preconceived views it is insightful to delve more deeply into what goes on in 
the minds of executives. To this end, this chapter on strategic thinking is intended to provide 
the theoretical basis necessary for developing a strategy-oriented psychometric instrument.  
However, strategic thinking is also a strategy issue on which individual strategists can 
have a view. Strategists can have a perspective on what constitutes strategic thinking, what is 
most effective and how they can improve their own strategizing capabilities. They can also 
champion an approach to strategic thinking in their organization and take actions to 
strengthen the level of strategic thinking among their colleagues. Good strategic thinking 
within the organization can lead to better performance, but what is good strategic thinking? 
As will become clear in the following pages, executives can have very different assumptions 
and beliefs on this topic. Therefore, the second objective of this chapter is to explore the issue 
of strategic thinking deeply enough to be able to outline where fundamental differences of 
opinion exist between executives, as the first of the ten dimensions of the ‘strategy profiler’ 
instrument. 
 So, coming back to the question at the top of this page: what goes on in the mind of 
the strategist? Well, a lot, but if reduced to its bare essentials it can be said that strategists are 
engaged in the process of dealing with strategic problems. Not problems in the negative 
sense of troublesome conditions that need to be avoided, but in the neutral sense of 
challenging situations that need to be resolved – a strategic problem is a set of circumstances 
requiring a reconsideration of the current course of action, either to profit from observed 
opportunities or to respond to perceived threats. To deal with these strategic problems, 
executives must not simply think, but they must go through a strategic reasoning process, 
searching for ways to define and resolve the challenges at hand. Executives must structure 
their individual thinking steps into a reasoning process that will result in effective strategic 
behavior. The question is how executives actually go about defining strategic problems – how 
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do they identify and diagnose what is going on? – and how they go about solving strategic 
problems – how do they generate, evaluate and decide on potential answers? It is this issue of 
strategic reasoning, as a string of strategic thinking activities directed at defining and 
resolving strategic problems that needs to be examined first, before looking at different 
perspectives. 
 
 
3.2 THE ISSUE OF STRATEGIC REASONING 
 
The mind of the strategist is a complex and fascinating apparatus that never fails to astonish 
and dazzle on the one hand, and disappoint and frustrate on the other. We are often surprised 
by the power of the human mind, but equally often stunned by its limitations. For the 
discussion here it is not necessary to unravel all of the mysteries surrounding the functioning 
of the human brain, but a short overview of the capabilities and limitations of the human 
mind will greatly help to understand the issue of strategic reasoning. 
 The human ability to know is referred to as cognition. As strategists want to know 
about the strategic problems facing their organizations, they need to engage in cognitive 
activities. These cognitive activities (or strategic thinking activities) need to be structured into 
a strategic reasoning process. Hence, the first step towards a better understanding of what 
goes on in the mind of the strategist is to examine the various cognitive activities making up a 
strategic reasoning process. The four main cognitive activities will be discussed in the first 
section below. To be able to perform these cognitive activities, people need to command 
certain mental faculties. While very sophisticated, the human brain is still physically strongly 
limited in what it can do. These limitations to people’s cognitive abilities will be reviewed in 
the second section. To deal with its inherent physical shortcomings, the human brain copes by 
building simplified models of the world, referred to as cognitive maps. The functioning of 
cognitive maps will be addressed in the third section.  
In figure 3.1 the relationship between these three topics is visualized, using the 
metaphor of a computer. The cognitive abilities of our brains can be seen as a hardware level 
question – what are the physical limits on our mental faculties? The cognitive maps used by 
our brains can be seen as an operating system level question – what type of platform/language 
is ‘running’ on our brain? The cognitive activities carried out by our brains can be seen an 
application level question – what type of program is strategic reasoning?  
 
3.2.1 Cognitive Activities 
The strategic reasoning process consists of a number of strategic thinking elements or 
cognitive activities – mental tasks intended to increase the strategist’s knowing. A general 
distinction can be made been cognitive activities directed towards defining a strategic 
problem, and cognitive activities directed at solving a strategic problem. Each of these two 
major categories can be further split in two (see figure 3.2), leading to the following general 
elements of a strategic reasoning process: 
 
 Identifying. Before strategists can move to benefit from opportunities or to counter 
threats, they must be aware of these challenges and acknowledge their importance. This 
part of the reasoning process is variably referred to as identifying, recognizing or sense-
making. 
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 Diagnosing. To come to grips with a problem, strategists must try to understand the 
structure of the problem and its underlying causes. This part of the reasoning process is 
variably referred to as diagnosing, analyzing or reflecting. 
 Conceiving. To deal with a strategic problem, strategists must come up with a potential 
solution. If more than one solution is available, strategists must select the most promising 
one. This part of the reasoning process is variably referred to as conceiving, formulating, 
or imagining.  
 Realizing. A strategic problem is only really solved once concrete actions are undertaken 
that achieve results. Strategists must therefore carry out problem-solving activities and 
evaluate whether the consequences are positive. This part of the reasoning process is 
variably referred to as realizing, implementing, or acting.  
 
FIGURE 3.1  
Cognitive activities, maps and abilities 
 
Cognitive Abilities
Cognitive Maps
Cognitive Activities
Hardware Level
(Mental Faculties)
Operating System Level
(Mental Models)
Application Level
(Mental Reasoning)
 
 
A structured approach to these four cognitive activities is to carry them out in the above 
order, starting with problem identification and then moving through diagnosis to conceiving 
solutions and finally realizing them (clockwise movement in figure 3.2). In this approach the 
first step, identifying strategic problems, would require extensive external and internal 
scanning, thorough sifting of incoming information, and the selection of priority issues. In the 
next reasoning step, the strategic problems recognized would have to be diagnosed by 
gathering more detailed data, and by further analyzing and refining this information. Once the 
problem had been properly defined, a strategy could be formulated by evaluating the 
available options and deciding which solution would be best. In the final phase, realization, 
the strategist would need to ensure execution of the proposed solution by consciously 
planning and controlling implementation activities. In this case, the four elements of the 
strategic reasoning process could actually be labeled recognizing, analyzing, formulating and 
implementing. 
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FIGURE 3.2  
Elements of a strategic reasoning process 
 
Defining
Solving
Identifying
Recognizing
Sense-making
(“What is a problem?”)
Diagnosing
Analyzing
Reflecting
(“What is the nature
of the problem”)
Realizing
Implementing
Acting
(“What actions should 
be taken?”)
Conceiving
Formulating
Imagining
(“How should the 
problem be addressed?”)
 
However, strategists do not always reason in this step-by-step fashion. Their thinking is often 
less orderly, with identifying, diagnosing, conceiving and realizing intermingled with one 
another, even going on at the same time. Nor are the cognitive activities as straightforward as 
portrayed above. The identification of strategic problems is often not about objective 
observation, but rather subjective interpretation – by looking at the world from a particular 
angle, strategists see and value particular strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
Such sense-making activities (Weick, 1979; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991) lead to attention 
being paid to some issues, while others do not make the strategic agenda (Dutton, 1988; 
Ocasio, 1997). Likewise, diagnosing strategic problems is not always a structured analytical 
process. Gaining a deeper understanding of strategic problems may involve explicit analysis, 
but also intuitive reflecting – by employing unconscious reasoning rules strategists often 
quickly form a general picture of how key aspects of a strategic problem are interrelated.  
Conceiving strategic solutions can be equally ‘messy’ and subjective. Often, strategic 
options are not chosen from an available repertoire of potential solutions, but they are 
invented. In other words, new options are often not selected, discovered or figured out, but 
are envisioned – strategists imagine how things could be done. Such idea generation can 
involve reasoning by analogy or metaphor, brainstorming, or pure fantasizing. New potential 
solutions may come to the strategist in a flash (eureka!) or emerge over time, but usually 
require a period of incubation beforehand, and a period of nurturing afterwards. Furthermore, 
strategists often find it impossible to objectively prove which new idea would be the best 
solution. Therefore, the process of deciding on the solution to be pursued may involve more 
judgment than calculation. 
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Finally, it must be emphasized that action does not always come last, in the form of 
solution implementation. Often, strategists do not wait for a problem to be precisely defined, 
and for a solution to be fully conceived, before starting to act. On the contrary, strategists 
often feel they must first act – they must have experience with a problem and know that the 
current strategy will not be able to overcome the problem. To find a suitable solution it is 
often also necessary to test certain assumptions in practice and to experiment. Hence, acting 
regularly precedes, or goes hand in hand with, all other cognitive activities. 
  
3.2.2 Cognitive Abilities 
People are not omniscient – they do not have infinite knowledge. To some extent this is due 
to the nature of reality – many future events are inherently unpredictable, due to factors that 
are uncertain or unknowable. Yet, humans are also burdened with rather imperfect cognitive 
abilities. The human brain is severely limited in what it can know (Simon, 1947). The 
limitation to human’s cognitive abilities is largely due to three factors: 
 
 Limited information sensing ability. Humanity’s first ‘handicap’ is a limited information-
sensing ability. While the senses – touch, smell, taste, hearing and seeing – are 
bombarded with stimuli, much of reality remains unobservable to humans. This is 
partially due to the physical inability to be everywhere, all the time, noticing everything. 
However, people's limited ability to register the structure of reality is also due to the 
inherent superficiality of the senses and the complexity of reality. The human senses 
cannot directly identify the way the world works and the underlying causal relationships. 
Only the physical consequences of the complex interactions between elements in reality 
can be picked up by a person's sensory system. Therefore, the mental representations of 
the world that individuals build up in their minds are necessarily based on circumstantial 
evidence.  
 Limited information processing capacity. Unfortunately, a second drawback is that 
humans do not have unlimited data processing abilities. Thinking through problems with 
many variables, complex relationships and huge amounts of data is a task that people find 
extremely difficult to perform. Approaching every activity in this way would totally 
overload a person's brain. For this reason, humans hardly ever think through a problem 
with full use of all available data, but necessarily make extensive use of mental shortcuts, 
referred to as cognitive heuristics (Janis, 1989). Cognitive heuristics are mental ‘rules of 
thumb’ that simplify a problem, so that it can be more quickly understood and solved. 
Cognitive heuristics focus a person's attention on a number of key variables that are 
believed to be most important, and present a number of simple decision rules to rapidly 
resolve an issue. The set of possible solutions to be considered is also limited in advance.  
 Limited information storage capacity. Another human cognitive shortcoming is poor 
memory. People have only a limited capacity for storing information. Remembering all 
individuals, events, dates, places and circumstances is beyond the ability of the human 
brain. Therefore, people must store information very selectively and organize this 
information in a way that it can be easily retrieved when necessary. Here again, cognitive 
heuristics are at play – ‘rules of thumb’ make the memorization process manageable in 
the face of severe capacity limitations. Such heuristics help to simplify complex clusters 
of data into manageable chunks and help to categorize, label and store this information so 
that it can be recalled at a later moment. 
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To deal with these severe physical limitations, the brain has come up with more than only 
simple cognitive heuristics. The human mind has come to work with more holistic cognitive 
maps, which will be examined in more detail below.  
 
3.2.3 Cognitive Maps 
Knowledge that people have is stored in their minds in the form of cognitive maps (e.g. 
McCaskey, 1982, Weick & Bourgnon), also referred to as cognitive schemata (e.g. Anderson, 
1983; Schwenk, 1988), mental models (e.g. Lord and Day, 1992; Knight et al., 1999), 
knowledge structures (e.g. Lyles and Schwenk, 1983; Walsh, 1995) and construed reality 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). These cognitive maps are representations in a person’s 
mind of how the world works. A cognitive map of a certain situation reflects a person's 
beliefs about the importance of the issues and about the cause and effect relationships 
between them. 
Cognitive maps are formed over time through education, experience and interaction 
with others. Based on the inputs of their senses, people will infer causal relationships between 
phenomena, making guesses about unobservable factors and resolving inconsistencies 
between the bits of information received. In turn, people's cognitive maps steer their senses – 
while cognitive maps are built on past sensory data, they will consequently direct which new 
information will be sought and perceived. A person's cognitive map will focus attention on 
particular phenomena, while blocking out other data as noise, and will quickly make clear 
how a situation should be perceived. In this way, a cognitive map provides an interpretive 
filter or perceptual screen, aiding the senses in selecting and understanding external stimuli 
(England, 1967; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Furthermore, cognitive maps help to direct 
behavior, by providing an existing repertoire of ‘problem-solving’ responses (also referred to 
as scripts or recipes) from which an appropriate action can be derived.     
In building their cognitive maps, people acquire a lot of their knowledge by means of 
direct experience. They learn to communicate, play an instrument, drive a vehicle and solve 
problems by doing. This knowledge is added to people’s cognitive maps without being 
explicitly articulated. In other words, knowledge gained through experiential learning is 
usually not codified into formal rules, principles, models or theories, but remains tacit 
(Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka, 1991). People formulate implicit models and draw conclusions, but 
do so largely unconsciously. In this way, cognitive maps evolve without people themselves 
being entirely aware of their own cognitive map. Hence, when people use their intuition, this 
is not a mystical or irrational way of reasoning, but thinking guided by the tacit knowledge 
they have acquired in the past (Behling and Eckel, 1991). Intuitive thinking is the opposite of 
analytical thinking – informal and holistic (Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). Informal 
means that the thinking is largely unconscious and based on assumptions, variables and 
causal relationships not explicitly identifiable by those doing the thinking. Holistic means 
that the thinker does not aim at unraveling phenomena into their constituent parts, but rather 
maintains a more integrated view of reality.  
Yet, people’s cognitive maps are not developed independently, but in interaction with 
one another. People tend to construct a shared understanding of the world by interacting with 
each other within a group over an extended period of time. By exchanging interpretations of 
what they see, it is said that they enact a shared reality (Daft & Weick, 1984; Smircich and 
Stubbart, 1985). The resulting shared cognitive map is variably referred to as the group’s 
dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), common paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) or belief system 
(Noorderhaven, 1995). Such a shared worldview can exist within small social units, such as a 
firm or a family, but also within larger units, such as an industry or a nation.   
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 As individuals can belong to different groups, they can be influenced by different 
belief systems simultaneously. As members of a national culture, their cognitive maps will to 
a certain extent be influenced by the beliefs dominant within the nation. As employees of a 
company, their cognitive maps will be affected by the beliefs common within the firm and the 
industry as well. In the same manner, people can be impacted by the professional community 
to which they belong, their religious affiliation, their political party and any other groups in 
which they interact with others (Hambrick et al., 1993; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998). Due to the 
mutually inclusive nature of group membership, an individual’s cognitive map will be a 
complex combination of elements taken from different group-level dominant logics. While 
these paradigms on which an individual draws can be complementary, or overlapping yet 
consistent, it is quite possible that inconsistencies arise (Schein, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 
1993). 
As shared beliefs develop over time through interaction and are passed on through 
socialization, they remain largely tacit. The shared cognitive map of a group is literally 
‘common sense’ – sense shared by a common group of people. However, where members of 
different groups come into conflict with one another, or where an individual needs to deal 
with the inconsistencies brought on by multiple group memberships, beliefs can become 
more articulated. Different behaviors, based on different cognitive maps, will often lead to 
the identification and codification of beliefs, either to protect them or to engage in debate 
with people with other views. As paradigms become more articulated, they also become more 
mobile, making it possible to transfer ideas to people without direct interaction. 
The downside of cognitive maps is that they exhibit a high level of rigidity. People are 
generally not inclined to change their minds. Once people's cognitive maps have formed, and 
they have a grip on reality, they become resistant to signals that challenge their conceptions. 
As McCaskey (1982) remarks, the mind “strives mightily to bring order, simplicity, 
consistency, and stability to the world it encounters,” and is therefore reluctant to welcome 
the ambiguity presented by contradicting data. People tend to significantly overestimate the 
value of information that confirms their cognitive map, underestimate disconfirming 
information, and they actively seek out evidence that supports their current beliefs (Schwenk, 
1984). Once an interpretive filter is in place, seeing is not believing, but believing is seeing. 
People might have the impression that they are constantly learning, but they are largely 
learning within the bounds of a paradigm. When an individual’s map is supported by similar 
beliefs shared within a firm, industry or country, the ability to question key aspects of a 
paradigm will usually be rather limited. Not only does the individual have no ‘intellectual 
sounding board’ for teasing out new ideas, but deviation from the dominant logic might also 
have adverse social and political ramifications within the group (e.g. Powell and DiMaggio, 
1983; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Not for nothing the old proverb is: ‘old ideas never change; 
they eventually die out’ (Kuhn, 1970). 
 For strategists, cognitive rigidity is particularly worrying. Strategists should be at the 
forefront of market developments, identifying changing circumstances and new opportunities 
before their competitors. Strategic thinking is by its very nature focused on understanding and 
shaping the future, and therefore strategists must have the ability to challenge current beliefs 
and change their own mind. They must be able to come up with innovative, but feasible, new 
strategies that will fit with the unfolding reality. This places extraordinary cognitive demands 
on strategists – they must be able to overcome the limitations of their own cognitive maps 
and develop a new understanding.  
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3.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN LOGIC AND CREATIVITY 
 
Many management theorists have noted that the opposites of intuition and analysis create a 
tension for executives (e.g. Langley, 1989, 1995; Pondy, 1983). While some researchers 
make a strong case for more formal analysis (e.g. Isenberg, 1984; Schoemaker & Russo, 
1993), there is a broad understanding that executives need to employ both intuitive and 
analytical thinking, even if they are each other’s opposites.  
The extensive use of intuitive judgment among executives is understood by most as 
necessary and beneficial. An executive’s intuition is built up through years of experience and 
contains a vast quantity of tacit knowledge that can only superficially be tapped by formal 
analysis. Intuition can also give a ‘richer’ assessment, by blending in all types of qualitative 
information. Moreover, intuitive thinking is often better at capturing the big picture than 
analytical thinking. And very practically, intuition is needed to cut corners – without the 
widespread use of cognitive heuristics, management would grind to a halt, overloaded by the 
sheer complexity of the analyses that would need to be carried out. Such a situation of 
rationality gone rampant is referred to as paralysis by analysis (Lenz and Lyles, 1985; 
Langley, 1995).  
However, it is equally clear to most that human intuition is often unreliable. Cognitive 
heuristics are 'quick and dirty' – efficient, but imprecise. They help people to intuitively jump 
to conclusions without thorough analysis, which increases speed, but also increases the risk 
of drawing faulty conclusions. The main danger of cognitive heuristics is that they are 
inherently biased, as they focus attention on only a few variables and interpret them in a 
particular way, even when this is not appropriate (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; 
Bazerman, 1990). For this reason, many academics urge practitioners to bolster their intuitive 
judgments with more explicit rational analysis. Especially in the case of strategic decisions, 
more time and energy should be made available to avoid falling prey to common cognitive 
biases. Otherwise the ultimate result might be a ‘corporate gravestone’ with the epitaph 
‘extinct by instinct’ (Langley, 1995).  
While the tension between intuition and analysis is important, it does not go to the 
heart of the strategic reasoning issue. For strategists the more fundamental question is how 
they can escape getting stuck with an outdated cognitive map. How can they avoid the danger 
of building up a flawed picture of their industry, their markets and themselves? As strategists 
must be acutely aware of the unfolding opportunities and threats in the environment, and the 
evolving strengths and weaknesses of the organization, they must be able to constantly 
reevaluate their views.  
On the one hand, this requires rigorous logical thinking. All the key assumptions on 
which a strategist’s cognitive map has been based need to be reviewed and tested against 
developments in the firm and its environment. On the other hand, strategists must have the 
ability to engage in creative thinking. To be able to see new opportunities and strengths, 
strategists must be able to think beyond current models of reality. Both demands on 
strategists will be reviewed in more detail below.   
 
3.3.1 The Demand for Logical Thinking 
It is clear that if executives only base their strategic decisions on heavily biased cognitive 
maps, unconsciously built up through past experience, this will lead to very poor results. 
Executives need to have the ability to critically reflect on the assumptions they hold, to check 
whether they are based on actual fact, or on organizational folklore and industry recipes. 
They must be capable of making their tacit beliefs more explicit, so that the validity of these 
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mental models can be evaluated and they can be further refined. In short, to be successful 
strategists, executives need to escape the confines of their own cognitive maps – and those of 
other stakeholders engaged in the strategy process. 
 Assessing the validity of a cognitive map requires strong logical thinking. Logical 
thinking is a disciplined and rigorous way of thinking, on the basis of formal rules. When 
employing logic, each step in an argumentation follows from the previous, based on valid 
principles. In other words, a logical thinker will only draw a conclusion if it is arrived at by a 
sound succession of arguments. 
 Logical thinking can be applied to all four cognitive activities outlined in figure 3.2. 
When identifying and diagnosing a strategic problem, logical thinking can help to avoid the 
emotional interpretations that so often color people’s understanding of environmental 
opportunities and threats, and organizational strengths and weaknesses. Logical thinking can 
also expose a person’s bullish or bearish bias and can be instrumental in discarding old 
‘theories’ of how the firm and its environment function. By analyzing the empirical facts and 
rigorously testing the hypotheses on which the firm’s shared cognitive map has been built, 
the strategist can prevent building a false model of reality.  
 When conceiving and realizing a strategic solution, logical thinking can help to avoid 
the danger of following outdated habits and routines. Routines are programmed courses of 
action that originally were deliberately conceived, but have been subsequently internalized 
and are used automatically (March and Simon, 1993). Habits are programmed courses of 
action that have developed unconsciously. By explicitly formulating strategic options and 
subjecting them to formal evaluation, the strategist can break away from such established 
behavior and develop new approaches to gaining and retaining competitive advantage. 
Moreover, logical thinking can aid in making a distinction between fantasy and feasibility. 
Sound logic can serve to weed out strategic options that are flights of fancy, by analyzing the 
factors that will determine success or failure. 
 
3.3.2 The Demand for Creative Thinking 
Creative thinking is the opposite of logical thinking. As described above, when employing 
logic, a thinker bases each step in a train of thought on the previous steps, following formal 
rules of valid thinking. De Bono (1970) refers to this pattern of thought as vertical thinking. 
However, when creativity is used, the thinker doesn’t take a valid step, but takes a leap of 
imagination, without being able to support the validity of the mental jump. In creative 
thinking a person abandons the rules governing sound argumentation and draws a conclusion 
that is not justified based on the previous arguments. In this way the thinker generates a new 
understanding, but without objective proof that the new idea ‘makes sense’. De Bono refers 
to this pattern of thought as lateral thinking. 
 In essence, creative thinking takes liberty in following thinking rules. One idea might 
lead to another idea, without formal logic interfering. One variable might be linked by the 
thinker to another, without a sound explanation of why a correlation is assumed. Creativity in 
effect creates a new understanding, with little attention paid to supporting evidence. Often 
logic is used afterwards to justify an idea that was actually generated by creative means.   
 When identifying and diagnosing strategic problems creative thinking is often needed. 
Old cognitive maps usually have a very compelling logic, locking people into old patterns of 
thinking. These old cognitive maps are usually tried and tested, and have become immune to 
external signals that they are no longer fitting. Thinking within the boundaries of a shared 
cognitive map is generally accepted and people tend to proceed rationally – that is, they try to 
avoid logical inconsistencies. Challenging a cognitive map's fundamental assumptions, 
however, cannot be done in a way that is logically consistent with the map itself. 
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Contradicting a paradigm is illogical from the point of view of those who accept the 
paradigm. Therefore, changing a rigid and subjective cognitive map, rooted in a shared 
paradigm, requires strategists to imagine new ways of understanding the world, which do not 
logically follow from past beliefs. Strategic thinkers need to be willing and able to break with 
orthodoxy and make leaps of imagination, that are not logically justified, but needed to 
generate novel ways of looking at old problems. 
 The same is true when conceiving and realizing strategic solutions. New strategies 
often do not follow from the facts, but need to be invented – they are not analyzed into 
existence, but need to be generated, if they are to be innovative and distinctive. Creative 
solutions do not follow from the dominant logic, but are the unexpected answers that emerge 
when the grip of the dominant logic is loosened.    
 Unfortunately, the conclusion must be that logical thinking and creative thinking are 
not only opposites, but that they are partially incompatible as well. They are based on 
methods that are at odds with one another. Strategizing executives would probably love to be 
fully logical and fully creative at the same time, but both require such a different mindset and 
range of cognitive skills that in practice it is very difficult to achieve both simultaneously. 
The demand for logic and creativity is not only contradictory for each individual, but also 
within teams, departments and the overall firm – while strategizing groups would like to be 
fully capable of logical and creative thinking, finding ways of incorporating both forms of 
strategic thinking into a workable strategy process is extremely challenging. Commonly, 
conflicting styles lead to conflicting people, and therefore a blend between the two is not that 
simple. It is for this reason that we speak of the tension between logic and creativity – the two 
demands on executives seem to be contradictory, yet both are required at the same time.   
 
 
3.4 PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC THINKING 
 
While the need for both logical and creative thinking is clear, this does place strategists in a 
rather awkward position of needing to bring two partially contradictory forms of thinking 
together in one strategic reasoning process. Logical thinking helps to make the strategic 
reasoning process more rational – rigorous, comprehensive and consistent, instead of 
haphazard, fragmentary and ad hoc. Creative thinking, on the other hand, helps to make the 
strategic reasoning process more generative – producing more unorthodox insights, 
imaginative ideas and innovative solutions, instead of having a bland, conformist, and 
conservative output. In finding a balance between these opposite forms of thinking, the main 
question is whether the strategic reasoning process should actually be a predominantly 
rational affair, or a much more generative process. Is strategizing largely a rational activity, 
requiring logical thinking to be the dominant modus operandi, with occasional bits of 
creativity needed here and there to generate new ideas? Or is strategizing largely a generative 
activity, requiring creative thinking to be the standard operating procedure, with occasional 
bits of logical analysis needed here and there to weed out unfeasible ideas?   
 The answer to this question might be found in the strategic management literature. 
Yet, upon closer inspection, the opinions outlined in both the academic and popular literature 
show that the views vary widely among researchers and executives alike. A wide spectrum of 
differing perspectives can be recognized, each giving their own angle on how strategic 
thinking should use logic and creativity – sometimes explicitly mentioning the need for both, 
but more commonly making implicit assumptions about the role of logic and creativity in 
strategy processes.  
 As was outlined in chapter two, it is not the intention to summarize all of the ‘schools 
of thought’ on the topic of strategic thinking here. Instead, only the two most opposite points 
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of view will be presented in this section. These two poles are not necessarily the most popular 
points of view and at times they might seem somewhat extreme, arguing in terms of ‘black-
and-white’ instead of shades of gray. Yet, as the two pure ‘archetypes’ they do form the 
ultimate pair for developing one dimension of a psychometric instrument.  
At the one end of the spectrum, there are those who argue that strategic reasoning 
should be a predominantly rational process, requiring logic to be the main form of thinking in 
use. This point of view is referred to as the rational reasoning perspective. At the other pole, 
there are those who argue that the essence of strategic reasoning is the ability to break 
through orthodox beliefs and generate new insights and behaviors, requiring the extensive use 
of creativity. This point of view will be referred to as the generative reasoning perspective. 
 
3.4.1 The Rational Reasoning Perspective 
Strategists employing the rational reasoning perspective argue that strategic reasoning is 
predominantly a “logical activity” (Andrews, 1987). To deal with strategic problems the 
strategist must first consciously and thoroughly analyze the problem situation. Data must be 
gathered on all developments external to the organization, and this data must be processed to 
pinpoint the opportunities and threats in the organization's environment. Furthermore, the 
organization itself must be appraised, to uncover its strengths and weaknesses and to establish 
which resources are available. Once the problem has been defined, a number of alternative 
strategies can be identified by matching external opportunities to internal strengths. Then, the 
strategic options must be extensively screened, by evaluating them on a number of criteria, 
such as internal consistency, external consonance, competitive advantage, organizational 
feasibility, potential return and risks. The best strategy can be selected by comparing the 
scores of all options and determining the level of risk the strategist is willing to take. The 
chosen strategy can subsequently be implemented. 
 This type of intellectual effort requires well-developed analytical skills. Strategists 
must be able to rigorously, consistently and objectively comb through huge amounts of data, 
interpreting and combining findings to arrive at a rich picture of the current problem 
situation. Possible solutions require critical appraisal and all possible contingencies must be 
logically thought through. Advocates of the rational reasoning perspective argue that such 
reasoning strongly resembles the problem-solving approach of chess grand masters (Simon, 
1987). They also thoroughly assess their competitive position, sift through a variety of 
options and calculate which course of action brings the best chances of success. Therefore, 
the reasoning processes of chess grand masters can be used as an analogy for what goes on in 
the mind of the strategist. 
 While depicted here as a purely step-by-step process of recognition, analysis, 
formulation and implementation, proponents of the rational reasoning perspective note that in 
reality strategists often have to backtrack and redo some of these steps, as new information 
becomes available or chosen strategies do not work out. Strategists attempt to be as 
comprehensive, consistent and rigorous as possible in their analyses and calculations, but of 
course they cannot know everything and their conclusions are not always perfect. Even with 
the most advanced forecasting techniques, not all developments can be foreseen. Even with 
state of the art market research, some trends can be missed. Even with cutting edge test 
marketing, scenario analyses, competitive simulations and net present value calculations, 
some selected strategies can turn out to be failures. Strategists are not all knowing, and do 
make mistakes – their rationality is limited by incomplete information and imperfect 
cognitive abilities. Yet, strategists try to be as rational as possible. Simon (1957) refers to this 
as bounded rationality – “people act intentionally rational, but only limitedly so”. This 
coincides with Ambrose Bierce's famous sarcastic definition of logic as “the art of thinking 
70
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
54 
and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human 
misunderstanding”. 
 The (boundedly) rational strategist must sometimes improvise to make up for a lack 
of information, but will try to do this as logically as possible. Inferences and speculation will 
always be based on the facts as known. By articulating assumptions and explicitly stating the 
facts and arguments on which conclusions have been based, problem definitions and 
solutions can be debated within the firm, to confirm that they have been arrived at using 
sound reasoning. This strongly resembles the scientific method, in that hypotheses are 
formulated and tested as a means for obtaining new knowledge. Only by this consistent 
alignment of mental models with the empirical reality can the strategist avoid the danger of 
becoming stuck with an outdated cognitive map.  
 The alternative to this rational approach, it is often pointed out, is to be irrational and 
illogical, which surely cannot be a desirable alternative for the strategist. Non-rational 
reasoning comes in a variety of forms. For instance, people's thinking can be guided by their 
emotions. Feelings such as love, hate, guilt, regret, pride, anxiety, frustration, and 
embarrassment, can all cloud the strategist's understanding of a problem situation and the 
possible solutions. Adherents of the rational reasoning perspective do not dispute the 
importance of emotions – the purpose of an organization is often based on “personal values, 
aspirations and ideals”, while the motivation to implement strategies is also rooted in human 
emotions. However, the actual determination of the optimal strategy is a “rational 
undertaking” par excellence (Andrews, 1987: 32). 
 Neither is intuitive thinking an appealing alternative for strategists. Of course, 
intuition can often be useful – decision rules based on extensive experience (cognitive 
heuristics) are often correct (even if they have been arrived at unconsciously) and they save 
time and effort. For example, Simon argues that even chess grand masters make many 
decisions intuitively, based on tacit rules of thumb, formulated through years of experience. 
Yet, intuitive judgments must be viewed with great suspicion, as they are difficult to verify 
and infamously unreliable (e.g. Hogarth, 1980; Schwenk, 1984). Where possible, intuitive 
thinking should be made explicit – the strategist’s cognitive map should be captured on paper 
(e.g. Anthony et al., 1993; Eden, 1989), so that the reasoning of the strategist can be checked 
for logical inconsistencies.  
 Creative thinking is equally suspicious. Of course, creativity techniques can be 
beneficial for triggering some unexpected ideas. Whether it is by means of brainstorming, six 
thinking caps or action art, creative thinking can spark some unconventional thoughts. Even a 
rational scientist like Newton has remarked that “no great discovery was ever made without a 
bold guess”. But this is usually where the usefulness of creativity ends, and to which it should 
be limited. In creative thinking anything goes and that can lead to anything between odd and 
ludicrous. To be able to sift the sane from the zany, logic is needed. To make sense of the 
multitude of new ideas the logical thinker must analyze and evaluate them. A more serious 
drawback is that in practice many ‘creative ideas’ are just someone’s unsupported beliefs, 
dressed up to sound fashionable. ‘Creative thinking’ is often just an excuse for intellectual 
laziness. 
In conclusion, advocates of the rational reasoning perspective argue that emotions, 
intuition, and creativity have a small place in the strategic reasoning process, but that logical 
thinking should be the dominant ingredient. It could be said that the rational reasoning 
process of the strategist strongly resembles that of the scientist. The scientific methods of 
research, analysis, theorizing and falsification are all directly applicable to the process of 
strategic reasoning – so much so, that the scientific method can be used as the benchmark for 
strategy development processes. Consequently, the best preparation for effective strategic 
reasoning would be to be trained in the scientific tradition. 
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3.4.2 The Generative Reasoning Perspective 
Strategists taking a generative reasoning perspective are strongly at odds with the 
unassailable position given to logic in the rational reasoning perspective. They agree that 
logic is important, but stress that it is often more a hindrance than a help. The heavy emphasis 
placed on rationality can actually frustrate the main objective of strategic reasoning – to 
generate novel insights, new ways of defining problems and innovative solutions. Analysis 
can be a useful tool, but as the aim of strategic reasoning is to tear up outdated cognitive 
maps and to reinvent the future, creative thinking should be the driving force, and logical 
thinking a supporting means. For this reason, proponents of the generative reasoning 
perspective argue that strategists should avoid the false certainty projected by rational 
approaches to strategic reasoning, but should nurture creativity as their primary cognitive 
asset. 
 In the generative reasoning perspective emphasis is placed on the wicked nature of 
strategic problems (Rittel, 1972; Mason & Mitroff, 1981). It is argued that strategic problems 
cannot be easily and objectively defined, but that they are open to interpretation from a 
limitless variety of angles. The same is true for the possible solutions – there is no fixed set of 
problem solutions from which the strategist must select the best one. Defining and solving 
strategic problems, it is believed, is fundamentally a creative activity. As such, strategic 
reasoning has very little in common with the thought processes of the aforementioned chess 
grand master, as was presumed by the rationalists. Playing chess is a tame problem. The 
problem definition is clear and all options are known. In the average game of chess, 
consisting of 40 moves, 10120 possibilities have to be considered (Simon, 1972). This makes 
it a difficult game for humans to play, because of their limited computational capacities. 
Chess grand masters are better at making these calculations than other people and are 
particularly good at computational short cuts – recognizing which things to figure out and 
which not. However, even the best chess grand masters have been beaten at the game by 
highly logical computers with a superior number crunching capability. For the poor chess 
grand master, the rules of the game are fixed and there is little room for redefining the 
problem or introducing innovative approaches. 
 Engaging in business strategy is an entirely different matter. Strategic problems are 
wicked. Problem definitions are highly subjective and there are no fixed sets of solutions. It is 
therefore impossible to ‘identify’ the problem and ‘calculate’ an optimal solution. 
Opportunities and threats do not exist, waiting for the analyst to discover them. A strategist 
understands that a situation can be ‘viewed’ as an opportunity and ‘believes’ that certain 
factors can be threatening if not approached properly. Neither can strengths and weaknesses 
be objectively determined – a strategist can employ a company characteristic as a strength, 
but can also turn a unique company quality into a weakness by a lack of vision. Hence, doing 
a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) actually has little to do 
with logical analysis, but in reality is nothing less than a creative interpretation of a problem 
situation. Likewise, it is a fallacy to believe that strategic options follow more or less 
logically from the characteristics of the firm and its environment. Strategic options are not 
‘deduced from the facts’ or selected from a 2x2 matrix, but are dreamt up. Strategists must be 
able to use their imaginations to generate previously unknown solutions. If more than one 
strategic option emerges from the mind of the strategist, these cannot be simply scored and 
ranked to choose the optimal one. Some analyses can be done, but ultimately the strategist 
will have to intuitively judge which vision for the future has the best chance of being created 
in reality. 
 Hence, a generative reasoning process is more than just brainstorming or having a 
wild idea every once in a while. In a generative reasoning process all strategic thinking 
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activities are oriented towards creating, instead of calculating – ‘inventing’ instead of 
‘finding’ (Liedtka, 2000). This type of creative thinking is very hard work, as strategists must 
leave the intellectual safety of generally accepted concepts to explore new ideas, guided by 
little else than their intuition. They must be willing to operate without the security of a 
dominant logic; experimenting, testing, arguing, challenging, doubting and living amongst 
the rubble of demolished certainties, without having new certainties to give them shelter.  
To proponents of the generative reasoning perspective, it is essential for strategists to 
have a slightly contrarian (Hurst, Rush and White, 1989), revolutionary predisposition 
(Hamel, 1996). Strategists must enjoy the challenge of thinking ‘out of the box’, even when 
this disrupts the status quo and is not much appreciated by those with their two feet (stuck) on 
the ground. As Picasso once remarked, “every act of creation is first of all an act of 
destruction” – strategists must enjoy the task of eroding old paradigms and confronting the 
defenders of these beliefs. And if some analyses can be done to support this effort, then they 
can serve a valuable purpose in the overall strategy process. 
 In conclusion, advocates of the generative reasoning perspective argue that the 
essence of strategic reasoning is the ability to creatively challenge “the tyranny of the given” 
(Kao, 1996) and to generate new and unique ways of understanding and doing things. As 
such, strategic reasoning closely resembles the frame-breaking behavior common in the arts. 
In fields such as painting, music, motion pictures, dancing and architecture, artists are 
propelled by the drive to challenge convention and to seek out innovative approaches. Many 
of their methods, such as brainstorming, experimentation, openness to intuition, and the use 
of metaphors, contradictions and tensions, are directly applicable to developing strategy. 
Consequently, the best preparation for strategic reasoning might actually be to be trained in 
the artistic tradition of iconoclastic creativity and mental flexibility. 
 
TABLE 3.1   
Rational reasoning versus generative reasoning perspective  
 
 Rational Reasoning Perspective Generative Reasoning Perspective 
Emphasis on Logic over creativity  Creativity over logic  
Dominant cognitive style  Analytical  Intuitive 
Thinking follows  Formal, fixed rules Informal, variable rules 
Nature of thinking Deductive and computational Inductive and imaginative 
Direction of thinking Vertical Lateral 
Problem defining seen as Recognizing and analyzing activities Reflecting and sense-making activities 
Problem solving seen as Formulation and execution activities Imagining and doing activities 
Value placed on Consistency and rigor Unorthodoxy and innovativeness 
Assumption about reality Objective, (partially) knowable Subjective, (partially) creatable 
Thinking hindered by Incomplete information Adherence to current cognitive map 
Decisions based on Calculation Judgment 
Metaphor Strategy as science Strategy as art 
  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
So, how do executives believe they should engage in strategic reasoning processes and how 
do they feel they should encourage fruitful strategic reasoning within their organizations? 
73
Chapter 3: Strategic Thinking  
57 
Should executives view strategic reasoning primarily as a rational and deductive activity, or 
as a more imaginative and generative process? Should strategists train themselves to follow 
procedural rationality – rigorously analyzing problems using scientific methods and 
calculating the optimal course of action? Or should strategists practice to ‘boldly go where no 
one has gone before’ – redefining problems and inventing new courses of action? The main 
differences between the rational reasoning perspective and the generative reasoning 
perspective are outlined in table 3.1. 
To measure what executives actually think about strategic thinking, these two 
opposite poles need to be translated into statements or items that can be judged by executives. 
In table 3.2, two sets of opposing policy statements have been formulated on the basis of the 
two strategy perspectives, which can be used as part of a psychometric instrument for 
capturing executives’ strategy perspectives. These statements will be revisited in chapter 14. 
 
TABLE 3.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
 
Rational Reasoning Perspective Generative Reasoning Perspective 
1.1 
To understand strategic issues, successful 
managers depend heavily on their analytical 
capabilities. 
2.1 
To understand strategic issues, successful 
managers depend heavily on their intuitive 
capabilities. 
1.2 Formulating strategies requires strong logical thinking. 2.2 
Formulating strategies requires strong creative 
thinking. 
1.3 Managers should identify opportunities and threats in an objective way. 2.3 
Managers should evaluate what should be 
seen as opportunities and threats based on 
their subjective judgment. 
1.4 Managers should be highly rational in developing strategy. 2.4 
Managers should be highly unorthodox in 
developing strategy. 
1.5 
Strategic decision-making should be based on 
insights generated through scientific research 
methods. 
2.5 Strategic decision-making should be based on insights generated through experience. 
1.6 Managers should review all possible options and calculate which one is most attractive. 2.6 
Managers should creatively generate a few 
options and pick the one they feel is most 
attractive. 
1.7 Strategies should be based on facts, not on impressions. 2.7 
For strategists having a clear vision is more 
important than knowing the cold facts. 
1.8 It is dangerous to take bold strategic action without extensive market analysis. 2.8 
Bold new strategic ideas can easily be killed by 
colleagues wanting more analysis.    
1.9 Generating new strategic options is easy, but evaluating which will be successful is hard. 2.9 Strategizing requires imagination. 
1.10 
The biggest problem in understanding a new 
strategic issue is usually a lack of relevant 
information. 
2.10 
The biggest problem in understanding a new 
strategic issue is usually people’s existing 
opinions. 
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1.11 Strategizing should be driven by analysis and supported by creativity. 2.11 
Strategizing should be driven by creativity and 
supported by analysis. 
1.12 
The difference between a good and an 
excellent manager is the discipline to 
rigorously diagnose each new strategic issue. 
2.12 
The difference between a good and an 
excellent manager is the imagination to see 
opportunities before they become obvious. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
STRATEGY FORMATION  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are many definitions of strategy and many ideas of how strategies should be made. In 
the introduction of the strategy process section of this book, our definition of strategy was 
kept basic, to encompass the large majority of these different views – strategy is a course of 
action for achieving an organization's purpose. Taking this definition as a starting point, a 
major distinction can be observed between people who see strategy as an intended course of 
action and those who regard strategy as a realized course of action. Mintzberg and Waters 
(1985) have remarked that these two views of strategy are not contradictory, but 
complementary. Intended strategy is what individuals or organizations formulate prior to 
action (a pattern of decisions), while realized strategy refers to the strategic behavior 
exhibited in practice (a pattern of actions). Of course, not all behavior is necessarily strategic 
– if the actions do not follow a pattern directed at achieving the organization’s purpose, it 
does not qualify as strategy.   
 The process by which an intended strategy is created is called strategy formulation. 
Normally strategy formulation is followed by strategy implementation. However, intentions 
sometimes end up not being put into practice – plans can be changed or cancelled along the 
way. The process by which a realized strategy is formed is called strategy formation. What is 
realized might be based on an intended strategy, but it can also be the result of unplanned 
actions as time goes by. In other words, the process of strategy formation encompasses both 
formulation and action. Strategy formation is the entire process leading to strategic behavior 
in practice.  
For executives with the responsibility for getting results, it would be too limited to 
only look at the process of strategy formulation and to worry about implementation at a later 
moment. Executives must ask themselves how the entire process of strategy formation should 
be managed to get their organizations to act strategically. Who should be involved, which 
activities need to be undertaken and to what extent can strategy be formulated in advance? In 
short, for executives finding a way to realize a strategic pattern of actions is the key issue. 
In this chapter, the issue of realizing strategy will be the central focus of discussion. 
The intention is to describe the main elements involved in this issue, leading up to a 
discussion of the differing perspectives on strategy formation. As before, the chapter will be 
concluded with a list of opposite statements representing the two opposing views on this 
topic. 
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4.2 THE ISSUE OF REALIZED STRATEGY 
 
Getting an organization to exhibit strategic behavior is what all strategists aim to achieve. 
Preparing detailed analyses, drawing up plans, making extensive slide presentations and 
holding long meetings might all be necessary means to achieve this end, but ultimately it is 
the organization’s actions directed at the market place that count. The key issue facing 
executives is, therefore, how this strategic behavior can be attained. How can a successful 
course of action be realized in practice? 
 To answer these questions, it is first necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the 
‘who’ and ‘what’ of strategy formation – what type of strategy formation activities need to be 
carried out and ‘what type of strategy formation roles need to be filled by whom’. Both 
questions will be examined in the following sections.        
 
4.2.1 Strategy Formation Activities 
In chapter 3 it was argued that the process of strategic reasoning could be divided into four 
general categories of activities – identifying, diagnosing, conceiving and realizing. These 
strategic problem solving activities, taking place in the mind of the strategist, are in essence 
the same as those encountered in organizations at large. Organizations also need to ‘solve 
strategic problems’ and achieve at successful pattern of actions. The difference is that the 
organizational context – involving many more people, with different experiences, 
perspectives, personalities, interests and values – leads to different requirements for 
structuring the process. Getting people within an organization to exhibit strategic behavior 
necessitates the exchange of information and ideas, decision-making procedures, 
communication channels, the allocation of resources and the coordination of actions.   
When translated to an organizational environment, the four general elements of the 
strategic reasoning process can be further divided into the eight basic building blocks of the 
strategy formation process, as illustrated in figure 4.1. 
 
Strategic Issue Identification Activities 
If a strategy is seen as an answer to a perceived ‘problem’ or ‘issue’, executives must have 
some idea of what the problem is. ‘Identifying’ refers to all activities contributing to a better 
understanding of what should be viewed as problematic – what constitutes an important 
opportunity or threat that must be attended to if the organization’s purpose is to be met. The 
key activities here are: 
 
 Mission setting. What the organization sees as an issue will in part depend on its mission 
– the enduring set of fundamental principles outlining what purpose the organization 
wishes to serve, in what domain and under which conditions. A company’s mission, 
encompassing its core values, beliefs, business definition and purpose, forms the basis of 
the organization’s identity and sets the basic conditions under which the organization 
wishes to function. Where a company has a clearly developed mission, shared by all key 
players in the organization, this will strongly color its filtering of strategic issues. The 
mission does not necessarily have to be formally captured in a mission statement, but can 
be informally internalized as a part of the company culture.    
 Agenda setting. Besides the organizational mission as screening mechanism, many other 
factors can contribute to the focusing of organizational attention on specific strategic 
issues. For instance, the cognitive map of each strategist will influence which 
environmental and organizational developments are identified as issues. Furthermore, 
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group culture will have an impact on which issues are discussable, which are off-limits to 
open debate, and under what conditions discussions should take place. Getting people to 
sit up and take notice will also depend on each actor’s communication and political skills, 
as well as their sources of power, both formal and informal. Together these attention-
focusing factors determine which issues are picked up on the ‘organizational radar 
screen’, discussed and looked into further. It is said that these issues make it on to the 
organizational agenda, while all other potential problems receive less or no attention.  
FIGURE 4.1   
The main strategy formation activities 
 
Agenda
Setting
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Mission
Setting
Performance
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Strategic Issue Diagnosis Activities 
To come to grips with a ‘problem’ or ‘issue’, executives must try to comprehend its structure 
and its underlying causes. Especially since most strategic issues are not simple and 
straightforward, but complex and messy, it is very important to gain a deeper understanding 
of ‘what is going on’ – which ‘variables’ are there and how are they inter-related? This part 
of the strategy formation processes can be divided into the following activities: 
 
 External assessment. The activity of investigating the structure and dynamics of the 
environment surrounding the organization is commonly referred to as an external 
assessment or analysis. Typically such a diagnosis of the outside world includes both a 
scan of the direct (market) environment and the broader (contextual) environment. In both 
cases the analyst wants to move beyond observed behavior, to understand ‘what makes 
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the system tick’. What is the underlying structure of the industry and the market that is 
conditioning each party’s behavior? And what are the characteristics and strategies of 
each important actor, including customers, competitors, suppliers, distributors, unions, 
governments and financiers? Furthermore, only understanding the current state of affairs 
is generally insufficient, making it necessary to analyze in which direction external 
circumstances are developing. Which trends can be discerned, which factors seem to be 
driving the industry and market dynamics, and can these be used to forecast or estimate 
future developments?  
 Internal assessment. The activity of investigating the capabilities and functioning of the 
organization is commonly referred to as an internal assessment or analysis. Typically 
such a diagnosis of the inner workings of the organization includes an assessment of the 
business system with which the firm creates value and the organizational system that has 
been developed to facilitate the business system. When dissecting the business system, 
attention is directed at understanding the resources and chain of value-adding activities 
that enable the firm to offer a set of products and services. To gain insight into the 
functioning of the organizational system, it is necessary to determine the structure of the 
organization, the processes used to control and coordinate the various people and units, 
and the organizational culture. In all these analyses a mere snapshot of the firm is 
generally insufficient – the direction in which the organization is developing must also be 
examined, including a consideration of the main change drivers and change inhibitors. 
Furthermore, for strategy making it is important to compare how the organization scores 
on all aforementioned factors compared to rival firms. 
Strategy Conception Activities 
To deal with a strategic ‘problem’ or ‘issue’, executives must come up with a potential 
solution. A course of action must be found that will allow the organization to relate itself to 
the environment in such a way that it will be able to achieve its purpose. ‘Conceiving’ refers 
to all activities that contribute to determining which course of action should be pursued. In 
this part of the strategy formation process, the following categories of activities can be 
discerned: 
 
 Option generation. Creating potential strategies is what option generation is about. 
Sometimes executives will immediately jump at one specific course of action, limiting 
their strategic option generation activities to only one prime candidate. However, many 
executives will be inclined to explore a number of different avenues for approaching a 
specific strategic issue, thereby generating multiple strategic options. Each option can 
range in detail from a general outline of actions to be taken, up until a full blown strategic 
plan, specifying goals, actions, tasks, responsibilities, resource allocation, milestones and 
performance measures. Which questions each strategic option should address, is the main 
focus of discussion in the strategy content section of this book.  
 Option selection. The potential ‘solutions’ formulated by executives must be evaluated to 
decide whether they should be acted upon. It must be weighed whether the strategic 
option generated will actually lead to the results required and then it must be concluded 
whether to act accordingly. Especially where two or more strategic options have come 
forward, executives need to judge which one of them is most attractive to act on. This 
screening of strategic options is done on the basis of evaluation criteria, for instance 
perceived risk, anticipated benefits, the organization’s capacity to execute, expected 
competitor reactions and follow-up possibilities. Sometimes a number of the evaluation 
criteria used are formally articulated, but generally the evaluation will at least be partially 
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based on the experience and judgment of the decision-makers involved. Together, these 
activities of assessing strategic options and arriving at a selected course of action are also 
referred to as the strategic decision-making.  
Strategy Realization Activities 
A strategic ‘problem’ or ‘issue’ can only be resolved if concrete actions are undertaken that 
achieve results. Executives must make adjustments to their business or organizational system, 
or initiate actions in the market – they must not only think, talk and decide, but also do, to 
have a tangible impact. ‘Realizing’ refers to all these practical actions performed by the 
organization. If there is a clear pattern to these actions, it can be said that there is a realized 
strategy. In this part of the strategy formation process, the following activities can be 
distinguished:  
 
 Action taking. A potential problem solution must be carried out – intended actions must 
be implemented to become realized actions. This performing of tangible actions 
encompasses all aspects of a firm’s functioning. All hands-on activities, more commonly 
referred to as ‘work’, fall into this category – everything from setting up and operating the 
business system, to getting the organizational system to function on a day-to-day basis.  
 Performance control. Executives must also measure whether the actions being taken in 
the organization are in line with the option selected and whether the results are in line 
with what was anticipated. This reflection on the actions being undertaken can be 
informal, and even unconscious, but it can be formally structured into a performance 
monitoring and measuring system as well. Such performance measurement can be 
employed to assess how well certain people and organizational units are doing vis-à-vis 
set objectives. Incentives can be linked to achieving targets, and corrective steps can be 
taken to ensure conformance to an intended course of action. However, deviation from 
the intended strategy can also be a signal to reevaluate the original solution or even to 
reevaluate the problem definition itself. An important issue when engaging in 
performance control is the determination of which performance indicators will be used – 
micro measuring all aspects of the organization’s functioning is generally much too 
unwieldy and time-consuming. Some executives prefer a few simple measures, 
sometimes quantitative (e.g. financial indicators), sometimes qualitative (e.g. are clients 
satisfied?), while others prefer more extensive and varied measures, such as a balanced 
scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Simons, 1995).   
Note that these strategy formation activities have not been labeled ‘steps’ or ‘phases’. While 
these eight activities have been presented in an order that seems to suggest a logical sequence 
of steps, it remains to be seen in which order they should be carried out in practice. In figure 
4.1 the black arrows represent the logical clockwise sequence, similar to the rational 
reasoning process discussed in chapter 3. The red arrows represent the possibility to jump 
back and forth between the strategy formation activities, similar to the irregular pattern 
exhibited in the generative reasoning process in chapter 3.  
 
4.2.2 Strategy Formation Roles 
In all strategy formation processes the abovementioned activities need to be carried out. 
However, there can be significant differences in who carries out which activities. Roles in the 
strategy formation process can vary as tasks and responsibilities are divided in alternative 
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ways. The main variations are due to a different division of labor along the following 
dimensions: 
 
 Top vs. middle vs. bottom roles. Strategy formation activities are rarely the exclusive 
domain of the CEO. Only in the most extreme cases will a CEO run a ‘one-man show’, 
carrying out all activities except realization. Usually some activities will be divided 
among members of the top management team, while other activities will be pushed 
further down to divisional executives, business unit executives, and department 
executives (e.g. Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1983; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). Some 
activities might be delegated or carried out together with people even further down the 
hierarchy, including employees on the work floor. For activities such as external and 
internal assessment and option generation it is more common to see participation by 
people lower in the organization, while top management generally retains the 
responsibility for selecting, or at least deciding on, which strategic option to follow. The 
recurrent theme in this question of the vertical division of activities is how far down 
activities can and should be pushed – how much empowerment of middle and lower 
levels is beneficial for the organization?  
 Line vs. staff roles. By definition line executives are responsible for realization of 
strategic options pertaining to the primary process of the organization. Because they are 
responsible for achieving results, they are often also given the responsibility to participate 
in conceiving the strategies they will have to realize. Potentially, line executives can carry 
out all strategy formation activities without staff support. However, many organizations 
do have staff members involved in the strategy formation process. Important staff input 
can come from all existing departments, while some organizations institute special 
strategy departments to take care of strategy formation activities. The responsibilities of 
such strategy departments can vary from general process facilitation, to process 
ownership to full responsibility for strategy formulation. 
 Internal vs. external roles. Strategy formation activities are generally seen as an important 
part of every executive’s portfolio of tasks. Yet, not all activities need to be carried out by 
members of the organization, but can be ‘outsourced’ to outsiders (e.g. Robinson, 1982). 
It is not uncommon for firms to hire external agencies to perform diagnosis activities or to 
facilitate the strategy formation process in general. Some organizations have external 
consultants engaged in all aspects of the process, even to the extent that the outside 
agency has the final responsibility for drawing up the strategic options. 
 
In organizing the strategy formation process, a key question is how formalized the 
assignment of activities to the various potential process participants should be. The advantage 
of formalization is that it structures and disciplines the strategy formation process (e.g. 
Chakravarthy & Lorange, 1991; Hax & Maljuf, 1984). Especially in large organizations, 
where many people are involved, it can be valuable to keep the process tightly organized. 
Formalization can be achieved by the establishment of a strategic planning system. In such a 
system, strategy formation steps can be scheduled, tasks can be specified, responsibilities can 
be assigned, decision-making authority can be clarified, budgets can be allocated and 
evaluation mechanisms can be put in place. Generally, having unambiguous responsibilities, 
clearer accountability and stricter review of performance will lead to a better functioning 
organization. The added benefit of formalization is that it gives top management more control 
over the organization, as all major changes must be part of approved plans and the 
implementation of plans is checked. 
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 Yet, there is a potential danger in using formal planning systems as a means to make 
strategy. Formalization strongly emphasizes those aspects which can be neatly organized 
such as meetings, writing reports, giving presentations, making decisions, allocating 
resources and reviewing progress, while having difficulty with essential strategy making 
activities that are difficult to capture in procedures. Important aspects such as creating new 
insights, learning, innovation, building political support and entrepreneurship can be side-
lined or crushed if rote bureaucratic mechanisms are used to produce strategy. Moreover, 
planning bureaucracies, once established, can come to live a life of their own, creating rules, 
regulations, procedures, checks, paperwork, schedules, deadlines, and double-checks, making 
the system inflexible, unresponsive, ineffective and demotivating (e.g. Marx, 1991; 
Mintzberg, 1994). 
 
 
4.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN DELIBERATENESS AND EMERGENCE 
 
Strategy has to do with the future. And the future is unknown. This makes strategy a 
fascinating, yet frustrating, topic. Fascinating because the future can still be shaped and 
strategy can be used to achieve this aim. Frustrating because the future is unpredictable, 
undermining the best of intentions, thus demanding flexibility and adaptability. To 
executives, the idea of creating the future is highly appealing, yet the prospect of sailing for 
terra incognita without a compass is unsettling at best. 
 This duality of wanting to intentionally design the future, while needing to gradually 
explore, learn and adapt to an unfolding reality, is the tension central to the topic of strategy 
formation. It is the conflicting need to figure things out in advance, versus the need to find 
things out along the way. One the one hand, executives would like to forecast the future and 
to orchestrate plans to prepare for it. Yet, on the other hand, executives understand that 
experimentation, learning and flexibility are needed to deal with the fundamental 
unpredictability of future events. 
In their influential article, Of Strategies: Deliberate and Emergent, Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) were one of the first to explicitly focus on this tension. They argued that a 
distinction should be made between deliberate and emergent strategy (see figure 4.2). Where 
realized strategies were fully intended, one can speak of deliberate strategy. However, 
realized strategies can also come about “despite, or in the absence of, intentions”, which 
Mintzberg and Waters labeled emergent strategy. In their view, few strategies were purely 
deliberate or emergent, but usually a mix between the two. 
Hence, in realizing strategic behavior executives need to blend the conflicting 
demands for deliberate strategizing and strategy emergence. In the following sections both 
sides of this tension between deliberateness and emergence will be examined further. 
 
4.3.1 The Demand for Deliberate Strategizing 
Deliberateness refers to the quality of acting intentionally. When people act deliberately, they 
‘think’ before they ‘do’. They make a plan and then implement the plan. A plan is an 
intended course of action, stipulating which measures a person or organization proposes to 
take. In common usage, plans are assumed to be articulated (made explicit) and documented 
(written down), although strictly speaking this is not necessary to qualify as a plan. 
 As an intended course of action, a plan is a means towards an end. A plan details 
which actions will be undertaken to reach a particular objective. In practice, however, plans 
can exist without explicit objectives. In such cases, the objectives are implicitly wrapped up 
in the plan – the plan incorporates both ends and means. 
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FIGURE 4.2   
Deliberate and emergent strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) 
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All organizations need to plan. At the operational level, most firms will have some degree of 
production planning, resource planning, manpower planning and financial planning, to name 
just a few. When it comes to strategic behavior, there are also a number of prominent 
advantages that strongly pressure organizations to engage in deliberate strategizing: 
 
 Direction. Plans give organizations a sense of direction. Without objectives and plans, 
organizations would be adrift. If organizations did not decide where they wanted to go, 
any direction and any activity would be fine. People in organizations would not know 
what they were working towards and therefore would not be able to judge what 
constitutes effective behavior (e.g. Ansoff, 1965; Chakravarthy and Lorange, 1991). 
 Commitment. Plans enable early commitment to a course of action. By setting objectives 
and drawing up a plan to accomplish these, organizations can invest resources, train 
people, build up production capacity and take a clear position within their environment. 
Plans allow organizations to mobilize themselves and to dare to take actions that are 
difficult to reverse and have a long payback period (e.g. Ghemawat, 1991; Marx, 1991).  
 Coordination. Plans have the benefit of coordinating all strategic initiatives within an 
organization into a single cohesive pattern. An organization-wide master plan can ensure 
that differences of opinion are ironed out and one consistent course of action is followed 
throughout the entire organization, avoiding overlapping, conflicting and contradictory 
behavior (e.g. Ackoff, 1980; Andrews, 1987).  
 Optimization. Plans also facilitate optimal resource allocation. Drawing up a plan 
disciplines strategizing executives to explicitly consider all available information and 
consciously evaluate all available options. This allows executives to choose the optimal 
course of action, before committing resources. Moreover, documented plans permit 
corporate level executives to compare the courses of action proposed by their various 
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business units and to allocate scarce resources to the most promising initiatives (e.g. 
Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990; Bower, 1970).  
 Programming. Last, but not least, plans are a means for programming all organizational 
activities in advance. Having detailed plans allows organizations to be run with the 
clockwork precision, reliability and efficiency of a machine. Activities that might 
otherwise be plagued by poor organization, inconsistencies, redundant routines, random 
behavior, helter-skelter fire fighting and chaos, can be programmed and controlled if 
plans are drawn up (e.g. Grinyer et al., 1986; Steiner, 1979).  
 
Given these major advantages, it can come as no surprise that organizations feel the pressure 
to engage in deliberate strategizing. Deliberateness is a quality that the strategy formation 
process cannot do without. 
  
4.3.2 The Demand for Strategy Emergence 
Emergence is the process of becoming apparent. A strategy emerges when it comes into 
being along the way. Where there are no plans, or people divert from their plans, but their 
behavior is still strategic, it can be said that the strategy is emergent – gradually shaped 
during an iterative process of ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’. 
 Emergent strategy differs from ad hoc behavior in that a coherent pattern of action 
does evolve. While executives may have no prior intentions, they can explore, learn, and 
piece together a consistent set of behaviors over time. Such an approach of letting strategy 
emerge has a number of major advantages that organizations also need to consider:   
 
 Opportunism. As the future is unknown and therefore unpredictable, organizations must 
retain enough mental freedom to grab unforeseen opportunities as they emerge. 
Organizations must keep an open mind to sense where positive and negative 
circumstances are unfolding, so that they can respond rapidly to these new conditions – 
proactively riding the wave of opportunity, using the momentum in the environment 
and/or the organization to their advantage. This ability to ‘play the field’ is an important 
factor in effective strategy formation (e.g. Quinn, 2002; Stacey, 2001).  
 Flexibility. Not only must executives keep an open mind, they must keep their options 
open as well, by not unnecessarily committing themselves to irreversible actions and 
investments. Letting strategy emerge means not prematurely locking the organization in 
to a preset course of action, but keeping alternatives open for as long as practically 
possible. And where commitments must to be made, executives need to select ‘robust’ 
options, which permit a lot of leeway to shift along with unfolding events. This pressure 
to remain flexible is also an important demand on strategizing executives (e.g. 
Beinhocker, 1999; Evans, 1991).  
 Learning. Often, the best way to find out what works is to give it a try – to act before you 
know. Letting strategy emerge is based on the same principle, that to learn what will be 
successful in the market must be discovered by experimentation, pilot projects, trial runs 
and gradual steps. Through the feedback obtained by hands-on ‘doing’, a rich insight can 
grow into what really works. As Thomas Alva Edison is well known for remarking, 
invention is 5% inspiration and 95% perspiration, and this is probably equally true for 
‘inventing the corporate future’. Learning is hard work, but it is an essential part of 
strategy formation (e.g. Pascale, 1984; Mintzberg, 1994).   
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 Entrepreneurship. Building on the previous point, often the best way to find out what 
works is to let various people give it a try – to tap into the entrepreneurial spirits within 
the organization. Different people in the organization will have different strategic ideas 
and many of them will feel passionately about proving that their idea ‘can fly’. By 
providing individuals, teams and/or entire units with a measure of autonomy to pursue 
innovative initiatives, firms can use the energy of intrapreneurs within the organization, 
instead of forcing them to conform or start on their own (e.g. Amabile, 1998; Pinchot, 
1985). As true incubators, firms can facilitate various divergent projects simultaneously, 
increasing commitment or closing them down as their potential unfolds (e.g. Burgelman, 
1983, 1991; Lyon, Lumpkin and Dess, 2000).  
 Support. A major shift in strategy generally requires a major shift in the political and 
cultural landscape of an organization – careers will be affected, vested departmental 
interests will be impacted and cultural values and beliefs will be challenged. Rarely can 
such shifts be imposed top-down by decree. Getting things done in organizations includes 
building coalitions, blocking rivals, convincing wavering parties, confronting opposing 
ideas and letting things ‘sink in’, all with the intention of gradually building enough 
support to move forward. Yet, finding out where enough support can be mustered to 
move forward, and where side steps or even reversals are needed, is an on-going process 
and cannot be predicted in advance. Hence, strategizing executives must understand the 
internal political and cultural dynamics of their organizations and pragmatically shape 
strategy depending on what is feasible, not on what is ideal (e.g. Allison, 1971; Quinn, 
1980). 
Each of these points seems to be the opposite counterpart of the advantages of deliberate 
strategizing – while deliberateness creates commitment, emergence allows for flexibility; 
while deliberateness gives direction, emergence allows for opportunism; while deliberateness 
facilitates fixed programming, emergence allows for on-going learning. This places 
executives in a paradoxical position. While both deliberate strategizing and strategy 
emergence seem to have advantageous characteristics, they are each other’s opposites and are 
to a certain extent contradictory – a firm cannot be fully committed to detailed and 
coordinated long term plans, while simultaneously adapting itself flexibly and 
opportunistically to unfolding circumstances, ongoing learning and unpredictable political 
and cultural processes. With two conflicting demands placed on the strategy formation 
process at the same time, executives need to choose one at the expense of the other, trying to 
strike the best possible balance between deliberateness and emergence.  
 
 
4.4 PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGY FORMATION 
 
In Hollywood, most directors don’t start shooting a movie until the script and storyboard are 
entirely completed – the script details each actors words, expression and gestures, while the 
storyboard graphically depicts how each scene will look in terms of camera angles, lighting, 
backgrounds and stage props. Together they form a master plan, representing the initial 
intentions of the director. However, it frequently happens that a director has a new insight, 
and changes are made to the script or storyboard “on the fly”. Yet, on the whole, most 
‘realized movies’ are fairly close to directors’ intentions. 
 For some directors this is madness. They might have a movie idea, but in their mind’s 
eye they cannot yet picture it in its final form. Some elements might have already crystallized 
in their thoughts, but other parts of the film can only be worked out once the cameras are 
rolling and the actors start playing their roles. In this way, directors can let movies emerge 
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without having a detailed script or storyboard in advance to guide them. It can be said that 
such movies are shaped by gradually blending together a number of small intentional steps 
over a long period of time, instead of taking one big step of making a master plan and 
implementing it. This approach of taking many small steps is called incrementalism. 
 The question is how this works for executives making strategy. Is it best to 
deliberately draw up a storyboard for the firm and trust that the ‘actors’ are flexible enough to 
adapt to minor changes in the script as time goes by? Or is the idea of a master plan 
misplaced, and are the best results achieved by developing a strategy incrementally, 
emergently responding to opportunities and threats as they unfold along the way? In short, 
how should strategizing executives strike a balance between deliberateness and emergence? 
 Views on how to strike a balance seem to differ strongly, both in academia and among 
executives. In both the academic journals and the practitioner-oriented literature, a wide 
spectrum of views can be observed on how executives should engage in strategy formation. 
While some writers suggest that there might be different styles in balancing deliberateness 
and emergence (e.g. Chaffee, 1985; Hart, 1992), most seem intent on offering ‘the best way’ 
to approach the issue of strategy formation – which often differs significantly from ‘the best 
way’ advised by others.  
Therefore, this seems to be a fundamental dimension along which views differ, 
making it the second dimension which is potentially usable for measuring different strategy 
perspectives. At one pole we find those executives and theorists who strongly emphasize 
deliberateness over emergence. They argue that organizations should strive to make strategy 
in a highly deliberate manner, by first explicitly formulating comprehensive plans, and only 
then implementing them. In accordance with common usage, this point of view shall be 
referred to as the strategic planning perspective. At the other pole are those who strongly 
emphasize emergence of deliberateness, arguing that in reality most new strategies emerge 
over time and that organizations should facilitate this messy, fragmented, piecemeal strategy 
formation process. This point of view shall be referred to as the strategic incrementalism 
perspective. Both will be described in more detail below. 
 
4.4.1 The Strategic Planning Perspective 
Advocates of the strategic planning perspective argue that strategies should be deliberately 
planned and executed. In their view, anything that emerges unplanned is not really strategy. 
A successful pattern of action that was not intended can not be called strategy, but should be 
seen for what it is – brilliant improvisation or just plain luck (Andrews, 1987). However, 
executives cannot afford to count on their good fortune or skill at muddling through. They 
must put time and effort into consciously formulating an explicit plan, making use of all 
available information and weighing all of the strategic alternatives. Tough decisions need to 
be made and priorities need to be set, before action is taken. ‘Think before you act’ is the 
strategic planning perspective's motto. But once a strategic plan has been adopted, action 
should be swift, efficient and controlled. Implementation must be secured by detailing the 
activities to be undertaken, assigning responsibilities to executives and holding them 
accountable for achieving results (e.g. Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990; Chakravarthy and 
Lorange, 1991). 
 Hence, in the strategic planning perspective, strategies are intentionally designed, 
much as an engineer designs a bridge. Building a bridge requires a long formulation phase, 
including extensive analysis of the situation, the drawing up of a number of rough designs, 
evaluation of these alternatives, choice of a preferred design, and further detailing in the form 
of a blueprint. Only after the design phase has been completed, do the construction 
companies take over and build according to plan. Characteristic of such a planning approach 
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to producing bridges and strategies is that the entire process can be disassembled into a 
number of distinct steps, that need to be carried out in a sequential and orderly manner. Only 
by going through these steps in a conscious and structured manner will the best results be 
obtained (e.g. Armstrong, 1982; Powell, 1992). 
 For advocates of the strategic planning perspective, the whole purpose of strategizing 
is to give organizations direction, instead of letting them drift. Organizations cannot act 
rationally without intentions – if you do not know where you are going, any behavior is fine, 
which soon degenerates into muddling through (e.g. Ansoff, 1991; Steiner, 1979). By first 
setting a goal and then choosing a strategy to get there, organizations can get ‘organized’. 
Executives can select actions that are efficient and effective within the context of the strategy. 
A structure can be chosen, tasks can be assigned, responsibilities can be divided, budgets can 
be allotted, and targets can be set. Not unimportantly, a control system can be created to 
measure results in comparison to the plan, so that corrective action can be taken. 
 Another advantage of the planning approach to strategy formation is that it allows for 
the formalization and differentiation of strategy tasks. Because of its highly structured and 
sequential nature, strategic planning lends itself well to formalization. The steps of the 
strategic planning approach can be captured in planning systems (e.g. Kukalis, 1991; Lorange 
and Vancil, 1977), and procedures can be developed to further enhance and organize the 
strategy formation process. In such strategic planning systems, not all elements of strategy 
formation need to be carried out by one and the same person, but can be divided among a 
number of people. The most important division of labor is often between those formulating 
the plans and those implementing them. In many large companies the executives proposing 
the plans are also the ones implementing them, but deciding on the plans is passed up to a 
higher level. Often other tasks are spun off as well, or shared with others, such as diagnosis 
(strategy department or external consultants), implementation (staff departments) and 
evaluation (corporate planner and controller). Such task differentiation and specialization, it 
is argued, can lead to a better use of management talent, much as the division of labor has 
improved the field of production. At the same, having a formalized system allows for 
sufficient coordination and mutual adjustment, to make ensure that all specialized elements 
are integrated back into a consistent organization-wide strategy (e.g. Grinyer et al., 1986; 
Jelinek, 1979). 
 Last, but not least, an advantage of strategic planning is that it encourages long-term 
thinking and commitment. ‘Muddling through’ is short-term oriented, dealing with issues of 
strategic importance as they come up or as a crisis develops. Strategic planning, on the other 
hand, directs attention to the future. Executives making strategic plans have to take a more 
long-term view and are stimulated to prepare for, or even create, the future (Ackoff, 1980). 
Instead of just focusing on small steps, planning challenges executives to define a desirable 
future and to work towards it. Instead of wavering and opportunism, strategic planning 
commits the organization to a course of action and allows for investments to be made at the 
present that may only pay off in the long run (e.g. Ansoff, 1991; Miller and Cardinal, 1994). 
 One of the difficulties of strategic planning, advocates of this perspective will readily 
admit, is that plans will always be based on assumptions about how future events will unfold. 
Plans require forecasts. And as the Danish physicist Niels Bohr once joked, “prediction is 
very difficult, especially about the future.” Even enthusiastic planners acknowledge that 
forecasts will be inaccurate. As Makridakis, the most prolific writer on the topic of 
forecasting, writes (1990: 66), “the future can be predicted only by extrapolating from the 
past, yet it is fairly certain that the future will be different from the past.” Consequently, it is 
clear that rigid long-range plans based on such unreliable forecasts would amount to nothing 
less than Russian roulette. Most proponents of the strategic planning perspective therefore 
caution for overly deterministic plans. Some argue in favor of contingency planning, whereby 
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a number of alternative plans are held in reserve in case key variables in the environment 
suddenly change. These contingency plans are commonly based on different future scenarios 
(Van der Heijden, 2002; Wilson, 2000). Others argue that organizations should stage regular 
reviews, and realign the strategic plans to match the altered circumstances. This is usually 
accomplished by going through the planning cycle every year, and adapting strategic plans to 
fit with the new forecasts. 
 The strategic planning perspective shares many of the assumptions underlying the 
rational reasoning perspective discussed in chapter 3. Both perspectives value systematic, 
orderly, consistent, logical reasoning and assume that humans are capable of forming a fairly 
good understanding of reality. And both are based on a calculative and optimizing view of 
strategy making. It is, therefore, not surprising that many executives who are rationally 
inclined also exhibit a distinct preference for the strategic planning perspective.  
 
4.4.2 The Strategic Incrementalism Perspective 
To advocates of the strategic incrementalism perspective, the planners’ faith in deliberateness 
is misplaced and counterproductive. In reality, incrementalists argue, new strategies largely 
emerge over time, as executives proactively piece together a viable course of action or 
reactively adapt to unfolding circumstances. The strategy formation process is not about 
rigidly setting the course of action in advance, but about flexibly shaping the course of action 
by gradually blending together initiatives into a coherent pattern of actions. Making strategy 
involves sense making, reflecting, learning, envisioning, experimenting and changing the 
organization, which cannot be neatly organized and programmed. Strategy formation is 
messy, fragmented, and piecemeal – much more like the unstructured and unpredictable 
processes of exploration and invention, than like the orderly processes of design and 
production (e.g. Mintzberg, 1990; Quinn, 1980). 
 Yet proponents of the strategic planning perspective prefer to press strategy formation 
into an orderly, mechanistic straightjacket. Strategies must be intentionally designed and 
executed. According to strategic incrementalists, this excessive emphasis on deliberateness is 
due to planners’ obsession with rationality and control (e.g. Wildavsky, 1979; Mintzberg, 
1993). Planners are often compulsive in their desire for order, predictability and efficiency. It 
is the intention of strategic planning to predict, analyze, optimize and program – to 
deliberately fine-tune and control the organization's future behavior. For them, ‘to manage’ is 
‘to control’ and therefore only deliberate patterns of action constitute good strategic 
management.  
 Incrementalists do not question the value of planning and control as a means for 
managing some organizational processes, but point out that strategy formation is not one of 
them. In general, planning and control are valuable for routine activities that need to be 
efficiently organized (e.g. production or finance). But planning is less suitable for non-routine 
activities – that is, for doing new things. Planning is not appropriate for innovation (e.g. 
Hamel, 1996; Kanter, 2002). Just as R&D departments cannot plan the invention of new 
products, executives cannot plan the development of new strategies. Innovation, whether in 
products or strategies, is not a process that can be neatly structured and controlled. Novel 
insights and creative ideas cannot be generated on demand, but surface at unexpected 
moments, often in unexpected places. Nor are new ideas born full-grown, ready to be 
evaluated and implemented. In reality, innovation requires brooding, tinkering, 
experimentation, testing and patience, as new ideas grow and take shape. Throughout the 
innovation process it remains unclear which ideas might evolve into blockbuster strategies 
and which will turn out to be miserable disappointments. No one can objectively determine 
ahead of time which strategic initiatives will ‘fly’ and which will ‘crash’. Therefore, 
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executives engaged in the formation of new strategies must move incrementally, letting novel 
ideas crystallize over time, and increase commitment as ideas gradually prove their viability 
in practice. This demands that executives behave not as planners, but as inventors – 
searching, experimenting, learning, doubting, and avoiding premature closure and lock-in to 
one course of action (e.g. Stacey, 1993; Beinhocker, 1999). 
 Recognizing that strategy formation is essentially an innovation process has more 
consequences. Innovation is inherently subversive, rebelling against the status quo and 
challenging those who are emotionally, intellectually or politically wedded to the current 
state of affairs. Creating new strategies involves confronting people's cognitive maps, 
questioning the organizational culture, threatening individuals’ current interests and 
disrupting the distribution of power within the organization (e.g. Hamel, 1996; Johnson, 
1988). None of these processes can be conducted in an orderly fashion, let alone be 
incorporated into a planning system. Changing people's cognitive maps requires complex 
processes of unlearning and learning. Cultural and political changes are also difficult 
processes to program. Even for the most powerful CEO, managing cognitive, cultural and 
political changes is not a matter of deliberate control, but of incremental shaping. Less 
powerful executives will have even a weaker grip on the unfolding cognitive, cultural and 
political reality in their organization, and therefore will be even less able to plan. In short, 
executives who understand that strategy formation is essentially a disruptive process of 
organizational change will move incrementally, gradually molding the organization into a 
satisfactory form. This demands that executives behave not as commanders, but as 
organizational developers – questioning assumptions, challenging ideas, getting points on the 
strategic agenda, encouraging learning, championing new initiatives, supporting change and 
building political support. 
 Incrementalists point out that planning is particularly inappropriate when dealing with 
wicked problems. While solving tame problems can often be planned and controlled, 
strategizing executives rarely have the luxury of using generic solutions to fix clearly 
recognizable strategic problems. Strategic problems are inherently wicked – they are 
essentially unique, highly complex, linked to other problems, can be defined and interpreted 
in many ways, have no correct answer, nor a delimited set of possible solutions. The planning 
approach of recognizing the problem, fully analyzing the situation, formulating a 
comprehensive plan and then implementing the solution, is sure to choke on a wicked 
problem. A number of weaknesses of planning show up when confronted with a wicked 
problem.  
 First, problems cannot be simply recognized and analyzed, but can be interpreted and 
defined in many ways, depending on how the executive looks at it. Therefore, half the work 
of the strategizing executive is making sense out of complex problems. Or, as Rittel and 
Webber (1973) put it, the definition of a wicked problem is the problem! Executives must 
search for new ways for understanding old problems and must be aware of how others are 
reinterpreting what they see (e.g. Liedtka, 2000; Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). This inhibits 
strategic planning and encourages strategic incrementalism. 
 Second, a full analysis of a wicked problem is impossible. Due to a wicked problem’s 
complexity and links to other problems, a full analysis would take, literally, forever. And 
there would always be more ways of interpreting the problem, requiring more analysis. 
Strategic planning based on the complete understanding of a problem in advance therefore 
necessarily leads to paralysis by analysis (e.g. Langley, 1995; Lenz and Lyles, 1985). In 
reality, however, executives move proactively despite their incomplete understanding of a 
wicked problem, learning as they go along. By acting and thinking at the same time, 
strategizing executives can focus their analyses on what seems to be important and realistic in 
practice, gradually shaping their understanding along the way. 
89
Chapter 4: Strategy Formation  
73 
 Third, developing a comprehensive plan to tackle a wicked problem is asking for 
trouble. Wicked problems are very complex, consisting of many sub-problems. Formulating a 
master plan to solve all sub-problems in one blow would require a very high level of planning 
sophistication and an organization with the ability to implement plans in a highly coordinated 
manner – much like the circus performers who can keep ten plates twirling at the ends of 
poles at the same time. Such organizations are rare at best, and the risk of a grand strategy 
failing is huge – once one plate falls, the rest usually comes crashing down. This is also 
known as Knagg’s law: the more complex a plan, the larger the chance of failure. 
Incrementalists therefore argue that it is wiser to tackle sub-problems individually, and 
gradually blend these solutions into a cohesive pattern of action. 
 Finally, planners who believe that formulation and implementation can be separated 
underestimate the extent to which wicked problems are interactive. As soon as an 
organization starts to implement a plan, its actions will induce counteractions. Customers will 
react, competitors will change behavior, suppliers will take a different stance, regulatory 
agencies might come into action, unions will respond, the stock markets will take notice and 
company employees will draw conclusions. Hence, action by the organization will change the 
nature of the problem. And since the many counter-parties are intelligent players, capable of 
acting strategically, their responses will not be entirely predictable. Planners will not be able 
to forecast and incorporate other parties’ reactions into the plans. Therefore, plans will be 
outdated as soon as implementation starts. For this reason, incrementalists argue that action 
must always be swiftly followed by redefinition of the problem and reconsideration the 
course of action being pursued. Over time, this iterative process of action-reaction-
reconsideration will lead to the emergence of a pattern of action, which is the best possible 
result given the interactive nature of wicked problems. 
 This last point, on the unpredictability of external and internal reactions to a plan, 
leads up to a weakness of strategic planning that is possibly its most obvious one – strategy 
has to do with the future and the future is inherently unknown. Developments cannot be 
clearly forecast, future opportunities and threats cannot be predicted, nor can future strengths 
and weaknesses be accurately foreseen. In such unknown terrain, it is foolhardy to commit 
oneself to a preset course of action unless absolutely necessary. It makes much more sense in 
new and unpredictable circumstances to remain flexible and adaptive, postponing fixed 
commitments for as long as possible. An unknown future requires not the mentality of a train 
conductor, but of an explorer – curious, probing, venturesome, and entrepreneurial, yet 
moving cautiously, step-by-step, ready to shift course when needed. 
 To proponents of the strategic incrementalism perspective, it is a caricature to call 
such behavior ad hoc or muddling through. Rather, it is behavior that acknowledges the fact 
that strategy formation is a process of innovation and organizational development in the face 
of wicked problems in an unknown future. Under these circumstances, strategies must be 
allowed to emerge and ‘strategic planning’ must be seen for what it is – a contradiction in 
terms. 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
So, how should strategies be formed in practice? Should executives strive to formulate and 
implement strategic plans, supported by a formalized planning and control system? Or should 
executives move incrementally, behaving as inventors, organizational developers and 
explorers? The main differences between the strategic planning perspective and the strategic 
incrementalism perspective are outlined in table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.1   
Strategic planning versus strategic incrementalism perspective 
 
 Strategic Planning Strategic Incrementalism 
Emphasis on Deliberateness over emergence  Emergence over deliberateness  
Nature of strategy  Intentionally designed Gradually shaped 
Strategy formation as Figuring out Finding out 
Future developments Forecast and anticipate Partially unknown and unpredictable 
Posture towards the future Make commitments, prepare Few commitments, remain flexible 
Formation process Formally structured & comprehensive Unstructured and fragmented 
Formation process steps First think, then act Thinking and acting intertwined 
Decision-making Hierarchical Dispersed 
Decision-making focus Resource allocation and coordination Experimentation and parallel initiatives 
Implementation focus on Programming (efficiency) Learning (development) 
Strategic change Implemented top-down Needs broad cultural & cognitive shifts 
  
 
To measure what executives actually think about strategy formation, these two opposite poles 
have been translated into 24 statements that can be judged by executives. In table 4.2, the two 
sets of opposing policy statements are presented, which can be used for capturing executives’ 
views on strategy formation. These statements will be revisited in chapter 14. 
 
TABLE 4.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
 
Strategic Planning Perspective Strategic Incrementalism Perspective 
3.1 Strategies should be largely thought out before actions are undertaken. 4.1 
The strategic direction should be found step 
by step through experimenting and learning. 
3.2 Firms should forecast long-term developments and plan accordingly. 4.2 
Firms should not bother trying to forecast 
long-term developments. 
3.3 Firms should first formulate strategic plans and then implement them. 4.3 
Firms should gradually explore the best 
strategic direction to take. 
3.4 Firms should plan their investments and activities in advance. 4.4 
Firms should flexibly respond to emerging 
opportunities and threats. 
3.5 Managers should create detailed road maps of all activities that need to be done. 4.5 
Managers should grab unforeseen 
opportunities as they emerge. 
3.6 Firms should have an internally consistent strategy. 4.6 
Top management should allow various 
strategic initiatives to compete with one 
another. 
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3.7 
Annual strategic planning processes are an 
effective way to formulate and implement the 
strategic actions of firms. 
4.7 
Strategic moves cannot be planned long in 
advance, but need to be constantly adapted 
to unfolding conditions. 
3.8 Without a long-term plan, a firm will be engaged in ad hoc management. 4.8 
Even if a firm doesn’t have a long-term plan, 
it can still behave strategically. 
3.9 
Detailed strategic plans are valuable, 
because they specify goals against which 
progress can be measured. 
4.9 Making detailed strategic plans is a waste of time. 
3.10 
Detailed long-term planning is valuable for 
coordinating strategic developments within a 
firm. 
4.10 
Successful managers set a general strategic 
direction and then fill in the details along the 
way. 
3.11 Detailed strategic plans are essential for firms to set investment priorities. 4.11 
A good strategy is not a detailed long-term 
plan, but a guideline for the further 
exploration of opportunities. 
3.12 Linking operational planning to long-term strategy is essential for corporate success. 4.12 
In the long run firms must reinvent 
themselves, which is an unplannable process 
of experimentation and learning. 
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Chapter 5 
 
STRATEGIC CHANGE  
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a world of new technologies, transforming economies, shifting demographics, reforming 
governments, fluctuating consumer preferences, and dynamic competition, it is not a question 
of whether firms should change, but of where, how and in what direction they must change. 
For ‘living’ organizations, change is a given. Firms must constantly be aligned with their 
environments, either by reacting to external events, or by proactively shaping the businesses 
in which they operate.  
 While change is pervasive, not all change in firms is strategic in nature. Much of the 
change witnessed is actually the on-going operational kind. To remain efficient and effective, 
firms constantly make ‘fine-tuning’ alterations, whereby existing procedures are upgraded, 
activities are improved and people are reassigned. Such operational changes are directed at 
increasing the performance of the firm within the confines of the existing system – within the 
current basic set-up used to align the firm with the environment. Strategic changes, on the 
contrary, are directed at creating a new type of alignment – a new fit between the basic set-up 
of the firm and the characteristics of the environment. Strategic changes have an impact on 
the way the firm does business (its business system) and on the way the organization has been 
configured (its organizational system). In short, while operational changes are necessary to 
maintain the business and organizational systems, strategic changes are directed at renewing 
them.  
 For executives the challenge is to implement strategic changes on time, to keep the 
firm in step with the shifting opportunities and threats in the environment. Some parts of the 
firm’s business system and organizational system can be preserved, while others need to be 
transformed for the firm to stay up-to-date and competitive. This process of constantly 
enacting strategic changes to remain in harmony with external conditions is called strategic 
renewal.  
In this chapter it will be examined what series of strategic change steps executives 
believe are required to bring about a process of on-going strategic renewal. However, before 
moving to the differing perspectives on this topic, a further review of the nature of strategic 
renewal is necessary.   
 
5.2 THE ISSUE OF STRATEGIC RENEWAL 
There are many actions that constitute a strategic change – a reorganization, a diversification 
move, a shift in core technology, a business process redesign and a product portfolio 
reshuffle, to name a few. Each one of these changes is fascinating in itself. Yet, here the 
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discussion will be broader than just a single strategic change, looking instead at the process of 
how a series of strategic changes can be used to keep the firm in sync with its surroundings 
(see figure 5.1). How can ‘a path of strategic changes’ be followed to constantly renew the 
firm and avoid that the firm ‘drifts’ too far away from the demands of the environment 
(Johnson, 1988).  
 To come to a deeper understanding of the issue of strategic renewal, the first step that 
must be taken is to examine what is actually being renewed during a process of strategic 
renewal. The areas of strategic renewal will be explored in the next section below. After this 
initial analysis of ‘what’ is being changed, a distinction will be made between the magnitude 
and the pace of changes. The magnitude of changes refers to the size of the steps being 
undertaken, whereby the question is whether executives should move in bold and dramatic 
strides, or in moderate and undramatic ones. The pace of changes refers to the relative speed 
at which the steps are being taken, whereby the question is whether executives should move 
quickly in a short period of time, or more gradually over a longer time span.   
 
FIGURE 5.1  
Example of an on-going strategic renewal process 
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5.2.1 The Areas of Strategic Renewal 
Firms are complex systems, consisting of many different elements, each of which can be 
changed. Therefore, to gain more insight into the various areas of potential change, firms 
need to be analytically disassembled into a number of component parts. The most 
fundamental distinction that can be made within a firm is between the business system and 
the organizational system: 
 
 Business system. The term business system refers to the way a firm conducts its business. 
A simple definition would be “how a firm makes money”. A more formal definition of 
business system is “the specific configuration of resources, value-adding activities and 
product/service offerings directed at creating value for customers”. Each firm has its own 
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specific system for taking certain resources as inputs (e.g. materials and know how), 
adding value to them in some type of manner (e.g. production and branding) and then 
selling a particular package of products and/or services as output. As such, a firm’s 
business system (or value creation system) is particular to the type of business that the 
firm is in – an airplane manufacturer conducts its business differently than an airline. 
 Organizational system. The term organizational system refers to the way a firm gets its 
people to work together to carry out the business. A simple definition would be “how a 
firm is organized”. A more formal definition of the organizational system would be “how 
the individuals populating a firm have been configured, and relate to one another, with the 
intention of facilitating the business system”. Every firm needs to determine some type of 
organizational structure, dividing the tasks and responsibilities among the organizational 
members, thereby instituting differing functions and units. Firms also require numerous 
organizational processes to link individual members to each other, to ensure that their 
separate tasks are coordinated into an integrated whole. And firms necessarily have 
organizational cultures, and sub-cultures, as organizational members interact with one 
another and build up joint beliefs, values and norms.  
In figure 5.2 the relationship between the business system and the major components of the 
organizational system is depicted. As this figure illustrates, the business system is ‘supported’ 
by the organizational system, with the organizational members ‘at its base’. While each 
firm’s business and organizational systems are essentially unique, their general configuration 
can be fairly similar to that of other firms. Where firms have a comparable business 
‘formula’, it is said that they share the same business model. Likewise, where firms have a 
similar organizational ‘form’, they are said to subscribe to the same organizational model.  
 
FIGURE 5.2  
General view of the business system and the organizational system 
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Both the business system and the organizational system can be further disaggregated into 
component parts and examined in more detail. With this aim in mind, the business system 
will be at the center of attention in chapter 6. Here the organizational system will be further 
dissected. Actually, the term dissection conjures up images of the organizational system as 
‘corporate body’, which is a useful metaphor for distinguishing the various components of an 
organizational system (Morgan, 1986). Following Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995) the 
organizational system can be divided into its anatomy (structure), physiology (processes) and 
psychology (culture). Each of these components, summarized in figure 5.3, will be examined 
below. 
 
FIGURE 5.3 
Detailed view of the components of the organizational system 
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Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure refers to the clustering of tasks and people into smaller groups. All 
organizations need at least some division of labor to function efficiently and effectively, 
requiring them to structure the organization into smaller parts. The main question when 
determining the organizational structure is which criteria will be used to differentiate tasks 
and to cluster people into particular units. While there are numerous structuring (or 
decomposition) criteria, the most common ones are summarized in figure 5.4. In a simple 
organization tasks might be divided according to just one criterion, but in most organizations 
multiple criteria are used (either sequentially or simultaneously).  
97
Chapter 5: Strategic Change  
81 
To balance this horizontal differentiation of tasks and responsibilities, all 
organizations also have integration mechanisms, intended to get the parts to function well 
within the organizational whole (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). While some of these 
integration mechanisms are found in the categories of organizational processes and culture, 
the most fundamental mechanism is usually built into the organizational structure – formal 
authority. In organizations, executives are appointed with the specific task of supervising the 
activities of various people or units and to report to executives higher up in the hierarchy. 
Depending on the span of control of each executive (the number of people or units reporting 
to him/her) an organizational structure will consist of one or more layers of management. At 
the apex of this vertical structure is the board of directors, with the ultimate authority to make 
decisions or ratify decisions made at lower levels in the hierarchy. The most important 
questions in this context are the number of management layers needed and the amount of 
authority delegated to lower levels of management. It should be noted that the organizational 
charts used to represent the formal structure of an organization (see figure 5.3) need not be an 
accurate reflection of the informal organizational structure as it operates in reality.   
 
FIGURE 5.4 
Organizational structuring criteria 
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Organizational Processes  
Organizational processes refer to the arrangements, procedures and routines used to control 
and coordinate the various people and units within the organization. Some formalized 
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processes span the entire organization, such as business planning and control procedures, and 
financial budgeting and reporting processes. Other control and coordination processes have a 
more limited scope, such as new product development meetings, yearly sales conferences, 
weekly quality circles, web-based expert panels and quarterly meetings with the board of 
directors. But not all organizational processes are institutionalized as on-going integration 
mechanisms. Often, integration across units and departments is needed for a short period, 
making it useful to employ task forces, committees, working groups, project teams and even 
joint lunches as means for ensuring coordination.  
While all of these processes are formalized to a certain degree, many more informal 
organizational processes exist, such as communicating via hallway gossip, building support 
through personal networking, influencing decision-making through informal negotiations and 
solving conflicts by means of impromptu meetings.    
Organizational Culture  
Organizational culture refers to the worldview and behavioral patterns shared by the members 
of the same organization (e.g. Schein, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 1993). As people within a 
group interact and share experiences with one another over an extended period of time, they 
construct a joint understanding of the world around them. This shared belief system will be 
emotionally charged, as it encompasses the values and norms of the organizational members 
and offers them an interpretive filter with which to make sense of the constant stream of 
uncertain and ambiguous events around them. As this common ideology grows stronger and 
becomes more engrained, it will channel members’ actions into more narrowly defined 
patterns of behavior. As such, the organizational culture can strongly influence everything 
from how to behave during meetings to what is viewed as ethical behavior.  
As part of the organizational system, culture can act as a strong integration 
mechanism, controlling and coordinating people’s behavior, by getting them to abide by ‘the 
way we do things around here’. Having a common ‘language’, frame of reference and set of 
values also makes it easier to communicate and work together. However, an organizational 
culture is not always homogeneous – in fact, strongly divergent subcultures might arise in 
certain units, creating ‘psychological’ barriers within the organization.  
 
5.2.2 The Magnitude of Change 
Strategic change is by definition far-reaching. We speak of strategic change when 
fundamental alterations are made to the business system or the organizational system. Adding 
a lemon-flavored Coke to the product portfolio is interesting, maybe important, but not a 
strategic change, while branching out into bottled water was – it was a major departure from 
Coca Cola’s traditional business system. Hiring a new CEO is also important, but is in itself 
not a strategic change, while following this up by reorganizing the firm into global business 
units is. 
Strategic renewal is often even more far-reaching, as a number of strategic changes 
are executed in a variety of areas to keep the firm aligned with market demands. But while 
the result of all of these strategic changes is far-reaching, this says nothing about the size of 
the steps along the way. The strategic renewal process might consist of a few large change 
steps or numerous small ones. This distinction is illustrated in figure 5.5. The total amount of 
strategic change envisaged is measured along the Y-axis. Route A shows the change path 
taken by a firm that has implemented all changes in two big steps, while route B shows the 
change path followed by a firm taking numerous smaller steps. Both organizations have 
completed the same renewal, but via distinctly different routes. 
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FIGURE 5.5 
Example of two alternative change paths 
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The size of the change steps is referred to as the magnitude of change. This issue of change 
magnitude can be divided into two component parts:   
 
 Scope of change. The scope of change in a firm can vary from broad to narrow. Change 
is broad when many aspects and parts of the firm are altered at the same time. In the most 
extreme case the changes might be comprehensive, whereby the business system is 
entirely revised, and the organizational structure, processes, culture and people are 
changed in unison. However, change can also be much more narrowly focused on a 
specific organizational aspect (e.g. new product development processes) or department 
(e.g. marketing). If many changes are narrowly targeted, the total result will be a more 
piecemeal change process. 
 Amplitude of organizational changes. The amplitude of change in firms can vary from 
high to low. The amplitude of change is high when the new business system, 
organizational culture, structure, processes or people are a radical departure from the 
previous situation. The amplitude of change is low when the step proposed is a moderate 
adjustment to the previous circumstances.  
 
Where a change is comprehensive and radical, the magnitude of the change step is large. In 
figure 5.5 this is represented as a large jump along the Y-axis. Where a change is narrow and 
moderate, the magnitude of the step is small. However, the above distinction also clarifies 
that there are two rather different types of medium-sized change steps – a focused radical 
change (narrow scope, high amplitude) and a comprehensive moderate change (broad scope, 
low amplitude). Both changes are ‘mid-sized’, yet significantly different to manage in 
practice.   
5.2.3 The Pace of Change 
Strategic renewal takes time. Yet, there is quite a variety of ways by which the strategic 
renewal process can take place over time. Strategic change measures can be evenly spread 
out over an extended period, allowing the organization to follow a relatively steady pace of 
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strategic renewal. However, it is also possible to cluster all changes into a few short irregular 
bursts, giving the renewal process an unsteady, stop-and-go, pace. 
This distinction is seen in figure 5.5 as well. The total time period needed for achieving a 
strategic change is measured along the X-axis. Route A shows the change path taken by a 
firm that has had an unsteady pace of change, while route B tracks the path taken by a firm on 
a more steady change trajectory. Both organizations have completed the same strategic 
renewal process by T3 and by T6, but have distributed their change activities differently 
during the period.  
In figure 5.5 it can also be seen that the pace of organizational changes can be 
decomposed into two related parts: 
 
 Timing of change. First, the pace of change depends on the moment at which changes are 
initiated. The timing of change can vary from intermittent to constant. Where change is 
intermittent, it is important for a firm to determine the right moment for launching a new 
initiative (for example, T1 and T4 in change path A). The need to ‘wait for the right 
timing’ is often a reason for spreading change activities unevenly over time. On the other 
hand, change can be constant, so that the exact moment for kicking off any new set of 
measures is less important, as long as there is no peak at any one moment in time (see 
change path B). 
 Speed of change. The pace of change also depends on the time span within which changes 
take place. The speed of change can vary from high to low. Where a major change needs 
to be implemented within a short period of time, the speed of change must be high. A 
short burst of fast action can bring about the intended changes. In figure 5.5, the speed 
can be seen by the slope of the arrow (in change path A, the speed between T1 and T2 is 
higher than between T4 and T5). On the other hand, where the change measures are less 
formidable and the time span for implementation is longer, the speed of change can be 
lower.  
 
The variables of timing and speed of change, together with the variables of scope and 
amplitude of change, create a wide range of possible strategic renewal paths. Firms have 
many different ways of bringing about strategic change. Unavoidably, this raises the question 
which route is best. Why should a firm choose one trajectory over another?  
 
5.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION 
In selecting an approach to strategic change, most executives struggle with the question of 
how bold they should be. On the one hand, they usually realize that to fundamentally 
transform the organization a break with the past is needed. To achieve strategic renewal it is 
essential to turn away from the firm’s heritage and to start with a clean slate.  On the other 
hand, they also recognize the value of continuity, building on past experiences, investments 
and loyalties. To achieve lasting strategic renewal people in the organization will need time 
to learn, adapt and grow into a new organizational reality. 
This distinction between disruptive change and gradual change has long been 
recognized in the strategic management and organizational behavior literature (e.g. Greiner, 
1972; Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986). Disruptive change is variably referred to as 
frame breaking (e.g. Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992; Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 
1987), radical (e.g. Stinchcombe, 1965; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) and revolutionary 
(e.g. Gersick, 1991; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Gradual change is variably referred to as 
incremental (e.g. Quinn, 1980; Johnson, 1987) and evolutionary (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 
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1982; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Here the labels revolutionary and evolutionary change 
will be used, in keeping with the terminology used by Greiner (1972) in his classic work. 
It is widely accepted among researchers that firms need to balance revolutionary and 
evolutionary change processes. However, most authors see this as a balancing of strategic 
(revolutionary) change and operational (evolutionary) change. As strategic change is far-
reaching, it is often automatically equated with radical means, while gradual means are 
reserved for smaller-scale operational changes. Yet, in the previous section it was made clear 
that a radical result (a strategic change) can be pursued by both revolutionary and 
evolutionary means (e.g. Hayes, 1985; Krüger, 1996; Nonaka, 1988; Strebel, 1994).  
While these two change processes are each other’s opposites, and they seem to be at 
least partially contradictory, both approaches are needed within firms. In practice both change 
processes have valuable, but conflicting, qualities. The tension that this creates between 
revolution and evolution will be explored in the sections below.    
 
5.3.1 The Demand for Revolutionary Change Processes 
Revolution is a process whereby an abrupt and radical change takes place within a short 
period of time. Revolutionary change processes are those that do not build on the status quo, 
but overthrow it. ‘Revolutionaries’ revolt against the existing business system and 
organizational system, and attempt to push through changes that will reinvent the firm. Thus, 
revolution leads to a clear break with the past – a discontinuity in the firm’s development 
path.  
Such a ‘big bang’ approach to strategic change is generally needed when the 
organizational rigidity is so deeply rooted that smaller pushes do not bring the firm into 
movement. If the firm threatens to become paralyzed by these inherited rigidities in the 
business system and organizational system, the only way to get moving can be to radically 
break with the past. Typical sources of organizational rigidity include: 
 
 Psychological resistance to change. Many people resist change, because of the 
uncertainty and ambiguity that unavoidably accompanies any shift in the old way of 
doing business (e.g. Argyris, 1990; Pondy, Boland and Thomas, 1988). As people become 
accustomed to fixed organizational routines and established habits, their ability to learn 
and gradually adapt invariably recedes. New business methods or job descriptions are not 
seen as a challenging opportunity to learn, but as an unwelcome interference in the 
existing system. It can be necessary to break through this psychological resistance to 
change by imposing a new business system and/or organizational system on people (e.g. 
Hammer, 1990; Powell, 1991). 
 Cultural resistance to change. As discussed in chapter 3, people can easily become 
immune to signals that their cognitive maps are outdated, especially if they are 
surrounded by others with the same flawed belief system. Once an organizational culture 
develops that perpetuates a number of obsolete assumptions about the market or the 
organization, it is very difficult for organizational members to challenge and gradually 
reshape the organizational belief system. It can be necessary to break through this cultural 
resistance to change by exposing the organization to a shocking crisis or by imposing a 
new organizational system (e.g. Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986; Senge, 1990).   
 Political resistance to change. Change is hardly ever to everyone’s advantage, as 
Machiavelli pointed out at the start of this chapter. Each organizational change leads to a 
different constellation of winners and losers. Generally, the potential losers reject a 
strategic change, although they are likely to think of some seemingly objective reasons 
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for their opposition. Even a situation in which a person or department thinks that it might 
run the risk of losing power to others can be enough to block a change. Since strategic 
changes invariably have a significant impact on all people within an organization, there 
will always be a number of open, and hidden, opponents. It can be necessary to break 
through this political resistance by imposing a new business system and reshuffling 
management positions (e.g. Allison, 1969; Krüger, 1996). 
 Investment lock-in. Once a firm has committed a large amount of money and time to a 
certain product portfolio, activity system, or technology, it will find that this fixed 
investment locks the organization in. Any gradual movement away from the past 
investment will increase the risk of not earning back the sunk cost. Therefore, it can be 
necessary to break through the lock-in, by radically restructuring or disposing of the 
investment (e.g. Ghemawat, 1991; Bower and Christensen, 1995). 
 Competence lock-in. The better a firm becomes at something, the more a firm becomes 
focused on becoming even better still – which is also known as the virtuous circle of 
competence building. Once a competitive advantage has been built on a particular type of 
competence, the natural tendency of firms is to favor external opportunities based on 
these competencies. New people are hired that fit with the corporate competence profile 
and R&D spending further hones the firm’s skill. But if the firm’s competence base 
threatens to become outdated due to market or technological changes, its former 
advantage could become its downfall – the firm can become caught in a vicious 
competence trap, unable to gradually shift the organization to an alternative set of 
competences, because the entire business system and organizational system have been 
aligned to the old set (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1995; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
Changing the core competence of the corporation in a comprehensive and radical manner 
can be the only way to ‘migrate’ from one competence profile to another.   
 System lock-in. Firms can also become locked into an open standard (e.g. sizes in inches, 
GAAP accounting rules) or a proprietary system (e.g. Windows operating system, SAP 
enterprise resource planning software). Once the firm has implemented a standard or 
system, switching to another platform cannot be done gradually or at low cost. Therefore, 
the lock-in can usually only be overcome by a big bang transition to another platform 
(e.g. Arthur, 1996; Shapiro and Varian, 1998). 
 Stakeholder lock-in. Highly restrictive commitments can also be made towards the firm’s 
stakeholders. Long term contracts with buyers and suppliers, warranties, commitments to 
governments and local communities, and promises to shareholders can all lock firms into 
a certain strategic direction. To break through the stakeholders’ resistance to change it can 
be necessary to court a crisis and aim for a radical restructuring of the firm’s external 
relationships (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Oliver, 1991).  
 
Besides the use of revolutionary change to overcome organizational rigidity, such a radical 
approach to strategic renewal is often also necessary given the short time span available for a 
large change. The ‘window of opportunity’ for achieving a strategic change can be small for a 
number of reasons. Some of the most common triggers for revolutionary strategic change are: 
 
 Competitive pressure. When a firm is under intense competitive pressure and its market 
position starts to erode quickly, a rapid and dramatic response might be the only approach 
possible. Especially when the organization threatens to slip into a downward spiral 
towards insolvency, a bold turnaround can be the only option left to the firm. 
103
Chapter 5: Strategic Change  
87 
 Regulatory pressure. Firms can also be put under pressure by the government or 
regulatory agencies to push through major changes within a short period of time. Such 
externally imposed revolutions can be witnessed among public sector organizations (e.g. 
hospitals and schools) and highly regulated industries (e.g. utilities and 
telecommunications), but in other sectors of the economy as well (e.g. antitrust break-ups, 
public health regulations).  
 First mover advantage. A more proactive reason for instigating revolutionary change is to 
be the first firm to introduce a new product, service or technology and to build up barriers 
to entry for late movers. Especially for know-how that is dissipation-sensitive, or for 
which the patent period is limited, it can be important to cash in quickly, before others 
arrive on the market (e.g. Kessler and Chakrabarthi, 1996; Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988, 1998) 
 
To some extent all executives recognize that their organizations are prone to inertia, and most 
will acknowledge that it is often vital to move quickly, either in response to external 
pressures or to cash in on a potential first mover advantage. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that most executives would like their organizations to have the ability to successfully 
pull off revolutionary strategic changes.  
 
5.3.2 The Demand for Evolutionary Change Processes 
Evolution is a process whereby a constant stream of moderate changes gradually accumulates 
over a longer period of time. Each change is in itself small, but the cumulative result can be 
large. Evolutionary change processes take the current firm as a starting point, constantly 
modifying aspects through extension and adaptation. Some ‘mutations’ to the firm prove 
valuable and are retained, while other changes are discarded as dysfunctional. Thus, a new 
business system and/or organizational system can steadily evolve out of the old, as if the 
organization were shedding its old skin to grow a new one (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; Kagono et al., 
1985).  
 This ‘metamorphosis’ approach to strategic change is particularly important where the 
strategic renewal hinges on widespread organizational learning. Learning is not a process 
that is easily compressed into a few short bursts of activity (as anyone who has studied 
knows). Learning is a relatively slow process, whereby know-how is accumulated over an 
extended period of time. It can take years to learn things, especially if the necessary 
knowledge is not readily available, but must be acquired ‘on the job’ (e.g. Agryris, 1990; 
Senge, 1990).  
This is true for both individuals and firms. When groups of people in a firm need to 
develop new routines, new competences, new processes, as well as new ways of 
understanding the world, time is needed to experiment, reflect, discuss, test and internalize. 
Even in the circumstances where individuals or departments are merely asked to adjust their 
behaviors to new norms, the learning process is often protracted and difficult (e.g. Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999). 
 While the evolutionary nature of learning is a positive factor stimulating gradual 
change, the organizational reality is often also that power is too dispersed for revolutionary 
changes to be imposed upon the firm. Where no one has enough sway in the organization to 
push through radical changes, a more evolutionary approach can be the only viable route 
forward. 
 To some extent all executives recognize that their firms need to continuously learn 
and adapt, while most will acknowledge that they do not have the absolute power to impose 
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revolutionary changes at will. For these reasons executives generally would like their 
organizations to have the ability to pursue evolutionary changes.  
Yet, engaging in evolutionary change is the opposite of revolutionary change. On the 
one hand, being opposites might make revolution and evolution complementary. Some 
authors suggest that organizations should be ‘ambidextrous’, using both revolution and 
evolution, contingent upon internal and external conditions (e.g. Duncan, 1976; Krüger, 
1996; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). On the other hand, the above discussion makes clear 
that the two are, to a certain extent, mutually incompatible. Once the one form of change has 
been chosen, this will seriously limit the ability of the strategist to simultaneously, or even 
subsequently, use the other. Hence, executives are once again faced with a tension, between 
revolution and evolution.     
 
5.4 PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC CHANGE 
Although the demand for both revolutionary and evolutionary change is clear, this does place 
executives in the difficult position of having to determine how these two must be combined 
and balanced in a process of on-going strategic renewal. Revolutionary change is necessary to 
create discontinuity in the renewal process – radical and swift breaks with the past. 
Evolutionary change is necessary to ensure continuity in the renewal process – moderate and 
gradual metamorphosis from one state into another. In finding a balance between these two 
demands, the question is which of the two must play a leading role and what type of change 
path this leads to. Does successful strategic renewal hinge on a few infrequent big bangs, 
with some minor evolutionary changes in the intervening time span, or is successful strategic 
renewal essentially a gradual process of mutation and selection, where revolutionary changes 
are only used in case of emergency?  
 As in the previous chapters, the strategic management literature comes up with a wide 
variety of answers to this question. Both among business practitioners and strategy 
researchers, views differ sharply about the best way of dealing with the tension between 
revolution and evolution. To gain insight into the major points of disagreement between 
people on the issue of strategic renewal, again the two diametrically opposed perspectives 
will be reviewed here.  
At one end of the virtual continuum of views, are the strategists who argue that real 
strategic renewal can only be achieved by radical means. Revolutionary change, although 
difficult to achieve, is at the heart of renewal, while evolutionary changes can only figure in a 
supporting role. This point of view shall be referred to as the discontinuous renewal 
perspective. At the other end of the spectrum are the strategists who argue that real strategic 
renewal is not brought about by an “axe”, but must grow out of the existing firm, in a 
constant stream of small adjustments. Evolutionary change, although difficult to sustain, is at 
the heart of renewal, while revolutionary changes are a fall-back alternative, if all else fails. 
This point of view shall be referred to as the continuous renewal perspective. 
 
5.4.1 The Discontinuous Renewal Perspective 
According to advocates of the discontinuous renewal perspective, it is a common 
misconception that firms develop gradually. It is often assumed that organizations move 
fluidly from one state to the next, encountering minimal friction. In reality, however, strategic 
change is arduous and encounters significant resistance. Pressure must be exerted, and 
tension must mount, before a major shift can be accomplished. Movement, therefore, is not 
steady and constant, as a current in the sea, but abrupt and dramatic, as in an earthquake, 
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where resistance gives way and tension is released in a short shock. In general, the more 
significant a change is, the more intense the shock will be. 
 Proponents of this perspective argue that people and organizations exhibit a natural 
reluctance to change. Humans have a strong preference for stability. Once general policy has 
been determined, most firms are inclined to settle into a fixed way of working. The 
organizational structure will solidify, formal processes will be installed, standard operating 
procedures will be defined, key competence areas will be identified, a distribution of power 
will emerge, and a corporate culture will become establish. The stability of an organization 
will be especially high if all of these elements form a consistent and cohesive configuration 
(e.g. Mintzberg, 1991; Waterman, Peters and Philips, 1982). Moreover, if a firm experiences 
a period of success, this usually strongly reinforces the existing way of working (e.g. 
Markides, 1998; Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000). 
 It must be emphasized that stability is not inherently harmful, as it allows people to 
‘get to work’. A level of stability is required to function efficiently (e.g. March and Simon, 
1958; Thompson, 1967). Constant upheaval would only create an organizational mess. There 
would be prolonged confusion about tasks and authority, poorly structured internal 
communication and coordination, and a lack of clear standards and routines. The instability 
brought on by such continuously changing processes and structures would lead to widespread 
insecurity, political maneuvering, and interdepartmental conflicts. 
 Advocates of the discontinuous renewal perspective, therefore, argue that long periods 
of relative stability are necessary for the proper functioning of firms. However, the downside 
of stability is rigidity – the unwillingness and/or inability to change, even when it is urgently 
required. To overcome rigidity and get the firm in motion, a series of small nudges will by no 
means be sufficient. A big shove will be needed. For strategic changes to really happen, 
measures must be radical and comprehensive. A coordinated assault is usually required to 
decisively break through organizational defenses and ‘shock therapy’ is needed to 
fundamentally change people's cognitive maps. Solving lock-in problems generally also 
demands a quick, firm-wide switchover to a new system. For instance, business process 
reengineering must involve all aspects of the value chain at once (e.g. Hammer, 1990; 
Hammer and Champy, 1993). However, proponents of the discontinuous renewal perspective 
emphasize that the period of turmoil must not take too long. People cannot be indefinitely 
confronted with high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, and a new equilibrium is vital for a 
new period of efficient operations. 
 Therefore, the long-term pattern of strategic renewal is not gradual, but episodic. 
Periods of relative stability are interrupted by short and dramatic periods of instability, during 
which revolutionary changes take place (e.g. Greiner, 1972; Tushman, Newman and 
Romanelli, 1986). This pattern of development has been recognized in a variety of other 
sciences as well (Gersick, 1991). Following the natural historians Eldredge and Gould, this 
discontinuous pattern of strategic renewal is often called punctuated equilibrium – stability 
punctuated by episodes of revolutionary change. 
 Some proponents of this view argue that episodes of revolutionary change are 
generally not chosen freely, but are triggered by crises. A major environmental jolt can be the 
reason for a sudden crisis (e.g. Meyer, 1982; Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 1990) – for example, 
the introduction of a new technology, a major economic recession, new government 
regulations, a novel market entrant or a dramatic event in international political affairs. 
However, often a misalignment between the firm and its environment grows over a longer 
period of time, causing a mounting sense of impending crisis (e.g. Johnson, 1988; Strebel, 
1992). As tension increases, people in the firm become more receptive to submit to the 
painful changes that are necessary. This increased willingness to change under crisis 
circumstances coincides with the physical law that ‘under pressure things become fluid’. As 
106
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
90 
long as the pressure persists, revolutionary change is possible, but as soon as the pressure lets 
up the firm will resolidify in a new form, inhibiting any further major changes (e.g. Lewin, 
1947; Miller and Friesen, 1984). For this reason, executives often feel impelled to heighten 
and prolong the sense of crisis, to keep the organizational members receptive to the changes 
being pushed through. And where a crisis is lacking, some executives will induce one, to 
create the sense of urgency and determination needed to get people in the change mind-set.  
 Other authors argue that revolutionary changes are not always reactive responses to 
crisis conditions. Revolutionary change can also be proactively pursued, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or even to change the rules of the game in the industry in which the firm is 
competing. If a firm decides to use a breakthrough technology or a new business model to 
improve its competitive position vis-à-vis rivals, this does entail that it will need to execute 
some major changes in a short period of time. Such innovations to the business system are 
inherently revolutionary. Creating novel products and developing a unique business formula 
requires a sharp break with the past. Old ways must be discarded, before new methods can be 
adopted. This is the essence of what Schumpeter (1950) referred to as the process of creative 
destruction, inherent in the capitalist system. This process is not orderly and protracted, but 
disruptive and intense. Therefore, it is argued, to be a competitive success, firms must learn 
to master the skill of on-going revolutionary change (e.g. D'Aveni, 1994; Hamel, 1996). 
Rapid implementation of system-wide change is an essential organizational capability – the 
firm needs to be able to run faster than its competitors. 
 It can be concluded that strategic changes, whether proactive or reactive, require an 
abrupt break with the status quo. Change management demands strong leadership to rapidly 
push through stressful, discomforting and risky shifts in the business and organizational 
system. Battling the sources of rigidity and turning crisis into opportunity are the key 
qualities needed by executives implementing strategic change. Ultimately, strategizing 
executives should know when to change and when it is wiser to seek stability – they should 
know when to trigger an ‘earthquake’ and when to avoid one. 
 
5.4.2 The Continuous Renewal Perspective 
According to proponents of the continuous renewal perspective, if firms shift by 
‘earthquake’, it is usually their own ‘fault’. The problem with revolution is that it commonly 
leads to the need for further revolution at a later time – discontinuous change creates its own 
boom-and-bust cycle. Revolutionary change is generally followed by a strong organizational 
yearning for stability. The massive, firm-wide efforts to implement agonizing changes can 
often only be sustained for a short period of time, after which change momentum collapses. 
Any positive inclination towards change among employees will have totally disappeared by 
the time the reorganizations are over. Consequently, the firm lapses back into a stable state, in 
which only minor changes occur. This stable situation is maintained until the next round of 
shock therapy becomes necessary, to jolt the organization out of its ossified state. 
 To supporters of the continuous renewal perspective, the boom-and-bust approach to 
strategic change is like running a marathon by sprinting and then standing still to catch one's 
breath. Yet, marathons are not won by good sprinters, but by runners with endurance and 
persistence, who can keep a steady pace – runners who are more inspired by the tortoise than 
by the hare. The same is true for companies in the marathon of competition. Some companies 
behave like the hare in Aesop's fable, showing off their ability to take great leaps, but 
burdened by a short span of attention. Other companies behave more like the tortoise, moving 
gradually and undramatically, but unrelentingly and without interruption, focusing on the 
long-term goal. In the short run, the hares might dash ahead, suggesting that making big leaps 
forward is the best way to compete. But in the long run, the most formidable contenders will 
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be the diligent tortoises, whose ability to maintain a constant speed will help them to win the 
race. 
 Therefore, the ‘big ideas’, ‘frame-breaking innovations’ and ‘quantum leaps’ that so 
mesmerize proponents of the discontinuous renewal perspective, are viewed with suspicion 
by supporters of continuous renewal. Revolution not only causes unnecessary disruption and 
dysfunctional crises, but also is usually the substitute of diligence. If organizations do not 
have the stamina to continuously improve themselves, quick fix radical change can be used as 
a short-term remedy. Where firms do not exhibit the drive to permanently upgrade their 
capabilities, revolutionary innovations can be used as the short cut to renewed 
competitiveness. In other words, the lure of revolutionary change is that of short-term results. 
By abruptly and dramatically making major changes, executives hope to rapidly book 
tangible progress – and instantly win recognition and promotion (Imai, 1986).  
 To advocates of the continuous renewal perspective, a preference for revolution 
usually reflects an unhealthy obsession with the short term. Continuous renewal, on the other 
hand, is more long term in orientation. Development is gradual, piecemeal and undramatic, 
but as it is constantly maintained over a longer period of time, the aggregate level of change 
can still be significant. Three organizational characteristics are important for keeping up a 
steady pace of change. First, all employees within the firm should be committed to 
continuously improve. Everyone within the firm should be driven by constructive 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. This attitude, that things can always be done better, 
reflects a rejection of stability and the acceptance of bounded instability (e.g. Beinhocker, 
1999; Stacey, 1993) – everything is open to change. 
 Secondly, everyone in the firm must be motivated to continuously learn. People 
within the organization must constantly update their knowledge base, which not only means 
acquiring new information, but challenging accepted company wisdom as well. Learning 
goes hand in hand with unlearning – changing the cognitive maps shared within the 
organization. In this respect, it is argued that an atmosphere of crisis actually inhibits 
continuous renewal. In a situation of crisis, it is not a matter of ‘under pressure things become 
fluid’, but ‘in the cold everything freezes’. Crisis circumstances might lower people's 
resistance to imposed change, but it also blunts their motivation for experimenting and 
learning, as they brace themselves for the imminent shock. Crisis encourages people to seek 
security and to focus on the short term, instead of opening up and working towards long-term 
development (e.g. Bate, 1994; Senge, 1990). 
 Thirdly, everyone in the firm must be motivated to continuously adapt. Constant 
adjustment to external change and fluid internal realignment should be pursued. To this end, 
the organization must actively avoid inertia, by combating the forces of ossification. 
Executives should strive to create flexible structures and processes (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1995; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1997), to encourage an open and tolerant corporate culture, and 
to provide sufficient job and career security for employees to accept other forms of ambiguity 
and uncertainty (e.g. Kagono et al., 1985; Nonaka, 1988). 
 These three characteristics of an evolutionary firm – continuous improvement, 
learning and adaptation – have in common that basically everyone in the organization is 
involved. Revolutionary change can be initiated by top management, possibly assisted and 
urged on by a few external consultants, and carried by a hand full of change agents or 
champions (e.g. Maidique, 1980; Day, 1994). Evolutionary change, on the other hand, 
requires a firm-wide effort. Leaders cannot learn on behalf of their organizations, nor can 
they orchestrate all of the small improvements and adaptations needed for continuous 
renewal. Executives must realize that evolution can be led from the top, but not imposed from 
the top. For strategizing executives to realize change, hands-on guidance of organizational 
developments is more important than commanding organizational actions. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
So, how do executives believe they should go about renewing their organizations? Do they 
feel they need to strive to bring about renewal abruptly, by emphasizing radical, 
comprehensive and dramatic changes? Or do they suppose they should try to make renewal a 
more continuous process, accentuating on-going improvement, learning and adaptation? The 
main differences between the discontinuous renewal perspective and the continuous renewal 
perspective are outlined in table 5.1. 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Discontinuous renewal versus continuous renewal perspective 
 
 Discontinuous Renewal Perspective Continuous Renewal Perspective 
Emphasis on Revolution over evolution Evolution over revolution 
Strategic renewal as Disruptive innovation/turnaround Uninterrupted improvement 
Strategic renewal process Creative destruction Organic adaptation 
Magnitude of change Radical, comprehensive and dramatic Moderate, piecemeal and undramatic 
Pace of change Abrupt, unsteady and intermittent Gradual, steady and constant 
Lasting renewal requires Sudden break with status quo Permanent learning and flexibility 
Reaction to external jolts Shock therapy Continuous adjustment 
View of crises Under pressure things becomes fluid In the cold everything freezes 
Renewal dynamics Stable and unstable states alternate Persistent transient state 
Long-term renewal pattern Punctuated equilibrium Gradual development 
  
 
To measure what executives actually think about strategic renewal, the two opposite poles 
have again been translated into 24 statements that can be judged by executives. In table 5.2, 
the two sets of opposing policy statements are presented, which will be used for capturing 
executives’ views on strategic change. These statements will be revisited in chapter 14. 
 
TABLE 5.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
  
Discontinuous Renewal Perspective Continuous Renewal Perspective 
5.1 
To achieve a major change, managers 
should push through all necessary measures 
in a swift, bold move. 
6.1 
To achieve a major change, managers 
should implement many moderate changes 
one after the other. 
5.2 Major organizational change requires large-scale dramatic measures. 6.2 
Major organizational change works best 
through continuous small improvements. 
5.3 Major organizational changes require a crisis, to undermine potential resistance. 6.3 
If employees are directly involved, major 
organizational changes can be achieved 
without a crisis. 
5.4 
Major change should take place in short 
episodes, disrupting longer periods of 
stability. 
6.4 Major change should be the result of a continual development process. 
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5.5 
Organizational change should be radical, to 
break through employees’ old habits and 
routines. 
6.5 
Organizational change should be moderate, 
to allow employees to learn and adapt their 
routines. 
5.6 Managers must avoid losing momentum by changing too few things. 6.6 
Managers must avoid creating a mess 
caused by changing too many things at the 
same time. 
5.7 
Managers expecting organizational changes 
to take years of gradual development lack 
ambition. 
6.7 It is unrealistic to expect radical measures to bring lasting change within a few months. 
5.8 
Gradual and continual organizational change 
is favored by managers without the courage 
to upset current interests. 
6.8 
Radical and disruptive organizational change 
is favored by managers without the discipline 
to guide a continuous process. 
5.9 
Only managers who provoke a radical break 
with the past will successfully change an 
existing organization. 
6.9 
Only managers who maintain constant 
pressure over a prolonged period of time will 
successfully change an existing organization. 
5.10 
Employees can endure a period of disruption 
and uncertainty, if organizational changes 
have a clear end date. 
6.10 To achieve employee acceptance, change needs to be gradual. 
5.11 Organizations are like old regimes that can only be overthrown by revolution. 6.11 
Organizations are like oil tankers, whose 
course can only be changed gradually. 
5.12 
Advocating evolutionary change is the best 
way to ensure that no real changes will 
happen at all. 
6.12 
Striving for revolutionary change is the 
quickest way to create resistance to any 
changes in future. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management is concerned with relating a firm to its environment, in order to 
successfully meet long-term objectives. As both the business environment and individual 
firms are dynamic systems, constantly in flux, achieving a fit between the two is an ongoing 
challenge. Executives are continuously looking for new ways to align the current, and 
potential, strengths and weaknesses of the organization with the current, and potential, 
opportunities and threats in the environment.  
 Part of the difficulty lies in the competitive nature of the environment. To be 
successful, firms need to gain a competitive advantage over rival organizations operating in 
the same business area. Within the competitive arena chosen by a firm, it needs to accrue 
enough power to counterbalance the demands of buyers and suppliers, to outperform rival 
producers, to discourage new firms from entering the business and to fend off the threat of 
substitute products or services. Preferably this competitive advantage over other players in 
the business should be sustainable over a prolonged period of time. How firms should go 
about creating a (sustainable) competitive advantage in each business in which they operate, 
is the central issue concerning executives engaged in business level strategy. 
 In this chapter, the focus will be on how executives believe they should achieve 
competitive advantage. Before moving to the two opposite perspectives on business level 
strategy, however, the nature of competitive advantage will be further explored. 
 
6.2 THE ISSUE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Whether a firm has a competitive advantage depends on the business system that it has 
developed to relate itself to its business environment. A business system is the configuration 
of resources (inputs), activities (throughput) and product/service offerings (output) intended 
to create value for customers – it is the way a firm conducts its business. In figure 6.1 an 
overview is given of the components of a business system.  
Competitive advantage can only be achieved if a business system creates superior 
value for buyers. Therefore, the first element in a successful business system is a superior 
value proposition. A firm must be able to supply a product or service more closely fitted to 
client needs than rival firms. To be attractive, each element of a firm’s product offering needs 
to be targeted at a particular segment of the market and have a superior mix of attributes (e.g. 
price, availability, reliability, technical specifications, image, color, taste, ease of use, etc.). 
Secondly, a successful company must also have the ability to actually develop and supply the 
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superior product offering. It needs to have the capability to perform the necessary value-
adding activities in an effective and efficient manner. These value-adding activities, such as 
R&D, production, logistics, marketing and sales, are jointly referred to as a firm’s activity 
system (or value chain). The third component of a business system consists of the resource 
base required to perform the value-adding activities. Resources such as know how, patents, 
facilities, money, brands and relationships make up the stock of assets that can be employed 
to create the product offering. If these firm-specific assets are distinctive and useful, they can 
form the basis of a superior value proposition. To create a competitive advantage, alignment 
must be achieved between all three elements of a business system. In the following pages all 
three elements will be discussed in more detail. 
 
FIGURE 6.1  
Components of a business system 
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6.2.1 The Product Offering 
At the intersection between a firm and its environment transactions take place, whereby the 
firm supplies goods or performs services for clients in the market place. It is here that the 
alignment of the firm and its environment is put to the test. If the products and services 
offered by the firm are more highly valued by customers than alternatives, a profitable 
transaction could take place. In other words, for sales to be achieved a firm must have a 
competitive value proposition – a cluster of physical goods, services and/or additional 
attributes with a superior fit to customer needs. 
 For the strategizing executive the key question is which products should be developed 
and which markets should be served. In many cases the temptation is to be everything to 
everybody – making a wide range of products and serving as many clients as possible. 
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However, a number of practical constraints inhibit companies from taking such an unfocused 
approach to the market. Companies that do not focus on a limited set of product-market 
combinations run the risk of encountering a number of major problems: 
 
 Low economies of scale. Being unfocused is expensive, because of the low economies of 
scale that can be achieved. In general, the less specialized the company, the lower the 
opportunities to organize the activity system efficiently and leverage the resource base.   
 Slow organizational learning. Being involved in a multitude of products and markets 
generally slows the organization’s ability to build up specific knowledge and capabilities. 
In general, the less specialized the company, the lower the opportunity to develop a 
distinctive activity system and resource base. 
 Unclear brand image. Unfocused companies have the added disadvantage of having a 
fuzzy image in the market. In general, companies that stand for everything tend to stand 
out in nothing.  
 Unclear corporate identity. The lack of clear external image is usually compounded by a 
lack of internal identity within unfocused organizations. In general, a company with 
highly diversified activities will have difficulty explaining why its people are together in 
the same company. 
 High organizational complexity. Highly diverse products and customers also create an 
exponential increase in organizational complexity. In general, the less specialized the 
company, the lower the opportunity to keep the organization simple and manageable. 
 Limits to flexibility. Being all things to all people is often physically impossible due to the 
need to specify procedures, routines, systems and tools. In general, less specialized firms 
are often forced into certain choices due to operational necessity.  
 
For these reasons, companies need to focus on a limited number of businesses and within 
each business on a limited group of customers and a limited set of products. This focus 
should not be arbitrary – the challenge for strategizing executives is to understand which 
businesses are (or can be made to be) structurally attractive and how their firm can gain a 
competitive advantage within each business, by offering specific value propositions to 
selected customer segments.  
 Determining a focus starts by looking for the boundaries of a business – how can 
executives draw meaningful delineation lines in the environment, distinguishing one arena of 
competition from another, so that they can select some and ignore others? Ideally, the 
environment would be made up of neatly compartmentalized businesses, with clear borders 
separating them. In reality, however, the picture is much messier. While there are usually 
certain clusters of buyers and suppliers interacting more intensely with one another, 
suggesting that they are operating in the same business, there are often numerous exceptions 
to any neat classification scheme. To explore how a business can be defined, it is first 
necessary to specify how a business differs from an ‘industry’ and a ‘market’.   
 
Delineating Industries 
An industry is defined as a group of firms making a similar type of product or employing a 
similar set of value-adding processes or resources. In other words, an industry consists of 
producers that are much alike – there is supply side similarity (Kay, 1993). The simplest way 
to draw an industry boundary is to use product similarity as delineation criterion. For 
instance, British Airways can be said to be in the airline industry, along with many other 
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providers of the same product, such as Delta, Singapore Airlines and Ryan Air. However, an 
industry can also be defined on the basis of activity system similarity (e.g. consulting industry 
and mining industry) or resource similarity (e.g. information technology industry and oil 
industry).  
Economic statisticians tend to favor fixed industry categories based on product 
similarity and therefore most figures available about industries are product-category based, 
often making use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Strategists, on the 
contrary, like to challenge existing definitions of an industry, for instance by regrouping them 
on the basis of underlying value-adding activities or resources. Take the example of Swatch – 
how did it conceptualize which industry it was in? If they had focused on the physical 
product and the production process, then they would have been inclined to situate Swatch in 
the watch industry. However, Swatch also viewed its products as fashion accessories, placing 
emphasis on the key value-adding activities of fashion design and marketing. On this basis, 
Swatch could just as well be categorized as a member of the fashion industry (Porac, Thomas 
& Baden-Fuller, 1989). For the strategizing executive, the realization that Swatch can be 
viewed in both ways is an important insight. As creating a competitive advantage often 
comes from doing things differently, rethinking the definition of an industry can be a 
powerful way to develop a unique product offering.  
Figure 6.2 gives four examples of traditionally defined industry columns, which 
Porter (1980) draws not top-down, but left-right, using the term value system. These columns 
start with upstream industries, which are involved in the extraction/growing of raw materials 
and their conversion into inputs for the manufacturing sector. Downstream industries take the 
output of manufacturing companies and bring them to clients, often adding a variety of 
services into the product mix. In practice, industry columns are not as simple as depicted in 
figure 6.2, as each industry has many different industries as suppliers and usually many 
different industries as buyers.  
A second limitation of the industry columns shown in figure 6.2 is that they are 
materials-flow oriented – industry boundaries are drawn on the basis of product similarity, 
while strategists might want to take a different angle on defining the industry. The darker 
colored blocks are some examples of alternative industry definitions, but one can imagine 
many more; not only broader definitions, but also more narrow ones. For instance, it could be 
argued that clothing retailers with physical stores are in a distinct industry as opposed to 
internet/mail-order retailers.  
 A further downside of the industry column figure is that the ‘materials-flow’ angle 
does not really suit the two-thirds of the economy that is involved in services. Understanding 
who are the buyers and the suppliers of insurance, education, consultancy, advertising and 
health care requires a different way of conceiving the industry column than looking at the 
flow of goods. Generally, for each different type of service a different value system will exist, 
with a distinct web of suppliers and buyers. 
 
Segmenting Markets 
While economists see the market as a place where supply and demand meet, in the business 
world a market is usually defined as a group of customers with similar needs. In other words, 
a market consists of buyers whose demands are much alike – demand side similarity. For 
instance, there is a market for air transportation between London and Jamaica, which is a 
different market than for air transportation between London and Paris – the customer needs 
are different and therefore these products cannot be substituted for one another. But 
customers can substitute a British Airways flight London-Paris for one by Air France, 
indicating that both companies are serving the same market.  
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Yet, this market definition (London-Paris air transport) might not be the most 
appropriate, if in reality many customers are willing to substitute air travel by rail travel, 
taking Le Shuttle through the channel tunnel, or by ferry. In this case, there is a broader 
London-Paris transportation market, and air transportation is a specific market segment. If 
many customers are willing to substitute physical travel by teleconferencing or other 
telecommunications methods, the market might need to be defined as the 'London-Paris 
meeting market'.  
 
FIGURE 6.2   
Alternative industry categorizations 
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As with industries, there are many ways of defining markets, depending on which buyer 
characteristics are used to make a clustering. In figure 6.3, a number of examples are given of 
segmentation criteria. The first group of segmentation criteria is based on buyer attributes that 
are frequently thought to be important predictors of actual buying criteria and buyer behavior. 
Such customer characteristics are commonly used to group potential clients because this 
information is objective and easily available. However, the pitfall of segmenting on the basis 
of buyer attributes is that the casual link between characteristics and actual needs and 
behaviors is often rather tenuous – not all Canadians need hockey sticks and not all 3 year 
olds nag their parents while shopping. In other words, the market can be segmented on the 
basis of any demographic characteristic (e.g. income, family composition, employment), but 
this might not lead to meaningful groups of customers with similar needs and buying 
behavior.  
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Therefore, instead of using buyer attributes as indirect – predictive – measures of 
what clients probably want, segments can also be directly defined on the basis of buying 
criteria employed and/or buyer behaviors exhibited. The advantage is that segments can then 
be identified with clearly similar wishes and/or behaviors. The disadvantage is that it is very 
difficult to gather and interpret information on what specific people want and how they really 
act.  
 
FIGURE 6.3   
Alternative market categorizations  
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For strategists, one of the key challenges is to look at existing categorizations of buyers and 
to wonder whether a different segmentation would offer new insights and new opportunities 
for developing a product offering specifically tailored to their needs. As with the redefining 
of industry boundaries, it is often in the reconceptualization of market segments that a unique 
approach to the market can be found. 
 
Defining and Selecting Businesses 
A business is as a set of related product-market combinations. The term 'business' refers 
neither to a set of producers nor a group of customers, but to the domain where the two meet. 
In other words, a business is a competitive arena where companies offering similar products 
serving similar needs rival against one another for the favor of the buyers. Hence, a business 
is delineated in both industry and market terms (see figure 6.4). Typically, a business is 
narrower than the entire industry and the set of markets served is also limited. For instance, 
within the airline industry the charter business is usually recognized as rather distinct. In the 
charter business, a subset of the airline services is offered to a number of tourist markets. 
Cheap flights from London to Jamaica and from London to Barcelona fall within this 
business, while service levels will be different than in other parts of the airline industry. It 
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should be noted, though, that just as with industries and markets, there is no best way to 
define the boundaries of a business (Abell, 1980). 
 
FIGURE 6.4   
Industries, markets and businesses 
London-
Jamaica
Transport
London-
Barcelona
Transport
Railways
Shipping
Airlines
London-
Paris
Transport
Charter Business
Ferry
Business
Markets (Demand side)
In
du
st
rie
s
(S
up
pl
y 
si
de
)
 
 
As stated before, companies cannot afford to be unfocused, operating superficially in a whole 
range of businesses. They must direct their efforts by focusing in two ways: 
 
 Selecting a limited number of businesses. The first constraint that companies need to 
impose on themselves is to choose a limited array of businesses within which they wish to 
be successful. This essential strategic challenge is referred to as the issue of corporate 
configuration and will be examined in more detail in chapter 6 (multi-business level 
strategy). Here it suffices to say that firms need to analyze the structural characteristics of 
interesting businesses to be able to judge whether they are attractive enough for the firm, 
or can be made to be attractive.     
 Focusing within each selected business. Even within the limited set of businesses 
selected, firms need to determine what they want to be and what they want to leave aside. 
To be competitive, it is necessary to choose a number of distinct market segments and to 
target a few special product offerings to meet these customers’ needs. As illustrated in 
figure 6.1, these specific product offerings in turn need to be aligned with a focused 
activity system and resource base.  
This act of focusing the overall business system to serve the particular needs of a targeted 
group of buyers, in a way that distinguishes the firm vis-à-vis rivals, is called positioning. 
This positioning of the firm in the business requires a clearly tailored product offering 
(product positioning), but also an activity system and resource base that closely fit with the 
demands of the specific group of customers and competitors being targeted.  
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Positioning within a Business 
Positioning is concerned with both the questions of ‘where to compete’ and ‘how to compete’ 
(Porter, 1980). Determining in which product-market combinations within a business a firm 
wants to be involved is referred to as the issue of competitive scope. Finding a way to beat 
rivals and win over customers for a product offering is the issue of competitive advantage. 
The two questions are tightly linked, because firms need to develop a specific advantage to be 
competitive within a specific product-market domain. If they try to use the same competitive 
advantage for too many dissimilar products and customers, they run the risk of becoming 
unfocused. 
 In selecting a competitive scope, firms can vary anywhere between being widely 
oriented and very tightly focused. Firms with a broad scope compete in a large number of 
segments within a business, with varied product offerings. Firms with a narrow scope target 
only one, or just a few, customer segments and have a more limited product line (see figure 
6.5). If there is a small part of the business with very specific demands, requiring a distinct 
approach, firms can narrowly focus on this niche as their competitive scope. In between these 
two extremes are firms with a segment focus and firms with a product focus, but in practice 
many other profiles are also possible.  
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In developing a competitive advantage, firms have many dimensions along which they can 
attempt to outdo their rivals. Some of the most important bases of competitive advantage are 
the following: 
 
 Price. The most straightforward advantage a firm can have in a competitive situation is 
the ability to charge a lower price. All things being equal, buyers generally prefer to pay 
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the lowest amount necessary. Hence, when purchasing a commodity product or service, 
most customers will be partial to the lowest priced supplier. And even when selecting 
among differentiated products, many customers will be inclined to buy the cheapest or at 
least the cheapest within a subgroup of more comparable products. For a firm wanting to 
compete on price, the essential point is that it should have a low cost product offering, 
activity system and resource base to match the price positioning. After all, in the long run 
a firm can only survive at a lower price level if it has developed a business system that 
can sustainably operate at a lower cost level.  
 Features. Firms can also distinguish their product offerings by having different intrinsic 
functional characteristics than competing offerings. There are many ways to make a 
product or service different, for instance by changing its size, smell, taste, color, 
functionality, compatibility, content, design or style. An ice cream manufacturer can 
introduce a new flavor and more chunky texture, a motorcycle producer can design a 
special ‘low rider’ model for women, a pay TV company can develop special channels for 
dog owners and science fiction addicts, and a utility company can offer environmentally-
friendly electricity. To be able to compete on each of these product features, firms need to 
command different specialized resources and activity systems. In some cases, they require 
significant technological knowledge and a technically sophisticated activity system, while 
in other cases design capabilities, marketing prowess or a satellite infrastructure are 
essential to the functioning of the business system.   
 Bundling. Another way to offer a uniquely different value proposition is to sell a package 
of products and/or services ‘wrapped together’. By bundling a number of separate 
elements into a package, the customer can have the convenience of ‘one stop shopping’, 
while also having a family of related products and/or services that fit together well. So, 
for instance, many customers prefer to purchase their software from one supplier because 
this raises the chance of compatibility. In the chocolate industry, the leading manufacturer 
of chocolate making machines, Rademakers, was able to gain a competitive advantage by 
bundling its machines with various services, such as installation, repair, spare parts and 
financing.   
 Quality. When competing with others, a firm’s product offering doesn’t necessarily have 
to be fundamentally different, it can just be better. Customers generally appreciate 
products and services that exhibit superior performance in terms of usability, reliability 
and durability, and are often willing to pay a premium price for such quality. Achieving 
excellent quality can be done along many fronts, for instance through the materials used, 
the people involved, the manufacturing process employed, the quality assurance 
procedures followed, or the distribution system used.  
 Availability. The method of distribution can in itself be the main competitive edge on 
which a firm bases its positioning. Having a product available at the right place, at the 
right moment and in the right way, can be much more important to customers than 
features and quality. Just ask successful ice cream manufacturers – most of their revenues 
are from out-of-doors impulse sales, so they need to have their products available in 
individually wrapped portions at all locations where people have the urge to indulge. In 
the same way, Avon’s cosmetics are not primarily sold because of their uniqueness or low 
price, but because of the strength of their 3 million salespeople, who can be at the right 
place at the right time.    
 Image. In the competition for customers’ preference, firms can also gain an advantage by 
having a more appealing image than their rivals. In business-to-consumer markets this is 
particularly clear when looking at the impact of brands. Consumers often feel attracted to 
120
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
104 
brands that project a certain image of the company or the products it sells. Brands can 
communicate specific values that consumers want to be associated with (Nike’s ‘just do 
it’), or can help to build trust among consumers who have too little information to base 
their product choices on (GE’s ‘we bring good things to life’). But even in business-to-
business markets buyers often suffer from a shortage of information about the available 
product offerings or lack the time to research all possible suppliers. Therefore, the image 
of suppliers, mostly in terms of their standing (‘a leading global player’) and reputation 
(‘high quality service’) can be essential to be considered at all (to be ‘short-listed’) and to 
be trusted as business partner.   
 Relations. Good branding can give customers the impression that they know the supplier, 
without actually being in direct contact. Yet, having a direct relation with customers can 
in itself be a potent source of competitive advantage. In general, customers prefer to know 
their suppliers well, as this gives them a more intimate knowledge of the product offering 
being provided. Having a relationship with a supplier can also give the customer more 
influence on what is offered. But besides these rational points, customers often value the 
personal contact, the trust and the convenience of having a long-standing relationship as 
well. For suppliers this means that they might acquire a competitive edge by managing 
their customer relationships well. To do so, however, does imply that the activity system 
and resource base are fit to fulfill this task.   
 
The type of competitive advantage that a firm chooses to pursue will be influenced by what 
the targeted group of buyers find important. These factors of importance to potential clients 
are referred to as value drivers – they are the elements responsible for creating value in the 
eyes of the customer. Which value drivers a firm will want to base its value proposition on is 
a matter of positioning. 
According to Porter (1980) all the specific forms of competitive advantage listed 
above can be reduced to two broad categories, namely lower cost and differentiation. On the 
one hand, firms can organize their business systems in such a manner that, while their 
products or services are largely the same as other manufacturers, their overall cost structure is 
lower, allowing them to compete on price. On the other hand, firms can organize their 
business systems to supply a product or service that has distinctive qualities compared to rival 
offerings. According to Porter, these two forms of competitive advantage demand 
fundamentally different types of business systems and therefore are next to impossible to 
combine. Firms that do try to realize both at the same time run the risk of getting stuck in the 
middle – not being able to do either one properly. 
 Treacy and Wiersema (1995) argue that there are actually three generic competitive 
advantages, each requiring a fundamentally different type of business system (they speak of 
three distinctive value disciplines). They, too, warn firms to develop an internally consistent 
business system focused on one of these types of competitive advantage, avoiding a ‘mix-
and-match’ approach to business strategy: 
 
 Operational excellence. Firms striving for operational excellence meet the buyers’ need 
for a reliable, low cost product offering. The activity system required to provide such no-
frills, standardized, staple products, emphasizes a ‘lean and mean’ approach to production 
and distribution, with simple service. 
 Product leadership. Firms taking the route of product leadership meet the buyers’ need 
for special features and advanced product performance. The activity system required to 
provide such differentiated, state-of-the-art products, emphasizes innovation and the 
creative collaboration between marketing and R&D. 
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 Customer intimacy. Firms deciding to focus on customer intimacy meet the buyers’ need 
for a tailored solution to their particular problem. The activity system required to provide 
such a client-specific, made-to-measure offering, emphasizes flexibility and 
empowerment of the employees close to the customer.  
 
Other strategy researchers, however, argue that there is no such thing as generic competitive 
strategies that follow from two or three broad categories of competitive advantage (e.g. 
Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1995).  In their view, there is a sheer endless variety of ways in 
which companies can develop a competitive advantage, many of which do not fit into the 
categories outlined by Porter or Treacy and Wiersema – in fact, finding a new type of 
competitive advantage might be the best way of obtaining a unique position in a business. 
 
6.2.2 The Activity System 
To be able to actually make what it wants to sell, a firm needs to have an activity system in 
place. An activity system is an integrated set of value creation processes leading to the supply 
of product and/or service offerings. Whether goods are being manufactured or services are 
being provided, each firm needs to perform a number of activities to successfully fill the 
customer’s wants. As these value-adding activities need to be coordinated and linked 
together, this part of the business system is also frequently referred to as the value chain 
(Porter, 1985). 
 Activity systems can vary widely from industry to industry. The activity system of a 
car manufacturer is quite distinct from that of an advertising agency. Yet even within an 
industry there can be significant differences. Most ‘bricks and mortar’ bookstores have 
organized their value chain differently than on-line book retailers like Amazon.com. The 
activity systems of most ‘hub-and-spoke’ airline companies hardly resemble that of ‘no-frills’ 
carriers such as Southwest in the US and easy Jet in Europe.  
While these examples point to radically different activity systems, even firms that 
subscribe to the same basic model can apply it in their own particular way. Fast-food 
restaurants such as McDonald’s and Burger King may employ the same basic model, but 
their actual activity systems differ in quite a few ways. The same goes for the PC 
manufacturers HP and IBM, who share a similar type of activity system, but who still differ 
on many fronts. ‘On-line mass-customization’ PC manufacturer Dell, on the other hand, has a 
different model and consequently a more strongly differing activity system than HP and IBM.     
Having such a distinct activity system often provides the basis for a competitive 
advantage. A unique value chain allows a firm to offer customers a unique value proposition, 
by doing things better, faster, cheaper, nicer or more tailored than competing firms. 
Developing the firm’s activity system is therefore just as strategically important as 
developing new products and services. 
Although activity systems can differ quite significantly, some attempts have been 
made to develop a general taxonomy of value adding activities that could be used as an 
analytical framework (e.g. Day, 1990; Norman & Ramirez, 1993). By far the most influential 
framework is Porter’s value chain, which distinguishes primary activities and support 
activities (see figure 6.6). Primary activities “are the activities involved in the physical 
creation of the product and its sale and transfer to the buyer, as well as after-sale assistance” 
(Porter, 1985; 16). Support activities facilitate the primary process, by providing purchased 
inputs, technology, human resources and various firm-wide functions. The generic categories 
of primary activities identified by Porter are:  
 
122
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
106 
 Inbound logistics. Activities associated with receiving, storing, and disseminating inputs, 
including material handling, warehousing, inventory control, vehicle scheduling, and 
returns to suppliers. 
 Operations. Activities associated with transforming inputs into final products, including 
machining, packaging, assembly, equipment maintenance, testing, printing, and facility 
operations. 
 Outbound logistics. Activities associated with collecting, storing, and physically 
distributing products to buyers, including warehousing, material handling, delivery, order 
processing, and scheduling. 
 Marketing and sales. Activities associated with providing a means by which buyers can 
purchase the product and inducing them to do so, including advertising, promotion, sales 
force, quoting, channel selection, channel relations, and pricing. 
 Service. Activities associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value of 
products, including installation, repair, training, parts supply, and product adjustment.   
 
FIGURE 6.6  
The generic value chain (Porter, 1985) 
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For service industries Porter argues that the specific activities will be different, and might be 
performed in a different order, but can still be subdivided into these five generic categories. 
To ensure that the primary activities can be carried out, each firm also needs to organize four 
types of support activities: 
 
 Procurement. Activities associated with the purchasing of inputs to facilitate all other 
activities, including vendor selection, negotiations, contracting, and invoice 
administration. 
 Technology development. Activities associated with the improvement of technologies 
throughout the firm, including basic research, product and process design, and procedure 
development. 
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 Human resource management. Activities associated with the management of personnel 
throughout the organization, including recruiting, hiring, training, development, and 
compensation. 
 Firm infrastructure. Firm infrastructure consists of all general activities that support the 
entire value chain, including general management, planning, finance, accounting, legal, 
government affairs, and quality management. 
The uniqueness of the activity system, and its strength as the source of competitive 
advantage, will usually not depend on only a few specialized activities, but on the 
extraordinary configuration of the entire activity system. An extraordinary configuration 
multiplies the distinctness of a particular activity system, while often raising the barrier to 
imitation (Porter, 1996; Amit & Zott, 2000).  
 
6.2.3 The Resource Base 
To carry out activities and to produce goods and services, firms need resources. A firm’s 
resource base includes all means at the disposal of the organization for the performance of 
value-adding activities. Other authors prefer the term assets, to emphasize that the resources 
belong to the firm (e.g. Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Itami, 1987). 
Under the broad umbrella of resource-based view of the firm, there has been much 
research into the importance of resources for the success and even existence of firms (e.g. 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). No generally accepted classification of firm 
resources has yet emerged in the field of strategic management, however the following major 
distinctions are commonly made: 
 
 Tangible vs. intangible resources. Tangible resources are all means available to the firm 
that can physically be observed (touched), such as buildings, machines, materials, land 
and money. Tangibles can be referred to as the 'hardware' of the organization. Intangibles, 
on the other hand, are the 'software' of the organization. Intangible resources cannot be 
touched, but are largely carried within the people in the organization. In general, tangible 
resources need to be purchased, while intangibles need to be developed. Therefore, 
tangible resources are often more readily transferable, easier to price and usually are 
placed on the balance sheet.  
 Relational resources vs. competences. Within the category of intangible resources, 
relational resources and competences can be distinguished. Relational resources are all of 
the means available to the firm derived from the firm's interaction with its environment 
(Lowendahl, 1997). The firm can cultivate specific relationships with individuals and 
organizations in the environment, such as buyers, suppliers, competitors and government 
agencies, which can be instrumental in achieving the firm's goals. As attested by the old 
saying, “it's not what you know, but whom you know”, relationships can often be an 
essential resource (see Chapter 7 for a further discussion). Besides direct relationships, a 
firm's reputation among other parties in the environment can also be an important 
resource. Competence, on the other hand, refers to the firm's fitness to perform in a 
particular field. A firm has a competence if it has the knowledge, capabilities and attitude 
needed to successfully operate in a specific area.  
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FIGURE 6.7   
Types of firm resources 
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This description of competences is somewhat broad and therefore difficult to employ. 
However, a distinction between knowledge, capability and attitude (Durand, 1996) can be 
used to shed more light on the nature of competences: 
 
 Knowledge. Knowledge can be defined as the whole of rules (know-how, know-what, 
know-where and know-when) and insights (know-why) that can be extracted from, and 
help make sense of, information. In other words, knowledge flows from, and influences, 
the interpretation of information (Dretske, 1981). Examples of knowledge that a firm can 
possess are market insight, competitive intelligence, technological expertise, and 
understanding of political and economic developments. 
 Capability. Capability refers to the organization's potential for carrying out a specific 
activity or set of activities. Sometimes the term skill is used to refer to the ability to carry 
out a narrow (functional) task or activity, while the term capability is reserved for the 
quality of combining a number of skills. For instance, a firm's capability-base can include 
narrower abilities such as market research, advertising and production skills, that if 
coordinated could result in a capability for new product development (Stalk, Evans & 
Shulman, 1992). 
 Attitude. Attitude refers to the mindset prevalent within an organization. Sometimes the 
terms disposition and will are used in the same sense, to indicate how an organization 
views and relates to the world. Although ignored by some writers, every sports coach will 
acknowledge the importance of attitude as a resource. A healthy body (tangible resource), 
insight into the game (knowledge), speed and dexterity (capabilities) – all are important, 
but without the winning mentality a team will not get to the top. Some attitudes may 
change rapidly within firms, yet others may be entrenched within the cultural fabric of the 
organization – these in particular can be important resources for the firm. A company's 
attitude can, for instance, be characterized as quality-driven, internationally-oriented, 
innovation-minded and/or competitively-aggressive. 
 
It must be noted that the term 'competences' is used in many different ways, partially due to 
the ambiguous definition given by its early proponents (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). It is often 
used as a synonym for capabilities, while Prahalad & Hamel seem to focus more on 
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technologically-oriented capabilities (“how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies”). Others (e.g. Durand, 1996) have suggested that a 
firm has a competence in a certain area, when the firm's underlying knowledge base, 
capabilities and attitude are all aligned. So, Honda's engine competence is built on specific 
knowledge, development capabilities and the right predisposition. Wal-Mart’s inventory 
control competence depends on specific information technology knowledge, coordination 
capabilities and a conducive state of mind. Virgin Airway's service competence combines 
customer knowledge, adaptation capabilities and a customer-oriented attitude. 
 As in the case of industries, markets, and businesses, employing the concepts of 
tangible and intangible resources is quite difficult in practice. Two problems need to be 
overcome – resources are difficult to categorize, but worse yet, often difficult to recognize. 
The issue of categorization is a minor one. For some resources it is unclear how they should 
be classified. Are human resources tangible or intangible? Problematically, both. In humans, 
hardware and software are intertwined – if an engineer's expertise is required, the physical 
person usually needs to be hired. Knowledge, capabilities and attitudes need human carriers. 
Sometimes it is possible to separate hardware and software, by making the intangibles more 
tangible. This is done by 'writing the software down'. In such a manner, knowledge can be 
codified, for instance in a patent, a capability can be captured in a computer program and a 
relationship can be formalized in a contract. Sometimes intangibles become more tangible, as 
they become attached to physical carriers – for instance, attitude can be embodied by a person 
or a symbol, while reputation becomes attached to a brand.  
 More important is the problem of resource identification. Tangible resources, by their 
very nature, are relatively easy to observe. Accountants keep track of the financial resources, 
production executives usually know the quality of their machinery and stock levels, while the 
personnel department will have an overview of all people on the pay role. Intangible 
resources, on the other hand, are far more difficult to identify (e.g. Grant, 1991; Itami, 1986). 
With whom does the firm have a relationship and what is the state of this relationship? What 
is the firm's reputation? These relational resources are hard to pin down. Competences are 
probably even more difficult to determine. How do you know what you know? Even for an 
individual it is a formidable task to outline areas of expertise, let alone for a more complex 
organization. Especially the tacit (non-articulated) nature of much organizational knowledge 
makes it difficult to identify the firm's knowledge base (Polanyi, 1958; Nonaka and Konno, 
1998). The same is true for a firm's capabilities, which have developed in the form of 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Likewise, the firm's attitudes are difficult 
to discern, because all people sharing the same disposition will tend to consider themselves 
normal and will tend to believe that their outlook is 'a matter of common sense' (see Chapter 
2). Hence, firms intent on identifying their competences find that this is not an easy task. 
 While an overview of the firm's resource-base is important in itself, a strategizing 
executive will want to compare the firm's resources to other companies to determine their 
relative strength. In other words, are the firm's resources unique, superior to, or inferior to the 
resources of (potential) competitors? This type of analysis is particularly difficult, as 
comparison requires insight into other firms' resource-bases. Especially the identification of 
other firms' intangible resources can be quite arduous. 
 
6.2.4 Sustaining Competitive Advantage 
A firm has a competitive advantage when it has the means to edge out rivals when vying for 
the favor of customers. In the previous subsections it was argued that competitive advantage 
is rooted in a unique business system, whereby the resource base, activity system, and 
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product-market position are all aligned to provide goods and/or services with a superior fit to 
customer needs.   
A competitive advantage is said to be sustainable if it cannot be copied, substituted or 
eroded by the actions of rivals, and is not made redundant by developments in the 
environment (Porter, 1980). In other words, sustainability depends on two main factors, 
competitive defendability and environmental consonance:  
 
 Competitive defendability. Some competitive advantages are intrinsically easier to defend 
than others, either because they are difficult for rivals to imitate, or because rivals find it 
next to impossible to find an alternative route of attack. In general, a firm’s competitive 
advantage is more vulnerable when it is based on only a limited number of distinct 
elements (e.g. a different packaging technology, a different delivery system, or different 
product colors). For rivals, imitating or substituting a few elements is comparatively easy. 
If, however, a firm’s business system has an entirely different configuration altogether, 
the barriers to imitation and substitution are much higher. In such a case, it is said that a 
firm has a distinct business model. So, for instance, in the airline industry the traditional 
firms have tried to imitate some parts of the low cost service of Southwest in the U.S., 
and Ryanair and easy Jet in Europe, but have been largely unsuccessful because their 
business model as a whole is based on a different logic. Yet, many strategists note that the 
best defense is not to build walls around a competitive position to ‘keep the barbarians 
out’, but to have the ability to run faster than rivals – to be able to upgrade one’s 
resources, activity system and product offering more rapidly than competitors. In this 
view, a competitive advantage is sustainable due to a company’s capacity to stay one step 
ahead of rivals, outpacing them in a race to stay ahead (e.g. Gilbert and Strebel, 1992; 
Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992).   
 Environmental consonance. The sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage is also 
threatened by developments in the market. Customer needs and wants are in constant 
flux, distribution channels can change, government regulations can be altered, innovative 
technologies can be introduced and new entrants can come into the competitive arena. All 
of these developments can undermine the fit between the firm’s competitive advantage 
and the environment, weakening the firm’s position (Rumelt, 1980). 
 
Yet, these two factors for sustaining competitive advantage seem to pose opposite demands 
on the organization. Building a distinctive business system to fend off competition would 
suggest that a firm should remain true to its fundamental strengths, especially when it comes 
to unique resources and activities that it has built up over a prolonged period of time. On the 
other hand, environmental consonance requires a firm to continually adapt its business 
system to the demands and new opportunities in the market place. The tension created by 
these opposite pressures will be discussed in the following section.  
 
6.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN MARKETS AND RESOURCES 
There must be a fit between an organization and its environment. This point is often 
expressed in terms of the classic SWOT analysis tool that suggests that a sound strategy 
should match a firm's strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) to the opportunities (O) and threats 
(T) encountered in the firm's environment. The key to success is alignment of the two sides. 
Yet, fitting internal strengths and weaknesses to external opportunities and threats is often 
frustrated by the fact that the two sides pull in opposite directions – the distinctive resource 
base and activity system of a firm can point in a totally different direction than the 
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developments in their current markets. Take the example of Bally, in the 1990s the 
worldwide market leader in pinball machines. Their strength in the manufacturing of 
electromechanical games was no longer aligned with developments in the market, where 
young people were turning to video games, produced by companies such as Nintendo, Sega 
and Sony. As sales of pinball machines were quickly deteriorating, it was clear that Bally had 
to find a new fit with the market to survive. On the one hand, this meant that there was a 
strong pressure on Bally to adapt to market developments, for instance by upgrading its 
technology to also produce video games. On the other hand, Bally felt a strong pressure to 
exploit its current strength in electromechanical manufacturing, instead of building a new 
competence base from scratch. It was not self-evident for Bally how the demands for market 
adaptation and resource leveraging could be met simultaneously, as they seemed to be 
tugging the firm in diametrically opposite directions.  
This tension arising from the partially conflicting demands of market adaptation and 
resource leveraging is referred to as the tension between markets and resources. In the 
following sections both sides of the tension will be examined in more detail. 
 
6.3.1 The Demand for Market Adaptation 
While adaptation to the environment is a vital requirement for the success of any 
organization, Bally had been very slow in responding to external developments ever since the 
introduction of Pac Man. Bally had not exhibited the ability to shift its product offering to 
follow changing customer preferences and to respond to new entrants in the gaming market. 
It had lost its leading position because it no longer fully understood ‘the rules of the game’ in 
its own market. As Bally drifted further and further away from developments in the market, 
the misalignment was threatening the survival of its business. ‘Game over’ was impending.  
 To counter this downward trend, Bally needed to identify an attractive market 
opportunity that it could exploit. Not a short-term sales opportunity, but a market position 
that could be defended against rival firms and potential new entrants over a longer period. 
Ideally, this market position would serve buyers willing and able to pay a premium price, and 
whose loyalty could be won, despite the efforts of the competition. This market position 
would also need to be largely immune to substitute products and should not make the firm 
overly dependent on strong suppliers. Once such an opportunity had been identified, it would 
be essential for Bally to reorganize itself to fully meet the demands of this new positioning. 
 Adapting to a new market position and subsequently following the many shifts in 
such factors as customer preferences, competitor moves, government regulations and 
distribution structures, can have a significant impact on a firm. It requires significant agility 
in changing the product offering, activity system and resource base to remain in constant 
alignment with the fluctuating external circumstances. For Bally adapting to the digital 
technology and software environment of the current gaming industry would have had far 
reaching consequences for its entire business system. Even if Bally decided to stick to 
electromechanical pinball machines and to target the home market of aging pinball wizards, 
the company would need to make significant alterations to its business system, getting to 
know new distribution channels and developing new marketing competences.  
 
6.3.2 The Demand for Resource Leveraging  
Yet, for Bally it was essential to build on the resource base and activity system that it had 
already developed. It did not want to write off the investments it had made in building up a 
distinctive profile – it had taken years of acquiring and nurturing resources and fine-tuning 
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the activity system to reach its level of expertise. Its strength in electromechanical 
manufacturing and the development of large ‘moving parts’ games was much too valuable to 
casually throw away just because video games were currently in fashion.  
However, building a new area of competence, it was understood, should not be 
considered lightly. It would take a considerable amount of time, effort and money to shift the 
resource base and reconfigure the activity system, while there would be many risks associated 
with this transformation process as well. On the other hand, the danger of attempting to 
exploit the firm’s current resources would be to excel at something of increasing irrelevance. 
The pinball machine might be joining the buggy whip and the vacuum tube as a museum 
exhibit, with a real threat that Bally too could become history.  
 Eventually, the solution found by Bally was to give up on pinball machines altogether 
and to redirect its existing resources towards a much more attractive market opportunity – 
slot machines. This move allowed Bally to exploit its electromechanical manufacturing 
capability and game making expertise, while building a strong market position in fast 
growing market. But while Bally was able to find a synthesis, reconciling the two conflicting 
demands, not all companies are as successful. Nor do all executives agree on how the tension 
between markets and resources can best be tackled.   
 
6.4 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS LEVEL STRATEGY 
Firms need to adapt themselves to market developments and they need to build on the 
strengths of their resource bases and activity systems. The main question that could 
potentially divide executives is ‘who should be fitted to whom’ – should an organization 
adapt itself to its environment or should it attempt to adapt the environment to itself? What 
should be the dominant factor driving a firm, its strengths or the opportunities? Should 
executives take the environment as starting point, choose an advantageous market position 
and then build the resource base and activity system necessary to implement this choice? Or 
should executives take the organization's resource base (and possibly also its activity system) 
as starting point, selecting and/or adapting an environment to fit with these strengths?  
As before, the strategic management literature comes with strongly different views on 
how executives should proceed. The variety of opinions among strategy theorists is 
dauntingly large, with many incompatible prescriptions being given. Here, for the purpose of 
developing a dimension along which the differences of opinion can be measured, the two 
diametrically opposed positions will be identified and discussed. On the one side of the 
spectrum, there are those executives who argue that the market opportunities should be 
leading, while implying that the organization should adapt itself to the market position 
envisioned. This point of view is called the outside-in perspective. At the other end of the 
spectrum, many executives believe that competition eventually revolves around rivaling 
resource bases and that firms must focus their strategies on the development of unique 
resources and activity systems. They argue that product-market positioning is a tactical 
decision that can be taken at a latter moment. This view is referred to as the inside-out 
perspective.  
 
6.4.1 The Outside-in Perspective 
Executives with an outside-in perspective believe that firms should not be self-centered, but 
should continuously take their environment as starting point when determining their strategy. 
Successful companies, it is argued, are externally-oriented and market-driven (e.g. Day, 
1990; Webster, 1994). They have their sights clearly set on developments in the market place 
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and are determined to adapt to the unfolding opportunities and threats encountered. They take 
their cues from customers and competitors, and use these signals to determine their own 
game plan (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993). For these successful companies, markets are leading, 
resources are following. 
Therefore, for the outside-in directed executive, developing strategy begins with an 
analysis of the environment to identify attractive market opportunities. Potential customers 
must be sought, whose needs can be satisfied more adequately than currently done by other 
firms. Once these customers have been won over and a market position has been established, 
the firm must consistently defend or build on this position by adapting itself to changes in the 
environment. Shifts in customers' demands must be met, challenges from rival firms must be 
countered, impending market entries by outside firms must be rebuffed and excessive pricing 
by suppliers must be resisted. In short, to the outside-in executive the game of strategy is 
about market positioning and understanding and responding to external developments. For 
this reason, the outside-in perspective is sometimes also referred to as the positioning 
approach (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998). 
 Positioning is not short-term opportunistic behavior, but requires a strategic 
perspective, because superior market positions are difficult to attain, but once conquered can 
be the source of sustained profitability. Some proponents of the outside-in perspective argue 
that in each market a number of different positions can yield sustained profitability. For 
instance, Porter suggests that companies that focus on a particular niche, and companies that 
strongly differentiate their product offering, can achieve strong and profitable market 
positions, even if another company has the lowest cost position (Porter, 1980, 1985). Other 
authors emphasize that the position of being market leader is particularly important (e.g. 
Buzell and Gale, 1987). Companies with a high market share profit more from economies of 
scale, benefit from risk aversion among customers, have more bargaining power towards 
buyers and suppliers, and can more easily flex their muscles to prevent new entrants and 
block competitive attacks.     
 Unsurprisingly, proponents of the outside-in perspective argue that insight into 
markets and industries is essential. Not only the general structure of markets and industries 
needs to be analyzed, but also the specific demands, strengths, positions and intentions of all 
major forces need to be determined. For instance, buyers must be understood, with regard to 
their needs, wants, perceptions, decision-making processes and bargaining chips. The same 
holds true for suppliers, competitors, potential market and/or industry entrants, and providers 
of substitute products (Porter, 1980, 1985). Once a executive knows 'what makes the market 
tick' – sometimes referred to as the rules of the game – a position can be identified within the 
market that could give the firm bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers and buyers, while 
keeping competitors at bay. Of course, the wise executive will not only emphasize winning 
under the current rules with the current players, but will attempt to anticipate market and 
industry developments, and position the firm to benefit from these. Many outside-in 
advocates even advise firms to initiate market and industry changes, so that they can be the 
first to benefit from the altered rules of the game (this issue will be discussed in further length 
in chapter 8). 
 Proponents of the outside-in perspective readily acknowledge the importance of firm 
resources and activities for cashing in on market opportunities the firm has identified. If the 
firm does not have, or is not able to develop or obtain, the necessary resources to implement a 
particular strategy, then specific opportunities will be unrealizable. Therefore, executives 
should always keep the firm's strengths and weaknesses in mind when choosing an external 
position, to ensure that it remains feasible. Yet, to the outside-in strategist, the firm's current 
resource base should not be the starting point when determining strategy, but should merely 
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be acknowledged as a potentially limiting condition on the firm's ability to implement the 
best business strategy.  
Actually, firms that are market-driven are often the first ones to realize that new 
resources and/or activities need to be developed and, therefore, are better positioned to build 
up a first mover advantage (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998). Where the firm does 
not have the ability to catch up with other firms’ superior resources, it can always enter into 
an alliance with a leading organization, offering its partner a crack at a new market 
opportunity.  
 
6.4.2 The Inside-out Perspective 
Executives adopting an inside-out perspective believe that strategies should not be built 
around external opportunities, but around a company's strengths. Successful companies, it is 
argued, build up a strong resource base over an extended period of time, which offers them 
access to unfolding market opportunities in the medium and short term. For such companies, 
the starting point of the strategy formation process is the question of which resource base it 
wants to have. The fundamental strategic issue is which difficult-to-imitate competences and 
exclusive assets should be acquired and/or further refined. Creating such a resource platform 
requires major investments and a long breath, and to a large extent will determine the culture 
and identity of the organization. Hence, it is of the utmost importance and should be the 
central tenet of a firm’s strategy. Once the long-term direction for the building of the resource 
infrastructure has been set, attention can be turned to identifying markets opportunities where 
these specific strengths can be exploited. To the inside-out oriented executive the issue of 
market positioning is essential, as only a strong competitive position in the market will result 
in above average profitability. However, market positioning must take place within the 
context of the broader resource-based strategy and not contradict the main thrust of the firm – 
selected market positions must leverage the existing resource base, not ignore it. In other 
words, market positioning is vital, but tactical, taking place within the boundaries set by the 
resource-driven strategy. For success, resources should be leading, and markets following.  
 Many executives taking an inside-out perspective tend to emphasize the importance of 
a firm's competences over its tangible resources (physical assets). Their way of looking at 
strategy is referred to as the competence-based view (e.g. Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Sanchez, 
Heene and Thomas, 1996) or capabilities-based view (e.g. Stalk, Evans & Shulman, 1992; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). These executives point out that it is especially the 
development of unique abilities that is such a strenuous and lengthy process, more so than the 
acquisition of physical resources, such as production facilities and computer systems. Some 
companies might be able to achieve a competitive advantage based on physical assets, but 
usually such tangible infrastructure is easily copied or purchased. However, competences are 
not readily for sale on the open market as ‘plug-and-play’ components, but need to be 
painstakingly built up by an organization through hard work and experience. Even where a 
company takes a short cut by buying another organization or engaging in an alliance, it takes 
significant time and effort to internalize the competences in such a way that they can be put 
to productive use. Hence, having distinctive competences can be a very attractive basis for 
competitive advantage, as rival firms generally require a long time to catch up (e.g. Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995; Barney, 1991). And even if competitors are successful at identifying 
embedded competences and imitating them, the company with an initial lead can work at 
upgrading its competences in a race to stay ahead – this is often referred to as the dynamic 
capabilities view (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  
To proponents of the inside-out perspective the ‘dynamic capabilities’ argument 
accentuates the importance of committing the organization to the long-term development of a 
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limited set of competences in which it can stay ahead of rivals. The ‘nightmare scenario’ for 
inside-out oriented strategists is where the firm flexibly shifts from one market demand to the 
next, building up an eclectic collection of unrelated competences, none of which are 
distinctive compared to competence-focused companies. In this scenario, a firm is fabulously 
market-driven, adaptively responding to shifts in the environment, but incapable of 
concentrating itself on forming the distinctive competence base needed for a robust 
competitive advantage over the longer term.     
 
FIGURE 6.8   
Two perspectives on shaping the business system  
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Most inside-out oriented executives also recognize the ‘shadow side’ of competences – they 
are not only difficult to learn, but difficult to unlearn as well. The laborious task of building 
up competences makes it hard to switch to new competences, even if that is what the market 
demands (e.g. Christensen, 1997; Rumelt, 1996). Companies far down the route of 
competence specialization, find themselves locked in by the choices made in the past. In the 
same way as few concert pianists are able (and willing) to switch to playing saxophone when 
they are out of a job, few companies are able and willing to scrap their competence base, just 
because the market is taking a turn for the worse. Becoming a concert pianist not only costs 
years of practice, but is a way of life, with a specific way of working, network and career 
path, making it very unattractive to make a mid-career shift towards a more marketable trade. 
Likewise, companies experience that their core competences can simultaneously be their core 
rigidities, locking them out of new opportunities (Leonard-Barton, 1995). From an inside-out 
perspective, both companies and concert pianists should therefore first try to build on their 
unique competences and attempt to find or create a more suitable market, instead of 
reactively adapting to the unpredictable whims of the current environment. 
 
132
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
116 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
So, how do executives believe that a sustainable competitive advantage can be created? 
Should generals create a sustainable competitive advantage by first selecting a superior 
position in the environment (e.g. a mountain pass) and then adapt their military resources to 
this position, or should generals develop armies with unique resources and then try to let the 
battle take place where these resources can best be employed? Should football coaches first 
determine how they want the game to be played on the field and then attract and train players 
to fit with this style, or should coaches develop uniquely talented players and then adapt the 
team’s playing style to make the best use of these resources? Whether a military, sports or 
business strategist, it is possible that people have preconceived views about the best approach 
to creating competitive advantage.  
 
TABLE 6.1   
Outside-in versus inside-out perspective 
 Outside-in Perspective Inside-out Perspective 
Emphasis on Markets over resources Resources over markets 
Orientation Opportunity-driven (external potential) Strength-driven (internal potential) 
Starting point Market demand & industry structure Resource base & activity system 
Fit through Adaptation to environment Adaptation of environment 
Strategic focus Attaining advantageous position Attaining distinctive resources 
Strategic moves External positioning Building resource base 
Tactical moves Acquiring necessary resources External positioning 
Competitive weapons Bargaining power & mobility barriers Superior resources & imitation barriers 
  
 
In table 6.1 the main differences between the outside-in and inside-out perspectives have 
been summarized. And as in the previous chapters, these two opposite poles have been 
operationalized by formulating 24 corresponding statements that can be judged by executives. 
In table 6.2, the two sets of opposing policy statements are presented, which will be used for 
capturing executives’ views on business level strategy. These statements will also be revisited 
in chapter 14. 
 
TABLE 6.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
 
Outside-In Perspective Inside-Out Perspective 
7.1 
Flexibly responding to emerging market 
opportunities is the key to a successful 
strategy. 
8.1 
The firm that is best at developing unique 
capabilities will be most successful in the 
long run. 
7.2 
If companies jump at market opportunities, 
they can always develop the necessary 
competences and technologies to match. 
8.2 If companies build distinctive competences, the market opportunities will soon follow.   
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7.3 Firms should adapt their core technologies and capabilities to fit new market demands. 8.3 
Firms should stick to their core technologies 
and capabilities, seeking new markets where 
they can be applied. 
7.4 Long-term profitability is best achieved by securing a defensible market position. 8.4 
Long-term profitability is best achieved by 
building distinctive technologies and 
capabilities. 
7.5 
Firms should pursue the best market 
opportunities, not necessarily the ones 
closest the firm’s current competences. 
8.5 Firms should always stay close to their core competences. 
7.6 
Managers who understand market 
developments should lead strategy 
formulation. 
8.6 
Managers who understand know-how and 
capability development should lead strategy 
formulation. 
7.7 
A primary reason for corporate decline is that 
firms fail to adapt to shifting market 
opportunities. 
8.7 A primary reason for corporate decline is that firms fall behind in the technology race. 
7.8 The customer is always king. 8.8 
Firms that quickly adapt to changing market 
conditions risk never developing a distinctive 
competence. 
7.9 
Firms that focus on building their core 
competences are usually too slow in 
capturing shifting market opportunities. 
8.9 
Having superior technologies and capabilities 
is more important than being first on the 
market. 
7.10 The starting point of all strategizing should be the opportunities present in the market. 8.10 
The starting point of all strategizing should be 
the distinctive capabilities of the firm. 
7.11 
Developing market positions is strategic, 
while obtaining the necessary technologies 
and capabilities is tactical. 
8.11 
Firms should say ‘no’ to current customers, if 
new demands draw the firm far away from its 
core competences. 
7.12 
Firms should jump at market opportunities 
first and worry how to acquire the necessary 
resources and skills later. 
8.12 Building competences is strategic, while selecting market opportunities is tactical. 
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Chapter 7 
 
CORPORATE LEVEL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As firms seek growth, they have a number of directions in which they can expand. The most 
direct source of increased revenue is to enlarge their market share, selling more of their 
current product offerings in their current market segments. Besides this growth through 
focused market penetration, firms can also broaden their scope by extending their product 
range (product development) and/or move into neighboring market segments and geographic 
areas (market development). All of these growth options can be pursued while staying within 
the ‘boundaries’ of a single business (see figure 7.1). However, firms can broaden their scope 
even further, venturing into other lines of business, thus becoming multi-business 
corporations. Some multi-business firms are involved in only two or three businesses, but 
there are numerous corporations spanning twenty, thirty, or more, business areas.    
This chapter deals with the specific strategic questions facing firms as they work on 
determining their multi-business scope. At this level, strategists must not only consider how 
to gain a competitive advantage in each line of business the firm has entered, but also which 
businesses they should be in at all. Corporate level strategy is about selecting an optimal set 
of businesses and determining how they should be integrated into the corporate whole. This 
issue of deciding on the best array of businesses and relating them to one another is referred 
to as the issue of corporate configuration. 
As before, there seems to be a wide variety of views regarding the best approach to 
managing the corporate configuration. In this chapter these different perspectives will be 
examined and structured on the basis of the fundamental tension underlying the topic of 
corporate strategy – the tension between responsiveness and synergy. The chapter will again 
end with the identification of two opposite poles, which can be used in constructing a 
psychometric instrument.     
 
7.2 THE ISSUE OF CORPORATE CONFIGURATION 
All multi-business firms have a particular configuration, either intentionally designed or as 
the result of emergent formation. Determining the configuration of a corporation can be 
disentangled into two main questions: What businesses should the corporation be active in 
and how should this group of businesses be managed? This first question of deciding on the 
business areas that will be covered by the company is called the topic of corporate 
composition. The second question, of deciding on the organizational system necessary to run 
the cluster of businesses, is labeled as the issue of corporate management. In the following 
pages both questions will be explored in more detail.   
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7.2.1 Corporate Composition 
A multi-business firm is composed of two or more businesses. When a corporation enters yet 
another line of business, either by starting up new activities (internal growth) or by buying 
another firm (acquisition), this is called diversification. There are two general categories of 
diversification moves, vertical and horizontal. Vertical diversification, usually called vertical 
integration, is when a firm enters other businesses upstream or downstream within its own 
industry column (see chapter 6) – it can strive for backward integration by getting involved in 
supplier businesses or it can initiate forward integration by entering the businesses of its 
buyers. The firm can also integrate related businesses at the same tier in the industry column 
– an example of such horizontal integration is when a newspaper and magazine publisher 
moves into educational publishing, as Thomson did. If a firm expands outside of its current 
industry, the term ‘integration’ is no longer employed, and the step is referred to as 
straightforward (horizontal) diversification (see figure 7.1). 
 
FIGURE 7.1  
Corporate growth directions 
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The issue of corporate composition deals with the question of where the firm wants to have 
which level of involvement. Corporate level strategists must decide where to allocate 
resources, build up activities and try to achieve market sales. The issue of corporate 
composition can be further subdivided into two parts: 
 
 Corporate scope. First, the composition of the corporation depends on the business areas 
selected. The more ‘business components’ chosen, the broader the scope of the 
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corporation. Deciding on the corporate scope is not only a matter of choosing out of the 
diversification options depicted in figure 7.1, but can also work in the opposite direction, 
as a firm can withdraw from a certain line of business, either by divesting, or closing 
down, its activities.   
 Corporate distribution. The composition of the corporation also depends on the relative 
size of the activities in each business area covered. The distribution within the corporation 
is determined by the relative weight of each business component. Some corporations are 
equally active in all of their selected businesses, while other firms are more asymmetrical, 
placing more emphasis on just a few of their business activities. Deciding on the 
corporate distribution is a matter of determining which lines of business will receive more 
attention than others. Corporate level strategists need to decide which activities will be 
the focus of further growth and increased weight within the firm, allocating resources 
accordingly. However, they must also keep in mind that a certain balance within the 
corporation might be beneficial. 
 
A common way of depicting the corporate composition is to plot all of the businesses in a 
portfolio matrix. The term ‘portfolio’ refers to the set of business activities carried out by the 
corporation. In a portfolio matrix each business activity is represented as a ‘bubble’ in a two 
dimensional grid, with the size of the bubble reflecting the revenue generated with that 
activity. The number of bubbles indicates the corporate scope, while the corporate 
distribution can be seen in the relative size of the bubbles. The intention of a portfolio matrix 
is not merely to give an overview of the corporate scope and distribution, but also to provide 
insight into the growth and profitability potential of each of the corporation’s business 
activities and to judge the balance between the various business activities.  
 
FIGURE 7.2  
The BCG Matrix and GE Business Screen 
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There are different types of portfolio matrices in use, the most well known of which are the 
Boston Consulting Group Matrix (Hedley, 1977) and the General Electric Business Screen 
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978). All of these portfolio matrices are based on the same analytical 
format. Each business activity is mapped along two dimensions – one measuring the 
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attractiveness of the business itself, the other measuring the strength of the corporation to 
compete in the business. In other words, one axis is a measure of external opportunity, while 
the other axis is a measure of internal strength in comparison to rival firms. The major 
difference between the portfolio matrices is which measures are used along the axes. The 
BCG matrix employs two simple variables: business growth to determine attractiveness and 
relative market share to reflect competitive strength. The GE business screen, on the other 
hand, uses composite measures: both industry attractiveness and competitive position are 
determined by analyzing and weighing a number of different factors. Industry attractiveness 
will be impacted by such variables as sales growth, demand cyclicality, buyer power, supplier 
power, the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitutes and competitive intensity. 
Competitive position often reflects such factors as market share, technological know how, 
brand image, customer loyalty, cost structure and distinctive competences. Another 
difference between the two matrices is that in the BCG portfolio grid the bubbles represent 
the company’s sales in a line of business, while in the GE business screen the bubbles reflect 
the total business size, with the pie slices indicate the firm’s share of the business. 
Deciding which portfolio of businesses to pursue, both in terms of corporate scope 
and corporate distribution, will depend on how the corporate strategist intends to create value 
– or as Porter (1987) puts it, how the corporate strategist wants to make “the corporate whole 
add up to more than the sum of its business unit parts.” After all, there must be some benefit 
to having the various business activities together in one corporation, otherwise each business 
activity could just as easily (and with less overhead) be carried out by autonomous firms. 
This added value of having two or more business activities under one corporate umbrella is 
called multi-business synergy and it strongly determines the corporate composition the 
strategist will prefer. But before turning to the topic of synergy, the counterpart of corporate 
composition, namely corporate management, needs to be reviewed first. 
 
7.2.2 Corporate Management 
It has become a widespread policy to organize multi-business firms into strategic business 
units (SBUs). Each strategic business unit is given the responsibility to serve the particular 
demands of one business area. The business units are labeled ‘strategic’, because each is 
driven by its own business level strategy.  
This dominant approach to structuring multi-business firms does present executives 
with the issue of how to bring together the separate parts into a cohesive corporate whole. 
The corporation can be divided into business units with the intent of focusing each on 
separate business areas, but this differentiation must be offset by a certain degree of 
integration to be able to address common issues and realize synergies (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). The challenge for executives is to find the most effective and efficient forms of 
integration between two or more separate business units. Three key integration mechanisms 
can be distinguished: 
 
 Centralization. The most straightforward form of integration is to bring resources and 
activities physically together into one organizational unit. In other words, where the 
‘division of labor’ between the business units has not been applied, resources and 
activities will be kept together in one department. Such a centralized department can be 
situated at the corporate center, but can also reside at one of the business units or at 
another location.  
 Coordination. Even where resources, activities and product offerings have been split 
along business unit lines, integration can be achieved by ensuring that coordination is 
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carried out between business units. Such orchestration of work across business unit 
boundaries should result in the ability to operate as if the various parts were actually one 
unit.  
 Standardization. Integration can also be realized by standardizing resources, activities 
and/or product offering characteristics across business unit boundaries. By having similar 
resources (e.g. technologies, people), standardized activities (e.g. R&D, human resource 
management) and common product features (e.g. operating system, high tech positioning) 
such advantages as economies of scale and rapid competence development can be 
achieved without the need to physically centralize or continuously coordinate. 
These three integration mechanisms are the tools available to executives to achieve a certain 
level of harmonization between the various parts of the corporate whole. Yet it is often the 
question who should take the initiative to realize integration – where in the management 
system is the responsibility vested to ensure that centralization, coordination and 
standardization are considered and carried out? If all business unit executives are looking 
after their own backyard, who is taking care of the joint issues and cross-business synergies? 
Basically there are two organizational means available to secure the effective deployment of 
the integration mechanisms (see figure 7.3):   
 
 Control. A straightforward way to manage activities that cross the boundaries of an 
individual business unit is to give someone the formal power to enforce centralization, 
coordination and standardization. Such a division-level or corporate-level executive can 
exert control in many ways. It can be by direct supervision (telling business units what to 
do), but often it is indirect, by giving business units objectives that must be met and 
discussing initiatives. The formal authority to secure integration does not always have to 
be given to an executive at the corporate center, but can be assigned to a executive within 
one of the business units as well. There are also various levels of authority that can be 
defined, ranging from full final decision-making power to ‘coordinator’ or ‘liaison 
officer’, who have only limited formal means at their disposal. 
 Cooperation. Centralization, coordination and standardization between business units can 
also be achieved without the use of hierarchical authority. Business units might be willing 
to cooperate because it is in their interest to do so, or because they recognize the overall 
corporate interests. If business units believe in the importance of certain joint activities, 
this can be a powerful impetus to collaborate. Corporate strategists interested in such 
integration by mutual adjustment will focus on creating the organizational circumstances 
under which such self-organization can take place (see chapter 10 for a further 
discussion). For instance, they might strengthen formal and informal ties between the 
business units, to enhance mutual understanding and encourage the exchange of ideas and 
joint initiatives. They may also support cross-business career paths and try to instill a 
corporation-wide culture, to facilitate the communication between business units 
(Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000). 
 
It is the task of the corporate level strategist to determine the mix of control and cooperation 
needed to manage the corporation. In their seminal research, Goold and Campbell (1987) 
distinguish three general corporate control styles, each emphasizing different levels of 
centralization, coordination and standardization: 
 
 Financial control style. In the financial control style the strategic business units are highly 
autonomous from the corporate center. Few activities are centralized or standardized 
(except for the financial reporting system) and the corporate center does not explicitly 
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attempt to coordinate activities across business unit boundaries. Control is exerted by 
negotiating, setting and monitoring financial objectives.  
 Strategic control style. In the strategic control style the strategic business units have a 
closer relationship with the corporate center. A number of central services exist, some 
systems and activities are standardized and the corporate center explicitly tries to 
coordinate activities that reach beyond the boundaries of only one business unit. Control 
is exerted by negotiating, setting and monitoring strategic objectives. 
 Strategic planning style. In the strategic planning style the strategic business units have 
relatively little autonomy from the corporate center. Many key activities are centralized or 
standardized, and the corporate center is also heavily involved in securing cross-business 
coordination. Control is exerted by means of direct supervision. 
 
FIGURE 7.3  
Corporate integration through control and cooperation 
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Which corporate management style is adopted depends strongly on what the corporate 
strategist wishes to achieve. The preferred corporate management style will be determined by 
the type of multi-business synergies that the corporate strategist envisages, but also on the 
level of autonomy that the business units require. On the one hand, strategists will want to 
encourage integration to reap the benefits of having various business units together under one 
corporate roof and will therefore have a strong motivation to exert strong corporate center 
control and stimulate inter-business cooperation. On the other hand, strategists will be wary 
of heavy-handed head office intervention, blunt centralization, rigid standardization, 
paralyzing coordination meetings and excessive overhead. Recognizing that the business 
units need to be highly responsive to the specific demands of their own business area, 
corporate strategists will also be inclined to give business units the freedom to maneuver and 
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to emphasize their own entrepreneurship. Yet, these two demands on the corporate level 
strategy – multi-business synergy and business responsiveness – are to a certain extent at odds 
with one another. How corporate strategists deal with the tension created by these conflicting 
demands will be examined more closely in the following section. 
  
7.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN RESPONSIVENESS AND SYNERGY 
When Cor Boonstra took over as CEO of Philips Electronics in 1996, after a long career at 
the fast-moving consumer goods company Sara Lee, one of his first remarks to the business 
press was that Philips reminded him of “a plate of spaghetti” – the company’s more than 60 
business units were intertwined in many different ways, sharing technologies, facilities, sales 
forces and customers, leading to excessive complexity, abundant bureaucracy, turf wars and a 
lack of accountability. To Boonstra the pursuit of multi-business synergy had spiraled into an 
overkill of centralization, coordination and standardization, requiring direct rectification. 
Thus Boonstra set out to restructure Philips into, in his own words, “a plate of asparagus,” 
with business units neatly lined up, one next to the other. Over a period of five years he 
disposed of numerous business units and made sure that the others were independent enough 
“to hold up their own pants.” The result was a loss of some valuable synergies, but a 
significant increase in the business units’ responsiveness to the demands in their own 
business. Then, in 2001, Boonstra handed over the reigns to a Philips insider, Gerard 
Kleisterlee, who during one of his first media encounters as new CEO stated that the business 
units within Philips had become too insular and narrowly focused, thereby missing 
opportunities to capture important synergies. Therefore, he indicated that it would be his 
priority to get Philips to work more like a team. 
 What this example of Philips illustrates is that corporate level strategists constantly 
struggle with the balance between realizing synergies and defending business unit 
responsiveness. To achieve synergies, a firm must to some extent integrate the activities 
carried out in its various business units. The autonomy of the business units must be partially 
limited, in the interest of concerted action. However, integration comes with a price tag. An 
extra level of management is often required, more meetings, extra complexity, potential 
conflicts of interest, additional bureaucracy – harmonization of operations cost money and 
diminishes a business unit’s ability to precisely tailor its strategy to its specific business 
environment. Hence, for the corporate strategist the challenge is to realize more value 
creation through multi-business synergies than value destruction through the loss of business 
responsiveness (e.g. Campbell, Goold and Alexander, 1995; Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
 This tension arising from the partially conflicting demands of business 
responsiveness and multi-business synergy is called the tension between responsiveness and 
synergy. In the following sections both sides of the tension will be examined in more detail. 
 
7.3.1 The Demand for Multi-Business Synergy 
Diversification into new business areas can only be economically justified if it leads to value 
creation.  According to Porter (1987) entering into another business (by acquisition or 
internal growth) can only result in increased shareholder value if three essential tests are 
passed: 
 
 The attractiveness test. The business "must be structurally attractive, or capable of being 
made attractive." In other words, firms should only enter businesses where there is a 
possibility to build up a profitable competitive position (see chapter 5). Each new 
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business area must be judged in terms of its competitive forces and the opportunities 
available to the firm to sustain a competitive business model.  
 The cost-of-entry test. "The cost of entry must not capitalize all the future profits." In 
other words, firms should only enter new businesses if it is possible to recoup the 
investments made. This is important for internally generated new business ventures, but 
even more so for external acquisitions. Many researchers argue that, on average, firms 
significantly overpay for acquisitions, making it next to impossible to compensate for the 
value given away during the purchase (e.g. Sirower, 1997).     
 The better-off test. "Either the new unit must gain competitive advantage from its link 
with the corporation or vice versa." In other words, firms should only enter new 
businesses if it is possible to create significant synergies. If not, then the new unit would 
be better off as an independent firm or with a different parent company, and should be cut 
loose from the corporation.  
 
It is this last test that reveals one of the key demands of corporate level strategy. Multi-
business level firms need to be more than the sum of their parts. They need to create more 
added value than the extra costs of managing a more complex organization. They need to 
identify opportunities for synergy between business areas and manage the organization in 
such a way that the synergies can be realized.   
 But what are the sources of synergy? For quite some time, strategists have known that 
potential for synergy has something to do with relatedness (Rumelt, 1974). Diversification 
moves that were unrelated (or conglomerate), for example a food company's entrance into the 
bicycle rental business, were deemed to be less profitable, in general, than moves that were 
related (or concentric), such as a car maker’s diversification into the car rental business (e.g. 
Chatterjee, 1986; Rumelt, 1982). However, the problem has been to determine the nature of 
‘relatedness’. Superficial signs of relatedness do not indicate that there is potential for 
synergy. Drilling for oil and mining might seem highly related (both are ‘extraction 
businesses’), but Shell found out the hard way that they were not related, selling the acquired 
mining company Billiton to Gencor after they were unable to create synergy (see the Shell 
case in Section VI). Chemicals and pharmaceuticals seem like similar businesses (especially 
if pharmaceuticals are labeled ‘specialty chemicals’), but ICI decided to split itself in two 
(into ICI and Zeneca), because it couldn't achieve sufficient synergy between these two 
business areas. 
 Strategy researchers have therefore attempted to pin down the exact nature of 
relatedness (e.g. Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Following 
the business model framework outlined in chapter 6, the areas of relatedness that have the 
potential for creating synergy can be organized into three categories (see figure 7.4): resource 
relatedness, activity relatedness and product offering relatedness. 
Synergy by Leveraging Resources  
The first area of relatedness is at the level of the businesses’ resource bases. Two or more 
businesses are related if their resources can be productively shared between them. In 
principle, all types of resources can be shared, both the tangible and the intangible, although 
in practice some resources are easier to share than others – for example, it is easier to transfer 
money than knowledge. Such resource leveraging (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993) can be 
achieved by physically reallocating resources from one business area to another, or by 
replicating them so they can be used in a variety of businesses simultaneously: 
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 Achieving resource reallocation. Instead of leaving firm resources in the business unit 
where they happen to be located, a corporation can create synergy by transferring 
resources to other business units, where better use can be made of them. For instance, 
money and personnel are often shifted between business units, depending on where they 
are needed and the potential return is highest.  
 Achieving resource replication. While physical resources can only be used in one place at 
a time, intangible resources can often be copied from one business unit to the other, so 
that the same resource can be used many times over. This happens, for example, when 
knowledge and capabilities are copied and reused in other business units.  
 
FIGURE 7.4  
Forms of multi-business synergy 
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Synergy by Aligning Positions 
A second area of relatedness is at the level of product offerings. Two or more businesses are 
related if they can help each other by aligning their positioning in the market. Such 
coordination between product-market combinations can both improve the businesses’ 
bargaining position vis-à-vis buyers, as well as improve the businesses’ competitive position 
vis-à-vis rival firms: 
 Improving bargaining position. Business units can improve their bargaining power vis-à-
vis buyers by offering a broad package of related products and/or services to specific 
customer groups. Especially when the products being offered are complementary, share a 
common brand and have a comparable reputation, will they support each other in the 
market.  
 Improving competitive position. Coordination of product offerings within one firm can 
also prevent a number of business units from fighting fiercely amongst one another, 
which might have happened if all units were independent companies. Moreover, it is even 
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possible for multiple business units to support each other in attacking a third party, for 
example by setting a common standard or aggressively pricing selected products. 
Business units can team up to create barriers to entry into the industry/market as well.  
Synergy by Integrating Activities  
The third area of relatedness is at the level of activity systems. Two or more businesses are 
related if an integration of their value chains is more efficient and/or more effective than if 
they were totally separated. Such integration of value creation activities can focus on the 
sharing of similar activities or the linking up of sequential activities:  
 Sharing value-adding activities. Business units often combine some of their value-adding 
activities, such as logistics, production or marketing, if this leads to significant scale 
advantages or quality improvements. It is also common to see that the corporate center 
organizes certain support activities centrally. These ‘shared services’ often include 
functions such as human resource management, procurement, quality control, legal 
affairs, research and development, finance, and corporate communication.  
 Linking value-adding activities. Business units that are not horizontally but vertically 
related (see figure 7.1) can have an internal customer-supplier relationship. Such vertical 
integration of sequential value adding activities in one firm can be more efficient than 
operating independently where supplies need to be highly tailored to a specific type of 
customer demand.  
 
Much attention in the literature has been paid to this issue of vertical integration of activities. 
It is also referred to as internalization because firms decide to perform activities inside the 
firm, instead of dealing with outside suppliers and buyers. In general, companies will strive to 
integrate upstream or downstream activities where one or more of the following conditions 
are deemed important (e.g. Harrigan 1985; Mahoney, 1992): 
  
 Operational coordination. It can be necessary for various parts of the value system to be 
tightly coordinated or even physically integrated, to ensure that the right components, 
meeting the right specifications, are available in the right quantities, at the right moment, 
so that high quality, low cost and/or timely delivery can be achieved. To realize this level 
of coordination it can be necessary to gain control over a number of key activities in the 
value system, instead of trying to get suppliers and buyers to cooperate.  
 Avoidance of transaction costs. Reaching a deal with a supplier or buyer and transferring 
the goods or services to the required location may be accompanied by significant direct 
costs. These contracting costs can include the expenses of negotiations, drawing up a 
contract, financial transfers, packaging, distribution and insurance. Add to these the 
search costs, required to locate and analyze potential new suppliers or buyers, as well as 
the policing costs, which are incurred to check whether the contract is being met 
according to expectations and to take actions against those parties not living up to their 
contractual responsibilities. If a firm vertically integrates, many of these costs can be 
avoided, leading to potential savings (Williamson, 1975). 
 Increased bargaining power. If a firm is facing a supplier or buyer with a 
disproportionately high level of bargaining power (for instance, a monopolist), vertical 
integration can be used to weaken or neutralize such a party. By fully or partially 
performing the activities in-house, the firm can lessen its dependence on a strong buyer or 
supplier. The firm can also strive to acquire the other party, to avoid the bargaining 
situation altogether.  
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 Learning curve advantages. Where vertically linked business units work closely together, 
exchanging knowledge and personnel, they might also learn more quickly and more 
efficiently than if the business units were independent. Especially where they initiate joint 
R&D projects and collaborate on business process improvement efforts can significant 
learning curve advantages be realized.  
 Implementing system-wide changes. Besides continual operational coordination and on-
going learning, there may be a need to coordinate strategic changes throughout the value 
system. Switching over to new technologies, new production methods and new standards 
can sometimes only be implemented if there is commitment and a concerted effort in 
various parts of the value system. Sometimes even neighboring value systems need to be 
involved in the changes. Vertical integration and horizontal diversification can give a firm 
the formal control needed to push through such changes. 
 
Corporate level strategy is about determining the corporate configuration that offers the best 
opportunities for synergy, and implementing a corporate management system capable of 
realizing the intended synergies. However, what types of synergies can realistically be 
achieved, without paying a heavier penalty in terms of integration costs? Recognizing the 
possible benefits of bringing together various businesses under one corporate umbrella is one 
thing, but developing a corporate management system that does not cost more than it yields is 
another. Therefore, corporate strategists need to carefully consider the potential downside of 
resource leveraging, activity integration and position alignment – the loss of business 
responsiveness. 
 
7.3.2 The Demand for Business Responsiveness 
Responsiveness is defined as the ability to respond to the competitive demands of a specific 
business area in a timely and adequate manner. A business unit is responsive if it has the 
capability to tightly match its strategic behavior to the competitive dynamics in its business. 
If a business unit does not focus its strategy on the conditions in its direct environment and 
does not organize its value adding activities and management systems to fit with the business 
characteristics, it will soon be at a competitive disadvantage compared to more responsive 
rivals. Business responsiveness is therefore a key demand for successful corporate level 
strategy. 
 Yet, in multi-business firms the responsiveness of the business units is constantly 
under pressure. Various scope disadvantages limit the ability of the corporation to ensure 
business responsiveness. The major problems encountered by multi-business firms are the 
following: 
    
 High governance costs. Coordinating activities within a firm requires executives. Layers 
of management, and the bureaucratic processes that might entail, can lead to escalating 
costs.  
 Slower decision-making. Business units must usually deal with more layers of 
management, more meetings for coordination purposes, more participants in meetings, 
more conflicts of interest and more political infighting. This not only increases 
governance costs, but also slows down decision-making and action. 
 Strategy incongruence. The resource leveraging, activity integration and position 
alignment envisioned in the corporate strategy can be more suited to the conditions in 
some businesses than to others. Consequently, some business units might need to 
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compromise, adapting their business strategy to fit with the corporate strategy. However, 
such internal adaptation might lead to a misfit with the business demands. 
 Dysfunctional control. The corporate center might not have the specific business know-
how needed to judge business unit strategies, activities and results. However, the 
corporate center might feel the need to exert some control over business units, potentially 
steering them in an inappropriate direction.  
 Dulled incentives. Limited autonomy combined with the aforementioned problems can 
have a significant negative impact on the motivation to perform optimally. This dulled 
incentive to be entrepreneurial and to excel can be compounded by poorly delineated 
responsibilities, a lack of clear accountability and the existence of ‘captive’ internal 
customers. Together these factors limit the business units’ drive to be responsive. 
 
These threats make clear that multi-business firms must determine their composition and 
management systems in a way that enables business units to be responsive. Yet, 
simultaneously, corporate strategists need to strive towards the identification and realization 
of synergies. The question is how these two conflicting demands can be reconciled – how can 
corporate level strategists deal with the tension between responsiveness and synergy?  
 
7.4 PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE LEVEL STRATEGY 
Corporations need to capture multi-business synergies and they need to ensure each business 
unit’s responsiveness to its competitive environment. In other words, corporations need to be 
integrated and differentiated at the same time – emphasizing the whole and respecting the 
part. Striving towards synergy is a centripetal force, pulling the firm together into an 
integrated whole, while being responsive to business demands is a centrifugal force, pulling 
the firm apart into autonomous market-focused units (Ghoshal and Mintzberg, 1994). The 
main question dividing strategists is whether a corporation should primarily be a collection of 
parts or an integrated whole. Should corporations be loose federations of business units or 
tightly knit teams? Should corporations be business groups made up of distinctive parts, 
where only modest synergies can be realized and business units should be accorded a large 
measure of leeway to be responsive to their specific market conditions? Or should 
corporations actually be unitary organizations, with the parts serving the whole, allowing for 
significant synergies can be achieved, with the challenge of being responsive enough to 
varied business demands. 
 As before, the strategic management literature comes with strongly different views on 
how strategists should proceed. Here the two diametrically opposed positions will be 
identified and discussed. On the one side of the spectrum, there are those strategists who 
believe that multi-business firms should be viewed as portfolios of autonomous business units 
in which the corporation has a financial stake. They argue that business responsiveness is 
crucial and that only a limited set of financial synergies should be pursued. This point of view 
is referred to as the portfolio organization perspective. At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are strategists who believe that corporations should be tightly integrated, with a strong central 
core of shared resources, activities and/or product offerings keeping the firm together. They 
argue that corporations built up around these strong synergy opportunities can create 
significantly more value than lost through limitations to responsiveness. This point of view is 
referred to as the integrated organization perspective.  
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7.4.1 The Portfolio Organization Perspective 
In the portfolio organization perspective, responsiveness is strongly emphasized over 
synergy. Executives taking this perspective usually argue that each business has its own 
unique characteristics and demands. Firms operating in different businesses must therefore 
develop a specific strategy for each business and assign the responsibility for each business 
strategy to a separate strategic business unit. In this manner, the (strategic) business units can 
be highly responsive to the competitive dynamics in the business, while being a clear unit of 
accountability towards the corporate center. High responsiveness, however, requires freedom 
from corporate center interference and freedom from cross-business coordination. Hence, a 
high level of business unit autonomy is required, with the corporate center's influence limited 
to arm's length financial control. 
 In the portfolio organization perspective, the main reason for a number of highly 
autonomous business units to be in one firm is to leverage financial resources. The only 
synergies emphasized are financial synergies (e.g. Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994; Trautwein, 
1990). Actually, the term ‘portfolio’ entered the business vocabulary via the financial sector, 
where it refers to an investor's collection of shareholdings in different companies, purchased 
to spread investment risks. Transferred to corporate strategy, the portfolio organization 
perspective views the corporate center as an active investor with financial stakes in a number 
of stand-alone business units. The role of the center is one of selecting a promising portfolio 
of businesses, keeping tight financial control, and allocating available capital – redirecting 
flows of cash from business units where prospects are dim (‘cash cows’ or ‘dogs’), to other 
business units where higher returns can be expected (‘stars’ or ‘question marks’). The 
strategic objective of each business unit is, therefore, also financial in orientation – grow, 
hold, milk or divest, depending on the business unit's position on the portfolio grid (e.g. 
Henderson, 1979; Hedley, 1977). A good corporate strategy strives for a balanced portfolio of 
mature cash producers and high potential ROI cash users, at an acceptable level of overall 
risk.  
 The financial synergies can be gained in a number of different ways (e.g. Chatterjee, 
1986; Weston, Chung and Hoag, 1990). Firstly, by having various businesses within one 
firm, the corporate center can economize on external financing. By internally shifting funds 
from one business unit to another the corporation can avoid the transaction costs and taxation 
associated with external capital markets. Secondly, the corporation can limit dependence on 
the whims of external capital providers, who might be less inclined to finance some ventures 
(e.g. new businesses or high risk turnarounds) at acceptable levels of capital cost. Thirdly, 
where the corporation does want to secure external financing, the firm’s larger size, debt 
capacity and creditworthiness can improve its bargaining position in the financial markets. 
Finally, by having revenue and earning streams from two or more different businesses, the 
corporation can reduce its exposure to the risk of a single business. This risk balancing, or 
coinsurance, effect is largest where the portfolio is made up of counter-cyclical businesses. In 
turn, the stability and predictability of revenue and earning flows enable the corporation to 
plan and function more effectively and efficiently (e.g. Amit and Livnat, 1988; Seth, 1990).  
The business units do not necessarily need to be 'related' in any other way than 
financial. In practice, the business units can be related, that is, there can be resource 
leveraging, activity integration and position alignment opportunities that are seized. The 
portfolio organization perspective does not reject the pursuit of other forms of synergy, but 
neither does it accommodate such efforts (Haspeslagh, 1982). Responsiveness is not 
compromised to achieve these synergy opportunities. 
 New businesses can be entered by means of internal growth, but the portfolio 
approach to corporate strategy is particularly well suited to diversification through 
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acquisition. In a multi-business firm run on portfolio principles, acquired companies are 
simple to integrate into the corporation, because they can be largely left as stand alone units 
and only need to be linked to corporate financial reporting and control systems. Proponents of 
the portfolio organization perspective argue that such ‘non-synergistic’ acquisitions can be 
highly profitable (Kaplan, 1989; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993). Excess cash can be routed to 
more attractive investment opportunities than the corporation has internally. Moreover, the 
acquiring corporation can shake up the management of the acquired company and can 
function as a strategic sounding board for the new people. In this way, the acquirer can 
release the untapped value potential of under-performing stand-alone businesses (Anslinger 
and Copeland, 1996). 
 The portfolio organization perspective is particularly well known for the analytical 
techniques that have been developed to support it. As was mentioned before, a large number 
of portfolio grids are in widespread use as graphical tools for visualizing the corporate 
composition and for determining the position of each of the business units. These portfolio 
analysis tools have proven to be popular and much used (Goold and Lansdell, 1997), even 
among strategists who are not proponents of the portfolio organization perspective.  
 In conclusion, the basic assumption of the portfolio organization perspective is that 
business units must be responsible for their own competitive strategy. Business units are the 
main locus of strategic attention and the corporate center should understand their limited 
ability to get involved and stimulate synergy. Corporate centers should be modest in ambition 
and size, taking heed of the words of the famous ‘business philosopher’ Groucho Marx that 
“the most difficult thing about business is minding your own”. 
 
7.4.2 The Integrated Organization Perspective 
The integrated organization perspective is fundamentally at odds with the portfolio 
organization perspective’s minimalist interpretation of corporate level strategy. To 
proponents of the integrated organization perspective, a multi-business firm should be more 
than a loose federation of businesses held together by a common investor. Actually, a 
corporation should be quite the opposite – a tightly knit team of business units grouped 
around a common core. Having various businesses together in one corporation, it is argued, 
can only be justified if the corporate center has a clear conception of how strategically 
relevant multi-business synergies can be realized. It is not enough to capture a few 
operational synergies here and there – a compelling logic must lie at the heart of the 
corporation, creating a significant competitive advantage over rivals who operate on a 
business-by-business basis. The multi-business synergies generated at the core of the 
organization should enable the corporation to beat its competitors in a variety of business 
areas.    
 As corporate level strategists ‘lead from the center’ (Raynor and Bower, 2001) and 
develop a joint competitive strategy together with business level strategists, they must make 
very clear which multi-business synergies they intend to foster as the nucleus of the 
corporation. It is their task to determine what the core of the organization should be and to 
take the lead in building it. To be successful, it is necessary for them to work closely together 
with business level executives, whose main task it is to apply the core strengths of the 
corporation to their specific business area. The consequence of this tightly joint strategy 
development and synergy realization is that all business units are highly interdependent, 
requiring continual coordination.  
 Many different multi-business synergies can form the core of the corporation. In the 
strategic management literature one specific form has received a large amount of attention – 
the core competence centered corporation (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In such an 
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organization a few competences are at the heart of the corporation and are leveraged across 
various business units. Prahalad and Hamel's metaphor for the corporation is not an investor's 
portfolio, but a large tree, "the trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches 
are business units, the leaves, flowers and fruit are end products; the root system that 
provides nourishment, sustenance and stability is the core competence". Business unit 
branches can be cut off and new ones can grow on, but all spring from the same tree. It is the 
corporate center's role to nurture this tree, building up the core competences and ensuring that 
the firm's competence carriers can easily be redeployed across business unit boundaries. The 
strategic logic behind leveraging these intangible resources is that high investments in 
competence development can then be spread over a number of different businesses. 
Moreover, by using these competences in different business settings they can be further 
refined, leading to a virtuous circle of rapid learning, profiting the entire corporation. In line 
with the arguments of the inside-out perspective (see chapter 6), it is pointed out that in the 
long run inter-firm rivalries are often won by the corporation who has been able to upgrade 
its competences fastest – skirmishes in particular markets are only battles in this broader war. 
From this angle, building the corporation's core competences is strategic, while engaging 
other corporations in specific business areas is tactical. The corporate center is therefore at 
the forefront of competitive strategy, instead of the business units, that are literally divisions 
in the overall campaign (e.g. Kono, 1999; Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992).  
As all business units should both tap into, and contribute to, the corporation's core 
competences, the business units' autonomy is necessarily limited. Unavoidably, the 
responsiveness to the specific characteristics of each business does suffer from this emphasis 
on coordination. Yet, to advocates of the core competence model, the loss of business 
responsiveness is more than compensated by the strategic benefits gained. 
Besides competences as the core of the corporation, other synergies can also be at the 
heart of a multi-business firm. For instance, corporations can focus on aligning a variety of 
product offerings for a group of ‘core customers’. Many professional service firms, such as 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, are involved in a broad range of 
businesses, with the intention of offering an integrated package of services to their selected 
market segments. Another type of core is where a multi-business firm is built around shared 
activities. Many of the large airlines, for example, have one ‘core process’ flying planes, but 
operate in the very different businesses of passenger travel and cargo transport. Yet another 
central synergy can be the leveraging of the firm’s ‘software’. For instance, Disney is such a 
‘core content’ corporation, letting Cinderella work hard selling Disney videos, luring families 
to Disney theme parks, getting kids to buy Disney merchandise and enticing people to watch 
the Disney channel. Whichever synergy is placed center stage, to the proponents of the 
integrated organization perspective it should not be trivial, as such minor value creation 
efforts do not provide the driving motivation to keep a corporation together. The ‘glue’ of the 
corporation must be strong enough to convince all involved that they are much better off as 
part of the whole than on their own. 
 The flip side of having a tightly knit group of businesses arranged around a common 
core is that growth through acquisition is generally much more difficult than in the ‘plug and 
play’ set-up of a portfolio organization. To make an acquisition fit into the corporate family 
and to establish all of the necessary links to let the new recruits profit from, and contribute to, 
the core synergies, can be very challenging. Taking the previous metaphor a step further, the 
corporate center will find it quite difficult to graft oak roots and elm branches on to an 
existing olive tree. Consequently, acquisitions will be infrequent, as the firm will prefer 
internal growth.     
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
So, how do executives believe that the corporate configuration should be determined? Do 
they suppose that corporate strategists should limit themselves to achieving financial 
synergies, leaving SBU executives to 'mind their own business'? Or do they think that 
corporate strategists should strive to build a multi-business firm around a common core, 
intricately weaving all business units into a highly integrated whole? In table 7.1 the main 
differences between the portfolio organization perspective and the integrated organization 
perspective have been summarized. 
 To be able to measure whether executives have a predisposition towards one or the 
other view, these two perspectives have been used to generate a set of 24 statements on the 
best approach to corporate level strategy. These opposing policy statements are summarized 
in table 7.2. They will be used again in chapter 14, when putting together the ‘strategy 
profiler’ measurement instrument.    
 
TABLE 7.1   
Portfolio organization versus integrated organization perspective  
 
 Portfolio Organization Perspective Integrated Organization Perspective 
Emphasis on Responsiveness over synergy Synergy over responsiveness 
Conception of corporation  Collection of business shareholdings Core with business applications 
Corporate composition Potentially unrelated (diverse) Tightly related (focused) 
Key success factor Business unit responsiveness Multi-business synergy 
Focal type of synergy Cash flow optimization & risk balance Resources, activities & positions 
Corporate style  Exerting financial control Joint strategy development  
Focus corporate center Capital allocation & performance Setting direction & managing synergy 
Position of business units Highly autonomous (independent) Highly integrated (interdependent) 
Coordination of BUs Low, incidental High, structural 
Growth thru acquisitions Simple to accommodate Difficult to integrate 
  
 
 
TABLE 7.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
 
Portfolio Organization Perspective Integrated Organization Perspective 
9.1 In a corporation, each business unit should have its own resources and facilities. 10.1 
In a corporation, the sharing of resources and 
facilities between business units should be 
encouraged. 
9.2 
Each business unit within a corporation 
should have considerable freedom to 
determine its own strategic direction. 
10.2 Business unit strategies should be tightly integrated into the overall corporate strategy. 
9.3 
Each business unit in a corporation should 
only be responsible for its own financial 
performance. 
10.3 
Each business unit in a corporation should be 
responsible for the financial performance of 
the entire corporation. 
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9.4 
Business unit managers should only be given 
bonuses based on the performance of their 
own unit. 
10.4 
Business unit managers should be given 
bonuses based on the performance of the 
entire corporation. 
9.5 
The role of corporate headquarters should be 
focused on financial control of its business 
units. 
10.5 
The role of corporate headquarters should be 
to determine the strategic direction of its 
business units. 
9.6 
The success of a corporation depends on the 
ability of each business unit to operate 
almost independently. 
10.6 
The success of a corporation depends on the 
ability of the business units to work together 
to create synergies. 
9.7 Business units in a corporation should be given as much autonomy as possible. 10.7 
Managers should strive to create as much 
synergy between business units as possible. 
9.8 In a large corporation, business units should never be forced to work together. 10.8 
In successful corporations, business units 
work together very closely. 
9.9 Coordination between business units usually leads to inefficient bureaucracy. 10.9 
Coordination between business units can 
lead to crucial economies of scale. 
9.10 
In corporations you should decentralize 
everything, unless the situation forces you to 
centralize. 
10.10 
Business units that don’t create a high level 
of synergy with the rest of the corporation 
should be sold. 
9.11 The corporate head office’s role should be kept to a bare minimum. 10.11 
The corporate head office should set the 
general strategic direction for each business 
unit to follow. 
9.12 
The identity of individual business units 
should be given more emphasis than the 
overall corporate identity. 
10.12 
The overall corporate identity should be given 
more emphasis than the identity of individual 
business units. 
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Chapter 8 
 
NETWORK LEVEL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
A business unit can have a strategy, while a group of business units can also have a strategy 
together – this joint course of action at the divisional or corporate level was discussed in the 
previous chapter. What has not been examined yet is whether a group of companies can also 
have a strategy together. Is it possible that companies do not develop their strategies in 
‘splendid isolation’, but rather coordinate their strategies to operate as a team? And is it a 
good idea for firms to link up with others for a prolonged period of time to try to achieve 
shared objectives together? 
 Where two or more firms move beyond a mere transactional relationship and work 
jointly towards a common goal, they form an alliance, partnership or network. Their shared 
strategy is referred to as a network level strategy. In such a case, strategy is not only 
“concerned with relating a firm to its environment”, as was stated in chapter 6, but also with 
relating a network to its broader environment.  
 The existence of networks does raise a range of questions, not the least of which is 
whether they make strategic sense or not. Is it beneficial to engage in long-term collaborative 
relationships with other firms or is it more advantageous for firms to ‘keep their distance’ and 
to interact with one another in a more market-like, transactional way? Is it viable to manage a 
web of partnership relations or is it preferable to keep it simple, by having the firm operate 
more or less independently? To address these questions is to raise the issue of inter-
organizational relationships – what should be the nature of the relationship between a firm 
and other organizations in its surroundings? This issue will be the focus of the further 
discussion in this chapter, leading up to a review of the differing perspectives on this topic. 
 
8.2 THE ISSUE OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
No firm exists that is autarchic. All firms must necessarily interact with other organizations 
(and individuals) in their environment and therefore they have inter-organizational (or inter-
firm) relationships. These relationships can evolve without any clear strategic intent or 
tactical calculation, but most executives agree that actively determining the nature of their 
external relations is a significant part of what strategizing is about. Even avoiding relations 
with some external parties can be an important strategic choice.  
To gain a better understanding of the interaction between firms, four aspects are of 
particular importance and will be reviewed here – the who, why, what and how of inter-
organizational relationships (see figure 8.1). The first aspect is the question of who – who are 
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the potential counterparts with whom a firm can actually have a relationship? This is referred 
to as the topic of relational actors. The second aspect is the question of why – why do the 
parties want to enter into a relationship with one another? This is referred to as the topic of 
relational objectives. The third aspect is the question of what – what type of influences 
determine the nature of the relationship? This is referred to as the topic of relational factors. 
The fourth aspect is the question of how – how can relationships be structured into a 
particular organizational form to let them function in the manner intended? This is referred to 
as the topic of relational arrangements.  
 
FIGURE 8.1  
Aspects of inter-organizational relations 
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8.2.1 Relational Actors  
In figure 8.2 an overview is given of the eight major groups of external parties with whom the 
firm can, or must, interact. A distinction has been made between industry and contextual 
actors. The industry actors are those individuals and organizations that perform value-adding 
activities and/or consume the outputs of these activities. The contextual actors are those 
parties whose behavior, intentionally or unintentionally, sets the conditions under which the 
industry actors must operate. The four main categories of relationships between the firm and 
other industry parties are the following (e.g. Porter, 1980; Reve, 1990): 
 
 Upstream vertical (supplier) relations. Every company has suppliers of some sort. In a 
narrow definition these include the providers of raw materials, parts, machinery, and 
business services. In a broader definition the providers of all production factors (land, 
capital, labor, technology, information and entrepreneurship) can be seen as suppliers, if 
they are not part of the firm itself. All these suppliers can either be the actual producers of 
the input, or an intermediary (distributor or agent) trading in the product or service. 
Beside the suppliers with which the firm transacts directly (first-tier suppliers), the firm 
may also have relationships with suppliers further upstream in the industry. All these 
relationships are traditionally referred to as upstream vertical relations, because 
economists commonly draw the industry system as a column. 
 Downstream vertical (buyer) relations. On the output side, the firm has relationships with 
its customers. These clients can either be the actual users of the product or service, or 
intermediaries trading the output. Besides the buyers with which the firm transacts 
directly, it may also have relationships with parties further downstream in the industry 
column. 
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 Direct horizontal (industry insider) relations. This category includes the relations 
between the firm and other industry incumbents. Because these competitors produce 
similar goods or services, they are said to be at the same horizontal level in the industry 
column.  
 Indirect horizontal (industry outsider) relations. Where a firm has a relationship with a 
company outside its industry, this is referred to as an indirect horizontal relation. 
Commonly, companies will have relationships with the producers of complementary 
goods and services (e.g. hardware manufacturers with software developers). Such a 
relationship can develop with the producer of a substitute good or service, either as an 
adversary or an ally as well. A relation can also exist between a firm and a potential 
industry entrant, whereby the incumbent firm can assist or attempt to block the entry of 
the industry outsider. Furthermore, a firm can establish a relationship with a firm in 
another industry, with the intention of diversifying into that, or a third, industry. In 
reality, where industry boundaries are not clear, the distinction between direct and 
indirect horizontal relations is equally blurry. 
 
FIGURE 8.2  
The firm and its web of relational actors 
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Besides relationships with these industry actors, there can be many contacts with condition-
setting parties in the broader environment. Employing the classic SEPTember distinction, the 
following rough categories of contextual actors can be identified: 
 
 Socio-cultural actors. Individuals or organizations that have a significant impact on 
societal values, norms, beliefs and behaviors may interact with the firm. These could 
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include the media, community groups, charities, religious organizations, and opinion 
leaders. 
 Economic actors. There can also be organizations influencing the general economic state 
of affairs, with which the firm interacts. Among others tax authorities; central banks, 
employers' federations, stock exchanges and unions may be of importance. 
 Political/legal actors. The firm may also interact with organizations setting or influencing 
the regulations under which companies must operate. These could include governments, 
political parties, special interest groups, regulatory bodies and international institutions. 
 Technological actors. There are also many organizations that influence the pace and 
direction of technological development and the creation of new knowledge. Among 
others, universities, research institutes, patent offices, government agencies and 
standardization bodies may be important to deal with. 
As figure 8.2 visualizes, companies can choose, but are often also forced, to interact with a 
large number of organizations and individuals in the environment. This configuration of 
external actors with which the organization interacts is referred to as the company’s group of 
external stakeholders.  
 
8.2.2 Relational Objectives 
How organizations deal with one another is strongly influenced by what they hope to achieve 
(e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Preece, 1995). Both parties may have clear, open and mutually 
beneficial objectives, but it is also possible that one or both actors have poorly defined 
intentions, hidden agendas and/or mutually exclusive goals. Moreover, it is not uncommon 
that various people within an organization have different, even conflicting, objectives and 
expectations with regard to an external relationship (e.g. Allison, 1969; Doz and Hamel, 
1998).  
Where two or more firms seek to work together with one another, they generally do so 
because they expect some value added – they assume more benefit from the interaction than 
if they had proceeded on their own. This expectation of value creation as a driver for 
cooperation was also discussed in chapter 6, where two or more business units worked 
together to reap synergies. In fact, the same logic is at play between business units and 
between companies. In both cases, executives are oriented towards finding sources of added 
value in a potential relationship with another – either across business unit boundaries or 
across company boundaries. Hence, the same sources of synergy identified in the discussion 
on corporate level strategy are just as relevant when examining the objectives for inter-
organizational cooperation (see figure 8.3).   
 
Relations Oriented Towards Leveraging Resources 
The first area where companies can cooperate is at the level of their resource bases. By 
sharing resources with one another, companies can either improve the quantity or quality of 
the resources they have at their disposal. There are two general ways for firms to leverage 
resources to reap mutual benefit: 
 
 Learning. When the objective is to exchange knowledge and skills, or to engage in the 
joint pursuit of new know how, the relationship is said to be learning-oriented. Firms can 
enter into new learning relationships with industry outsiders, but can also team up with 
industry incumbents, for instance to develop new technologies or standards (e.g. Hamel, 
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Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Shapiro and Varian, 1998). However, firms can add a learning 
objective to an already existing relationship with a buyer or supplier as well. 
 Lending. Where one firm owns specific resources that it cannot make full use of, or 
another firm can make better use of, it can be attractive for both to lend the resource to 
the other. Lending relationships happen frequently in the areas of technology, copyrights 
and trademarks, where licensing is commonplace. But physical resources can also be lent, 
usually in the form of lease contracts. In all cases the benefit to lenders can be financial or 
they receive other resources in return.   
 
FIGURE 8.3  
Inter-organizational cooperation objectives 
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Relations Oriented Towards Integrating Activities 
The second area where companies can cooperate is at the level of their activity systems. Few 
companies can span an entire industry column from top to bottom and excel at every type of 
activity. Usually, by integrating their value chains with other organizations, firms can be 
much more efficient and effective than if they were totally separated. There are two general 
ways for firms to integrate their activities with others:  
 
 Linking. The most common type of relationship in business is the vertical link between a 
buyer and a seller. All relationships in which products or services are exchanged fall into 
this category. Most firms have many linking relationships, both upstream and 
downstream, because they want to focus on only a limited number of value-adding 
activities, but need a variety of inputs, as well as clients to purchase their finished goods.  
 Lumping. Where firms bring together their similar activities to gain economies of scale, 
the relationship is said to be oriented towards lumping. Sharing operations (e.g. airline 
alliances), sales infrastructure (e.g. software cross-selling deals), logistics systems (e.g. 
postal partnerships) or payment facilities (e.g. inter-bank settlement agreements) are 
examples of where firms can lump their activities together. Because the activities need to 
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be more or less the same to be able to reap scale economies, lumping relationships are 
usually found between two or more industry insiders. 
 
Relations Oriented Towards Aligning Positions 
The third area where companies can cooperate is at the level of their market positions. Even 
where companies want to keep their value adding activities separate, they can coordinate their 
moves in the environment with the intention of strengthening each other’s position. Usually, 
this type of coalition building is directed at improving the joint bargaining power of the 
cooperating parties. These position-enhancing relationships can be further subdivided into 
two categories:   
 
 Leaning. Where two or more firms get together to improve their bargaining position vis-
à-vis other industry actors, it is said that they lean on each other to stand stronger. 
Leaning can be directed at building up a more powerful negotiation position towards 
suppliers, or to offer a more attractive package of products and services towards buyers. 
Getting together with other companies to form a consortium to launch a new industry 
standard can also bolster the position of all companies involved. At the same time, the 
cooperation can be directed at weakening the position of an alternative group of 
companies or even heightening the entry barriers for interested industry outsiders.      
 Lobbying. Firms can also cooperate with one another with the objective of gaining a 
stronger position vis-à-vis contextual actors. Such lobbying relationships are often 
directed at strengthening the firms’ voice towards political and regulatory actors, such as 
governments and regulatory agencies. However, firms can get together to put pressure on 
various other contextual actors, such as standard setting bodies, universities, tax 
authorities and stock exchanges as well.  
In practice, cooperative relationships between organizations can involve a number of these 
objectives simultaneously. Moreover, it is not uncommon for objectives to shift over time and 
for various participants in the relationship to have different objectives.  
 
8.2.3 Relational Factors 
How inter-organizational relationships develop is strongly influenced by the objectives 
pursued by the parties involved. However, a number of other factors also have an impact on 
how relationships unfold. These relational factors can be grouped into four general categories 
(e.g. Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Gulati, 1998):  
 
 Legitimacy. Relationships are highly impacted by what is deemed to be legitimate. 
Written and unwritten codes of conduct give direction to what is viewed as acceptable 
behavior. Which topics are allowed on the agenda, who has a valid claim, how interaction 
should take place and how conflicts should be resolved, are often decided by what both 
parties accept as ‘the rules of engagement’. There is said to be trust, where it is expected 
that the other organization or individual will adhere to these rules. However, 
organizations do not always agree on ‘appropriate behavior’, while what is viewed as 
legitimate can shift over time as well. It can also be (seen as) advantageous to act 
opportunistically by not behaving according to the unwritten rules (e.g. Gambetta, 1988; 
Williamson, 1991). 
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 Urgency. Inter-organizational relations are also shaped by the factor ‘timing’. 
Relationships develop differently when one or both parties are under time pressure to 
achieve results, as opposed to a situation where both organizations can interact without 
experiencing a sense of urgency (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; James, 1985). 
 Frequency. Inter-organizational relations also depend on the frequency of interaction and 
the expectation of future interactions. Where parties expect to engage in a one-off 
transaction they usually behave differently than when they anticipate a more structural 
relationship, extending over multiple interactions. Moreover, a relationship with a low 
rate of interaction tends to develop differently that one with a high regularity of 
interaction (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991). 
 Power. Last but not least, relations between organizations are strongly shaped by the 
power held by both parties. Power is the ability to influence others’ behavior and 
organizations can have many sources of power. Most importantly for inter-organizational 
relationships, a firm can derive power from having resources that the other organization 
requires. In relationships with a very high level of resource dependence firms tend to 
behave differently towards each other than when they are interdependent or relatively 
independent of one another (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980).  
Especially the impact of power differences on inter-organizational relationships is given 
extensive attention in the strategic management literature. Many authors (e.g. Chandler, 
1990; Kay, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980; Schelling, 1960) stress that for 
understanding the interaction between firms it is of the utmost importance to gain insight into 
their relative power positions. One way of measuring relative power in a relationship is 
portrayed in figure 8.4, where a distinction is made between the closeness of the relationship 
(loose vs. tight) and the distribution of power between the two parties involved (balanced vs. 
unbalanced). This leads to a categorization of four specific types of inter-firm relationships 
from the perspective of relative power position. These four categories (adapted from Ruigrok 
and Van Tulder, 1995) are: 
 
A. Mutual independence. Organizations are independent in a relationship if they have full 
freedom to act according to their own objectives. Independence in an inter-organizational 
relationship means that organizations will only interact on their own terms and that they 
have the ability to break off the relationship without any penalty. In a situation of mutual 
independence, neither organization has significant influence over the other. 
B. Unbalanced independence. When two organizations work together in a loose relationship, 
one side (firm A) can have more power than the other (firm B). In such a case, it is said 
that firm A is more independent than firm B – firm A’s power gives it more freedom to 
act, while firm B can be influenced by the powerful firm A. This situation is called 
unbalanced independence, as both sides are independent, but one more so than the other. 
C. Mutual dependence. Two organizations can have a tight relationship, in which they are 
mutually dependent, while having an equal amount of sway over their counterpart. This 
type of situation, where there is a substantial, yet balanced, relationship between two or 
more parties, is also called interdependence. 
D. Unbalanced dependence. Where a tight relationship is characterized by asymmetrical 
dependence, one party will be able to dominate the other. In this situation of unbalanced 
dependence, the organization with the lower level of dependence will have more freedom 
to maneuver and impose its conditions than its counterpart.  
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FIGURE 8.4 
Relative power positions in inter-organizational relationships 
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The first category, mutual independence, is what is typically expected of a normal market 
relationship, although it is not strange to also witness market relationships that fit more in the 
second category, unbalanced independence. At the other extreme, unbalanced dependence is 
very close to the situation that would occur if the dominant firm acquired its counterpart. 
Whether acquired or fully dependent, the dominant firm controls its behavior. For this reason 
it is said that in cases of unbalanced dependence the inter-organizational relationship comes 
close to resembling the hierarchy-type relationship found within a firm. Interdependence 
seems to be somewhere between market and hierarchy type relationships. What this means 
for the structuring of these relationships will be examined below. 
 
8.2.4 Relational Arrangements  
In the classic dichotomy, the firm and its environment are presented as rather distinct entities. 
Within a firm coordination is achieved by means of direct control, leading transaction cost 
economists to refer to this organizational form as a hierarchy (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In a 
hierarchy a central authority governs internal relationships and has the formal power to 
coordinate strategy and solve interdepartmental disputes. In the environment, relationships 
between firms are non-hierarchical, as they interact with one another without any explicit 
coordination or dispute settlement mechanism. This organizational form is referred to as a 
market.  
In chapter 6 it was argued that there are all types of activities that companies should 
not want to internalize and run themselves, but should leave up to the marketplace. In many 
situations, it is such more efficient to buys inputs in the market than to make them yourself – 
where activities are performed by autonomous parties and outputs are sold in the market 
place, costs will often be lowest. As summarized by Ouchi (1980, p. 130), "in a market 
relationship, the transaction takes place between the two parties and is mediated by a price 
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mechanism in which the existence of a competitive market reassures both parties that the 
terms of exchange are equitable." 
Integration of activities into the firm is only necessary where “markets do not function 
properly” – where doing it yourself is cheaper or better. The firm must internalize activities, 
despite the disadvantages of hierarchy, where the invisible hand of the market cannot be 
trusted to be equitable and effective. Control over activities by means of formal authority – 
the visible hand – is needed under these conditions. This is particularly true of all of the 
synergy advantages mentioned in chapter 6, that the corporation would not be able to reap if 
the various business activities were not brought together under one ‘corporate roof’.  
In reality, however, there are many organizational forms between markets and 
hierarchies (e.g. Håkansson & Johanson, 1993; Powell, 1990; Thorelli, 1986). These are the 
networks, partnerships, or alliances introduced at the start of this chapter. In networks, 
strategies are coordinated and disputes resolved, not through formal top-down power, but by 
mutual adaptation. To extend the above metaphor, networks rely neither on the visible nor 
invisible hand to guide relationships, but rather employ the continuous handshake (Gerlach, 
1992).  
The organizations involved in networks can employ different sorts of collaborative 
arrangements to structure their ties with one another. In figure 8.5, an overview of a number 
of common types of collaborative arrangements is presented. Two major distinctions are 
made in this overview. First, between bilateral arrangements, which only involve two parties, 
and multilateral arrangements, which involve three or more. Commonly, only the multilateral 
arrangements are referred to as networks, although here the term is employed to cover all 
groupings of two or more cooperating firms. The second distinction is between non-
contractual, contractual and equity-based arrangements. Non-contractual arrangements are 
cooperative agreements that are not binding by law, while contractual arrangements do have a 
clear legal enforceability. Both, however, do not involve taking a financial stake in each other 
or in a new joint venture, while the equity-based arrangements do. 
The intent of these collaborative arrangements is to profit from some of the 
advantages of vertical and horizontal integration, without incurring their costs. Networks are 
actually hybrid organizational forms that attempt to combine the benefits of hierarchy with 
the benefits of the market. The main benefits of hierarchy are those associated with the 
structural coordination of activities. In non-market relational arrangements, all parties 
collaborate on a more long-term basis with the intent of realizing a common goal. They will 
organize procedures, routines and control systems to ensure effective and efficient 
functioning of their joint activities and a smooth transition at their organizational interfaces. 
The benefits of the market that these collaborative arrangements retain are flexibility and 
motivation. By not being entirely locked into a fixed hierarchy, individual firms can flexibly 
have multiple relationships, of varying length and intensity, and can change these 
relationships more easily where circumstances require adaptation. The market also provides 
the motivation to be efficient and to optimize the pursuit of the organization’s self-interest. 
This entrepreneurial incentive can be a strong spur for risk-taking, innovation and change.      
 A significant advantage of collaborative arrangements is that such relationships 
facilitate the process of co-specialization. Much of humanity’s economic progress is based on 
the principle of specialization by means of a division of labor. As people and firms focus 
more closely on performing a limited set of value-adding activities, they become more 
effective and efficient in their work. This division of labor assumes, however, that the value-
adding activities that are outsourced by one become the specialization of another, hence co-
specialization. Yet, many activities cannot be outsourced to outsiders on the basis of normal 
market relations, either due to the risk of dependence or because of the need for the structural 
coordination of activities. Under these conditions, collaborative arrangements can act as a 
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synthesis of hierarchy and market relations, thus catalyzing the process of specialization (e.g. 
Best, 1990; Axelsson & Easton, 1992). 
 
FIGURE 8.5 
Examples of collaborative arrangements 
• Lobbying coalition
(e.g. European Roundtable 
of Industrialists) 
• Joint standard setting
(e.g. Linux coalition)
• Learning communities
(e.g. Strategic Management 
Society)
• Research consortium
(e.g. Symbian in PDAs)
• International marketing 
alliance
(e.g. Star Alliance) 
• Export partnership
(e.g. Netherlands Export
Combination)
• Licensing agreement
(e.g. Disney & Coca-Cola)
• Co-development contract
(e.g. Disney and Pixar in 
movies)
• Co-branding alliance
(e.g. Coca-Cola and 
McDonalds)
• New product joint 
venture
(e.g. Philips and Nike in 
mp3 players)
• Cross-border joint 
venture
(e.g. EuMan in training)
• Local joint venture
(e.g. CNN Turk in Turkey)
• Shared payment system
(e.g. Visa)
• Construction consortium
(e.g. Eurotunnel)
• Joint reservation system
(e.g. Galileo)
• Cross-selling deal
(e.g. between pharma
firms)
• R&D staff exchange
(e.g. between IT firms)
• Market information 
sharing agreement
(e.g. between hardware 
and software makers)
Non-Contractual
Arrangements
Contractual
Arrangements
Equity-based
Arrangements
Multilateral
Arrangements
Bilateral
Arrangements
 
Such co-specialization can progress to such an extent that clusters of firms work together in 
more of less permanent networks. Such symbiotic groups of collaborating firms can actually 
function as virtual corporations (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Quinn, 1992). In such 
networks, the relationships between the participating firms are often very tight and durable, 
based on a high level of trust and perceived mutual interest. While each organization retains 
its individual identity, the boundaries between them become fuzzy, blurring the clear 
distinction between ‘the organization’ and ‘its environment’. When a high level of trust and 
reciprocity has been achieved, relations can move far beyond simple contractual obligations. 
The collaborative relations can become more open-ended, with objectives, responsibilities, 
authority and results not fully determined in advance in a written contract, but evolving over 
time, given all parties' sincere willingness to "work on their relationship" (e.g. Jarillo, 1988; 
Kanter, 1994). 
 While the intention of collaborative arrangements may be to blend the advantages of 
hierarchy with the qualities of the market, it is also possible that the weaknesses of both are 
actually combined. The main weakness of hierarchy is bureaucracy – creating red tape, 
unnecessary coordination activities and dulling the incentive to perform. In reality, 
collaborative arrangements might be mechanisms for structuring static relationships and 
dampening entrepreneurial behavior. A further danger is that the mutual dependence might 
become skewed, shifting the balance of power to one of the partners. Under such conditions, 
one or more organizations can become dependent on a dominant party, without much 
influence (voice) or the possibility to break off the relationship (exit). Such unbalanced 
dependency relationships (type D and E in figure 8.4) might be a great benefit for the 
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stronger party, but can easily lead to the predominance of its interests over the interests of the 
weaker partners (e.g. Oliver & Wilkinson, 1988; Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995). 
Simultaneously such partnerships are vulnerable to the main disadvantage of the 
market, namely opportunism. Companies run the risk of opportunism, that is, "self-interest 
seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, 
stealing and cheating...More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted 
disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse" (Williamson, 1985: 47). Such behavior can be limited by 
clearly defining objectives, responsibilities, authority and expected results ahead of time, 
preferably in an explicit contract. Even then collaborative arrangements expose companies to 
the risk of deception, the abuse of trust and the exploitation of dependence, making their use 
by no means undisputed. 
 
8.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 
When former CEO of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Pieter Bouw, teamed up with Northwest 
Airlines in 1989, he was thrilled to have the first major transatlantic strategic alliance in the 
industry, involving joint flights, marketing and sales activities, catering, ground handling, 
maintenance, and purchasing. Northwest was the fourth largest American carrier at that time, 
but was “in Chapter 11,” balancing on the verge of bankruptcy, and in dire need of cash. To 
help their new ally out, KLM gave a US$400 million capital injection, in return for 20% of 
the shares and the option to increase this to a majority within a few years. KLM and 
Northwest were on their way to becoming a virtual transatlantic company – a marriage “made 
in the heavens”.  
 Commercially the deal was a success, but relationally the alliance was a 
Shakespearean drama. KLM gave up its hopes of an alliance with Swissair, SAS, and Delta, 
to remain loyal to Northwest, but as soon as Northwest emerged from Chapter 11, it blocked 
KLM’s efforts to increase its shareholding. In the resulting two-year legal shooting match 
between 1995 and 1997, relations deteriorated sharply and the goose laying the golden eggs 
threatened to be killed in the cross fire. Disappointed and dismayed, Bouw decided to give in, 
selling Northwest back its shares, in return for a prolongation of the alliance, after which he 
immediately resigned. His successor, and current CEO, Leo van Wijk, has managed the 
alliance since then and it is still “up in the air,” in both senses of the expression. His most 
important conclusion has been that a collaborative alliance is not only about working together 
towards a common interest, but equally about being assertive with regard to one’s own 
interests. Alliances are not only cooperative, but also have competitive aspects. 
What this example of KLM and Northwest illustrates is that firms constantly struggle 
with the tension created by the need to work together with others, while simultaneously 
needing to pursue their own interests. Firms cannot isolate themselves from their 
environments, but must actively engage in relationships with suppliers and buyers, while 
selectively teaming up with other firms inside and outside their industry to attain mutual 
benefit. But while they are collaborating to create joint value, firms are also each other’s 
rivals when it comes to dividing the benefits. These opposite demands placed on 
organizations are widely referred to as the pressures for competition and cooperation (e.g. 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Lado, Boyd and Hanlon, 1997). In the following sections 
both pressures will be examined in more detail. 
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8.3.1 The Demand for Inter-Organizational Competition 
Competition can be defined as the act of working against others, where two or more 
organizations’ goals are mutually exclusive. In other words, competition is the rivalry 
behavior exhibited by organizations or individuals where one’s win is the other’s loss.  
Organizations need to be competitive in their relationships with others. As the 
interests and/or objectives of different organizations are often mutually exclusive, each 
organization needs to be determined and assertive in pursuing its own agenda. Each 
organization needs to be willing to confront others to secure its own interests. Without the 
will to engage in competitive interaction, the organization will be at the mercy of more 
aggressive counterparts – e.g. suppliers will charge excessively for products, buyers will 
express stiff demands for low prices, governments will require special efforts without 
compensation, and rival firms will poach among existing customers. Taking a competitive 
posture towards these external parties means that the organization is determined to assert its 
own interests and fight where necessary.  
The resulting competitive relations can vary between open antagonism and conflict on 
the one hand, and more subtle forms of friction, tension and strain on the other. Blatant 
competitive behavior is often exhibited towards organizations whose objectives are fully in 
conflict – most clearly other producers of the same goods, attempting to serve the same 
markets (aptly referred to as the competition). Highly competitive behavior can also be 
witnessed where a supplier and a buyer confront each other for dominance in the industry 
value chain (e.g. Porter, 1980; Van Tulder & Junne, 1988). A more restrained competitive 
stance can be observed where organizations’ objectives are less at odds, but assertiveness is 
still important to protect the organization’s interests. Negotiation and bargaining will 
commonly be employed under these circumstances. 
 To be competitive an organization must have the power to overcome its rivals and it 
must have the ability and will to use its power. Many factors shape the power of an 
organization, but its relative level of resource dependence is one of the most important 
determining elements. The more independent the organization, and the more others are 
dependent on it, the more power the organization will wield. In competitive relationships 
maneuvering the other party into a relatively dependent position is a common approach. In 
general, calculation, bargaining, maneuvering, building coalitions and outright conflict are all 
characteristic for the competitive interaction between organizations. 
 
8.3.2 The Demand for Inter-Organizational Cooperation 
Cooperation can be defined as the act of working together with others, where two or more 
organizations’ goals are mutually beneficial. In other words, cooperation is the collaborative 
behavior exhibited by organizations or individuals where both sides need each other to 
succeed. 
Organizations need to be cooperative in their relationships with others. The interests 
and/or objectives of different organizations are often complementary and working together 
can be mutually beneficial. Therefore, organizations must be willing to behave as partners, 
striving towards their common good. Without the will to engage in cooperative interaction, 
the organization will miss the opportunity to reap the advantages of joint efforts – e.g. 
developing new products together with suppliers, creating a better service offering together 
with buyers, improving the knowledge infrastructure together with government and setting 
new technical standards together with other firms in the industry. Taking a cooperative 
posture towards these external parties means that the organization is determined to leverage 
its abilities through teamwork.  
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The resulting cooperative relations can vary between occasional alliances on the one 
hand, to tight-knit, virtual integration on the other. Strongly cooperative behavior can be 
witnessed where the long-term interests of all parties are highly intertwined. This type of 
symbiotic relationship can be found between the producers of complementary goods and 
services, where success by one organization will positively impact its partners – aptly 
referred to as the network effect (Arthur, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1998). Highly cooperative 
behavior can also be observed were suppliers and buyers face a joint challenge (such as 
government regulation, an innovative technology or a new market entrant) that can only be 
tackled by significant mutual commitment to a shared objective.  
More restrained cooperative behavior is common where there is potential for a 
positive sum game, but some parties seek to optimize their own returns to the detriment of 
others. Under such circumstances, exhibiting cooperative behavior does not mean being naïve 
or weak, but creating conditions under which the long term shared interests prevail over the 
short term temptation by some to cheat their partners. An important ingredient for 
overcoming the lure of opportunism is to build long-term commitment to one another, not 
only in words and mentality, but also practically, through a high level of interdependence. 
Where organizations are tightly linked to one another, the pay-off for cooperative behavior is 
usually much more enticing than the possibility to profit from the dependence of one’s 
partner. But to be willing to commit to such a high level of interdependence, people on both 
sides of a relationship need to trust each other’s intentions and actions, while there must be 
coordination and conflict-resolution mechanisms in place to solve evolving issues (e.g. Dyer, 
Kale and Singh, 2001; Simonin, 1997).  
 
8.4 PERSPECTIVES ON NETWORK LEVEL STRATEGY 
Firms need to be able to engage in competition and cooperation simultaneously, even though 
these demands are each other’s opposites. Firms need to exhibit a strongly cooperative 
posture to reap the benefits of collaboration, and they need to take a strongly competitive 
stance to ensure that others do not block their interests. Some theorists conclude that what is 
required is co-opetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). But while a catchy word, 
executives are still left with the difficult question of how to deal with these conflicting 
demands. To meet the pressure for cooperation, firms must actually become part of a broader 
‘team’, spinning a web of close collaborative relationships. But to meet the pressure for 
competition, firms must not become too entangled in restrictive relationships, but rather 
remain free to maneuver, bargain and attack, with the intention of securing their own 
interests. In other words, firms must be embedded and independent at the same time – 
embedded in a network of cooperative interactions, while independent enough to wield their 
power to their own advantage. 
 The question that seems to be dividing strategizing executives is whether firms should 
be more embedded or more independent. Should firms immerse themselves in broader 
networks to create strong groups, or should they stand on their own? Should firms willing 
engage in long-term interdependence relationships or should they strive to remain as 
independent as possible? Should firms develop network level strategies at all, or should the 
whole concept of multi-firm strategy-making be directed to the garbage heap?  
 As before, here the two diametrically opposed positions will be identified and 
discussed, to be able to formulate statements for measuring executives’ preferences. On the 
one side of the spectrum, there are strategists who believe that it is best for companies to be 
primarily competitive in their relationships to all outside forces. They argue that firms should 
remain independent and interact with other companies under market conditions as much as 
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possible. As these strategists emphasize the discrete boundaries separating the firm from its 
‘competitive environment’, this point of view is called the discrete organization perspective. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are strategists who believe that companies should 
strive to build up more long-term cooperative relationships with key organizations in their 
environment. They argue that firms can reap significant benefits by surrendering a part of 
their independence and developing close collaborative arrangements with a group of other 
organizations. This point of view will be referred to as the embedded organization 
perspective.  
 
8.4.1 The Discrete Organization Perspective 
Executives taking the discrete organization perspective view companies as independent 
entities competing with other organizations in a hostile market environment. In line with 
neoclassical economics, this perspective commonly emphasizes that individuals, and the 
organizations they form, are fundamentally motivated by aggressive self-interest and 
therefore that competition is the natural state of affairs. Suppliers will try to enhance their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers with the aim of getting a better price, while conversely 
buyers will attempt to improve their negotiation position to attain better quality at lower cost. 
Competing firms will endeavor to gain the upper hand against their rivals if the opportunity 
arises, while new market entrants and manufacturers of substitute products will consistently 
strive to displace incumbent firms (e.g. Porter, 1980, 1985). 
 In such a hostile environment it is a strategic necessity for companies to strengthen 
their competitive position in relation to the external forces. The best strategy for each 
organization is to obtain the market power required to get good price/quality deals, ward off 
competitive threats, limit government demands and even determine the development of the 
industry. Effective power requires independence and therefore heavy reliance on specific 
suppliers, buyers, financiers or public organizations should be avoided.  
The label ‘discrete organization’ given to this perspective refers to the fact that each 
organization is seen as being detached from its environment, with sharp boundaries 
demarcating where the outside world begins. The competitive situation is believed to be 
atomistic, that is, each self-interested firm strives to satisfy its own objectives, leading to 
rivalry and conflict with other organizations. Vertical interactions between firms in the 
industry column tend to be transactional, with an emphasis on getting the best possible deal. 
It is generally assumed that under such market conditions the interaction will be of a zero-
sum nature, that is, a fight for who gets how much of the pie. The firm with the strongest 
bargaining power will usually be able to appropriate a larger portion of the ‘economic rent’ 
than will the less potent party. Therefore, advocates of the discrete organization perspective 
emphasize that the key to competitive success is the ability to build a powerful position and 
to wield this power in a calculated and efficient manner. This might sound Machiavellian to 
the faint-hearted, but it is the reality of the market place that is denied at one’s own peril. 
Essential for organizational power is the avoidance of resource dependence. Where a 
firm is forced to lean on a handful of suppliers or buyers, this can place the organization in a 
precariously exposed position. To executives taking a discrete organization perspective, such 
dependence on a few external parties is extremely risky, as the other firm will be tempted to 
exploit their position of relative power to their own advantage. Wise firms will therefore not 
let themselves become overly dependent on any external organization, certainly not for any 
essential resources. This includes keeping the option open to exit from the relationship at will 
– with low barriers to exit the negotiation position of the firm is significantly stronger. 
Therefore the firm must never become so entangled with outsiders, that it cannot rid 
themselves of them at the drop of a hat. The firm must be careful that in a web of 
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relationships it is the spider, not the fly (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ruigrok and Van 
Tulder, 1995). 
Keeping other organizations at arm’s length also facilitates clear and business-like 
interactions. Where goods and services are bought or sold, distinct organizational boundaries 
help to distinguish tasks, responsibilities, authority and accountability. But as other firms will 
always seek to do as little as possible for the highest possible price, having clear contracts 
and a believable threat to enforce them, will serve as a method to ensure discipline. Arm’s 
length relations are equally useful in avoiding the danger of vital information leaking to the 
party with whom the firm must (re) negotiate. 
In their relationships with other firms in the industry it is even clearer that companies’ 
interests are mutually exclusive. More market share for one company must necessarily come 
at the expense of another. Coalitions are occasionally formed to create power blocks, if 
individual companies are not strong enough to compete on their own. Such tactical alliances 
bring together weaker firms, not capable of doing things independently. But ‘competitive 
collaboration’ is usually short lived – either the alliance is unsuccessful and collapses, or it is 
successful against the common enemy, after which the alliance partners become each other’s 
most important rivals.  
Proponents of the discrete organization perspective argue that collaborative 
arrangements are always second best to doing things independently. Under certain conditions, 
weakness might force a firm to choose for an alliance, but it is always a tactical necessity, 
never a strategic preference. Collaborative arrangements are inherently risky, fraught with the 
hazard of opportunism. Due to the ultimately competitive nature of relationships, allies will 
be tempted to serve their own interests to the detriment of the others, by maneuvering, 
manipulating or cheating. The collaboration might even be a useful ploy, to cloak the 
company's aggressive intentions and moves. Collaboration, it is therefore concluded, is 
merely "competition in a different form" (Hamel, Doz & Prahalad, 1989). Hence, where 
collaboration between firms really offers long-term advantages, a merger or acquisition is 
preferable to the uncertainty of an alliance. 
 Where collaboration is not the tool of the weak, it is often a conspiracy of the strong 
to inhibit competition. If two or more formidable companies collaborate, chances are that the 
alliance is actually ganging up on a third party, for instance on buyers. In such cases the term 
‘collaboration’ is just a euphemism for collusion and not in the interest of the economy at 
large. 
 Worse yet, collaboration is usually also bad for a company's long-term health. A 
highly competitive environment is beneficial for a firm, because it provides the necessary 
stimulus for companies to continually improve and innovate. Strong adversaries push 
companies towards competitive fitness. A more benevolent environment, cushioned by 
competition-inhibiting collaboration, might actually make a firm more content and less eager 
to implement tough changes. In the long run this will make firms vulnerable to more 
aggressive companies, battle-hardened by years of rivalry in more competitive environments.  
In conclusion, the basic assumption of the discrete organization perspective is that 
companies should not develop network level strategies, but should strive for ‘strategic self-
sufficiency’. Collaborative arrangements are a tactical tool, to be selectively employed. The 
sentiment of this perspective has been clearly summarized by Porter (1990; 224): "alliances 
are rarely a solution...no firm can depend on another independent firm for skills and assets 
that are central to its competitive advantage...Alliances tend to ensure mediocrity, not create 
world leadership." 
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8.4.2 The Embedded Organization Perspective 
Strategists taking an embedded organization perspective are fundamentally at odds with the 
assumption that competition is the predominant factor determining the interaction between 
organizations. Business isn't war, so to approach all interactions from an antagonistic angle is 
seen as overly pessimistic, even cynical. On the contrary, it is argued that business is about 
value creation, which is inherently a positive-sum activity. Creating value brings together 
organizations towards a common goal, as they can achieve more by working together than by 
behaving autistically. In the modern economy, no organization can efficiently perform all 
activities in-house, as the division of labor has encouraged companies to specialize and 
outsource as many non-core activities as possible. Companies are necessarily cogs in the 
larger industrial machine and they can achieve little without working in unison with the other 
parts of the system. In the embedded organization perspective, atomistic competition is a 
neoclassical theoretical abstraction that seriously mischaracterizes the nature of relationships 
between organizations. In reality, cooperation is the predominant factor determining inter-
organizational relations. Symbiosis, not aggression, is the fundamental nature of economic 
functioning (e.g. Jarillo, 1988; Moore, 1996).  
A company can always find many organizations in its environment with which it 
shares an interest and whose objectives are largely parallel to its own (Child & Faulkner, 
1998). A company might want to develop new products together with its buyers, optimize the 
logistical system together with its suppliers, expand the industry’s potential together with 
other manufacturers, link technological standards with other industries and improve 
employment conditions together with the government. In general, most organizations have a 
stronger interest in increasing the size of the pie, than in deciding who gets what – keeping 
the focus on making a success of value creation eases the process of finding an equitable 
solution to the issue of value distribution.    
The label ‘embedded organization’ given to this perspective refers to the fact that 
firms are becoming increasing integrated into webs of mutually dependent organizations (e.g. 
Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Granovetter, 1985). As companies strive to focus on a 
limited set of core competences and core business processes, they have moved to outsource 
as many non-core activities as possible. But as firms have attempted to further specialize by 
outsourcing activities that are close to their core business, they have become more vulnerable 
to outside suppliers and the need for explicit coordination of activities has often remained 
high. The outsourcing of such essential and coordination-intensive activities can only take 
place where the other party can be trusted to closely collaborate with the joint interests in 
mind. Of course, a company will not quickly move to such dependence on an outside 
supplier. But as experience and trust build over time, a strategic partnership can develop, 
where both sides come to accept the value of the close cooperation (e.g. Axelsson and Easton, 
1992; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995).  
For a firm to willingly surrender a part of its independence, it must be certain that its 
partners are also willing to invest in the relationship and will not behave opportunistically. 
Ideally, therefore, durable partnerships are based on mutual dependence and reciprocity. Both 
sides of the relationship must need each other, which gives an important incentive for both to 
find solutions to the disputes that will inevitably pop up. A balance in the benefits to be 
gained and the efforts to be exerted will also contribute to the success of a long-term 
collaborative relationship.  
While such close collaborative relationships place a firm in a position of resource 
dependence, the benefits are much larger. By specializing in a certain area, the firm can gain 
scale and experience advantages much faster. Specialization helps the firm to focus on a more 
limited set of core competences, which can be developed more efficiently and rapidly than if 
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the firm were a ‘conglomerate’ of activities. At the same time the firm can tap into the 
complementary resources (Richardson, 1972) developed by its co-specialized partners. These 
complementary resources will usually be of higher quality and lower price than if the firm 
had built them up independently.  
 Specialized firms also use collaborative arrangements to quickly combine their 
resources with industry outsiders, to create new products and services. As product and 
business innovation is high paced and usually requires the combination of various types of 
resources, developing everything in isolation is unworkable for most firms. By teaming up 
with other firms that have complementary resources, a company can make the most of its 
own resource base, without having to build up other resources from scratch. But again trust is 
needed to engage in such a joint venture, as there are significant downside risks that the firm 
needs to take into account. 
So, from the embedded organization perspective, collaboration is not competition in 
disguise, but a real alternative means of dealing with other organizations (e.g. Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Successful firms embed themselves in webs of 
cooperative relationships, developing strategies together with their partners. These networks 
might compete against other networks (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hamilton & Woolsey 
Biggart, 1988; Weidenbaum & Hughes, 1996), but even here the relationships need not be 
fundamentally antagonistic. Proponents of the embedded organization perspective do not 
believe that firms should become obsessed with ‘putting the competition out of business’, as 
this again reduces business to win-lose, zero-sum game. Firms should be focused on creating 
value and avoiding direct confrontation with other manufacturers, emphasizing the 
opportunity for a win-win, positive sum game (e.g. Chan Kim and Mauborgne, 1999; Moore, 
2000). With this approach, firms in the same industry will recognize that they often have 
parallel interests as well. Setting industry standards, lobbying the government, finding 
solutions to joint environmental problems, improving the image of the industry, investing in 
fundamental research and negotiating with the unions are just a few of the issues where 
cooperation can be fruitful.  
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
So, do executives believe that it is wise to form network level strategies or not? Do they think 
that firms should consciously embed themselves in a web of durable collaborative 
relationships, emphasizing the value of cooperative inter-organizational interactions for 
realizing their long-term aims? Or do they suppose that it is better for firms to try to remain 
as independent as possible, emphasizing the value of competitive power in achieving their 
strategic objectives? Is their view that it should be “all for one, one for all” or do they believe 
that the strong must stand alone? 
In table 8.1 the main differences between the discrete organization perspective and the 
integrated organization perspective have been summarized. These two opposing poles have 
been translated into a set of 24 policy statements for measuring executives’ views, as part of 
the strategy profiler psychometric instrument. An overview of these statements is given in 
table 8.2.     
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TABLE 8.1   
Discrete organization versus embedded organization perspective  
 
 Discrete Organization Perspective Embedded Organization Perspective 
Emphasis on Competition over cooperation Cooperation over competition 
Preferred position Independence Interdependence 
Environment structure Discrete organizations (atomistic) Embedded organizations (networked) 
Firm boundaries Distinct & defended Fuzzy & open 
Inter-firm relations Arm’s length & transactional Close & structural 
Interaction outcomes Mainly zero-sum (win/lose) Mainly positive-sum (win/win) 
Interaction based on Bargaining power & calculation Trust & reciprocity 
Network level strategy No Yes 
Use of collaboration Temporary coalitions (tactical alliance) Durable partnerships (strategic alliance) 
Collaborative arrangement Limited, well-defined, contract-based Broad, open, relationship-based 
 
TABLE 8.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
Discrete Organization Perspective Embedded Organization Perspective 
11.1 
When entering an entirely new market, a 
good strategy is to do so independent of 
firms already active in that market. 
12.1 
When entering an entirely new market, a 
good strategy is to establish a joint venture 
with a firm already active in that market. 
11.2 
When developing new products, firms should 
only seek partners if they lack the ability to do 
it themselves. 
12.2 
When developing new products, firms should 
routinely seek partners to bring in different 
ideas and know-how. 
11.3 In alliances between firms, partners can never be fully trusted. 12.3 
In alliances between firms, building trust is 
essential for success. 
11.4 
The outsourcing of essential business 
activities should only be done if there are 
various suppliers competing for the job. 
12.4 
The outsourcing of essential business 
activities can be done to one unique supplier, 
if a mutually beneficial deal can be made. 
11.5 
When working together with suppliers, firms 
should be able to switch to other suppliers at 
short notice. 
12.5 
When working together with suppliers, firms 
should be able to switch to other suppliers at 
short notice. 
11.6 When working together with suppliers, it is a bad idea to tell them what your strategy is. 12.6 
When working together with suppliers, it is a 
good idea to tell them what your strategy is. 
11.7 
When working together with suppliers, you 
should keep your market intelligence to 
yourself. 
12.7 
When working together with suppliers, it is 
mutually beneficial to share your market 
intelligence with them. 
11.8 In relationships between buyers and sellers, if one side gains, the other side loses. 12.8 
In relationships between buyers and sellers, 
if one side gains, the other side can also 
gain. 
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11.9 Firms should never become dependent on a few key customers. 12.9 
Firms should invest in very tight long-term 
relationships with their customers. 
11.10 Partnerships between firms are never stable for very long. 12.10 
Cooperation between firms is much more 
healthy than competition. 
11.11 
Firms should work as independently as 
possible, only using temporary alliances if 
necessary. 
12.11 
Firms should seek strong partner 
organisations, with which to build long-term 
alliances. 
11.12 Firms should avoid long-term partnerships, as these limit a firm’s freedom to manoeuvre. 12.12 
Firms should build long-term partnerships to 
reach strategic goals that are impossible to 
achieve independently. 
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Chapter 9 
 
THE INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
If strategic management is concerned with relating a firm to its environment, then it is 
essential to know this environment well. In the previous chapters, the factors and actors that 
shape the external context of the firm have been thoroughly reviewed. While the entire 
outside world was taken into consideration, emphasis was placed on the direct environment in 
which a firm needs to compete – its industry context. It was concluded that an understanding 
of competitors, buyers, suppliers, substitutes and potential new entrants, as well as the 
structural factors that influence their behavior, is invaluable for determining a successful 
strategy.     
 A constant theme in the strategy process and strategy content sections was industry 
change. Knowing the current industry context, it became clear, is not enough to secure an on-
going alignment between a firm and its environment. Strategizing executives need to 
recognize in which direction the industry is developing to be able to maintain a healthy fit. 
However, what was not addressed in these discussions is how industry development actually 
takes place. Important questions such as ‘what are the drivers propelling industry 
development?’ and ‘what patterns of development do industries exhibit?’ have not yet be 
examined. Nor has it been established whether industries develop in the same way and at the 
same speed, and whether change is always accompanied by the same opportunities and 
threats. In this chapter, these questions surrounding the issue of industry development will be 
at the center of attention. 
 For strategizing executives, however, the most important question linked to the issue 
of industry development is how a firm can move beyond adapting to shaping. How can a 
firm, or a group of collaborating firms, modify the structure and competitive dynamics in 
their industry to gain an advantageous position? How can the industry’s evolutionary path be 
proactively diverted into a particular direction? If a firm would be capable of shaping its 
industry environment instead of following it, this would give them the potential for creating a 
strong competitive advantage – they could ‘set the rules of the competitive game’ instead of 
having to ‘play by the rules’ set by others. This topic of industry leadership – shaping events 
as opposed to following them – will be the key focus throughout this chapter, as it also seems 
to be the main factor underlying the different points of view among executives.   
 
9.2 THE ISSUE OF INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 
When strategists look at an industry, they are interested in understanding ‘the rules of the 
game’ (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Hamel, 1996). The industry rules are the demands 
dictated to the firm by the industry context, which limit the scope of potential strategic 
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behaviors. In other words, industry rules stipulate what must be done to survive and thrive in 
the chosen line of business – they determine under what conditions the competitive game will 
be played. For example, an industry rule could be ‘must have significant scale economies’, 
‘must have certain technology’ or ‘must have strong brand’. Failure to adhere to the rules 
leads to being selected out. 
 The industry rules arise from the structure of the industry (e.g. Porter, 1980; Tirole, 
1988). All of Porter’s five forces can impose constraints on a firm's freedom of action. Where 
the rules are strict, the degrees of freedom available to the strategist are limited. Strict rules 
imply that only very specific behavior is allowed – firms must closely follow the rules of the 
game or face severe consequences. Where the rules are looser, firms have more room to 
maneuver and exhibit distinctive behavior – the level of managerial discretion is higher (e.g. 
Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Carpenter and Golden, 1997). 
 As industries develop, the rules of competition change – vertical integration becomes 
necessary, certain competencies become vital or having a global presence becomes a basic 
requirement. To be able to play the competitive game well, strategizing executives need to 
identify which characteristics in the industry structure and which aspects of competitive 
interaction are changing. This is the topic of dimensions of industry development, which will 
be reviewed in more detail below. To determine their response, it is also essential to 
understand the nature of the change. Are the industry rules gradually shifting or is there a 
major break with the past? Is the industry development more evolutionary or more 
revolutionary? A process of slow and moderate industry change will demand a different 
strategic reaction than a process of sudden and dramatic disruption of the industry rules. This 
topic of paths of industry development will also be examined more closely. 
 As strategists generally like to have the option to shape instead of always being 
shaped, they need to recognize the determinants of industry development as well. What are 
the factors that cause the industry rules to change? This subject can be divided into two parts. 
First, the question of what the drivers of industry development are, pushing the industry in a 
certain direction. Second, the question of what the inhibitors of industry development are, 
placing a brake on changes. Together, these forces of change and forces for stability will 
determine the actual path of development that the industry will follow. How these 
abovementioned four topics are inter-related is outlined in figure 9.1.  
 
9.2.1 Dimensions of Industry Development 
Industry development means that the structure of the industry changes. In chapter 6, the key 
aspects of the industry structure have already been discussed. Following Porter (1980), five 
important groups of industry actors were identified (i.e. competitors, buyers, suppliers, new 
entrants and substitutes) and the underlying factors determining their behavior were 
reviewed. Industry development (which Porter calls industry evolution) is the result of a 
change in one or more of these underlying factors.   
 As Porter already indicates, the industry structure can be decomposed into dozens of 
elements, each of which can change, causing a shift in industry rules. Here it is not the 
intention to go through all of these elements, but to pick out a number of important structural 
characteristics that require special attention. Each one of these structural characteristics 
represents a dimension along which significant industry developments can take place: 
 
 Convergence – divergence. Where the business models that firms employ increasing start 
to resemble each other, the industry is said to be moving towards convergence (e.g. 
insurance and airline industries). Oppositely, where many firms introduce new business 
models, the industry is said to be developing towards more diversity (e.g. car retailing and 
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restaurant industries). Higher diversity can be due to the mutation of existing firms, as 
they strive to compete on a different basis, or the result of new entrants with their own 
distinct business model. Convergence is the consequence of adaptation by less successful 
firms to a ‘dominant design’ in the industry and the selecting out of unfit firms incapable 
of adequate and timely adaptation (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1980). 
Generally, patterns of divergence and convergence can be witnessed in all industries, 
although the amount of mutation and the pressure for convergence can greatly differ, as 
can the overall cycle time of an ‘evolutionary phase’ of mutation and selection (e.g. 
Aldrich, 1999; Baum and Singh, 1994). 
 
FIGURE 9.1 
The issue of industry development 
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 Concentration – fragmentation. Where an increasing share of the market is in hands of 
only a few companies, the industry is said to be developing towards a more concentrated 
structure (e.g. aircraft and food retailing industries). Conversely, where the average 
market share of the largest companies starts to decrease, the industry is said to be moving 
towards a more fragmented structure (e.g. airline and telecom services industries). 
Concentration can be due to mergers and acquisitions, or the result of companies exiting 
the business. Fragmentation can happen when new companies are formed and grab a part 
of the market, or through the entry of existing companies into the industry. In a 
concentrated industry it is much more likely that only one or two firms will be dominant 
than in a fragmented industry, but it is also possible that the industry structure is more 
balanced.  
 Vertical integration – fragmentation. Where firms in the industry are becoming involved 
in more value-adding activities in the industry column, the industry is said to be 
developing towards a more vertically integrated structure (e.g. media and IT service 
providers). Conversely, where firms in the industry are withdrawing from various value-
adding activities and ‘going back to the core’, the industry is said to be moving towards a 
more, disintegrated, layered or vertically fragmented structure (e.g. telecom and 
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automotive industries). It is even possible that the entire vertical structure changes, if a 
new business model has major consequences upstream and/or downstream. In recent 
years, technological changes surrounding IT and the internet have triggered a number of 
such instances of industry reconfiguration (e.g. travel and encyclopedia industries). 
However, even though we are now equipped with more fashionable terms (e.g. 
deconstruction), such industry wide transformations of the value creation process are in 
themselves not new (e.g. PCs and the computer industry in 1980s; airplanes and the travel 
industry in the 1950s) (e.g. Evans and Wurster, 1997; Porter, 2001).  
 Horizontal integration – fragmentation. Where the boundaries between different 
businesses in an industry become increasingly fuzzy, the industry is said to be developing 
towards a more horizontally integrated structure (e.g. consumer electronics and defense 
industries).  Conversely, where firms become more strictly confined to their own 
business, the industry is said to be moving towards a more segmented or horizontally 
fragmented structure (e.g. construction and airline industries). Links between businesses 
can intensify or wane, depending on the mobility barriers and potential cross-business 
synergies. However, horizontal integration and fragmentation are not limited to the intra-
industry domain. Inter-industry integration between two or more industries can also 
increase, creating a more or less open competitive space (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) with 
few mobility barriers (e.g. the digital industries). Inter-industry integration can also occur 
where the producers of different products and services are complementary and/or 
converge on a common standard or platform (e.g. Palm OS and Linux), making them 
complementors (e.g. Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; Moore, 1996). Yet, the opposite trend 
is possible as well, whereby an industry becomes more isolated from neighboring sectors 
(e.g. accountancy). 
 International integration – fragmentation. Where the international boundaries separating 
various geographic segments of an industry become increasingly less important, the 
industry is said to be developing towards a more internationally integrated structure (e.g. 
food retailing and business education industries). Conversely, where the competitive 
interactions in an industry are increasingly confined to a region (e.g. Europe) or country, 
the industry is said to be moving towards a more internationally fragmented structure 
(e.g. satellite television and internet retailing). These developments will be more 
thoroughly examined in chapter 10, which deals with the international context. 
 Expansion – contraction. Industries can also differ with regard to the structural nature of 
the demand for their products and/or services. Where an industry is experiencing an 
ongoing increase in demand, the industry is said to be in growth or expansion. Where 
demand is constantly receding, the industry is said to be in decline or contraction. If 
periods of expansion are followed by periods of contraction, and vice versa, the industry 
is said to be cyclical. A prolonged period of expansion is usually linked to the growth 
phase of the industry life cycle (e.g. Moore, 1999; Porter, 1980), while contraction is 
linked to the decline phase, but often it is rather difficult to apply the ‘life cycle’ concept 
to an entire industry (instead of to a product or technology). As industry growth 
(expansion) can easily follow a period of industry decline (contraction), the life cycle 
model has little descriptive value – what does it mean to be mature? – and even less 
predictive value.  
9.2.2 Paths of Industry Development 
The development of an industry can be mapped along any one of the dimensions listed above. 
The most popular is to track the pattern of expansion and contraction, to gain some indication 
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of the life cycle phase in which the industry might have arrived. Another frequently analyzed 
characteristic is the level of concentration, commonly using a concentration index to measure 
the market share of the four or eight largest companies. But it is equally viable to trace the 
trajectory of vertical, horizontal or international integration. In figure 9.2 examples of these 
paths of industry development are given. 
  
FIGURE 9.2 
Paths of industry development  
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In figure 9.3 one particular element of the convergence-divergence dimension has been 
selected for further magnification. As discussed above, in the development of an industry a 
particular business model can become the dominant design around which the rest of the 
industry converges. A strategically relevant development occurs when the dominant business 
model is replaced by a new business model that offers customers higher value. In figure 9.3, 
four generic patterns of industry development are outlined, each describing a different type of 
transition from the old dominant model to the new (Burgelman and Grove; D’Aveni, 1999):  
 
 Gradual development. In an industry where one business model is dominant for a long 
period of time and is slowly replaced by an alternative that is a slight improvement, the 
development process is gradual. The firms adhering to the dominant design will generally 
have little trouble adapting to the new rules of the game, leading to a situation of relative 
stability. Competition can be weak or fierce, depending on the circumstances, but will 
take place on the basis of the shared rules of the game. In this type of environment, 
companies with an established position have a strong advantage.   
 Continuous development. In an industry where changes to the dominant business model 
are more frequent, but still relatively modest in size, the development process is 
continuous. While firms need not have difficulties adjusting to each individual change to 
the rules of the game, they can fall behind if they do not keep up with the pace of 
improvement. In this type of environment, rapid adaptation to developments will 
strengthen the competitive position of firms vis-à-vis slow movers.  
 Discontinuous development. In an industry where one business model is dominant for a 
long period of time and then suddenly displaced by a radically better one, the 
development process is discontinuous. The firms riding the wave of the new business 
model will generally have a large advantage over the companies that need to adjust to an 
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entirely different set of industry rules. Where industry incumbents are themselves the 
‘rule breakers’ (Hamel, 1996), they can strongly improve their position vis-à-vis the ‘rule 
takers’ in the industry. But the business model innovator can also be an industry outsider, 
who gains entrance by avoiding competition with established players on their terms (e.g. 
Bower and Christensen, 1995; Slywotsky, 1996). 
 Hypercompetitive development. In an industry where business models are frequently 
pushed aside by radically better ones, the development process is hypercompetitive 
(D’Aveni, 1994). The rules of the game are constantly changing, making it impossible for 
firms to build up a sustainably dominant position. The only defense in this type of 
environment is offense – being able to outrun existing competitors being innovating first 
and being able to outperform new rule breakers at their own game.     
 
FIGURE 9.3 
Patterns of dominant business model development  
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9.2.3 Drivers of Industry Development 
There is a sheer endless list of factors in the environment that can change and can influence 
the direction of industry development. Following the categorization made in chapter 8, these 
factors can be divided into change drivers that are external or internal to the industry (see 
figure 9.4). The change drivers in the contextual environment can be roughly split into socio-
cultural, economic, political/regulatory and technological forces for change. The change 
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drivers in the industry environment can be divided into groups surrounding suppliers, buyers, 
incumbent rivals, new entrants, and substitutes and complementors.  
 
FIGURE 9.4 
Drivers of industry development 
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As the arrows indicate, change in a complex system like an industry does not always start in 
one discernable part and then reverberate throughout the whole. Rather, change can also be 
the result of the interplay of various elements in the system, without any clear start or ending 
point. Yet, for the discussion on shaping industry development it is important to recognize the 
distinction between industry changes that are largely triggered by an individual firm, as 
opposed to broader, system-wide changes, for which no one actor can claim responsibility. 
Where one firm is the major driver of industry development, it can claim industry leadership. 
But if there is no industry leader and the evolution of the industry is due to the complex 
interaction of many different change drivers, it is said that the industry dynamics determine 
the path of industry development.   
 
9.2.4 Inhibitors of Industry Development 
Forces of change do not always go unopposed. In the discussion on strategic change in 
chapter 4, the sources of organizational rigidity were reviewed, each of which acts as an 
inhibitor to organizational change. In the same way, there are many sources of industry 
rigidity, making the industry rules much more difficult to bend or break. Industry rigidity can 
be defined as the lack of susceptibility to change. If an industry is rigid, the rules of the game 
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cannot be altered and competitive positions are relatively fixed. The opposite term is industry 
plasticity – an industry’s susceptibility to change.  
A large number of factors can contribute to rigidity, thereby inhibiting industry 
development. Some of the most important ones are the following: 
 
 Underlying conditions. Basically, some rules might be immutable because the underlying 
industry conditions cannot be changed. In some industries economies of scale are 
essential (e.g. airplane manufacturing, merchant shipping), where in others economies of 
scale are not of importance (e.g. wedding services, dentistry services). In some industries 
buyers are fragmented (e.g. newspapers, moving services), while in others they are highly 
concentrated (e.g. defense systems, harbor construction). In some industries buyers value 
product differentiation (e.g. clothing, restaurants), while in others bulk producers must 
compete on price (e.g. chemicals, general construction). Many of these structural factors 
are inherent to the industry and defy any attempts to change them (e.g. Bain, 1959; Porter, 
1980). 
 Industry integration. Besides the limited plasticity of individual aspects of the industry 
context, it is also important to recognize that some industries are particularly rigid 
because of the complex linkages between various aspects of the industry. For example, to 
be a rule breaking music company not only requires developing new delivery methods via 
the internet, but also getting electronics manufacturers to adopt the new standards, finding 
ways to safeguard copyrights, working together with governments to find new policing 
methods, and not least to change the buying behavior of consumers. Such interrelations 
between various elements of the industry can make it particularly difficult to actually 
influence the direction of events over time. The industry can become locked in to a 
specific structure for a long period of time (e.g. Arthur, 1994; Shapiro and Varian, 1998).  
 Power structures. The industry rules can also be kept in place by those who feel they are 
better off with the status quo. Powerful industry incumbents often have little to gain and 
much to lose. They have established positions and considerable sunk costs, in the form of 
historical investments in technology, competencies, facilities and relationships, which 
makes them reluctant to support changes to the rules of the game. Hence, rule changers 
are usually vehemently resisted by existing firms and denied support by potential 
suppliers and buyers. For example, rivals might attack a rule breaker by lowering prices, 
launching a media campaign, or even lobbying government regulators to impose legal 
rules. Especially where a rule breaker needs allies to secure supplies, distribution or a new 
standard will it be vulnerable to the countermoves of parties with a vested interest in the 
current structure (e.g. Ghemawat, 1991; Moore, 2000). 
 Risk averseness. Challenging the industry rules is not only a risky step for the rule 
breaker, but also for many other parties involved. Customers might be hesitant about a 
new product or service until it has a firmer track record. Suppliers and distributors might 
worry whether the initial investments will pay off and what the countermoves will be of 
the established companies. The more risk averse the parties in the industry, the more rigid 
will be the industry rules (e.g. Christensen, 1997; Parolini, 1999).  
 Industry recipes. An industry recipe is a widely held perception among industry 
incumbents regarding the actual rules of the game in the industry. In other words, an 
industry recipe is the cognitive map shared by industry incumbents about the structure 
and demands of an industry. Such a common understanding of the rules of the game can 
develop over time through shared experiences and interaction – the longer people are in 
the industry and converse with each other, the greater the chance that a consensus will 
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grow about ‘what makes the industry tick’. Thus, the industry recipe can limit people’s 
openness to rule changers, who challenge the industry orthodoxy (e.g. Baden-Fuller and 
Stopford, 1992; Spender, 1989).  
 Institutional pressures. While the industry recipe is a shared understanding of how the 
industry actually functions, industry incumbents usually also share norms of what 
constitutes socially acceptable economic behavior. Companies experience strong 
pressures from government, professional associations, customers, consultants, trade 
unions, pressure groups and other industry incumbents prescribing permissible strategies 
and actions, and generally internalize these behavioral standards. Such conformity to 
institutional pressures gives companies legitimacy, but makes them less willing to 
question industry conventions, let alone work together with a maverick rule breaker (e.g. 
Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Oliver, 1997). 
Taken together, these historically determined factors inhibit developments in the industry. It 
is said that industry evolution is path dependent – the path that the industry has traveled in 
the past will strongly limit how and in which direction it can develop in future. In other 
words, ‘history matters’, setting bounds on the freedom to shape the future.   
 
9.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN COMPLIANCE AND CHOICE  
Yet, the question is whether firms should attempt to shape their industries at all, given the 
required effort and apparent risk of failure. There might be attractive rewards if a firm can 
lead industry developments, but trying to break industry rules that turn out to be immutable 
can be a quick way to achieve bankruptcy. Being an industry leader might sound very 
proactive, and even heroic, but it is potentially suicidal if the industry context defies being 
shaped.  
 This duality of wanting to change the industry rules that are malleable, while needing 
to adapt to the industry rules that are fixed, is the tension central to dealing with the industry 
context. On the one hand, executives must be willing to irreverently transgress widely 
acknowledged industry rules, going against what they see as the industry recipe. On the other 
hand, executives must respectfully accept many characteristics of the industry structure and 
play according to existing rules of the competitive game. Yet, these conflicting demands of 
being irreverent and respectful towards the industry rules are difficult for strategists to meet 
at the same time.  
 Where firms cannot influence the structure of their industry, compliance to the rules 
of the game is the strategic imperative. Under these circumstances, the strategic demand is for 
executives to adapt the firm to the industry context. Where firms do have the ability to 
manipulate the industry structure, they should exercise their freedom of choice to break the 
industry rules. In such a case, the strategic demand is for executives to try to change the terms 
of competition in their own favor. 
 This tension between compliance and choice has been widely acknowledged in the 
strategic management literature (e.g. Porter, 1980; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). The pressure 
for compliance has usually been presented as a form of environmental determinism, as the 
industry developments force firms to adapt or be selected out (e.g. Astley and Van der Ven, 
1983; Wilson, 1992). The freedom of choice has often been labeled as organizational 
voluntarism, to convey the notion that industry developments can be the result of the willful 
actions of individual organizations (e.g. Bettis & Donaldson, 1990; Handy, 1974). In the 
following sections both compliance and choice will be further examined.   
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9.3.1 The Demand for Firm Compliance 
It goes almost without saying that organizations must, to a large extent, adapt themselves to 
their environments. No organization has the ability to shape the entire world to fit its needs. 
Therefore, to be successful, all organizations need to understand the context in which they 
operate and need to play by most of the rules of the game.    
 After all, the alternative of ignoring the rules is fraught with danger. Probably the 
most common cause of ‘corporate death’ is misalignment between the organization and its 
environment. And misalignment can happen very quickly, as most industries are constantly in 
flux. Companies can misinterpret the direction of the changes, can fail to take appropriate 
corrective action, or can be plainly self-centered, paying insufficient attention to external 
developments. Most companies have enough difficulty just staying attuned to the current 
rules of the competitive game, let alone anticipating how the industry context will change in 
future. 
 To achieve compliance with the industry rules, firms must develop structures, 
processes and a culture in which listening and adapting to the environment becomes 
engrained. Firms must learn to become customer and market-oriented, reacting to the ‘pull’ 
of the market, instead of ‘pushing’ their standard approach and pet projects at an unwilling 
audience. Firm compliance means avoiding the pitfall of organizational arrogance – knowing 
it better than the market and imposing an approach that no one is waiting for (e.g. Miller, 
1990; Whitley, 1999).  
 
9.3.2 The Demand for Strategic Choice 
While compliance to the industry rules can be very beneficial, contradicting them can also be 
strategically valuable. If firms only play by the current rules, it is generally very difficult for 
them to gain a significant competitive advantage over their rivals. After all, adapting to the 
current industry structure means doing business in more or less the same way as competitors, 
with few possibilities to distinguish the organization. In other words, ‘compliance’ might be 
another way of saying ‘follow a me-too strategy’.  
 To be unique and develop a competitive advantage, firms need to do something 
different, something that does not fit within the current rules of the game. The more 
innovative the rule breaker, the larger will be the competitive advantage over rivals stuck 
with outdated business models. The more radical the departure from the old industry recipe, 
the more difficult it will be for competitors to imitate and catch up. Where companies are 
capable of constantly leading industry developments, they will have the benefit of capturing 
attractive industry positions before less proactive competitors eventually follow. In other 
words, there is a strong pressure for firms to attempt to shape the industry rules.  
 To achieve organizational choice, firms must find ways of escaping the pitfall of 
organizational conformity – the strict adherence to current industry rules. Firms must develop 
structures, processes and a culture in which the current industry recipe is constantly 
questioned, challenged and changed. Executives must come to see that in the long run the 
easy path of following the industry rules will be less productive than the rocky road of 
innovation and change (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Kim and Mauborgne, 1999).  
 
9.4 PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
Once again the strategizing executive seems ‘stuck between a rock and a hard place’. The 
pressures for both compliance and choice are clear, but as opposites they are at least partially 
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incompatible. Developing an organizational culture, structure and processes attuned to 
compliance will to some extent be at odds with the culture, structure and processes needed to 
shape an industry. An organization well rehearsed in the art of adaptation and skillful 
imitation is usually quite different than the one geared towards business innovation and 
contrarian behavior. How should executives actually deal with the issue of industry 
development – should they lead or follow? 
 As before, to measure what executives believe is the best approach, the two 
diametrically opposed positions will be identified and discussed. On the one hand, there are 
strategists who argue that industry development is an autonomous process, which individual 
firms can hardly hope to shape. They believe that compliance to shifting industry 
characteristics is mandatory – adjust or risk being selected out. This point of view will be 
referred to as the industry dynamics perspective. On the other hand, many strategists believe 
that the industry context can be shaped in an infinite variety of ways by innovative firms. 
Therefore, industry development can be driven by firms willing and able to take a leading 
role. This point of view will be referred to as the industry leadership perspective. 
 
9.4.1 The Industry Dynamics Perspective 
To those taking an industry dynamics perspective, the popular notion that individual firms 
have the power to shape their industry is an understandable, but quite misplaced, belief. Of 
course, the illusion of control is tempting – most people, especially executives, would like to 
control their own destiny. Most individuals assume they have a free will and can decide their 
own future. Many governments suppose that they can shape society and many cultures 
assume that they control nature. In the same way, it is seductive to believe that the individual 
firm can matter, by influencing the development of its industry.  
 Unfortunately, this belief is largely a fallacy, brought on by a poor understanding of 
the underlying industry dynamics. In reality, according to advocates of the industry dynamics 
perspective, industries are complex systems, with a large number of forces interacting 
simultaneously, none of which can significantly direct the long-term development of the 
whole. Firms are relatively small players in a very large game – their behaviors may have 
some impact on industry development, but none can fundamentally shape the direction of 
changes. On the contrary, as industries evolve, all firms that do not meet the changing 
demands of the environment are weeded out. Firms not suited to the new circumstances die, 
while firms complying with the changing rules prosper. Hence, through selection the industry 
context determines the group of industry survivors and through the pressures for adaptation 
the behavior of the remaining firms is determined. In short, the industry shapes the firm, not 
the other way around. 
 The industry dynamics perspective is often also referred to as the industry evolution 
perspective, due to the strong parallel with biological evolution. Both evolutionary processes, 
it is argued, share a number of basic characteristics. In nature, as in business, the survival and 
growth of entities depends on their fit with the environment. Within each environment 
variations to a successful theme might come about. These new individuals will thrive, as long 
as they suit the existing circumstances, but as the environment changes, only those that meet 
the new demands will not be selected out. Hence, Darwin's well-known principle of ‘survival 
of the fittest’ is based on a cycle of variation and environmental selection. Many proponents 
of the industry dynamics perspective think that this biological view of evolution is a good 
model for what happens in industries – new organizations arise as mutations and only the 
fittest mutations survive. However, it is usually pointed out that in a business environment, 
organizations do not vary ‘at random,’ but purposefully, and they possess the ability to adapt 
to selection pressures during the evolution process (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982; Baum & 
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Singh, 1994). Therefore, organizations have much more flexibility to evolve along with the 
unfolding industry dynamics than life forms generally do. This process of mutual adaptation 
and development between entities in the system is called co-evolution (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; 
Moore, 1996). To proponents of the industry dynamics perspective, the objective of a firm 
should be to co-evolve with its environment, instead of trying to conquer it.  
 Supporters of the industry dynamics perspective do not deny that every once in a 
while a rule breaker comes along, turning an industry upside down and spawning dozens of 
case studies by admiring business professors and hours of television interviews. But these 
successes must be put into perspective, just as a lottery winner should not encourage 
everyone to invest their life savings into buying lottery tickets. Yes, some business innovators 
are successful, but we have no idea of how many challengers were weeded out along the way 
– only the most spectacular failures make it into the media, but most go unreported. This is 
called the survivor’s bias, and the emphasis on case-based reasoning in the field of strategy 
makes theorists and practitioners equally susceptible to fall in to this trap. But even where a 
firm has been able to pull off a major industry change once, this does not make them the 
industry leader going into the future. They might have been the right company in the right 
place at the right time, able to push the industry in a certain direction once, but to assume that 
they will win the lottery twice is not particularly realistic.  
 The conclusion drawn by advocates of the industry dynamics perspective is that 
‘winning big’ by changing the rules of the game sounds easy, fast and spectacular – but isn’t. 
If one thing has been learnt from the internet bubble, it is that changing the rules of the game 
is extremely difficult, slow and hazardous, and should be left up to those ‘high rollers’ 
willing to play for ‘high stakes’ with only a low chance of success (i.e. venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs). For regular companies, such an approach cannot be the mainstay of their 
strategy. Their basic approach must be to stick close to the shifting currents in their industry, 
which is challenging enough in most cases. Competitive advantage can be sought, but 
through hard work within the rules of the game.  
The bad news is that this leaves limited freedom to maneuver and that the general 
level of profitability that a firm can achieve is largely predetermined. Once in a poor industry, 
a firm’s growth and profit potential are significantly limited (Porter, 1980). The good news is 
that this still leaves plenty of room for a firm to score above the industry average, by 
positioning better than competitors, but also by adapting better to the ongoing industry 
changes, or even anticipating changes more skillfully and reacting appropriately. 
 
9.4.2 The Industry Leadership Perspective 
Strategists taking an industry leadership perspective fundamentally disagree with the 
determinism inherent in the industry dynamics perspective. Even in biology, breeders and 
genetic engineers consistently attempt to shape the natural world. Of course, in industries, as 
in biology, some rules are immutable. Certain economic, technological, social and political 
factors have to be accepted as hardly changeable. But the remaining environmental factors 
that can be manipulated leave strategists with an enormous scope for molding the industry of 
the future. This belief is reflected in the remark by the Dutch poet Jules Deelder that “even 
within the limits of the possible, the possibilities are limitless.” It is up to the strategist to 
identify which rules of the game must be respected and which can be ignored in the search 
for new strategic options. The strategist must recognize both the limits on the possible and the 
limitless possibilities. 
Advocates of the industry leadership perspective do not deny that in many industries 
the developments are largely an evolutionary result of industry dynamics. For an 
understanding of the development paths of these ‘leaderless’ industries, the industry 
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dynamics perspective offers a powerful explanatory ‘lens’ – many industries do evolve 
without a clear industry leader. However, these industries only followed this path because no 
firm was creative and powerful enough to actively shape the direction of change. A lack of 
leadership is not the ‘natural state of affairs,’ but simply weakness on behalf of the industry 
incumbents. Industry developments can be shaped, but it does require innovative companies, 
willing to take on the leadership role (e.g. Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1992; Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994). 
 A leadership role, supporters of this perspective argue, starts with envisioning what 
the industry of tomorrow might look like. The firm’s strategists must be capable of 
challenging the existing industry recipe and building a new conception of how the industry 
could function in the future. They must test their own assumptions about which industry rules 
can be changed and must, in fact, think of ways of ‘destroying their current business’. Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994) refer to this as intellectual leadership, noting that smart strategists also 
develop industry foresight, anticipating which trends are likely to emerge, so that they can be 
used to the firm’s advantage.  
Not only must a firm have the intellectual ability to envision the industry’s future, but 
it must also be able to communicate this vision in a manner that other firms and individuals 
will be willing to buy in. If a vision of the industry of tomorrow is compelling enough, people 
inside and outside the company will start to anticipate, and will become committed to, that 
future, making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. This ‘inevitableness’ of an industry vision can be 
important in overcoming risk averseness and resistance from industry incumbents (e.g. 
Levenhagen, Porac, and Thomas, 1995; Moore, 2000). 
To actually change the rules of the competitive game in an industry, a firm must move 
beyond a compelling vision, and work out a new competitive business model. If this new 
business model is put into operation and seems to offer a competitive advantage, this can 
attract sufficient customers and support to gain ‘critical mass’ and break through as a viable 
alternative to the older business models. To shape the industry, the firm will also need to 
develop the new competencies and standards required to make the new business model 
function properly. The better the firm is at building new competencies and setting new 
standards, alone or in cooperation with others, the more power it will have to determine the 
direction of industry development (e.g. D’Aveni, 1999; Hamel, 1996). 
All of the above mentioned points together add up to quite a considerable task. But 
then, industry leadership is not easy and changing the industry rules rarely happens overnight. 
Rather, it can take years, figuring out which rules can be broken and which cannot. It can be a 
marathon, trying to get the business model right, while building competences and support. 
Therefore, organizations require perseverance and commitment if they are to be successful as 
industry shapers (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994). 
 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
So, how do executives believe they can best deal with the industry context? Do they suppose 
that they should concentrate on adapting to the dynamics in the industry, honing their ability 
to respond to changing demands and to adjust their business model to meet new 
requirements? Or do they believe that they should take a more proactive role in shaping the 
future of the industry, changing the rules of the competitive game to suit their own needs? 
 The main differences between the industry dynamics perspective and the industry 
leadership perspective have been summarized in table 9.1. An overview of the policy 
statements that can be derived from these two opposite perspectives is given in table 9.2. 
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These statements will be used again in chapter 14 to build the ‘strategy profiler’ measurement 
instrument.   
 
TABLE 9.1  
Industry dynamics versus industry leadership perspective 
 Industry Dynamics Perspective  Industry Leadership Perspective 
Emphasis on Compliance over choice Choice over compliance 
Industry development Uncontrollable evolutionary process Controllable creation process 
Change dynamics Environment selects fit firms Firm creates fitting environment 
Firm success due to Fitness to industry demands Manipulation of industry demands 
Ability to shape industry Low, slow High, fast 
Normative implication Play by the rules (adapt) Change the rules (innovate) 
Development path Convergence to dominant design Divergence, create new design  
Firm profitability Largely industry-dependent Largely firm-dependent 
  
 
 
TABLE 9.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
Industry Dynamics Perspective Industry Leadership Perspective 
13.1 Individual firms cannot shape industry developments. 14.1 
Developments in an industry can be strongly 
shaped by individual firms. 
13.2 
In a mature industry, it is very difficult to find 
a successful strategy that is radically 
different. 
14.2 
In a highly competitive industry, some 
individual firms can still make exceptional 
profits. 
13.3 
Wanting to be radically innovative can be 
costly and dangerous; a bit of conservatism 
can be a good thing. 
14.3 A firm can be highly profitable in any industry, as long as the firm has a good strategy. 
13.4 Long run success depends on a firm’s ability to follow the developments in its industry. 14.4 
For a firm, long run success depends on its 
ability to lead the developments in its 
industry. 
13.5 Firms should adapt to the demands placed on them by their surroundings. 14.5 
Firms should shape their surroundings to fit 
with their objectives. 
13.6 Firms should shift their resources out of mature industries. 14.6 
Firms should reject the notion that an 
industry is mature. 
13.7 
Constantly striving to revolutionize the 
industry will lead to above average 
profitability. 
14.7 
Constantly striving to revolutionize the 
industry is likely to lead to bankruptcy in the 
long run. 
13.8 Managers should not think they know better than the rest of the industry. 14.8 
Managers should not accept the current 
industry opinion as the truth. 
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13.9 
Firms should let others be the pioneers and 
only embrace business innovations once they 
seem likely to become successful. 
14.9 Firms should strive to be the initiators of radical innovations in their industry. 
13.10 Adapting to market changes is wiser than trying to shape the market yourself. 14.10 
Above average profitability is attained by 
firms that don’t adapt to the market, but 
actively shape the market. 
13.11 Generally it is better to be a second-mover in an industry than the innovative first-mover. 14.11 
Innovative first-movers are generally more 
profitable than firms that are second-movers. 
13.12 The room to be very innovative in a mature industry is severely limited. 14.12 
The room to be very innovative in a mature 
industry is enormous. 
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Chapter 10 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In organizations, just as in families, each new generation does not start from scratch, but 
inherits properties belonging to their predecessors. In families, a part of this inheritance is in 
the form of genetic properties, but other attributes are also passed down such as family 
traditions, myths, habits, connections, feuds, titles, and possessions. People might think of 
themselves as unique individuals, but to some degree they are an extension of the family line, 
and their behavior is influenced by this inheritance. In firms the same phenomenon is 
observable. New top executives may arrive on the scene, but they inherit a great deal from the 
previous generation. They inherit traditions and myths in the form of an organizational 
culture. Habits are passed along in the form of established organizational processes, while 
internal and external relationships and rivalries shape the political constellation in which new 
executives must function. They are also bequeathed the family jewels – brands, competences 
and other key resources. 
 In chapter 5 it was pointed out that such inheritance is often the source of 
organizational rigidity and inertia (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Rumelt, 1995). Inheritance 
limits organizational plasticity – the capacity of the organization to change shape. As such, 
organizational inheritance can partially predetermine a firm's future path of development – 
which is referred to as path dependency, or sometimes simply summed up as ‘history matters’ 
(e.g. Aldrich, 1999; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, it was concluded that for strategic 
renewal to take place, some inherited characteristics could be preserved, but others needed to 
be changed, either by evolutionary or revolutionary means. 
 What was not discussed in chapter 5 was who should trigger the required strategic 
changes. Who should initiate adaptations to the firm’s business system and who should take 
steps to reshape the organizational system? Typically, executives will have some role to play 
in all developments in the organizational context, but the question is what role. It is unlikely 
that any executive will have complete influence over all organizational developments, or 
would even want to exert absolute control. Inheritance and other organizational factors limit 
organizational malleability – the capacity of the organization to be shaped by someone. As 
such, executives need to determine what power they do have and where this power should be 
applied to achieve the best results. At the same time, executives will generally also look for 
opportunities to tap into the capabilities of other people in the firm to contribute to ongoing 
organizational adaptation.  
So, the question can be summarized as ‘what is the role of executives in achieving a 
new alignment with the environment and what input can be garnered from other 
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organizational members?’. This question is also referred to as the issue of organizational 
development and will be the central topic of further discussion in this chapter.   
 
10.2 THE ISSUE OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
When it comes to realizing organizational development, executives generally acknowledge 
that they have some type of leadership role to play. Leadership refers to the act of influencing 
the views and behaviors of organizational members with the intention of accomplishing a 
particular organizational aim (e.g. Selznick, 1957; Bass, 1990). Stated differently, leadership 
is the act of getting organizational members to follow. From this definition it can be 
concluded that not all executives are necessarily leaders, and not all leaders are necessarily 
executives. Executives, or managers, are individuals with a formal position in the 
organizational hierarchy, with associated authority and responsibilities. Leaders are 
individuals who have the ability to sway other people in the organization to get something 
done.  
 To be able to lead organizational developments, executives need power. Power is the 
capability to influence. They also need to know how to get power, and how and where to 
exert it. In the following sections, these three topics will be examined in more detailed. First, 
the sources of leadership influence will be described, followed by the levers of leadership 
influence. Finally, the arenas of leadership influence will be explored.   
 
10.2.1 Sources of Leadership Influence 
To lead means to use power to influence others. Leaders can derive their potential influence 
from two general sources – their position and their person (Etzioni, 1961). Position power 
comes from a leader’s formal function in the organization. Personal power is rooted in the 
specific character, knowledge, skills, and relationships of the leader. Executives always have 
some level of position power, but they do not necessarily have the personal power needed to 
get organizational members to follow them. These two main types of power can be further 
subdivided into the following categories (French and Raven, 1959):  
 
 Legitimate power. Legitimate power exists when a person has the formal authority to 
determine certain organizational behaviors and other employees agree to comply with this 
situation. Examples of legitimate power are the authority to assign work, spend money 
and demand information. 
 Coercive power. People have coercive power when they have the capability to punish or 
withhold rewards to achieve compliance. Examples of coercive power include giving a 
poor performance review, withholding a bonus and dismissing employees. 
 Reward power. Reward power is derived from the ability to offer something of value to a 
person in return for compliance. Examples of reward power include giving praise, 
awarding wage raises, and promoting employees. 
 Expert power. Expert power exists when organizational members are willing to comply 
because of a person’s superior knowledge or skills in an important area. Such expert 
power can be based on specific knowledge of functional areas (e.g. marketing, finance), 
technologies (e.g. pharmaceuticals, information technology), geographic areas (e.g. 
Southeast Asia, Florida) and/or businesses (e.g. mining, automotive).  
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 Referent power. When organizational members let themselves be influenced by a person’s 
charismatic appeal, this is called referent power. This personal attraction can be based on 
many attributes, such as likeableness, forcefulness, persuasiveness, visionary qualities 
and image of success.  
The first three types of power are largely determined by the organizational position of leaders 
and their willingness to exert them – coercive and reward capabilities without the credibility 
of use are not a viable source of power. The last two sources of power, expert and referent 
power, are largely personal in nature, and also more subjective. Whether someone is seen as 
an expert and therefore accorded a certain level of respect and influence depends strongly on 
the perceptions of the people being lead. Expert power can be made more tangible by wearing 
a white lab coat, putting three pens in your breast pocket or writing a book, but still perceived 
expertise will be in the eyes of the beholder. The same is true for referent power, as people do 
not find the same characteristics equally charismatic. What is forceful to one follower might 
seem pushy to someone else; what is visionary to one person might sound like the 
murmurings of a madman to others (e.g. Klein and House, 1998; Waldman and Yammarino, 
1999).  
In practice, leaders will employ a mix of all five types of power to achieve the 
influence they desire. However, leadership styles can differ greatly depending on the relative 
weight placed on the various sources of power within the mix. 
 
10.2.2 Levers of Leadership Influence 
The sources of power available to the leader need to be used to have influence. There are 
three generic ways for leaders to seek influence, each focused on a different point in the 
activities of the people being influenced. These levers of leadership influence are:  
 
 Throughput control. Leaders can focus their attention directly at the actions being taken 
by others in the organization. Throughput control implies getting involved hands-on in 
the activities of others, either by suggesting ways of working, engaging in a discussion on 
how things should be done, leading by example or simply by telling others what to do. 
This form of direct influence does require sufficiently detailed knowledge about the 
activities of others to be able to point out what should be done. 
 Output control. Instead of directly supervising how things should be done, leaders can set 
objectives that should be met. Output control implies reaching agreement on certain 
performance targets and then monitoring how well they are being lived up to. The targets 
can be quantitative or qualitative, financial or strategic, simple or complex, realistic or 
stretch-oriented. And they can be arrived at by mutual consent or imposed by the leader. 
The very act of setting objectives can have an important influence on people in the 
organization, but the ability to check ongoing performance and to link results with 
punishment and rewards can further improve a person’s impact.   
 Input control. Leaders can also chose to influence the general conditions under which 
activities are carried out. Input control implies shaping the circumstances preceding and 
surrounding the actual work. Before activities start a leader can influence who is assigned 
to a task, which teams are formed, who is hired, where they will work and in what type of 
environment. During the execution of activities the leader can supply physical and 
financial resources, mobilize relationships and provide support. Not unimportantly, the 
leader can also be a source of enthusiasm, inspiration, ambition, vision and mission. 
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Of these three, throughput control is the most direct in its impact and input control the least. 
However, throughput control offers the lowest leverage and input control the highest, 
allowing a leader to influence many people over a longer period of time, while leaving more 
room for organizational members to take on their own responsibilities as well. In practice, 
leaders can combine elements of all three of the above, although leadership styles differ 
greatly with regard to the specific mix. 
 
10.2.3 Arenas of Leadership Influence 
As leaders attempt to guide organizational development, there are three main organizational 
arenas where they need to direct their influence to achieve strategic changes. These three 
overlapping arenas are the parts in the organization most resistant to change – they are the 
subsystems of the firm where organizational inheritance creates its own momentum, resisting 
a shift into another direction (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman, Newman and 
Romanelli, 1986):  
 The political arena. While most top executives have considerable position power with 
which they can try to influence the strategic decision-making process within their 
organization, very few top executives can impose their strategic agenda on the 
organization without building widespread political support. Even the most autocratic 
CEO will need to gain the commitment and compliance of key figures within the 
organization to be able to successfully push through significant changes. In practice, 
however, there are not many organizations where the ‘officers and the troops’ 
unquestioningly follow the general into battle. Generally, power is more dispersed 
throughout organizations, with different people and units having different ideas and 
interests, as well as the assertiveness to pursue their own agenda. Ironically, the more 
leaders that are developed throughout the organization, the more complex it becomes for 
any one leader to get the entire organization to follow – broad leadership can easily 
become fragmented leadership, with a host of strong people all pointing in different 
directions. For top management to gain control of the organization they must therefore 
build coalitions of supporters, not only to get favorable strategic decisions made, but also 
to ensure acceptance and compliance during the period of implementation. Otherwise 
strategic plans will be half-heartedly executed, opposed or silently sabotaged. However, 
gaining the necessary political support in the organization can be very difficult if the 
strategic views and interests of powerful individuals and departments differ significantly. 
Cultural and personality clashes can add to the complexity. Yet, top executives cannot 
recoil from the political arena, for it is here that new strategic directions are set (e.g. 
Allison, 1969; Pfeffer, 1992). 
 The cultural arena. Intertwined with the process of gaining political influence in the 
organization, there is the process of gaining cultural influence. After all, to be able to 
change the organization, a leader must be able to change people’s beliefs and associated 
behavioral patterns. Yet, affecting cultural change is far from simple. A leader must be 
capable of questioning the shared values, ideas and habits prevalent in the organization, 
even though the leader has usually been immersed in the very same culture for years. 
Leaders must also offer an alternative worldview and set of behaviors to supersede the 
old. All of this requires exceptional skills as visionary – to develop a new image of a 
desired future state for the firm – and as missionary – to develop a new set of beliefs and 
values to guide the firm. Furthermore, the leader needs to be an excellent teacher to 
engage the organizational members in a learning process to adapt their beliefs, values and 
norms to the new circumstances. In practice, this means that leaders often have to ‘sell’ 
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their view of the new culture, using a mix of rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, 
symbolic actions, motivational incentives and subtle pressure (e.g. Senge, 1990; Ireland 
and Hitt, 1999).   
 The psychological arena. While leaders need to influence the political process and the 
cultural identity of the organization, attention also needs to be paid to the psychological 
needs of individuals. To affect organizational change, leaders must win both the hearts 
and minds of the members of the organization. People must be willing to, literally, 
‘follow the leader’ – preferably not passively, but actively, with commitment, courage 
and even passion (e.g. Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Kelley, 1988). To achieve such 
‘followership’, leaders must gain the respect and trust of their colleagues. Another 
important factor in winning people over is the ability to meet their emotional need for 
certainty, clarity and continuity, to offset the uncertainties, ambiguities and 
discontinuities surrounding them (e.g. Argyris, 1990; Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999).  
 
Even where political, cultural and psychological processes make the organization difficult to 
lead, executives might still be able to gain a certain level of control over their organizations. 
Yet, there will always remain aspects of the organizational system that executives cannot 
control, and should not even want to control, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
10.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN CONTROL AND CHAOS 
In general, executives like to be in control. Executives like to be able to shape their own 
future, and by extension, to shape the future of their firm. Executives do not shy away from 
power – they build their power base to be able to influence events and steer the development 
of their organization. In short, to be an executive is to have the desire to be in charge. 
 Yet, at the same time, most executives understand that their firms do not resemble 
machines, where one person can sit at the control panel and steer the entire system. 
Organizations are complex social systems, populated by numerous self-thinking human 
beings, each with their own feelings, ideas and interests. These people need to decide and act 
for themselves on a daily basis, without the direct intervention of the executive. They must be 
empowered to weigh situations, take initiatives, solve problems and grab opportunities. They 
must be given a certain measure of autonomy to experiment, do things differently and even 
constructively disagree with the executive. In other words, executives must also be willing to 
‘let go’ of some control for the organization to function at its best. 
 Moreover, executives must accept that in a complex system, like an organization, 
trying to control everything would be a futile endeavor. With so many people and so many 
interactions going on in a firm, any attempt to run the entire system top-down would be an 
impossible task. Therefore, letting go of some control is a pure necessity for normal 
organizational functioning.   
 This duality of wanting to control the development of the organization, while 
understanding that letting go of control is often beneficial, is the key strategic tension when 
dealing with the organizational context. On the one hand, executives must be willing to act as 
benevolent ‘philosopher kings’, autocratically imposing what they see as best on the 
company. On the other hand, executives must be willing to act as constitutional monarchs, 
democratically empowering organizational citizens to take their own responsibilities and 
behave more as entrepreneurs. The strategic tension arises from the fact that the need for top-
down imposition and bottom-up initiative are conflicting demands that are difficult for 
executives to meet at the same time. 
194
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
178 
 At the one side of this strategy tension is ‘control’. Control can be defined as the 
power to direct and impose order. At the other side of the tension is the need for ‘chaos’. 
Chaos can be defined as disorder or the lack of fixed organization.  
 The tension between control and chaos is a recurrent theme in the literature on 
strategy, organization, leadership and governance. In most writings the need for control is 
presented as a pressure for a directive leadership style and/or an autocratic governance 
system (e.g. Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958; Vroom and Jago, 1988). The need for chaos is 
presented as a pressure for a participative leadership style and/or a democratic governance 
system (e.g. Ackoff, 1980; Stacey, 1992). In the following section both control and chaos will 
be further examined. 
    
10.3.1 The Demand for Top Management Control 
A famous remark by the Greek historian Herodotus is that “of all men’s miseries the bitterest 
is this; to know so much and to have control over nothing”. How true indeed. Not only would 
it be a misery for the frustrated executives, who would be little more than mere administrators 
or caretakers. It would also be a misery for their organizations, which would need to 
constantly adjust course without a helmsman to guide the ship. Executives cannot afford to 
let their organizations drift on the existing momentum. It is an executive’s task and 
responsibility to ensure that the organization changes in accordance to the environment, so 
that the organizational purpose can still be achieved. 
 Top management cannot realize this objective without some level of control. They 
need to be able to direct developments in the organization. They need to have the power to 
make the necessary changes in the organizational structure, processes and culture, to realign 
the organization with the demands of the environment. This power, whether positional or 
personal, needs to be applied towards gaining sufficient support in the political arena, 
challenging existing beliefs and behaviors in the cultural arena, and winning the hearts and 
minds of the organizational members in the psychological arena.  
 The control that top management needs is different from the day-to-day control built 
in to the organizational structure and processes – they need strategic control as opposed to 
operational control. While operational control gives executives influence over activities 
within the current organizational system, strategic control gives executives influence over 
changes to the organizational system itself (e.g. Goold and Quinn, 1990; Simons, 1994). It is 
this power that executives require to be able to steer the development of their organization.  
 
10.3.2 The Demand for Organizational Chaos 
To executives the term ‘chaos’ sounds quite menacing – it carries connotations of rampant 
anarchy, total pandemonium and a hopeless mess. Yet, chaos only means disorder, coming 
from the Greek term for the unformed original state of the universe. In the organizational 
context chaos refers to situations of disorder, where phenomena have not yet been organized, 
or where parts of an organizational system have become ‘unfreezed’. In other words, 
something is chaotic if it is unformed or has become ‘disorganized’.  
While this still does not sound particularly appealing to most executives, it should, 
because a period of disorganization is often a prerequisite for strategic renewal. Unfreezing 
existing structures, processes, routines and beliefs, and opening people up to different 
possibilities might be inefficient in the short run, as well as making people feel 
uncomfortable, but it is usually necessary to provoke creativity and to invent new ways of 
seeing and doing things. By allowing experimentation, skunk works, pilot projects and out-
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of-the-ordinary initiatives, executives accept a certain amount of disorder in the organization, 
which they hope will pay off in terms of organizational innovations.    
 But the most appealing effect of chaos is that it encourages self-organization. To 
illustrate this phenomenon, one should first think back to the old Soviet ‘command 
economy’, which was based on the principle of control. It was believed that a rational, 
centrally planned economic system, with strong top-down leadership, would be the most 
efficient and effective way to organize industrial development. In the West, on the other 
hand, the ‘market economy’ was chaotic – no one was in control and could impose order. 
Everyone could go ahead and start a company. They could set their own production levels 
and even set their own prices! As entrepreneurs made use of the freedom offered to them, the 
economy ‘self-organized’ bottom-up. Instead of the ‘visible hand’ of the central planner 
controlling and regulating the economy, it was the ‘invisible hand’ of the market that has 
created relative order out of chaos. 
 As the market economy example illustrates, chaos does not necessarily lead to 
pandemonium, but can result in a self-regulating interplay of forces. A lack of top-down 
control frees the way for a rich diversity of bottom-up ventures. Executives who also want to 
release the energy, creativity and entrepreneurial potential pent up in their organizations must 
therefore be willing to let go and allow some chaos to exist. In this context, the role of top 
management is comparable to that of governments in market economies – creating suitable 
conditions, encouraging activities and enforcing basic rules.  
 
10.4 PERSPECTIVES ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
While the pressures for both control and chaos are clear, this does leave executives with the 
challenging question of how they must reconcile two opposite, and at least partially 
incompatible, demands. Gaining a considerable level of top management control over the 
development of the organization will to some extent be at odds with a policy of accepting, or 
even encouraging, organizational chaos. To control or not to control, that is the question. 
 And yet again executives should not hope to find widespread consensus in the 
strategic management literature on what the optimal answer is for dealing with these two 
conflicting pressures. For among strategy academics and business practitioners alike, 
opinions differ strongly with regard to the best balance between control and chaos. Although 
many writers do indicate that there may be different styles in dealing with the tension and that 
these different styles might be more effective under different circumstances (e.g. Strebel, 
1994; Vroom and Jago, 1988), most authors still exhibit a strong preference for a particular 
approach – which is duly called the ‘modern’ or ‘new’ style, or better yet, ‘21st century 
practices’ (Ireland and Hitt, 1999). 
 Following the dialectical method used in previous chapters, here the two diametrically 
opposed positions will be identified and discussed. On the one hand, there are those who 
argue that top executives should lead from the front. Top executives should dare to take on 
the responsibility of imposing a new strategic agenda on the organization and should be at the 
forefront in breaking away from organizational inheritance where necessary. This point of 
view, with its strong emphasis on control and leading top-down, will be referred to as the 
organizational leadership perspective. This view is also known as the strategic leadership 
perspective (e.g. Cannella and Monroe, 1997; Rowe, 2001), but to avoid confusion with the 
industry leadership perspective discussed in chapter 9, here the prefix ‘organizational’ is 
preferred. On the other hand, there are people who believe that executives rarely have the 
ability to shape their organizations at will, but rather that organizations develop according to 
their own dynamics. These strategists argue that in most organizations no one is really in 
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control and that executives should not focus their energy on attempting to imposed 
developments top-down, but rather focus on facilitating processes of self-organization. This 
point of view, with its strong emphasis on chaos and facilitating bottom-up processes, will be 
referred to as the organizational dynamics perspective. 
 
10.4.1 The Organizational Leadership Perspective 
To proponents of the organizational leadership perspective, top management can – and 
should – take charge of the organization. In their view, organizational inertia and a growing 
misfit between the organization and its environment are not an inevitable state of affairs, but 
result from a failure of leadership. Bureaucracy, organizational fiefdoms, hostile 
relationships, inflexible corporate cultures, rigid competences, and resistance to change – all 
of these organizational diseases exist, but they are not unavoidable facts of organizational 
life. ‘Healthy’ organizations guard against falling prey to such degenerative illnesses, and 
when symptoms do arise, it is a task of the leader to address them. If organizations do go ‘out 
of control’, it is because weak leadership has failed to deal with a creeping ailment. The fact 
that there are many sick, poorly controllable, companies does not mean that sickness should 
be accepted as the natural condition. 
 At the basis of the organizational leadership perspective lies the belief that if people in 
organizations are left to ‘sort things out’ by themselves, this will inevitable degenerate into a 
situation of strategic drift (see chapter 4). Without somebody to quell political infighting, set 
a clear strategic direction, force through tough decisions, and supervise disciplined 
implementation, the organization will get bogged down in protracted internal bickering. 
Without somebody to champion a new vision, rally the troops and lead from the front, the 
organization will never get its heavy mass in motion. Without somebody who radiates 
confidence and cajoles people into action, the organization will not be able to overcome its 
risk-averseness and conservatism. In short, leaders are needed to counteract the inherent 
inertia characteristic of human organization. 
 As organizational order and direction do not happen spontaneously, the ‘visible hand’ 
of management is indispensable for the proper functioning of the organization (e.g. Child, 
1972; Cyert, 1990). And this hand must be firm. Executives cannot afford to take a laissez 
faire attitude towards their task as leader – to lead means to get the organizational members 
to follow, and this is usually plain hard work (e.g. Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Kelley, 1988). To 
convince people in the organization to let themselves be led, executives cannot simply fall 
back on their position power. To be able to steer organizational developments executives 
need considerable personal power. To be successful, executives must be trusted, admired and 
respected. The forcefulness of their personality and the persuasiveness of their vision must be 
capable of capturing people’s attention and commitment. And as leaders, executives must 
also be politically agile, to build coalitions where necessary to get their way.  
Of course, not all executives have the qualities needed to be effective leaders – either 
by nature or nurture. Some theorists emphasize the importance of ‘nature’, arguing that 
executives require specific personality traits to be successful leaders (e.g. House and Aditya, 
1997; Tucker, 1968).  Yet, other theorists place more emphasis on ‘nurture’, arguing that 
most effective leadership behavior can be learned if enough effort is exerted (e.g. Kotter, 
1990; Nanus, 1992). Either way, the importance of having good leadership makes finding and 
developing new leaders one of the highest priorities of the existing top management team. 
 To proponents of the organizational leadership perspective, being a leader does not 
mean engaging in simple top-down, command-and-control management. There are 
circumstances where the CEO or the top management team design strategies in isolation and 
then impose them on the rest of the organization. This type of direct control is sometimes 
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necessary to push through reorganizations or to make major acquisitions. In other 
circumstances, however, the top executives can control organizational behavior more 
indirectly. Proposals can be allowed to emerge bottom-up, as long as top management retains 
its power to approve or terminate projects as soon as they become serious plans (e.g. 
Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Quinn, 1980). Some authors suggest that top management 
might even delegate some decision-making powers to lower level executives, but still control 
outcomes by setting clear goals, developing a conducive incentive system and fostering a 
particular culture (e.g. Senge, 1990; Tichy and Cohen, 1997). 
 What leaders should not do, however, is to relinquish control over the direction of the 
organization. The strategies do not have to be their own ideas, nor do they have to carry out 
everything themselves. But they should take upon themselves the responsibility for leading 
the organization in a certain direction and achieving results. If leaders let go of the helm, 
organizations will be set adrift, and will be carried by the prevailing winds and currents in 
directions unknown. Someone has to be in control of the organization, otherwise its behavior 
will be erratic. Leadership is needed to ensure that the best strategy is followed.  
 In conclusion, the organizational leadership perspective holds that the upper echelons 
of management can, and should, control the strategy process and by extension the strategy 
content. The CEO, or the top management team (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984), should have a grip on the organization's process of strategy 
formation and should be able to impose their will on the organization. Leaders should strive 
to overcome organizational inertia and adapt the organization to the strategic direction they 
intend. This type of controlled strategic behavior is what Chandler (1962) had in mind when 
he coined the aphorism structure follows strategy – the organizational structure should be 
adapted to the strategy intended by the decision-maker. In the organizational leadership 
perspective it would be more fitting to expand Chandler's maxim to organization follows 
strategy – all aspects of the company should be matched to the strategist's intentions. 
 
10.4.2 The Organizational Dynamics Perspective 
To proponents of the organizational dynamics perspective, such a heroic depiction of 
leadership is understandable, but usually more myth than reality. There might be a few great, 
wise, charismatic executives that rise to the apex of organizations, but unfortunately, all other 
organizations have to settle for regular mortals. Strong leaders are an exception, not the norm, 
and even their ability to mold the organization at will is highly exaggerated – good stories for 
best-selling (auto)biographies, but legend nevertheless (e.g. Chen and Meindl, 1991; Kets de 
Vries, 1994). Yet, the belief in the power of leadership is quite popular, among executives 
and the managed alike (e.g. Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985; Pfeffer, 1977). Executives 
like the idea that as leaders of an organization or organizational unit, they can make a 
difference. To most, ‘being in control’ is what management is all about. They have a 
penchant for attributing organizational results to their own efforts (e.g. Calder, 1977; Sims 
and Lorenzi, 1992). As for ‘the managed’, they too often ascribe organizational success or 
failure to the figurehead leader, whatever that person’s real influence has been – after all, 
they too like the idea that somebody is in control. In fact, both parties are subscribing to a 
seductively simple great person model of how organizations work. The implicit assumption 
is that an individual leader, by the strength of personality, can steer large groups of people, as 
a present-day Alexander the Great. 
 However seductive, this view of organizational functioning is rarely a satisfactory 
model. A top executive does not resemble a commander leading the troops into battle, but 
rather a diplomat trying to negotiate a peace. The top executive is not like a jockey riding a 
thoroughbred horse, but more like a cowboy herding mules. Organizations are complex social 
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systems, made up of many ‘stubborn individuals’ with their own ideas, interests, and agendas 
(e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Stacey, 1993). Strategy formation is therefore an 
inherently political process that leaders can only influence depending on their power base. 
The more dispersed the political power, the more difficult it is for a leader to control the 
organization's behavior. Even if leaders are granted, or acquire, significant political power to 
push through their favored measures, there may still be considerable resistance and guerilla 
activities. Political processes within organizations do not signify the derailment of strategic 
decision-making – politics is the normal state of affairs and few leaders have real control over 
these political dynamics.  
 Besides such political limitations, a top executive's ability to control the direction of a 
company is also severely constrained by the organization's culture. Social norms will have 
evolved, relationships will have been formed, aspirations will have taken root and cognitive 
maps will have been shaped. A leader cannot ignore the cultural legacy of the organization's 
history, as this will be deeply etched into the minds of the organization's members. Any top 
executive attempting to radically alter the direction of a company will find out that changing 
the underlying values, perceptions, beliefs and expectations is extremely difficult, if not next 
to impossible. As Weick (1979) puts it, an organization does not have a culture, it is a culture 
– shared values and norms are what make an organization. And just as it is difficult to change 
someone's identity, it is difficult to change an organization's culture (e.g. Schein, 1993; 
Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). Moreover, as most top executives rise through the ranks to the 
upper echelons, they themselves are a product of the existing organizational culture. 
Changing your own culture is like pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps – a great trick, 
too bad that nobody can do it. 
 In chapters 6 and 7, a related argument was put forward, as part of the resource-based 
view of the firm. One of the basic assumptions of the resource-based view is that building up 
competences is an arduous task, requiring a relatively long period of time. Learning is a slow 
process under the best of circumstances, but even more difficult if learning one thing means 
unlearning something else. The stronger the existing cognitive maps (knowledge), routines 
(capabilities) and disposition (attitude), the more challenging it is to ‘teach an old dog new 
tricks.’ The leader’s power to direct and speed up such processes, it was argued, is quite 
limited (e.g. Barney, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
 Taken together, the political, cultural and learning dynamics leave top executives with 
relatively little direct power over the system they want to steer. Generally, they can react to 
this limited ability to control in one of two basic ways – they can squeeze tighter or let go. 
Many executives go the first route, desperately trying to acquire more power, to gain a tighter 
grip on the organization, in the vain attempt to become the heroic leader of popular legend. 
Such a move to accumulate more power commonly results in actions to assert control, 
including stricter reporting structures, more disciplined accountability, harsher punishment 
for non-conformists and a shakeout among executives. In this manner, control comes to mean 
restriction, subordination or even subjugation. Yet, such a step towards authoritarian 
management will still not bring executives very much further towards having a lasting impact 
on organizational development. 
 The alternative route is for executives to accept that they cannot, but also should not, 
try to tightly control the organization. As they cannot really control organizational dynamics, 
all heavy-handed control approaches will have little more result than making the organization 
an unpleasant and oppressive place to work. If executives emphasize control, all they will do 
is run the risk of killing the organization’s ability to innovate and learn. Innovation and 
learning are very difficult to control, especially the business innovation and learning 
happening outside of R&D labs. Much of this innovation and learning is sparked by 
organizational members, out in the markets or on the work floor, by questioning the status 
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quo. New ideas often start ‘in the margins’ of the organization and grow due to the room 
granted to offbeat opinions. Fragile new initiatives often need to be championed by their 
owners lower down in the hierarchy and only survive if there is a tolerance for unintended 
‘misfits’ in the organization’s portfolio of activities. Only if employees have a certain 
measure of freedom and are willing to act as intrapreneurs, will learning and innovation be an 
integral part of the organization’s functioning (e.g. Amabile, 1998; Quinn, 1985).   
 In other words, if executives move beyond their instinctive desire for control and 
recognize the creative and entrepreneurial potential of self-organization, they will not bemoan 
their lack of control. They will see that a certain level of organizational chaos can create the 
conditions for development (e.g. Levy, 1994; Stacey, 1993). According to the organizational 
dynamics perspective, the task for executives is to use their limited powers to facilitate self-
organization (e.g. Beinhocker, 1999; Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1996). Executives can 
encourage empowerment, stimulate learning and innovation, bring people together, take away 
bureaucratic hurdles – all very much like the approach by most governments in market 
economies, who try to establish conditions conducive to entrepreneurial behavior, instead of 
trying to control economic activity. Executives’ most important task is to ensure that the 
‘invisible hand of self-organization’ functions properly, and does not lead to ‘out-of-hand 
disorganization’.  
So, does the executive matter? Yes, but in a different sense than is usually assumed. 
The executive cannot shape the organization, it shapes itself. Organizational developments 
are the result of complex internal dynamics, which can be summarized as strategy follows 
organization, instead of the other way around. Executives can facilitate processes of self-
organization and thus indirectly influence the direction of development, but at the same time 
executives are also shaped by the organization they are in. 
 
TABLE 10.1  
Organizational leadership versus organizational dynamics perspective 
 
 Organizational Leadership Organizational Dynamics 
Emphasis on Control over chaos Chaos over control 
Organization development Controllable creation process Uncontrollable evolutionary process 
Development metaphor The visible hand The invisible hand 
Development direction  Top-down, imposed organization  Bottom-up, self-organization  
Decision-making Authoritarian (rule of the few) Democratic (rule of the many) 
Change process  Leader shapes new behavior  New behavior emerges from interaction 
Change determinants Leader's vision and skill Political, cultural and learning dynamics 
Organizational malleability High, fast  Low, slow 
Development driver Organization follows strategy Strategy follows organization 
Normative implication Strategize, then organize Strategizing and organizing intertwined 
  
 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
So, how do executives believe that organizational development should be encouraged? Do 
they believe that the top management of a firm can shape the organization to fit with their 
intended strategy or do they suppose that the organizational context largely determines the 
strategy that is actually followed? And do they assume that top management should strive to 
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have a tight grip on the organization, or is it their view that executives should leave plenty of 
room for self-organization?  
 The main differences between the organizational leadership perspective and the 
organizational dynamics perspective have been summarized in table 10.1. These two 
perspectives will form the poles of the organizational context dimension. In table 10.2 the 
two perspectives have been translated into two sets of 12 policy statements that will be used 
in the strategy profile instrument in chapter 14. 
 
TABLE 10.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
Organizational Leadership Perspective Organizational Dynamics Perspective 
15.1 Top management can fully control the outcome of organizational change processes. 16.1 
Top management cannot control the outcome 
of organizational change processes. 
15.2 
The ability of top management to impose a 
new way of working is the key to successful 
organizational change. 
16.2 
Building a strong coalition of managers 
willing to support a new way of working is key 
to successful organizational change. 
15.3 The culture of an organization can be shaped by top management. 16.3 
The culture of an organization is largely 
beyond the control of top management. 
15.4 Firms should have strong top-down leadership, with centralized power. 16.4 
Bottom-up involvement in strategy 
development builds essential wide-spread 
support and commitment. 
15.5 Strategy is the responsibility of top management. 16.5 
Strategy is the responsibility of all 
organizational members. 
15.6 
Top management should formulate strategic 
initiatives, for lower level managers to 
implement. 
16.6 
Top management should create the 
conditions for strategic initiatives to emerge 
from lower levels in the organization. 
15.7 
Top managers should tell their subordinate 
managers which strategic actions need to be 
taken. 
16.7 
Top managers should encourage middle 
managers to participate in setting the 
strategic direction of the firm. 
15.8 Firms can only be successful if they have a strongly directive leader. 16.8 
Firms can be successful without a strong 
central leader. 
15.9 
Top management should come up with 
strategies and to get everyone to move in 
that direction. 
16.9 
Good leaders make themselves redundant, 
building organizations that can be successful 
even after the leader is gone. 
15.10 Top-down strategy-making works best. 16.10 Bottom-up involvement in strategy formulation and implementation works best. 
15.11 A new CEO can make all the difference between corporate success and failure. 16.11 
Good leaders motivate middle managers to 
think strategically and to develop new 
strategic initiatives themselves. 
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15.12 
When it comes to changing strategic 
direction, firms need the strong hand of a 
powerful leader.   
16.12 Wise top managers leave considerable room for creative chaos in an organization. 
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Chapter 11 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As firms move out of their domestic market on to the international stage, they are faced with 
differing business arenas. The nations they expand to can vary with regard to consumer 
behavior, language, legal system, technological infrastructure, business culture, educational 
system, labor relations, political ideology, distribution structures and fiscal regime, to name 
just a few. At face value, the plurality of the international context can seem daunting. Yet, the 
question is how important the international differences are for firms operating across borders. 
Do firms need to adapt to the international diversity encountered, or can they find ways of 
overcoming the constraints imposed by distinct national systems, structures, and behaviors? 
This matter of understanding and dealing with international variety is one of the key topics 
for executives operating across borders. 
A second question with regard to the international context is that of international 
linkages – to what extent do events in one country have an impact on what happens in other 
countries? When a number of nations are tightly linked to one another in a particular area, 
this is referred to as a case of international integration. If, on the other hand, there are very 
weak links between developments in one country and developments elsewhere, this is 
referred to as a situation of international fragmentation. The question for executives is how 
tightly linked nations around the world actually are. Countries might be quite different, yet 
developments in one nation might significantly influence developments elsewhere. For 
instance, if interest rates rise in the United States, central bankers in most other countries 
cannot ignore this. If the price of oil goes down on the spot market in Rotterdam, this will 
have a ‘spill over effect’ towards most other nations. And if a breakthrough chip technology 
is developed in Taiwan, this will send a shockwave through the computer industry around the 
world. If nations are highly integrated, the executive must view all countries as part of the 
same system – as squares on a chessboard, not to be judged in isolation. 
 When looking at the subjects of international variety and linkages, it is also important 
to know in which direction they have been moving, and will develop further, over time. 
Where a development towards lower international variety and tighter international linkages 
on a worldwide scale can be witnessed, a process of globalization is at play. Where a 
movement towards more international variety and a loosening of international linkages is 
apparent, a process of localization is taking place.  
 For executives operating in more than one nation, it is vital to understand the nature of 
the international context. Have their businesses been globalizing or localizing, and what can 
be expected in future? Answers to these questions guide strategizing executives in choosing 
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which countries to be active in and how to manage their activities across borders. Taken 
together, these international context questions constitute the issue of international 
configuration. What executives believe about managing the international configuration of 
firms will be the focus of the further discussion in this chapter.  
 
 
11.2 THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFIGURATION 
 
How a firm configures its activities across borders is largely dependent on how it deals with 
the fundamental tension between the opposite demands of globalization and localization. To 
understand these forces, pulling the organization in contrary directions, it is first necessary to 
further define them. Globalization and localization are terms used by many, but explained by 
few. This lack of uniform definition often leads to an unfocused debate, as different people 
employ the same terms, but actually refer to different phenomena. Therefore, this discussion 
will start with a clarification of the concepts of globalization and localization. Subsequently, 
attention will turn to the two central questions facing the international executive: Which 
countries should the firm be active in and how should this array of international activities be 
managed? This first question, of deciding on which geographic areas the organization should 
be involved in, is the issue of international composition. The second question, of deciding on 
the organizational structure and systems needed to run the multi-country activities, is the 
issue of international management.    
 
11.2.1 Dimensions of Globalization 
Clearly, globalization refers to the process of becoming more global. But what is global? 
Although there is no agreement on a single definition, most writers use the term to refer to 
one or more of the following elements (see figure 11.1): 
 Worldwide scope. ‘Global’ can simply be used as a geographic term. A firm with 
operations around the world can be labeled a global company, to distinguish it from firms 
that are local (not international) or regional in scope. In such a case, the term ‘global’ is 
primarily intended to describe the spatial dimension – the broadest possible international 
scope is to be global. When this definition of global is employed, globalization is the 
process of international expansion on a worldwide scale (e.g. Patel and Pavitt, 1991).  
 Worldwide similarity. ‘Global’ can also refer to homogeneity around the world. For 
instance, if a company decides to sell the same product in all of its international markets, 
it is often referred to as a global product, as opposed to a locally tailored product. In such 
a case, the term ‘global’ is primarily intended to describe the variance dimension – the 
ultimate level of worldwide similarity is to be global. When this definition of global is 
employed, globalization is the process of declining international variety (e.g. Levitt, 
1983). 
 Worldwide integration. ‘Global’ can also refer to the world as one tightly linked system. 
For instance, a global market can be said to exist if events in one country are significantly 
impacted by events in other geographic markets. This as opposed to local markets, where 
price levels, competition, demand and fashions are hardly influenced by developments in 
other nations. In such a case, the term ‘global’ is primarily intended to describe the 
linkages dimension – the ultimate level of worldwide integration is to be global. When 
this definition of global is employed, globalization is the process of increasing 
international interconnectedness (e.g. Porter, 1986). 
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FIGURE 11.1 
Internationalization and globalization of the firm  
 
Globalization as 
increasing worldwide scope
Internationalization as 
increasing international scope
Globalization as 
increasing worldwide similarity
Globalization as 
increasing worldwide integration
 
So, is for example McDonald's a global company? That depends along which of the above 
three dimensions the company is measured. When judging the international scope of 
McDonald's, it can be seen that the company is globalizing, but far from global. The company 
operates in approximately half the countries in the world, but in many of these only in one or 
a few large cities. Of McDonald's worldwide revenues, more than half is still earned in the 
United States. This predominance of the home country is even stronger if the composition of 
the company's top management is looked at (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). However, when 
judging McDonald's along the dimension of international similarity, it is simple to observe 
that the company is relatively global, as it takes a highly standardized approach to most 
markets around the world. Although, it should be noted that on some aspects as menu and 
interior design there is leeway for local adaptation. Finally, when judging McDonald's along 
the dimension of international integration, the company is only slightly global, as it is not 
very tightly linked around the world. Some activities are centralized or coordinated, but in 
general there is relatively little need for concerted action.  
 As for localization, as the opposite process of globalization, it is characterized by 
decreasing international scope, similarity and integration. From the angle of international 
strategy the most extreme form of localness is when firms operate in one country and there is 
no similarity or integration between countries (e.g. the hairdressing and driving school 
businesses). However, this equates local with national, while firms and businesses can be 
even more local, all the way down to the state/province/department/district and municipal 
playing fields  
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11.2.2 Levels of Globalization 
The second factor complicating a clear understanding of the concept of globalization is that it 
is applied to a variety of subjects, while the differences are often not made explicit. Some 
people discuss globalization as a development in the economy at large, while others debate 
globalization as something happening to industries, markets, products, technologies, fashions, 
production, competition and organizations. In general, debates on globalization tend to 
concentrate on one of three levels of analysis:  
 Globalization of companies. Some authors focus on the micro level, debating whether 
individual companies are becoming more global. Issues are the extent to which firms have 
a global strategy, structure, culture, workforce, management team and resource base. In 
more detail, the globalization of specific products and value-adding activities is often 
discussed. Here it is of particular importance to acknowledge that the globalization of one 
product or activity (e.g. marketing) does not necessarily entail the globalization of all 
others (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987). 
 Globalization of businesses. Other authors are more concerned with the meso level, 
debating whether particular businesses are becoming more global. Here it is important to 
distinguish those who emphasize the globalization of markets, as opposed to those 
accentuating the globalization of industries. The issue of globalizing markets has to do 
with the growing similarity of worldwide customer demand and the growing ease of 
worldwide product flows (e.g. Levitt, 1983; Douglas and Wind, 1987). For example, the 
crude oil and foreign currency markets are truly global – the same commodities are traded 
at the same rates around the world. The markets for accountancy and garbage collection 
services, on the other hand, are very local – demand differs significantly, there is little 
cross-border trade and consequently prices vary sharply. The globalization of industries is 
quite a different issue, as it has to do with the emergence of a set of producers that 
compete with one another on a worldwide scale (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Porter, 
1990). So, for instance, the automobile and consumer electronics industries are quite 
global – the major players in most countries belong to the same set of companies that 
compete against each other all around the world. Even the accountancy industry is 
relatively global, even though the markets for accountancy services are very local. On the 
other hand, the hairdressing and retail banking industries are very local – the competitive 
scene in each country is relatively uninfluenced by competitive developments elsewhere. 
 Globalization of economies. Yet other authors take a macro level of analysis, arguing 
whether or not the world’s economies in general are experiencing a convergence trend. 
Many authors are interested in the macroeconomic dynamics of international integration 
and its consequences in terms of growth, employment, inflation, productivity, trade and 
foreign direct investment (e.g. Kay, 1989; Krugman, 1990). Others focus more on the 
political realities constraining and encouraging globalization (e.g. Klein, 2000; McGrew 
et al., 1992). Yet others are interested in the underlying dynamics of technological, 
institutional and organizational convergence (e.g. Dunning, 1986; Kogut, 1993).  
 
Ultimately, the question in this chapter is not only whether executives believe that 
economies, businesses and companies are actually globalizing, but also whether they believe 
that they can influence these developments. In other words, is global convergence or 
continued international diversity an uncontrollable evolutionary development to which firms 
(and governments) must comply, or can executives actively influence the globalization or 
localization of their environment? 
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11.2.3 International Composition 
An international firm operates in two or more countries. When a firm starts up value adding 
activities in yet another country, this process is called internationalization. In figure 11.2 an 
overview is presented of the most common forms of internationalization. One of the earliest 
international growth moves undertaken by firms is to sell their products to foreign buyers, 
either directly (internet or telephone sales), through a traveling salesperson, or via a local 
agent or distributor. Such types of export activities are generally less taxing for the 
organization than the establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary (or sales unit). Serving a 
foreign market by means of a sales subsidiary often requires a higher level of investment in 
terms of marketing expenditures, sales force development and after-sales service provision.  
A firm can also set up a foreign production subsidiary (or ‘off-shore’ production unit), whose 
activities are focused on manufacturing goods to be exported back to the firm’s other 
markets. Alternatively, a firm can begin an integrated foreign subsidiary that is responsible 
for a full range of value adding activities, including production and sales. In practice, there 
are many variations to these basic forms of internationalization, depending on the specific 
value adding activities carried out in different countries. For example, some subsidiaries have 
R&D, assembly and marketing their portfolio of activities, while others do not (Birkenshaw 
and Hood, 1998).  
 When establishing a foreign subsidiary the internationalizing firm must decide 
whether to purchase an existing local company (entry by acquisition) or to start from scratch 
(greenfield entry). In both cases the firm can work independently or by means of a joint 
venture with a local player or foreign partner. It is also possible to dispense with the 
establishment of a subsidiary at all, by networking with local manufacturers, assemblers, 
sales agents and distributors (as discussed in chapter 8).   
 
FIGURE 11.2 
International growth options  
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The issue of international composition deals with the question of where the firm wants to 
have a certain level of involvement. The firm’s strategists must decide where to allocate 
resources, build up activities and try to achieve results. The issue of international composition 
can be further subdivided into two parts: 
 
 International scope. The international composition of the firm depends first of all on the 
countries selected to do business in. The geographic spectrum covered by the firm is 
referred to as its international scope. The firm’s strategists must decide how many 
countries they want to be active in, and which countries these should be.   
 International distribution. The international composition of the firm also depends on how 
it has distributed its value adding activities across the countries selected. In some firms all 
national subsidiaries carry out similar activities and are of comparable size. However, in 
many firms activities are distributed less symmetrically, with, for example, production, 
R&D and marketing concentrated in only a few countries (Porter, 1986). Commonly 
some countries will also contribute much more revenue and profits than others, but these 
might not be the countries where new investments can best be made. It is the task of the 
firm’s strategists to determine how activities can best be distributed and how resources 
can best be allocated across the various countries.       
 
Just as a corporation’s portfolio of businesses could be visualized by means of a portfolio 
grid, so too can a business’s portfolio of foreign sales markets be displayed using such a 
matrix. In figure 11.3 a fictitious example is given of a firm’s international sales portfolio 
using the GE business screen as analysis tool. Instead of industry attractiveness along the 
vertical axis, country attractiveness is used, calculating in such as market growth, competitive 
intensity, buyer power, customer loyalty, government regulation and operating costs. 
Following a similar logic, firms can also evaluate their international portfolios of, for 
instance, production locations and R&D facilities. 
Deciding which portfolio of countries to be active in, both in terms of international 
scope and distribution, will largely depend on the strategic motives that have stimulated the 
firm to enter the international arena in the first place. After all, there must be some good 
reasons why a firm is willing to disregard the growth opportunities in its home market and to 
enter into uncertain foreign adventures. There must be some advantages to being international 
that offset the disadvantages of foreignness and distance. These advantages of having 
activities in two or more countries – cross-border synergies – will be discussed in more detail, 
after an account of the second international configuration question, the issue of international 
management.  
 
11.2.4 International Management 
A firm operating in two or more countries needs to find some way of organizing itself to deal 
with its border-spanning nature. As managing across borders is difficult and costly, the 
simplest solution would be to organize all operations on a country-by-country basis, and to 
leave all country units as autonomous as possible. Yet, internationalization is only 
economically rational if ‘the international whole is more than the sum of the country parts’ 
(see chapter 7). In other words, internationalization only makes sense if enough cross-border 
synergies can be reaped to offset the extra cost of foreignness and distance. 
 Therefore, the firm needs to have international integration mechanisms to facilitate 
the realization of cross-border synergies. The three most important integration mechanisms 
used in international management are: 
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FIGURE 11.3  
Example of foreign sales market portfolio 
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 Standardization. An easy way to reap cross-border synergies is to do the same thing in 
each country, without any costly adaptation. Such standardization can be applied to all 
aspects of the business model (see chapter 5) – the product offerings, value-adding 
activities and resources employed. Standardization is particularly important for achieving 
economies of scale (e.g. Hout, Porter and Rudden, 1982; Levitt, 1983), but can be equally 
valuable for serving border-crossing clients who want to encounter a predictable offering 
(e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1985; Yip, 1993).  
 Coordination. Instead of standardizing products or activities, international firms can also 
align their varied activities in different countries by means of cross-border coordination. 
Getting the activities in the various countries aligned is often inspired by the need to serve 
border-crossing clients in a coordinated manner (e.g. global service level agreements), or 
to counter these clients policy of playing off the firm’s subsidiaries against one another 
(e.g. cross-border price shopping). International coordination can be valuable when 
responding to, or attacking, competitors as well. A coordinated assault on a few markets, 
financed by the profits from many markets (i.e. cross-subsidization), can sometimes lead 
to competitive success (Prahalad and Doz, 1987).  
 Centralization. Of course, activities within the firm can also be integrated at one central 
location, either in the firm’s home country or elsewhere. Such centralization is often 
motivated by the drive for economies of scale (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1985; Dunning, 
1981), but might be due to the competitive advantage of a particular country as well. For 
example, production costs might be much lower, or quality much higher, in a certain part 
of the world, making it a logical location for centralized production. Centralization of 
knowledge intensive activities is sometimes also needed, to guard quality or to ensure 
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faster learning than could be attained with decentralized activities (e.g. Porter, 1990; 
Dunning, 1993).  
 
It is up to the firm’s strategists to determine the most appropriate level of standardization, 
coordination and centralization, needed to function efficiently and effectively in an 
international context. The level chosen for each of these three characteristics will largely 
determine the organizational model adopted by the international firm.  
In their seminal research, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) distinguish four generic 
organizational models for international firms, each with its own mix of standardization, 
coordination and centralization (see figure 11.4):    
FIGURE 11.4  
Generic organizational models for international firms  
(adapted from Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1995) 
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 Decentralized federation. In a decentralized federation, the firm is organized along 
geographic lines, with each full-scale country subsidiary largely self-sufficient and 
autonomous from international headquarters in the home country. Few activities are 
centralized and little is coordinated across borders. The level of standardization is also 
low, as the country unit is free to adapt itself to the specific circumstances in its national 
environment. Bartlett and Ghoshal refer to this organizational model as multinational. 
Another common label is multi-domestic (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Stopford and 
Wells, 1972).  
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 Coordinated federation. In a coordinated federation, the firm is also organized along 
geographic lines, but the country subsidiaries have a closer relationship with the 
international headquarters in the home country. Most of the core competences, 
technologies, processes and products are developed centrally, while other activities are 
carried out locally. As a consequence, there is some standardization and coordination, 
requiring some formalized control systems (i.e. planning, budgeting, administration). 
Another name employed by Bartlett and Ghoshal to refer to this organizational model is 
international. 
 Centralized hub. In a centralized hub, national units are relatively unimportant, as all 
main activities are carried out in the home country. Generally a highly standardized 
approach is used towards all foreign markets. As centralization and standardization are 
high, foreign subsidiaries are limited to implementing headquarters’ policies in the local 
markets. Coordination of activities across countries is made easy by the dominance of 
headquarters. Bartlett and Ghoshal use the term global to describe this organizational 
model. 
 Integrated network. In an integrated network, the country subsidiaries have a close 
relationship with international headquarters, just as in the coordinated federation, but also 
have a close relationship with each other. Very little is centralized at the international 
headquarters in the home country, but each national unit can become the worldwide 
center for a particular competence, technology, process or product. Thus subsidiaries need 
to coordinate the flow of components, products, knowledge and people between each 
other. Such a networked organization requires a certain level of standardization to 
function effectively. Another name used by Bartlett and Ghoshal for this organizational 
model is transnational. Which international organizational model is adopted depends 
strongly on what the corporate strategist believes and wishes to achieve. The preferred 
international management structure will be largely determined by the type of cross-border 
synergies that the strategists envisage. This topic of multi-country synergies will be 
examined more closely in the following section.   
 
 
11.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND LOCALIZATION  
 
It requires almost no argumentation that internationally operating companies are faced with a 
tension between treating the world as one market and acknowledging national differences. 
During the last few decades, achieving a balance between international uniformity and 
meeting local demands has been the dominant theme in the literature on international 
management. All researchers have recognized the tension between international 
standardization and local adaptation. The key question has been whether international firms 
have the liberty to standardize or face the pressure to adapt. 
 However, since the mid-1980s, this standardization-adaptation discussion has 
progressed significantly, as strategy researchers have moved beyond the organizational 
design question, seeking the underlying strategic motives for standardization and adaptation 
(e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Porter, 1986; Prahalad and Doz, 1987). It has been 
acknowledged that international standardization is not a matter of organizational convenience 
that companies naturally revert to when the market does not demand local adaptation. Rather, 
international standardization is a means for achieving cross-border synergies. A firm can 
achieve cross-border synergies by leveraging resources, integrating activities and aligning 
product offerings across two or more countries. Creating additional value in this way is the 
very raison d’etre of the international firm. If internationalizing companies would fully adapt 
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to local conditions, without leveraging a homegrown quality, they would have no advantage 
over local firms, while they would be burdened by the extra costs of international business 
(e.g. overcoming distance and foreignness). Therefore, international companies need to 
realize at least enough cross-border synergies to compensate for the additional expenses of 
operating in multiple countries. 
 Much of the theoretical discourse has focused on the question which cross-border 
synergies can be achieved on the ultimate, global, scale. Most researchers identify various 
potential opportunities for worldwide synergy, yet recognize the simultaneous demands to 
meet the specific conditions in each local market (e.g. Dicken, 1992; Yip, 1993). These 
possibilities for reaping global synergy will be examined first, followed by the countervailing 
pressures for local responsiveness.  
 
11.3.1 The Demand for Global Synergy 
Striving for cross-border synergies on as large a scale as possible can be an opportunity for an 
international firm to enhance its competitive advantage. However, realizing global synergies 
is often less an opportunity than a competitive demand. If rival firms have already 
successfully implemented a global strategy, there can be a severe pressure to also reap the 
benefits of globalization through standardization, coordination and/or centralization.    
 There are many different types of cross-border synergies. In accordance with the 
business model framework described in chapter 6, these synergies can be organized into three 
categories: aligning product offerings, integrating activities and leveraging resources (see 
figure 11.5). 
Synergy by Aligning Positions  
The first way to create cross-border synergies is to align market positions in the various 
countries in which the firm operates. Taking a coordinated approach to different national 
markets can be necessary under two circumstances, namely to offer a concerted cross-border 
product offering to customers and to stage a concerted cross-border attack on competitors: 
 
 Dealing with cross-border customers. An international firm is ideally placed to offer 
border-crossing customers an internationally coordinated product and/or service offering. 
Whether it is for a tourist who wants to have the same hotel arrangements around the 
world, or for an advertiser who wants to stage a globally coordinated new product 
introduction, it can be important to have a standardized and coordinated offering across 
various nations. It might be equally necessary to counter the tactics of customers 
shopping around various national subsidiaries for the best deals, or to meet the customer’s 
demand to aggregate all global buying via one central account.  
 Dealing with cross-border competition. An international firm is also in an ideal position 
to successfully attack locally oriented rivals, if it does not spread its resources too thinly 
around the world, but rather focuses on only a few countries at a time. By coordinating its 
competitive efforts and bringing its global power to bear on a few national markets, an 
international firm can push back or even defeat local rivals country-by-country. Of 
course, an international company must have the capability of defending itself against such 
a globally coordinated attack by a rival international firm as well. 
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FIGURE 11.5  
Forms of cross-border synergies 
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Synergy by Integrating Activities  
Cross-border synergies can also be achieved by linking the activity systems of the firm in its 
various national markets. Integrating the value creation processes across borders can be 
useful to realize economies of scale and to make use of the specific competitive advantages 
of each nation:  
 
 Reaping scale advantages. Instead of organizing the international firm’s activity system 
on a country-by-country basis, certain activities can be pooled to reap economies of scale. 
Commonly this means that activities must be centralized at one or a few locations, and 
that a certain level of product and/or process standardization must be accepted. 
Economies of scale can be realized for many activities, most notably production, 
logistics, procurement and R&D. However, scale advantages might be possible for all 
activities of the firm. Although scale advantages are often pursued by means of 
centralization, it is often possible to achieve economies by standardizing and coordinating 
activities across borders (e.g. joint procurement, joint marketing campaigns).  
 Reaping location advantages. For some activities certain locations are much more suited 
than others, making it attractive to centralize these activities in the countries that possess 
a particular competitive advantage. A national competitive advantage can consist of 
inexpensive or specialist local inputs, such as raw materials, energy, physical 
infrastructure, or human resources, but can also be due to the presence of attractive buyers 
and related industries (Porter, 1990). 
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Synergy by Leveraging Resources  
A third manner in which cross-border synergies can be realized is by sharing resources across 
national markets. Such resource leveraging can be achieved by physically reallocating 
resources to other countries where they can be used more productively, or by replicating them 
so they can be used in many national markets simultaneously:  
 
 Achieving resource reallocation. Instead of leaving resources in countries where they 
happen to be, international firms have the opportunity to transfer resources to other 
locations, where they can be used to more benefit. For example, money, machinery and 
people can be reallocated out of countries where the return on these resources is low, into 
countries where they can reap a higher return. Executives specializing in market 
development might be sent to new subsidiaries, while older machinery might be 
transferred to less advanced markets (Vernon, 1966; Buckley and Casson, 1976).  
 Achieving resource replication. While leveraging tangible resources requires physical 
reallocation or sharing (see reaping scale advantages), intangible resources can be 
leveraged by means of replication. Intangibles such as knowledge and capabilities can be 
copied across borders and reused in another country. This allows international companies 
to leverage their know-how with regard to such aspects as technology, production, 
marketing, logistics and sales (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Liebeskind, 1996). 
For all of these cross-border synergies it holds that the wider the geographic scope, the 
greater the potential benefit. Where possible, realizing these synergies on a global scale 
would result in the highest level of value creation.  
These opportunities for global synergy represent a strong demand on all companies, 
both international and domestic. If a company can reap these synergies more quickly and 
successfully than its competitors, this could result in a strong offensive advantage. If other 
companies have a head start in capturing these global synergies, the firm must move quickly 
to catch up. Either way, there is a pressure on companies to seek out opportunities for global 
synergy and to turn them to their advantage. 
 
11.3.2 The Demand for Local Responsiveness 
Yet the pressure to pursue global synergies is only half the equation. Simultaneously, 
companies must remain attuned to the specific demands of each national market and retain 
the ability to respond to these particular characteristics in a timely and adequate manner. In 
other words, firms must have the capability to be responsive to local conditions. If they lose 
touch with the distinct competitive dynamics in each of their national markets, they might 
find themselves at a competitive disadvantage compared to more responsive rivals. 
 While business responsiveness is always important, it becomes all the more pressing 
when the differences between various national markets are large. The more dissimilar the 
national markets, the more pressure on the international firm to be attuned to these distinct 
characteristics. The most important differences between countries include: 
  
 Differences in market structure. Countries can differ significantly with regard to their 
competitive landscape. For example, in some national markets there are strong local 
competitors, requiring the international firm to respond differently than in countries 
where it encounters its ‘regular’ international rivals. Another difference is that in some 
countries there are only a few market parties, while in other countries the market is highly 
fragmented among numerous competitors. There can also be large differences from 
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country to country in the background of competitors – in some countries conglomerates 
dominate the business scene, while in other countries single business competitors are 
more frequent.  
 Differences in customer needs. Customers in each national market can have needs that are 
significantly different than the needs exhibited in other countries. The nature of these 
customer differences can vary from divergent cultural expectations and use 
circumstances, to incompatible technical systems and languages employed. 
 Differences in buying behavior. Not only the customers' needs can differ across countries, 
but so can their buying behavior. For example, customers can be different with regard to 
the way they structure buying decisions, the types of information they consider, and the 
relationship they wish to have with their suppliers. 
 Differences in substitutes. National markets can also differ with regard to the types of 
indirect competition that needs to be faced. In some countries, for instance, beer brewers 
have to deal with wine as an important rival product, while in other markets tea or soft 
drinks might be the most threatening substitutes. 
 Differences in distribution channels. Countries can exhibit remarkable differences in the 
way their distribution channels work. For example, countries can vary with regard to the 
kinds of distribution channels available, the number of layers in the distribution structure, 
their level of sophistication, their degree of concentration and the negotiation power of 
each player. 
 Differences in media structure. National markets can have very different media channels 
available for marketing communication purposes. In the area of television, for instance, 
countries vary widely with regard to the number of stations in the air (or on the cable), the 
types of regulation imposed, the amount of commercial time available, and its cost and 
effectiveness. In the same way, all other media channels may differ. 
 Differences in infrastructure. Many products and services are heavily dependent on the 
type of infrastructure available in a country. For example, some products rely on a digital 
telephone system, high-speed motorways, 24-hour convenience stores, or a national 
health care system. Some services require an efficient postal service, poor public 
transport, electronic banking, or cable television.  
 Differences in supply structure. If a company has local operations, the differences 
between countries with regard to their supply structures can also force the company to be 
more locally responsive. Not only the availability, quality and price of raw materials and 
components can vary widely between countries, but the same is true for other inputs such 
as labor, management, capital, facilities, machinery, research, information and services. 
 Differences in government regulations. As most government regulations are made on a 
country-by-country basis, they can differ significantly. Government regulations can affect 
almost every aspect of a company's operations, as they range from antitrust and product 
liability legislation, to labor laws and taxation rules.  
 
Responsiveness to these local differences is not only a matter of adaptation. Simple 
adaptation can be reactive and slow. Being responsive means that the firm has to have the 
ability to be proactive and fast. As each market develops in a different way and at a different 
pace, the international firm needs to be able to respond quickly and adequately to remain in 
tune.   
It is clear that international executives cannot afford to neglect being responsive to 
local conditions. Yet, at the same time, they need to realize cross-border synergies to create 
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additional value. Unfortunately for executives, these two key demands placed on the 
international firm are, at least to some extent, in conflict with one another. Striving for cross-
border synergies on a global scale will interfere with being locally responsive and vice versa. 
Therefore, the question is how these two conflicting demands can be reconciled – how can 
the international executive deal with the tension between globalization and localization?  
 
 
11.4 PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
When doing business in an international context, it is generally accepted that the challenge 
for firms is to strive for cross-border synergies, while simultaneously being responsive to the 
local conditions. It is acknowledged that international executives need to weigh the specific 
characteristics of their business when reconciling the tension between globalization and 
localization – some businesses are currently more suited for a global approach than others. 
Where opinions start to diverge is on the question of which businesses will become more 
global, or can be made more global, in the near future. To some executives it is evident that 
countries are rapidly becoming increasingly similar and more closely interrelated. To them 
globalization is already far advanced and will continue into the future, wiping out the 
importance of nations as it progresses. Therefore, they argue that it is wise to anticipate, and 
even encourage, a ‘nationless’ world, by focusing on global synergies over local 
responsiveness. Other executives, however, are more skeptical about the speed and impact of 
globalization. In their view, much so-called globalization is quite superficial, while at a 
deeper level important international differences are not quickly changing and cross-border 
integration is moving very slowly. They also note that there are significant countercurrents 
creating more international variety, with the potential of loosening international linkages. 
Therefore, wise executives should remain highly responsive to the complex variety and 
fragmentation that characterizes our world, while only carefully seeking out selected cross-
border synergy opportunities. 
 These differing opinions among international strategists are reflected in differing 
views in the strategic management literature. While there is a wide spectrum of positions on 
the question of how the international context will develop, here the two opposite poles in the 
debate will be identified and discussed. On the one side of the spectrum, there are the 
executives who believe that globalization is bringing Lennon’s dream of the ‘world living as 
one’ closer and closer. This point of view is called the global convergence perspective. At the 
other end of the spectrum are the executives who believe that deep-rooted local differences 
will continue to force firms to ‘do in Rome as the Romans do’. This point of view is referred 
to as the international diversity perspective. 
 
11.4.1 The Global Convergence Perspective 
According to proponents of the global convergence perspective, the growing similarity and 
integration of the world can be argued by pointing to extensive economic statistics, showing 
significant rises in foreign direct investment and international trade. Yet, it is simpler to 
observe things directly around you. For instance, are you wearing clothing unique to your 
country, or could you mingle in an international crowd without standing out? Is the television 
you watch, the vehicle you drive, the telephone you use and the timepiece you wear specific 
to your nation, or based on the same technology and even produced by the same companies 
as those in other countries? Is the music you listen to made by local bands, unknown outside 
your country, or is this music equally popular abroad? Is the food you eat unique to your 
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region, or is even this served in other countries? Now compare your answers to what your 
parents would have answered thirty years ago – the difference is due to global convergence. 
 Global convergence, it is argued, is largely driven by the ease, low cost and frequency 
of international communication, transport and travel. This has diminished the importance of 
distance. In the past world of large distances, interactions between countries were few and 
international differences could develop in relative isolation. But the victory of technology 
over distance has created a ‘global village’, in which goods, services and ideas are easily 
exchanged, new developments spread quickly and the ‘best practices’ of one nation are 
rapidly copied in others. Once individuals and organizations interact with one another as if no 
geographic distances exist, an unstoppable process towards cultural, political, technological 
and economic convergence is set in motion – countries will become more closely linked to 
one another and local differences will be superseded by new global norms. 
 Of course, in the short run there will still be international differences and nations will 
not be fully integrated into a ‘world without borders’. Executives taking a global convergence 
perspective acknowledge that such fundamental and wide-ranging changes take time. There 
are numerous sources of inertia – e.g. vested interests, commitment to existing systems, 
emotional attachment to current habits, and fear of change. The same type of change 
inhibitors could be witnessed during the industrial revolution, as well. Yet, these change 
inhibitors can only slow the pace of global convergence, not reverse its direction – the 
momentum caused by the shrinking of distance can only be braked, but not stopped. 
Therefore, firms thinking further than the short term, should not let themselves be guided too 
much by current international diversity, but rather by the emerging global reality (Ohmae, 
1990).  
 For individual firms, global convergence is changing the rules of the competitive 
game. While in the past most countries had their own distinct characteristics, pressuring firms 
to be locally responsive, now growing similarity offers enormous opportunities for leveraging 
resources and sharing activities across borders – e.g. production can be standardized to save 
costs, new product development can be done on an international scale to reduce the total 
investments required, and marketing knowledge can easily be exchanged to avoid reinventing 
the wheel in each country. Simultaneously, international integration as made it much easier to 
centralize production in large-scale facilities at the most attractive locations and to supply 
world markets from there, unrestrained by international borders. In the same manner, all 
types of activities, such as R&D, marketing, sales and procurement, can be centralized to 
profit from worldwide economies of scale.  
 An equally important aspect of international integration is that suppliers, buyers and 
competitors can also increasingly operate as if there are no borders. The ability of buyers to 
shop around internationally makes the world one global market, in which global bargaining 
power is very important. The ability of suppliers and competitors to reap global economies of 
scale and sell everywhere around the world creates global industries, in which competition 
takes place on a worldwide stage, instead of in each nation separately. To deal with such 
global industries and global markets, the firm must be able to align its market activities across 
nations.  
 These demands of standardization, centralization and coordination require a global 
firm, with a strong center responsible for the global strategy, instead of a federation of 
autonomous national subsidiaries focused on being responsive to their local circumstances. 
According to proponents of the global convergence perspective, such global organizations, or 
'centralized hubs' (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1995), will become increasingly predominant over 
time. And as more companies switch to a global strategy and a global organizational form, 
this will in turn speed up the general process of globalization. By operating in a global 
fashion, these firms will actually contribute to a further decrease of international variety and 
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fragmentation. In other words, globalizing companies are both the consequence and a major 
driver of further global convergence. 
 
11.4.2 The International Diversity Perspective 
To executives taking an international diversity perspective, the ‘brave new world’ outlined 
above is largely science fiction. People around the world might be sporting a Swatch or a 
Rolex, munching Big Macs and drinking Coke, while sitting in their Toyota or Nissan, but to 
conclude that these are symptoms of global convergence is a leap of faith. Of course, there 
are some brand names and products more or less standardized around the world, and their 
numbers might actually be increasing. The question is whether these manufacturers are 
globalizing to meet increasing worldwide similarity, or whether they are actually finally 
utilizing the similarities between countries that have always existed. The actual level of 
international variety may really be quite consistent. 
 It is particularly important to recognize in which respects countries remain different. 
For instance, the world might be drinking the same soft drinks, but they are probably doing it 
in different places, at different times, under different circumstances and for different reasons 
in each country. The product might be standardized worldwide, but the cultural norms and 
values that influence its purchase and use remain diverse across countries. According to 
proponents of the international diversity perspective, it is precisely these fundamental aspects 
of culture that turn out to be extremely stable over time – habits change slowly, but cultural 
norms and values are outright rigid. Producers might be lucky to find one product that fits in 
with such cultural diversity, but it would be foolish to interpret this as worldwide cultural 
convergence. 
 Other national differences are equally resilient against the tides of globalization. No 
countries have recently given up their national language in favor of Esperanto or English. On 
the contrary, there has been renewed emphasis on the local language in many countries (e.g. 
Ireland and the Baltic countries) and regions (e.g. Catalonia and Quebec). In the same way, 
political systems have remained internationally diverse, with plenty of examples of 
localization, even within nations. For instance, in Russia and the US the shift of power to 
regional governments has increased policy diversity within the country. Similar arguments 
can be put forward for legal systems, fiscal regimes, educational systems and technological 
infrastructure – each is extremely difficult to change due to the lock in effects, vested 
interests, psychological commitment and complex decision-making processes.  
For each example of increasing similarity, a counterexample of local initiatives and 
growing diversity could be given. Some proponents of the international diversity perspective 
argue that it is exactly this interplay of divergence and convergence forces that creates a 
dynamic balance preserving diversity. While technologies, organizing principles, political 
trends and social habits disperse across borders, resulting in global convergence, new 
developments and novel systems in each nation arise causing international divergence (Dosi 
and Kogut, 1993). Convergence trends are usually easier to spot than divergence – 
international dispersion can be more simply witnessed than new localized developments. To 
the casual observer, this might suggest that convergence trends have the upper hand, but after 
more thorough analysis, this conclusion must be cast aside. 
 Now add to this enduring international diversity the reality of international economic 
relations. Since World War II attempts have been made to facilitate the integration of national 
economies. There have been some regional successes (e.g. the North American Free Trade 
Association and the European Union) and some advances have been made on a worldwide 
scale (e.g. the World Trade Organization). However, progress has been slow and important 
political barriers remain. 
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 The continued existence of international diversity and political obstacles, it is argued, 
will limit the extent to which nations can become fully integrated into one borderless world. 
International differences and barriers to trade and investment will frustrate firms’ attempts to 
standardize and centralize, and will place a premium on firms' abilities to adapt and 
decentralize. Of course, there will be some activities for which global economies of scale can 
be achieved and for which international coordination is needed, but this will not become true 
for all activities. Empowering national executives to be responsive to specific local 
conditions will remain an important ingredient for international success. Balancing 
globalization and localization of the firm's activities will continue to be a requirement in the 
future international context. 
 Ideally, the internationally operating company should neither deny nor regret the 
existence of international diversity, but regard it as an opportunity that can be exploited. Each 
country’s unique circumstances will pose different challenges, requiring the development of 
different competences. Different national ‘climates’ will create opportunities for different 
innovations. If a company can tap into each country’s opportunities and leverage the acquired 
competences and innovations to other countries, this could offer the company an important 
source of competitive advantage. Naturally, these locally leveraged competences and 
innovations would subsequently need to be adapted to the specific circumstances in other 
countries. This balancing act would require an organization that combined strong local 
responsiveness with the ability to exchange and coordinate internationally, even on a 
worldwide scale. International organizations blending these two elements are called 
transnational (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1995), or heterarchical (Hedlund, 1986). However, in 
some businesses the international differences will remain so large that an even more locally 
responsive organizational form might be necessary, operating on a federative basis. 
 
 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
 
So, do executives believe that the international context is moving towards increased 
similarity and integration, or do they think that it will remain as diverse and fragmented as at 
the moment? And what do executives suppose this mean for the international configuration of 
firms? Do they assume that they should anticipate and encourage global convergence by 
emphasizing global standardization, centralization and coordination? Then they would choose 
to place more emphasis on realizing value creation by means of global synergies, accepting 
some value destruction due to a loss of local responsiveness. Or do they feel that they should 
acknowledge and exploit international diversity by emphasizing local adaptation, 
decentralization and autonomy? They would then focus on being locally responsive, 
accepting that this will frustrate the realization of cross-border synergies.  
These main differences between the global convergence perspective and the 
international diversity perspective are outlined in table 11.1. As in previous chapters, these 
two opposite poles on the issue of international strategy can be translated into two sets of 
opposing policy statements. These statements, summarized in table 11.2, can be used as items 
for capturing executives’ strategy perspectives when constructing a psychometric instrument. 
These statements will be revisited in chapter 14. 
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TABLE 11.1   
Global convergence versus international diversity perspective 
 
 Global Convergence Perspective International Diversity Perspective 
Emphasis on Globalization over localization Localization over globalization 
International variety Growing similarity Remaining diversity 
International linkages Growing integration Remaining fragmentation 
Major drivers Technology and communication Cultural and institutional identity 
Diversity & fragmentation Costly, convergence to be encouraged Reality, can be exploited 
Strategic focus Global-scale synergies Local responsiveness 
Organizational preference Standardize/centralize unless Adapt/decentralize unless 
Innovation process Center-for-global Locally-leveraged 
Organizational structure Global (centralized hub) Transnational (integrated network) 
   
 
TABLE 11.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
Global Convergence Perspective International Diversity Perspective 
17.1 International firms should strive to sell globally standardized products. 18.1 
International firms should strive to sell 
products adapted to local needs and 
conditions. 
17.2 Around the world countries are becoming more and more similar. 18.2 
Around the world countries will remain 
significantly different. 
17.3 
In most industries, the competitive game 
increasingly takes place on a worldwide 
scale. 
18.3 
In most industries, the competitive game in 
each country will remain independent of what 
happens in other countries. 
17.4 International firms should focus on global standardization, to reap economies of scale. 18.4 
International firms should focus on local 
adaptation to a country’s specific demands. 
17.5 Firms should coordinate their international activities to realize cross-border synergies. 18.5 
International firms should establish 
autonomous country units to facilitate local 
responsiveness. 
17.6 Successful international firms gradually develop into nationless organizations. 18.6 
Successful international firms retain a clear 
sense of national identity. 
17.7 
To be successful, firms will need to have a 
strong position in all major countries around 
the world. 
18.7 
Even in the long run, firms can remain 
competitive without having a strong position 
all around the world. 
17.8 
With each new generation of children, 
consumer behaviour around the world 
converges even further. 
18.8 
Local habits, fashions and trends will cause 
international differences in consumer 
behaviour to remain. 
17.9 
International companies should concentrate 
their R&D activities in one country to achieve 
global economies of scale. 
18.9 
International companies should spread their 
R&D activities across a number of countries 
to make use of local expertise. 
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17.10 
International companies should centralize 
their worldwide purchasing to get the best 
possible deal for the entire firm. 
18.10 
International companies should have 
decentralized purchasing to allow local 
executives to negotiate deals that fit best with 
the local needs. 
17.11 
If an international company adapts its 
products to each national market, it probably 
lacks the imagination to find a cheaper, 
standardized product. 
18.11 
If an international company has globally 
standardized products, it probably lacks the 
capability to create a more tailored local 
variation. 
17.12 
International firms should strive towards a 
uniform corporate culture all around the 
world. 
18.12 
International firms should adapt the corporate 
culture to make it fit better with the local 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222
223
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 12 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE 
 
 
 
 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of this study, strategy was defined as a course of action for achieving an 
organization's purpose. Subsequently, many chapters were spent looking at strategy from 
many different angles, but scant attention was paid to the organizational purposes that firms 
want to achieve. How to set a course for the organizational vessel through turbulent waters 
was discussed, but the question of why the journey was being undertaken in the first place 
was hardly raised – the focus was on means, not on ends. This lack of attention for the subject 
of organizational purpose is widespread in the strategic management literature. This might be 
due to the widespread assumption that it is obvious why business organizations exist. Some 
writers might avoid the topic because it is highly value-laden and somehow outside the realm 
of strategic management. 
 Yet, in practice, executives must constantly make choices and seek solutions based on 
an understanding of what their organization is intended to achieve. It is hardly possible for 
strategizing executives to avoid taking a stance on what they judge to be the purpose of their 
organization. They are confronted with many different claimants, who believe that the firm 
exists to serve their interests. Demands are placed on the firm by shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, customers, governments and communities, forcing executives to weigh whose 
interests should receive priority over others. Even when explicit demands are not voiced, 
executives must still determine who will be the main beneficiary of the value creation 
activities of the firm. 
 Where executives have a clear understanding of their organization’s purpose, this can 
provide strong guidance during processes of strategic thinking, strategy formation and 
strategic change. The organizational purpose can function as a fundamental principle, against 
which strategic options can be evaluated. Yet, while of central importance, organizations can 
be guided by more principles than organizational purpose alone. For example, they can be 
strongly influenced by certain business philosophies and values. The broader set of 
fundamental principles giving direction to strategic decision-making, of which organizational 
purpose is the central element, is referred to as the corporate mission.  
Determining the corporate mission is a challenging task, not least because there are so 
many different views on how it should be done. In this chapter, the issue of corporate mission 
will be explored in more detail, with the intention of uncovering the conflicting perspectives 
on the subject of organizational purpose, which lay at the heart of the divergent opinions.  
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12.2 THE ISSUE OF CORPORATE MISSION 
Corporate mission is a rather elusive concept, often used to refer to the wooly platitudes on 
the first few pages of annual reports. To many people, mission statements are lists of lofty 
principles that have potential public relations value, but have little bearing on actual business, 
let alone impact on the process of strategy formation. Yet, while frequently employed in this 
hollow manner, a corporate mission can be very concrete and play an important role in 
determining strategic actions. 
A good way to explain the term’s meaning is to go back to its etymological roots. 
‘Mission’ comes from the Latin word mittere, which means ‘to send’ (Cummings and Davies, 
1994). A mission is some task, duty or purpose that “sends someone on their way” – a motive 
or driver propelling someone in a certain direction. Hence, ‘corporate mission’ can be 
understood as the basic drivers sending the corporation along its way. The corporate mission 
consists of the fundamental principles that mobilize and propel the firm in a particular 
direction.  
The corporate mission contributes to ‘sending the firm in a particular direction’ by 
influencing the firm’s strategy. To understand how a mission impacts strategy, two topics 
require closer attention. First, it is necessary to know what types of ‘fundamental principles’ 
actually make up a corporate mission. These elements of corporate mission will be described 
below. Secondly, it needs to be examined what types of roles are played by a corporate 
mission in the strategy formation process. These functions of corporate mission will also be 
described (see figure 12.1). 
 
FIGURE 12.1  
Corporate mission and corporate governance 
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Besides the ‘what’ of corporate mission, it is equally important to explore the ‘who’ – who 
should determine a corporate mission. In the previous chapters, the implicit assumption has 
consistently been that executives are the primary ‘strategic actors’ responsible for setting the 
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direction of the firm. But in fact, their actions are formally monitored and control by the 
board of directors. In this way, the direction of the firm must be understood as a result of the 
interaction between management (‘the executives’) and the board of directors. As the name 
would imply, directors have an important influence on direction.  
The activities of the board of directors are referred to as corporate governance – 
directors govern the strategic choices and actions of the management of a firm. And because 
they have such an important role in setting the corporate mission and strategy, their input will 
be examined here as well. First, an overall review will be presented of the various functions 
of corporate governance. Then it will be examined what the different forms of corporate 
governance are, as this can severely influence the eventual mission and strategy that are 
followed (see figure 12.1). 
 
12.2.1 Elements of Corporate Mission 
Organizational purpose can be defined as the reason for which an organization exists. It can 
be expected that the perception that executives have of their organization’s purpose will give 
direction to the strategy process and influence the strategy content (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1994; Campbell and Tawadey, 1990). Sometimes strategizing executives consciously reflect 
on, or question, the organizational purpose as they make strategic choices. However, more 
often their view of the organization’s purpose will be a part of a broader set of business 
principles that steers their strategic thinking. This enduring set of fundamental principles that 
forms the base of a firm’s identity and guides its strategic decision-making, is referred to as 
the corporate mission. 
 While the purpose of an organization is at the heart of the corporate mission, three 
other components can also be distinguished (see figure 12.2): 
 Organizational beliefs. All strategic choices ultimately include important assumptions 
about the nature of the environment and what the firm needs to do to be successful in its 
business. If people in a firm do not share the same fundamental strategic beliefs, joint 
decision-making will be very protracted and conflictual – opportunities and threats will be 
interpreted differently and preferred solutions will be very divergent (see chapter 3). To 
work swiftly and in unison, a common understanding is needed. The stronger the set of 
shared beliefs subscribed to by all organizational members, the easier communication and 
decision-making will become, and the more confident and driven the group will be. 
Where researchers refer to the organizational ideology (‘system of ideas’) as their 
collective cognitive map (Axelrod, 1976), dominant logic (Prahald and Bettis, 1986) or 
team mental model (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994), companies themselves usually 
simply speak of their beliefs or philosophy.   
 Organizational values. Each person in an organization can have their own set of values, 
shaping what they believe to be good and just. Yet, when an organization’s members 
share a common set of values, determining what they see as worthwhile activities, ethical 
behavior and moral responsibilities, this can have a strong impact on the strategic 
direction (e.g. Falsey, 1989; Hoffman, 1989). Such widely embraced organizational 
values also contribute to a clear sense of organizational identity, attracting some 
individuals, while repelling others. Although it can be useful to explicitly state the values 
guiding the organization, to be influential they must become embodied in the 
organization’s culture (e.g. McCoy, 1985; Collins and Porras, 1994).  
 Business definition. For some firms, any business is good business, as long as they can 
make a reasonable return on investment. Yet, if any business is fine, the firm will lack a 
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sense of direction. In practice, most firms have a clearer identity, which they derive from 
being active in a particular line of business. For these firms, having a delimiting definition 
of the business they wish to be in strongly focuses the direction in which they develop. 
Their business definition functions as a guiding principle, helping to distinguish 
opportunities from diversions (e.g. Abell, 1980; Pearce, 1982). Of course, while a clear 
business definition can focus the organization’s attention and efforts, it can lead to 
shortsightedness and the missing of new business developments (e.g. Ackoff, 1974; 
Levitt, 1960).   
 
FIGURE 12.2 
Elements of a corporate mission 
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The strength of a corporate mission will depend on whether these four elements fit together 
and are mutually reinforcing (Campbell and Yeung, 1991). Where a consistent and 
compelling corporate mission is formed, this can infuse the organization with a sense of 
mission, creating an emotional bond between organizational members and energizing them to 
work according to the mission. 
A concept that is often confused with mission is vision. Individuals or organizations 
have a vision if they picture a future state of affairs they wish to achieve (from the Latin vide 
– to see; Cummings and Davies, 1994). While the corporate mission outlines the fundamental 
principles guiding strategic choices, a strategic vision outlines the desired future at which the 
company hopes to arrive. In other words, vision provides a business aim, while mission 
provides business principles (see figure 12.3).  
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 Generally, a strategic vision is a type of aim that is less specific than a short-term 
target or longer-term objective. Vision is usually defined as a broad conception of a desirable 
future state, of which the details remain to be determined (e.g. Senge, 1990; Collins and 
Porras, 1996). As such, strategic vision can play a similar role as corporate mission, pointing 
the firm in a particular direction and motivating individuals to work together towards a shared 
end. 
 
12.2.2 Functions of Corporate Mission 
The corporate mission can be articulated by means of a mission statement, but in practice not 
everything that is called a mission statement meets the above criteria (e.g. David, 1989; 
Piercy and Morgan, 1994). However, firms can have a mission, even if it has not been 
explicitly written down, although this does increase the chance of divergent interpretations 
within the organization. 
In general, paying attention to the development of a consistent and compelling 
corporate mission can be valuable for three reasons. A corporate mission can provide:  
 
 Direction. The corporate mission can point the organization in a certain direction, by 
defining the boundaries within which strategic choices and actions must take place. By 
specifying the fundamental principles on which strategies must be based, the corporate 
mission limits the scope of strategic options and sets the organization on a particular 
heading (e.g. Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1983; Hax, 1990).  
 Legitimization. The corporate mission can convey to all stakeholders inside and outside 
the company that the organization is pursuing valuable activities in a proper way. By 
specifying the business philosophy that will guide the company, the chances can be 
increased that stakeholders will accept, support and trust the organization (e.g. Klemm, 
Sanderson and Luffman, 1991; Freeman and Gilbert, 1988). 
 
FIGURE 12.3  
Corporate mission and strategic vision 
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 Motivation. The corporate mission can go a step further than legitimization, by actually 
inspiring individuals to work together in a particular way. By specifying the fundamental 
principles driving organizational actions, an esprit de corps can evolve, with the powerful 
capacity to motivate people over a prolonged period of time (e.g. Campbell and Yeung, 
1991; Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
Especially these last two functions of a corporate mission divide both management theorists 
and business practitioners. What is seen as a legitimate and motivating organizational 
purpose is strongly contested. What the main factors of disagreement are will be examined in 
a later section of this chapter. 
 
12.2.3 Functions of Corporate Governance 
The subject of corporate governance, as opposed to corporate management, deals with the 
issue of governing the strategic choices and actions of top management. Popularly stated, 
corporate governance is about managing top management – building in checks and balances 
to ensure that the senior executives pursue strategies that are in accordance with the corporate 
mission. Corporate governance encompasses all tasks and activities that are intended to 
supervise and steer the behavior of top management. 
 In the common definition, corporate governance “addresses the issues facing boards 
of directors” (Tricker, 1994: xi). In this view, corporate governance is the task of the directors 
and therefore attention must be paid to their roles and responsibilities (e.g. Cochran and 
Wartick, 1994; Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997). Others have argued that this definition 
is too narrow, and that in practice there are more forces that govern the activities of top 
management. In this broader view, boards of directors are only a part of the governance 
system. For instance, regulation by local and national authorities, as well as pressure from 
societal groups, can function as the checks and balances limiting top management's discretion 
(e.g. Mintzberg, 1984; Demb and Neubauer, 1992). 
 Whether employing a narrow or broad definition, three important corporate 
governance functions can be distinguished (adapted from Tricker, 1994): 
 
 Forming Function. The first function of corporate governance is to influence the forming 
of the corporate mission. The task of corporate governance is to shape, articulate and 
communicate the fundamental principles that will drive the organization's activities. 
Determining the purpose of the organization and setting priorities among claimants are 
part of the forming function. The board of directors can conduct this task by, for example, 
questioning the basis of strategic choices, influencing the business philosophy, and 
explicitly weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the firm's strategies for various 
constituents (e.g. Freeman and Reed, 1983; Yoshimori, 1995). 
 Performance Function. The second function of corporate governance is to contribute to 
the strategy process with the intention of improving the future performance of the 
corporation. The task of corporate governance is to judge strategy initiatives brought 
forward by top management and/or to actively participate in strategy development. The 
board of directors can conduct this task by, for example, engaging in strategy discussions, 
acting as a sounding board for top management, and networking to secure the support of 
vital stakeholders (e.g. Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1995; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
 Conformance Function. The third function of corporate governance is to ensure corporate 
conformance to the stated mission and strategy. The task of corporate governance is to 
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monitor whether the organization is undertaking activities as promised and whether 
performance is satisfactory. Where management is found lacking, it is a function of 
corporate governance to press for changes. The board of directors can conduct this task 
by, for example, auditing the activities of the corporation, questioning and supervising top 
management, determining remuneration and incentive packages, and even appointing new 
executives (e.g. Parkinson, 1993; Spencer, 1983). 
 
These functions give the board of directors considerable influence in determining and 
realizing the corporate mission. As such, they have the ultimate power to decide on the 
organizational purpose. Therefore, it is not surprising that the question to whom these 
functions should be given is extremely important.  
 
12.2.4 Forms of Corporate Governance 
There is considerable disagreement on how boards of directors should be organized and run. 
Currently, each country has its own system of corporate governance and the international 
differences are large. Yet even within many countries, significant disagreements are 
discernable. In designing a corporate governance regime, three characteristics of boards of 
directors are of particular importance (adapted from Tricker, 1994): 
 
 Board structure. Internationally, there are major differences between countries requiring a 
two-tier board structure (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands and Finland), countries with a 
one-tier board (e.g. United States, Britain and Japan), and countries in which companies 
are free to choose (e.g. France and Switzerland). In a two-tier system there is a formal 
division of power, with a management board made up of the top executives and a distinct 
supervisory board made up of non-executives, with the task of monitoring and steering 
the management board. In a one-tier (or unitary) board system, executive and non-
executive (outside) directors sit together on one board (see figure 12.4). 
 Board membership. The composition of boards of directors can vary sharply, from 
company to company, and country to country. Some differences are due to legal 
requirements that are not the same internationally. For instance, in Germany by law half 
of the membership of a supervisory board must represent labor, while the other half 
represents the shareholders. In French companies labor representatives are given observer 
status on the board. In other countries there are no legal imperatives, yet differences have 
emerged. In some cases outside (non-executive) directors from other companies are 
common, while in other nations fewer outsiders are involved. Even within countries 
differences can be significant, especially with regard to the number, stature and 
independence of outside (non-executive) directors.   
 Board tasks. The tasks and authority of boards of directors also differ quite significantly 
between companies. In some cases boards meet infrequently and are merely asked to vote 
on proposals put in front of them. Such boards have little formal or informal power to 
contradict the will of the CEO. In other companies, boards meet regularly and play a 
more active role in corporate governance, by formulating proposals, proactively selecting 
new top executives, and determining objectives and incentives. Normally, the power of 
outside (non-executive) directors to monitor and steer a company only partly depends on 
their formally defined tasks and authority. To a large degree their impact is determined by 
how proactive they define their own role.     
 
230
Part II: Exploring Different Views 
214 
FIGURE 12.4  
Two vs. one tier board structure  
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The question in the context of this chapter is how a board of directors should be run to ensure 
that the organization’s purpose is best achieved. What should be the structure, membership 
and tasks of the board of directors, to realize the ends for which the organization exists? 
 
12.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFITABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Discussions on what firms should strive to achieve are not limited to the field of strategic 
management. Given the influential position of business organizations in society, the purpose 
they should serve is also discussed by theorists in the fields of economics, political science, 
sociology, ethics and philosophy. Since the industrial revolution, and the rise of the modern 
corporation, the role of business organizations within the ‘political economic order’ has been 
a central theme in many of the social sciences. It has been the topic that has filled libraries of 
books, inspired society-changing theories and stirred deep-rooted controversies.  
The enormous impact of corporations on the functioning of society has also attracted 
political parties, labor unions, community representatives, environmentalists, the media and 
the general public to the debate. All take a certain position on the role that business 
organizations should play within society and the duties that they ought to shoulder. Here, too, 
the disagreements can be heated, often spilling over from the political arena and negotiation 
tables into the streets. 
In countries with a market economy, it is generally agreed that companies should 
pursue strategies that ensure economic profitability, but that they have certain social 
responsibilities that must be fulfilled as well. But this is where the consensus ends. Opinions 
differ sharply with regard to the relative importance of profitability and responsibility. Some 
people subscribe to the view that profitability is the very purpose of economic organizations 
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and that the only social responsibility of a firm is to pursue profitability within the boundaries 
of the law. However, other people argue that business corporations are not only economic 
entities, but also social institutions, embedded in a social environment, which brings along 
heavy social responsibilities. In this view, organizations are morally obliged to behave 
responsibly towards all parties with a stake in the activities of the firm, and profitability is 
only a means to fulfill this duty. 
Most executives accept that both economic profitability and social responsibility are 
valuable goals to pursue. Yet, as organizational purpose, profitability and responsibility are at 
least partially contradictory. If executives strive towards profit maximization, shareholders 
might be enamored, but this will bring executives into conflict with the optimization of 
benefits for other stakeholders. In other words, to a certain extent there is a tension between 
the profitability and responsibility (e.g. Cannon, 1992; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Drucker, 
1984; Yoshimori, 1995). 
 
12.3.1 The Demand for Economic Profitability 
It is clear that business organizations must be profitable to survive. Yet simple profitability, 
that is having higher income than costs, is not sufficient. To be an attractive investment, a 
company must earn a higher return on the shareholders’ equity than could be realized if the 
money were deposited in the bank. Put differently, investors must have a financial incentive 
to run a commercial risk; otherwise they could just as well bring their money to the bank or 
buy low risk government bonds.    
 Yet, offsetting the risk bourn by investors is but a small part of the larger picture. 
Once a corporation has established a track record of profitability, this inspires trust among 
financers. Such trust makes it much easier to raise new capital, either through borrowing (at 
more attractive rates) or by issuing new shares. And of course, new capital can be used to 
further the competitive objectives of the organization. Where companies have not been 
particularly profitable in the past, and cannot authoritatively project an attractive level of 
profitability in the future, they will find it difficult or virtually impossible to find new 
financing. This can significantly weaken the position of the firm and undermine its long-term 
competitiveness.   
For publicly-traded corporations strong profitability is usually reflected in higher 
share prices, which is not only beneficial to the shareholders at that moment, but also makes 
it easier to acquire other firms and to pay with shares. Moreover, a high share price is the best 
defense against a hostile takeover and the best negotiation chip for a friendly one. In both 
publicly and privately held companies, retained profits can be an important source of funds 
for new investments as well.   
 In short, profitability is not only a result, but also a source, of competitive power. 
Profitability provides a company with the financial leeway to improve its competitive 
position and pursue its ambitions. 
 
12.3.2 The Demand for Social Responsibility 
As economic entities engaging in formalized arrangements with employees, suppliers, 
buyers, and government agencies, corporations have the legal responsibility to abide by the 
stipulations outlined in their contracts. Equally, they are bound to stay within the ‘letter of the 
law’ in each jurisdiction in which they operate. However, being good corporate citizens 
entails more than just staying out of court.  
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 Companies are more than just ‘economic machines’ regulated by legal contracts. They 
are also networks of people, working together towards a common goal. And as members of a 
social group, people within a company need to develop a sense of community if they are to 
function properly. One of the most basic needs is to build a level of trust among people – a 
feeling of security that each individual’s interests will be taken into account. Trust evolves 
where people feel certain that others will behave in a socially responsible manner, instead of 
letting their own self-interest prevail without limitation. Once there is enough trust between 
people, they can engage in productive teamwork and invest in their mutual relationships.  
 Hence, social responsibility – that is, acting in the interest of others, even when there 
is no legal imperative – lies at the basis of trust. And where there is trust, people are generally 
willing to commit themselves to the organization, both emotionally and practically. 
Emotionally, they will become involved with, and can become strongly connected to, the 
organization, which can lead to a sense of pride and loyalty. Practically, they will be willing 
to invest years acquiring firm-specific knowledge and skills, and in building a career. Such 
commitments make people dependent on the organization, as they will be less able and 
inclined to job-hop. It is therefore vital that the organization rewards such commitment by 
acting responsibly, even where this hurts profitability; otherwise the bond of trust can be 
seriously damaged. 
 Acting in the interest of all employees is a limited form of social responsibility. Just 
as it is beneficial for trust to evolve within organizations, it is important for trust to develop 
between the organization and its broader environment of buyers, suppliers, governments, 
local communities and activist groups. Therefore, it is important that these organizations also 
come to trust that the organization is willing to act in a socially responsible way, even when 
this entails sacrificing profitability.   
 
12.4 PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE 
Firms require a certain measure of economic profitability, if they want to compete and 
survive, and they need to exhibit a certain amount of social responsibility, if they are to retain 
the trust and support of key stakeholders. In itself, this creates a tension, as the two demands 
can be at odds with one another. Often, socially responsible behavior costs money, which can 
only be partially recouped by the increased ‘social dividend’ it brings. But if profitability and 
responsibility are both seen as the ultimate purpose of business firms, then the tension is even 
stronger, as optimizing the one will be in conflict with maximizing the other. Emphasizing 
profitability means subjecting all investments to an economic rationale – socially responsible 
behavior should only be undertaken if the net present value of such an investment is attractive 
or there is no legal way of avoiding compliance. Emphasizing responsibility means 
subjecting all activities to a moral and/or political rationale – asking who has a legitimate and 
pressing claim to be included as a beneficiary of the activities being undertaken, which can 
severely depress profitability.   
Hence, it is not surprising to find that the tension between profitability and 
responsibility strongly divides people across many walks of life, not only business executives 
and management theorists. The main point of contention is whether firms should primarily be 
run for the financial benefit of the legal owners, or for the broader benefit of all parties with a 
significant interest in the joint endeavor. Should it be the purpose of firms to serve the 
interests of their shareholders or of their stakeholders? Should profitability be emphasized 
because economic organizations belong to the providers of risk capital, or should 
responsibility be emphasized because organizations are joint ventures bringing together 
various resource providers by means of a social contract?  
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While there are many points of view on the ‘right’ organizational purpose in the 
strategy literature, here the two diametrically opposed positions will be identified and 
discussed. At the one pole of the debate are those people who argue that corporations are 
established to serve the purposes of their owners. Generally, it is in the best interest of a 
corporation's shareholders to see the value of their stocks increase through the organization's 
pursuit of profitable business strategies. This point of view is commonly referred to as the 
shareholder value perspective. At the other end of the spectrum are those people who argue 
that corporations should be seen as joint ventures between shareholders, employees, banks, 
customers, suppliers, governments and the community. All of these parties hold a stake in the 
organization and therefore can expect that the corporation will take as its responsibility to 
develop business strategies that are in accordance with their interests and values. This point 
of view will be referred to as the stakeholder values perspective. 
 
12.4.1 The Shareholder Value Perspective 
To proponents of the shareholder value perspective it is obvious that companies belong to 
their owners and therefore should act in accordance with the interests of the owners. 
Corporations are instruments, whose purpose it is to create economic value on behalf of those 
who invest risk-taking capital in the enterprise. This clear purpose should drive companies, 
regardless of whether they are privately or publicly held. According to Rappaport (1986), 
“the idea that business strategies should be judged by the economic value they create for 
shareholders is well accepted in the business community. After all, to suggest that companies 
be operated in the best interests of its owners is hardly controversial.” 
 There is some disagreement between advocates of this perspective with regard to the 
best way of advancing the interests of the shareholders, particularly in publicly held 
companies. Many people taking this point of view argue that the well being of the 
shareholders is served if the strategy of a company leads to higher share prices and/or higher 
dividends (e.g. Hart, 1995; Rappaport, 1986). Others are less certain of the stock markets’ 
ability to correctly value long-term investments, such as R&D spending and capital 
expenditures. In their view, the stock markets are excessively concerned with the short term 
and therefore share prices myopically overemphasize current results and heavily discount 
investments for the future. To avoid being pressured into short-termism, these people 
advocate that strategists must keep only one eye on the share prices, while the other is 
focused on the long-term horizon (e.g. Charkham, 1994; Sykes, 1994). 
 According to supporters of the shareholder value perspective, one of the major 
challenges in large corporations is to actually get top management to pursue the shareholders’ 
interests. Where ownership and executiveial control over a company have become separated, 
it is often difficult to get the executives to work on behalf of the shareholders, instead of 
letting executives’ self-interest prevail. This is known as the principal-agent problem (e.g. 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) – the executives are agents, working to further 
the interests of their principals, the shareholders, but are tempted to serve their own interests, 
even when this is to the detriment of the principal. This has led to a widespread debate in the 
academic and business communities, especially in Britain and the United States, about the 
best form of corporate governance. The most important players in corporate governance are 
the outside, or non-executive, members on the board of directors. It is one of the tasks of 
these outsiders to check whether the executives are truly running the company in a way that 
maximizes the shareholders’ wealth. For this reason, many proponents of the shareholder 
value perspective call for a majority of independent-minded outside directors in the board, 
preferably owning significant amounts of the company’s stock themselves. 
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 The emphasis placed on profitability as the fundamental purpose of firms does not 
mean that supporters of the shareholder value perspective are blind to the demands placed on 
firms by other stakeholders. On the contrary, most exponents of this view argue that it is in 
the interest of the shareholders to carry out a stakeholder analysis and even to actively 
manage stakeholder relations. Knowing the force field of stakeholders constraining the 
freedom of the company is important information for the strategy process. It is never 
advisable to ignore important external claimants such as labor unions, environmental 
activists, bankers, governmental agencies and community groups. Few strategists would 
doubt that proactive engagement is preferable to ‘corporate isolationism’. However, 
recognizing that it is expedient to pay attention to stakeholders does not mean that it is the 
corporation’s purpose to serve them. If parties have a strong bargaining position, a firm might 
be forced into all types of concessions, sacrificing profitability, but this has little to do with 
any moral responsibility of the firm towards these other powers. The only duty of a company 
is to maximize shareholder value, within the boundaries of what is legally permissible. 
 The important conclusion is that in this perspective it might be in the interest of 
shareholders to treat stakeholders well, but that there is no moral obligation to do so. For 
instance, it might be a good move for a troubled company not to lay off workers if the 
resulting loyalty and morale improve the chances of recovery and profitability later on. In this 
case the decision not to fire workers is based on profit-motivated calculation, not on a sense 
of moral responsibility towards the employees. Generally, proponents of the shareholder 
value perspective argue that society is best served by this type of economic rationale. By 
pursuing enlightened self-interest and maintaining market-based relationships between the 
firm and all stakeholders, societal wealth will be maximized. Responsibility for employment, 
local communities, the environment, consumer welfare and social developments are not an 
organizational matter, but issues for individuals and governments (Friedman, 1970). 
 
12.4.2 The Stakeholder Values Perspective  
Advocates of the stakeholder values perspective do not see why the supplier of one ingredient 
in an economic value creation process has a stronger moral claim on the organization than the 
providers of other inputs. They challenge the assumption that individuals with an equity stake 
in a corporation have the right to demand that the entire organization work on their behalf. In 
the stakeholder values perspective, a company should not be seen as the instrument of 
shareholders, but as a coalition between various resource suppliers, with the intention of 
increasing their common wealth. An organization should be regarded as a joint venture in 
which the suppliers of equity, loans, labor, management, expertise, parts and service all 
participate to achieve economic success. As all groups hold a stake in the joint venture and 
are mutually dependent, it is argued that the purpose of the organization is to serve the 
interests of all parties involved (e.g. Berle and Means, 1932; Freeman and Reed, 1983). 
 According to endorsers of the stakeholder values perspective, shareholders have a 
legitimate interest in the firm's profitability. However, the emphasis shareholders place on 
stock price appreciation and dividends must be balanced against the legitimate demands of 
the other partners. These demands are not only financial, as in the case of the shareholders, 
but also qualitative, reflecting different values held by different groups (e.g. Clarke, 1998; 
Freeman, 1984). For instance, employees might place a high value on job security, 
occupational safety, holidays and working conditions, while a supplier of parts might prefer 
secure demand, joint innovation, shared risk-taking and prompt payment. Of course, 
balancing these interests is a challenging task, requiring an on-going process of negotiation 
and compromise. The outcome will in part depend on the bargaining power of each 
stakeholder – how essential is its input to the economic success of the organization? 
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However, the extent to which a stakeholder’s interests are pursued will depend on the 
perceived legitimacy of their claim as well. For instance, employees usually have a strong 
moral claim because they are heavily dependent on the organization and have a relatively low 
mobility, while most shareholders have a spread portfolio and can ‘exit the corporation with a 
phone call’ (Stone, 1975). 
 In this view of organizational purpose, executives must recognize their responsibility 
towards all constituents (e.g. Clarkson, 1995; Alkhafaji, 1989). Maximizing shareholder 
value to the detriment of the other stakeholders would be unjust. Executives in the firm have 
a moral obligation to consider the interests and values of all joint-venture partners. Managing 
stakeholder demands is not merely a pragmatic means of running a profitable business – 
serving stakeholders is an end in itself. These two interpretations of stakeholder management 
are often confused. Where it is primarily viewed as an approach or technique for dealing with 
the essential participants in the value-adding process, stakeholder management is 
instrumental. But if it is based on the fundamental notion that the organization's purpose is to 
serve the stakeholders, then stakeholder management is normative (e.g. Buono and Nichols, 
1985; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
 Most proponents of the stakeholder values perspective argue that, ultimately, pursuing 
the joint interests of all stakeholders it is not only more just, but also more effective for 
organizations (e.g. Jones, 1995; Solomon, 1992). Few stakeholders are filled with a sense of 
mission to go out and maximize shareholder value, especially if shareholders bear no 
responsibility for the other stakeholders’ interests (e.g. Campbell and Yeung, 1991; Collins 
and Porras, 1994). It is difficult to work as a motivated team, if it is the purpose of the 
organization to serve only one group’s interests. Furthermore, without a stakeholder values 
perspective, there will be a deep-rooted lack of trust between all of the parties involved in the 
enterprise. Each stakeholder will assume that the others are solely motivated by self-interest 
and are tentatively cooperating in a calculative manner. All parties will perceive a constant 
risk that the others will use their power to gain a bigger slice of the pie, or even rid 
themselves of their ‘partners’. The consequence is that all stakeholders will vigorously guard 
their own interests and will interact with one another as adversaries. To advocates of the 
stakeholder values perspective, this ‘every person for themselves’ model of organizations is 
clearly inferior to the partnership model, in which sharing, trust, and symbiosis are 
emphasized. Cooperation between stakeholders is much more effective than competition 
(note the link with the embedded organization perspective in chapter 7). 
 Some exponents of the stakeholder values perspective argue that the narrow economic 
definition of stakeholders given above is too constrictive. In their view, the circle of 
stakeholders with a legitimate claim on the organization should be drawn more widely. Not 
only should the organization be responsible to the direct participants in the economic value 
creation process (the primary stakeholders), but also to all parties affected by the 
organization's activities. For example, an organization's behavior might have an impact on 
local communities, governments, the environment and society in general, and therefore these 
groups have a stake in what the organization does as well. Most supporters of the stakeholder 
values perspective acknowledge that organizations have a moral responsibility towards these 
secondary stakeholders (e.g. Carroll, 1993; Langtry, 1994). However, opinions differ whether 
it should actually be a part of business organizations’ purpose to serve this broader body of 
constituents. 
 The implication of this view for corporate governance is that the board of directors 
should be able to judge whether the interests of all stakeholders are being justly balanced. 
This has led some advocates of the stakeholder values perspective to call for representatives 
of the most important stakeholder groups in the board (e.g. Guthrie and Turnbull, 1994). 
Others argue more narrowly for a stronger influence of employees on the choices made by 
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organizations (e.g. Buchholz, 1986; Blair, 1995). Such co-determination of the corporation’s 
strategy by management and workers can, for instance, be encouraged by establishing work 
councils (a type of organizational parliament or senate), as is mandatory for larger companies 
in most countries of the European Union. Yet others emphasize measures to strengthen 
corporate social responsibility in general. To improve corporate social performance, it is 
argued, companies should be encouraged to adopt internal policy processes that promote 
ethical behavior and responsiveness to societal issues (e.g. Epstein, 1987; Wartick and Wood, 
1998). Corporate responsibility should not be, to quote Ambrose Bierce's sarcastic definition, 
“a detachable burden easily shifted to the shoulders of God, Fate, Fortune, Luck, or one's 
neighbor.” 
 
TABLE 12.1  
Shareholder value versus stakeholder values perspective 
 Shareholder Value Perspective  Stakeholder Values Perspective 
Emphasis on Profitability over responsibility Responsibility over profitability 
Organizations seen as Instruments Joint-ventures 
Organizational purpose To serve owner To serve all parties involved 
Measure of success Share price & dividends Satisfaction among stakeholders 
Major difficulty Getting agent to pursue interests Balancing interests of stakeholders 
Governance thru Independent outside directors Stakeholder representation 
Managing stakeholders Means End and means 
Social responsibility Individual, not organizational matter Both individual and organizational 
Society best served by Pursuing self-interest  Pursuing joint-interests 
 
 
12.5 CONCLUSION 
So, what do executives believe should be the purpose of a firm? Do executives believe that 
they should strive to maximize shareholder value or stakeholder values? Do they think that it 
should be the purpose of business organizations to pursue profitability on behalf of their 
owners, or do they feel that firms should serve the interests and promote the values of all of 
their stakeholders in a balanced way?  
 The main differences between the shareholder value perspective and stakeholder 
values perspective have been summarized in table 12.1. And as in all previous chapters, these 
two opposite points of view have been translated into two sets of 12 policy statements that 
can be used to identify where the preferences of executives lie. An overview of these 
statements is given in table 12.2.  
 
TABLE 12.2   
Statements representing the opposite perspectives 
 
Shareholder Value Perspective Stakeholder Values Perspective 
19.1 The ultimate objective of a firm should be to earn a profit for its shareholders. 20.1 
The ultimate objective of a firm should be to 
serve the interests of employees, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
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19.2 
Firms should strive to maximize long-term 
profitability, even if this means firing long-
time employees. 
20.2 
Firms should strive to ensure long-term 
profitability, but not by firing long-time 
employees. 
19.3 Firms belong to their shareholders. 20.3 
Firms belong to the shareholders, 
employees, managers and all others who 
make a major contribution to the 
organization. 
19.4 A firm should be seen as an instrument for investors to make money. 20.4 
A firm should be seen as a joint venture 
between investors, managers and 
employees. 
19.5 
The main measure of long-term success is 
whether a firm is able to create shareholder 
value. 
20.5 
The main measure of long-term success is 
whether a firm is able to satisfy the demands 
of all major contributors to the organization. 
19.6 Top management should not be accountable to representatives of the employees. 20.6 
Top management should be accountable to 
representatives of the employees. 
19.7 
The only responsibility for firms is to create 
shareholder value, within the boundaries of 
the law. 
20.7 Firms have social responsibilities beyond those in the law. 
19.8 Firms exist to make money, not to create jobs. 20.8 
Firms that make a lot of money, but are bad 
employers, should be despised. 
19.9 
It is not the responsibility of firms to consider 
the social impact they have on the local 
community. 
20.9 
Business strategies should be judged by the 
social impact they have on the local 
community. 
19.10 The only way for firms to be good corporate citizens is to build a profitable business. 20.10 
To be good corporate citizens, firms should 
look beyond profitability and make a strong 
contribution to society’s welfare. 
19.11 
It is not the responsibility of firms to treat their 
employees well, although it can make good 
business sense. 
20.11 
It is the responsibility of firms to treat their 
employees well, even when it lowers 
profitability. 
19.12 
Firms should avoid taking on social 
responsibilities such as creating jobs and 
cleaning up the environment. 
20.12 
Firms have social responsibilities, such as 
creating jobs and keeping the environment 
clean. 
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Chapter 13 
 
DEVELOPING THE MEASUREMENT 
INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As stated in chapter 1, it is the intention of this study to develop an instrument for measuring 
executives’ strategy beliefs along a selected number of key dimensions. In part II, ten 
dimensions were derived from the strategic management literature, along which potential 
differences in strategy perspectives could be quantitatively mapped. For each dimension 24 
statements were formulated; 12 representing the strategy perspective at the two poles of each 
dimension.  
In this chapter, the methodology employed for developing the measurement 
instrument using these dimensions and statements will be described in more detail. First, a 
more precise definition of the scope of the measurement instrument will be presented in 
section 13.2. Next, the overall design of the instrument will be outlined (section 13.3), 
followed by a discussion on the approach used in constructing the measurement scales 
(section 13.4). This methodological chapter will be concluded by a description of the sample 
selection and data collection process (section 13.5).   
 
 
13.2 SCOPE OF THE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT 
 
Every quantitative measurement instrument needs to be limited in scope if it is to measure 
something accurately and meaningfully. In this study, too, a number of choices have been 
made to focus the measurement process to achieve a useful result. First, an a priori choice 
was made to measure the beliefs of individuals, instead of collectively shared belief systems. 
Second, it was decided to measure individual’s beliefs directly, by asking them, instead of 
trying to induce their beliefs from circumstantial evidence. Thirdly, a choice was made to 
focus on executives’ general beliefs, instead of measuring their situation-specific responses. 
And finally, it was decided to develop an instrument directed at measuring current beliefs, as 
opposed to measuring the durability of beliefs over time. Each of these four choices, all of 
which will be discussed in more detail below, are not only limitations to the scope of the 
measurement instrument, but at the same time are the main design parameters of the intended 
tool. 
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13.2.1 Individual as Measurement Unit 
The measurement instrument is directed at measuring the strategy beliefs of individual 
executives. It is the intention to capture the cognitive map of each individual person, not the 
shared beliefs within a group; the individual is the focus, not the collective. This is an 
important choice, because it means that the instrument will measure each person as an 
independent unit, instead of measuring the shared views of a group.  
This “atomistic” measurement approach means that the information gathered will be 
relevant with regard to individuals and populations of individuals, but care is required when 
drawing conclusions at the level of groups. Of course, knowing the views of all individuals in 
a group can give an important insight into the distribution of strategy beliefs within the group. 
However, it can not be automatically assumed that the beliefs of the group will simply be the 
sum of the individual parts. A group of interacting people might develop a different picture 
about certain strategic issues than they would individually or people might express different 
beliefs when they are in a particular social setting. Hence, using individuals as measurement 
unit is unproblematic if the unit of analysis is also the individual, but caution is advised if a 
group of individuals is the unit of analysis. 
 
13.2.2 Individual as Information Source 
In addition to being the unit of measurement, it has also been decided to make the individual 
executive the sole source of information about his/her strategy perspective. Information about 
an executive’s cognitive map is not collected via circumstantial evidence or other people’s 
observations, but directly from the individual him/herself.  
This direct measurement method has the advantage of being less susceptible to researcher 
and/or third party interpretations, but has a potential disadvantage that the individual 
respondent may give socially desirable answers or answers more attuned to fit their self-
perception than representative of their true strategy beliefs. However, this disadvantage 
seems manageable in this context, for a number of reasons: 
 
 No technically-correct answers. Firstly, the instrument is not a test. It is not oriented 
towards measuring the level of strategizing skill (“vertical measurement”: high – low), 
but the perspective someone has (“horizontal measurement”: left – right). This focus on 
mapping different “styles”, instead of “ability”, is emphasized a number of times during 
the measurement process to reinforce the message that participants should respond in a 
relaxed fashion to any questions asked. It removes the pressure to give “the correct 
answer” and allows respondents to weigh each question without feel that they will be 
judged about the results.  
 No socially-desirable answers. A second, related point is that the threat of answering in a 
socially-desirable manner also seems limited here. Replying in a socially-desirable way is 
defined as giving an answer that does not reflect one’s deeper beliefs, because the 
respondent wants to conform to what she/he believes the researcher wants to hear. In this 
situation, however, it is clearly communicated that the researcher is measuring their 
“style” and has no preference for one style or the other, so it is not likely that the 
respondents will feel that the researcher favors one answer over the other. Nor do any of 
the perspectives carry a social stigma or benefit from a saintly “halo-effect”, making them 
more or less desirable to mention in an answer. It should be noted, however, that this does 
not mean that people do not give socially-influenced answers. Of course, most people are 
influenced by the beliefs of the social groups of which they are a part and their responses 
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often reflect this influence. But this is no problem. For the measurement instrument it 
doesn’t matter where executives’ beliefs come from, as long as it is their true beliefs that 
are being measured. It is fine if individuals give socially-influenced answers, impacted by 
the views held by the people around them, as long as they do not give socially-desirable 
answers, to look good to the researcher. 
 Aspirational answers are still beliefs. A different type of reason to prefer indirect, instead 
of direct, measurement of executives’ beliefs is that “deeds speak louder than words”. It 
could be argued that asking executives what they believe will only surface their 
“espoused theories”, but not their actual “theories in use” (Agyris and Schön, 1978) – you 
will only hear how they would like to think, not how they really think. Putting it even 
more paradoxically, executives will tell you what they would like to believe, or even what 
they believe that they believe, but they are incapable of telling you what they truly 
believe. Only by looking at what executives actually decide and carry out, can their true 
beliefs be reconstructed. However, this approach is also fraught with difficulties; each 
action will have a multitude of influencing factors, so it is next to impossible to determine 
what a particular executive was thinking at the time. And even if their theories-in-use 
could be vetted out, it does not mean that this says much about how these executives will 
think next time around. So, while there is a risk that asking managers what they believe 
might only give a map of what they would like to believe, instead of the beliefs on which 
they will act, this is the best that can be done under the circumstances.  It is a limitation 
that needs to be acknowledged, but also accepted. In the final chapter this issue will be 
revisited and some ideas for follow up research to compare espoused beliefs with acted-
on beliefs will be discussed.  
Hence, using executives as only information source means that the intended instrument will 
be measuring executives’ conscious beliefs (what they believe they believe), as opposed to 
beliefs-in-use (the beliefs they act on). 
In the same way, it must be emphasized that by focusing on the strategic beliefs as 
expressed by individual executives, the instrument might not always be valuable as a 
diagnostic tool for understanding executives’ recent actions or decisions. By asking 
executives how they believe they should act in future, the instrument should reveal a lot about 
what executives would like to be, not what they have been like so far. In other words, the 
instrument should give insight into their aspirational self – what they believe they should do 
– as opposed to their actual self – how they have behaved so far. This is important to keep in 
mind; the instrument looks forward to intended actions, not backwards at past actions. 
 
 
13.2.3 General Beliefs, not Situational Beliefs 
Consistent with an etic-type research approach (see chapter 1), a further scope limitation is 
that it is not the intention to measure executives’ situation-specific opinion, but rather their 
more fundamental attitude. Of course, executives usually also have a view on the best 
strategy for their current business and might even have ideas about the best strategic direction 
for other organizations, but the measurement instrument has not be designed to capture their 
situation-specific preferences. The focus is on identifying general strategy principles to which 
executives subscribe, regardless of the particular circumstances. 
 Given this focus, it is good to keep in mind that the predictive value of the instrument 
for an executive’s situation-specific point of view will not be perfect. While an executive 
might espouse a general strategy principle, he/she might always come to a different 
conclusion, given the special circumstances of a strategic issue. 
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13.2.4 Belief Preferences, not Belief Durability  
A last scope limitation is that the instrument is intended to measure what executives currently 
believe, not how durable these beliefs are. The focus is on mapping executives’ actual 
strategy views, not the stability of these views over time. This is a significant limitation, as it 
can not be determined whether executives have deeply-engrained ideologies or superficial 
preferences. This is the same problem faced by political pollsters in between elections – 
people will tell you their opinions, but it is difficult to distinguish between “hard core 
believers” and “opportunistic voters”. One executive who scores high on a particular strategy 
perspective might hold the core ideas as fundamental truths, while another might accept them 
now as the ‘flavor of the month’.  
Measuring the “robustness” of executives’ views would require longitudinal research, 
to assess the stability/rigidity of strategy perspectives over time. This retest stability is an 
interesting avenue for further research, for which the measurement instrument would be a 
suitable tool, but it is beyond the scope of the current study.  
 
 
13.3 DESIGN OF THE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT  
 
Hence, the measurement instrument should be a quantitative tool for mapping the general 
strategy preferences of individual executives, which can be directly administered to the 
executives themselves. For the design of such a psychometric instrument the standards set by 
the European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations (EFPA) have been employed 
(Bartram, 2002). The following design choices have been made: 
 
 Number of constructs. In the previous chapters, 10 dimensions have been identified which 
can be used to measure the views of executives. Each dimension is based on a tension 
between two partially conflicting demands, which executives find difficult to pursue 
simultaneously. It was therefore argued that most people tend to emphasize the pursuit of 
one demand over the other – they treat the tension as a trade-off. Practically-speaking, it 
is usually difficult to agree with the arguments on both sides of the 10 dimensions, as they 
are often mutually-exclusive. Yet, having said this, one can not assume beforehand that if 
an executive does not agree with the strategy perspective at one side of the dimension, 
they will automatically agree with the opposite perspective. Therefore, as a precaution, 
the support for each perspective must be measured separately. So, with 20 potential 
strategy perspectives with which executives can agree, there are 20 constructs that must 
be measured. In the next chapter, as part of the analysis of the construct correlation, it will 
be discussed whether the 20 constructs can actually be collapsed into 10, that coincide 
with the 10 dimensions outline in the theoretical framework. 
 Construct scale. A reliable measure for a construct requires 5 or 6 items/statements with 
which the respondents can agree or disagree. These items should reflect the main 
characteristics of the strategy perspective in a logically sound manner (which is referred 
to as the issue of construct validity; Hair et al., 2006) and the respondents should react to 
them in a consistent way (which is referred to as the issue of internal consistency or 
reliability). In the previous chapters, 12 potential items were formulated in a theoretically 
valid manner for each of the 20 constructs. The approach taken has been to reduce these 
12 items to 6 in such a way that the reliability test (Cronbach α > 0.70) could be met. A 
description of this process of scale construction will be given in the following section. 
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 Scale type. The most common scale type is the Likert 5-point scale. This scale has also 
been used here, as there was no reason to diverge from this norm. On the contrary, as 
most respondents are familiar with a Likert scale, this was seen as an advantage, since 
respondents can focus on the content of the items, instead of getting accustomed to the 
scale employed. The stem question used for all items is “Do you agree or disagree with 
the following statement?”, to which the respondents have the following 5 options: “totally 
disagree”, “disagree”, “in between”, “agree” and “totally agree”. 
 
EXHIBIT 13.1  
Open card sort response mode via website interface 
 
Note: The top central card (in light blue) is the card at the top of the stack, which needs to be placed in 
one of the five boxes below. In this example, some cards have already been placed in these boxes. The 
last card placed in each box remains visible throughout the exercise and the respondent can scroll 
through the cards in each box using the triangular buttons underneath. All cards can be moved 
between boxes at will, if the respondent changes his/her mind. 
 
 Response mode. The approach to answering the 5 options is referred to as open card sort. 
Instead of presenting respondents with a long, disheartening list of items, behind which 
they need to tick-the-box, a stack of 120 cards is presented via a web-based computer 
program, with one item per card (see exhibit 13.1 for a screenshot). The respondent is 
given the assignment to drop each card into one of five boxes, corresponding with the five 
Likert-scale options. It is anticipated that this more user-friendly and engaging response 
mode will ensure a higher response rate. There has been no limit imposed on the number 
of cards that can be dropped into each box (i.e. “open”), as there is no preconceived 
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reason why respondents should be limited in the number of items with which they agree 
or disagree. 
 Administration mode. All respondents are invited by e-mail to participate in the exercise 
and are given the correct web address, as well as a password and user name, to ensure that 
only invitees use the measurement instrument. All invitees are free to complete the 
exercise whenever they have the time, but within a month of the invitation. All responses 
are saved on-line in a central database for further analysis. There is no reason to assume 
that this unsupervised and time-insensitive administration mode will yield a different 
response than a supervised approach or with the imposition of a strict time limitation. 
The web-enabled computer program that has been specifically created to facilitate the 
measurement of strategy perspectives is called the Strategy Profiler. It is accessible via 
www.strategy-profiler.com (see exhibit 13.2 for a screenshot of the home page). The 
computer program consists of four main modules, as is also graphically depicted in figure 
13.1:  
 
EXHIBIT 13.2  
Strategy Profiler website home page 
 
 
1. Instrument construction module. The first building block is the instrument construction 
module (in dark purple in figure 13.1). In this module, items can be inserted and linked to 
each other to create scales, while scales can be linked to each other to create instruments. 
This flexibility of design was required to allow various generations of Strategy Profilers 
to be developed, as insight was gained into which items and scales were valid and 
reliable. 
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2. Respondent information module. The second building block is the respondent information 
module (in red in figure 13.1). Here, all information regarding the respondents is stored, 
structured by organization to which the respondents belong. The only information 
required upfront is the name of the individual, their e-mail address and their organization. 
All other respondent data (see section 13.5 for a description of the personal data 
collected) is filled out by the respondents themselves during the administration of the 
exercise. 
3. Session management module. The third building block is the session management module 
(dark grey in figure 13.1). Here the administrator can create a session, invite the 
respondent to participate, give background information about the objectives of the 
Strategy Profiler, provide instructions about how to proceed and actually administer the 
exercise. Once each respondent has completed the entire exercise and provided their 
required personal data, they are notified that they are finished and can exit the application. 
All data are stored in a common database. 
4. Analysis & reporting module. The fourth building block is the analysis and reporting 
module (light grey in figure 13.1). Here the administrator can make use of the data, either 
to perform specific analyses or to generate standardized reports containing a number of 
preset analyses. In these ‘template’ reports the administrator has the option to compare 
the individual to other individuals or groups using the data in the database. For specific 
analyses, the data can be downloaded into excel or SPSS, offering a multitude of analysis 
possibilities. 
 
FIGURE 13.1  
Strategy Profiler architecture 
Preparation
Process
1
2
3
Profiling 
Process
4
InstrumentsInstrumentsOrganizations
Instruments
Participant
Administration
Instruction
Organizations
Instrument
Session
Reporting
 
 
248
Part III: Capturing Different Views 
232 
The great advantage of having this web-enabled computer program, as opposed to a paper-
based survey, has been the ease of use for both respondents and administrator. Respondents 
have been able to receive the survey instantaneously anywhere around the world, completing 
it and sending it away again within 30 to 45 minutes. A certain novelty value has also made 
participating extra enticing. For the administrator it has made the sending out of surveys and 
the back office work of data entry significantly more efficient. The only important drawback 
of this technology-solution has been the dependency it creates – if the software fails, the 
problems are large. The “challenge” this has produced will be described further on in this 
chapter.     
 
 
13.4 APPROACH TO SCALE CONSTRUCTION 
  
While it is extremely exciting for a strategic management researcher to venture into the 
domain of another discipline such as psychometrics, being unfamiliar with the terrain and 
with the laws of the land requires extra caution. It was, therefore, necessary to take an 
approach that would compensate for this lack of familiarity and allow for learning and 
adaptation to take place along the way. 
Hence, a rather long process of refinement was employed, moving from broad and 
exploratory, to more detailed and statistically robust. In the initial phases, the emphasis was 
on the internal and external validity of the measurement scales – do the items and the scales 
make theoretical sense (internal validity) and are they really measuring what they are 
intended to measure (external validity). In later phases, as it became clearer that the emerging 
instrument made sense, the emphasis shifted more towards the reliability of the measurement 
instrument. In the following sections the four main steps in this refinement process will be 
described. 
 
13.4.1 Theory-Building Phase 
As was outlined in chapter 1, the general approach to the construction of a strategy 
perspective measurement tool has been theory-driven. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first step 
in the refinement process has been to develop the theoretical framework of 10 dimensions 
and 20 perspectives as described in the previous chapters. This development process was 
started approximately 10 years ago, in close cooperation with Bob de Wit, on the basis of an 
earlier textbook titled Strategy – Process, Content, Context: An International Perspective (De 
Wit and Meyer, 1994). The first version of this theoretical framework was published as the 
second edition of the Strategy textbook (De Wit and Meyer, 1998). The final, slightly revised, 
version as described in the previous ten chapters was at the heart of the third edition of 
Strategy – Process, Content, Context: An International Perspective (De Wit and Meyer, 
2004).  
 The advantage of this long incubation period and the framework’s dispersion via a 
widely-used strategic management textbook is that dozens of academic colleagues and 
management practitioners have responded and commented on its theoretical robustness and 
practical applicability. This process of feedback and theoretical refinement stretching over a 
period of a decade will not be described here in detail, but it is important to note that the 
framework as published in 2004 has received considerable acceptance within the 
international academic community, judging by the positive reviews gained before and after 
publication of the text (e.g. Baack, 2005, in the Academy of Management Learning and 
Education) and the high number of professors and lecturers employing Strategy as their main 
textbook (as of September 2006 there are 182 users registered via the companion website). 
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 Throughout this period, further internal validation of the theoretical framework was 
sought via conference papers at the Strategic Management Society annual conferences 
(Meyer, 1998; De Wit and Meyer, 2000, 2004), the Academy of Management annual 
conferences (Meyer, 2000) and a Strategic Management Society mini-conference specifically 
organized around the issue of “Plurality, Perspectives and Paradoxes” in Rotterdam in 2002 
(Meyer, 2002). Initial external validation was solicited via presentations to business 
practitioners. During the last ten years, more than 200 presentations have been given in 15 
different countries, to review the relevance of the framework vis-à-vis executives 
understanding of their own perspectives.  
 
13.4.2 Exploratory Phase  
The second step in constructing the measurement scales was to move from the general 
theoretical framework to items or questions that could be used to test executives’ perspectives 
and to see whether executives actually recognized the results. This phase was broadly 
exploratory for two reasons; first, because it was unclear what the best format would be for 
testing each perspective, and secondly, because of unfamiliarity with the formulation of 
questions, items or statements with which to solicit a response.     
 Format-wise, there were a number of options. The most important variations that were 
considered were the following: 
 Cases vs. Items. Many questionnaires measuring executives’ views attempt to describe a 
managerial situation, to which each respondent is asked to select their preferred action 
(e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars, 1993).  These ‘mini-cases’ often require a few lines 
of text to explain the situation, and are followed by a number of alternative responses. 
This was the first approach considered, but rejected. It was anticipated that the advantage 
of such a format might be the high reality level for executives, who are used to judging a 
situation and making a choice out of alternatives. However, the disadvantage of such 
mini-cases is that they require considerable reading time in a very concentrated way, 
especially if each case has different potential answers. Given the need for approximately 
5 to 6 data points per construct, this would require much more than an hour to complete 
for each respondent, which makes this approach highly impractical. Few respondents 
would be willing to spend this much time and few would be able to remain concentrated 
throughout the exercise. Therefore, the main alternative was chosen, which is to present 
short statements to executives and to ask if they agree or disagree. Given the simple 
calculation that 20 perspectives require 5 to 6 data points each, this means that 100 to 120 
items are required. If each can be read and judged within 30 seconds, the whole survey 
could be completed within an hour. Items that could be read and judged even faster are 
then even better. Therefore, an approach was taken to formulate items that were no longer 
than 25 words.  
 Separate items vs. linked items. The second issue was whether each item should be judged 
individually, or whether respondents should be asked to compare items and answer which 
item they agreed with more. Presenting each item separately was deemed to have the 
advantage of simplicity and speed, while presenting sets of items for comparison was 
deemed to be more discriminatory. If people are confronted with a forced choice, they 
have to take a position, whether they want to or not. And since the objective of the 
measurement instrument is to identify strategy-making preferences, this approach has the 
advantage of uncovering a person’s beliefs more readily. Hence, a choice was made in 
favor of forced choice. Here, again, there are various options, of which ranking, either/or 
choice and more/less choice are the most important. In ranking, respondents must put 
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various items in order, from most preferred to least preferred. This was judged too 
cumbersome for such a large set of items. An either/or choice is like a ranking, but with 
only two items, of which one is most preferred. This was judged too rough-grained. 
Therefore, the third option was selected, the more/less choice, in which the respondent 
must indicate along a scale between two items whether he/she is more or less inclined 
towards one or the other statement. 
At the same time, formulation-wise it was also unclear what type of items would appeal to 
executives. Should they be objectively dry or emotionally charged, emphasize the positive of 
a strategy perspective or touch on the allergies that people might have, use popular language 
or more scientific descriptions, and be more conceptually formulated or more concrete.  
 To explore what would work best, a first draft of the Strategy Profiler was made on 
paper and then peer-reviewed by 5 colleagues. After various revisions, the first Strategy 
Profiler, with 10 sets of more/less choices was field tested on 155 executives in the period 
from July 2001 to April 2002 (see exhibit 13.3). The executives who filled out the Strategy 
Profiler constituted a sample of convenience, as they were all participants in various 
executive management programs taking place during this period (see table 13.1). 
 
EXHIBIT 13.3  
Set-up of original strategy profiler 
Firms should engage in thorough strategic 
analysis and rational problem solving. 1......2......3......4......5......6....7 
Firms should engage in unorthodox thinking 
and creative problem solving. 
Firms should first formulate strategic plans, 
then move to disciplined implementation. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms should gradually shape strategy, 
through learning and unfolding events. 
Firms should push through strategic 
changes rapidly and dramatically.   1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms should keep up a steady pace of 
moderate changes. 
Firms should be driven by market oppor- 
tunities, developing competences to match. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms should be driven by their strong 
competences, developing markets to match.
Firms’ business units should be autono- 
mous, only sharing investment funds. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms’ business units should be highly 
coordinated and share key resources. 
Firms should be independent and assertive 
in their relations with other firms. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms should be interdependent and 
cooperative in their relations with others. 
Developments in an industry can be 
strongly shaped by individual firms. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Developments in an industry cannot be 
influenced by individual firms. 
Developments in firms can be fully 
controlled by top management. 1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Developments in firms will be the result of 
uncontrollable internal dynamics. 
International firms should focus on global 
standardization and integration.  1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
International firms should focus on local 
(national) adaptation and responsiveness. 
Firms should primarily focus on earning a 
profit for the shareholders.   1......2......3......4......5......6......7 
Firms should serve the interests of all 
stakeholders in a balanced manner. 
 
In each group, after filling out the Strategy Profiler form and discussing their results, three 
additional questions were asked: 
1. Did you understand all the statements? 
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2. Do you recognize the tension between each set of statements? 
3. Do you feel that your choice represents your true perspective? 
 
TABLE 13.1  
Exploratory phase sample 
 
Group  Program Period Number& Level Country of Origin 
Krauthammer 
International 
Strategic 
Leadership 
July 2001 -
January 2002 
14 Senior 
Consultants 
Netherlands, Britain, 
France, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland, Belgium 
Cap Gemini Strategy 
Consulting 
September 2001 
– March 2002 
12 Senior 
Consultants 
Netherlands 
Bled School of 
Management 
Executive MBA September 2001 45 Middle & 
Senior Managers 
Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, 
Hungary, Russia, Poland 
Mercuri Urval In-company MBA October 2001 23 Middle 
Managers 
Netherlands 
FME-CWM International 
Strategy 
October 2001 16 Export 
Managers 
Netherlands 
Jones Lang 
Lasalle 
In-company MBA November 2001 22 Middle 
Managers 
Britain, Belgium, 
Netherlands, France, USA 
Astra Zeneca In-company MBA February 2002 17 Middle 
Managers 
Sweden, Netherlands, 
Britain, Belgium, Germany 
VNU In-company MBA April 2002 16 Middle 
Mangers 
Britain, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France 
 
In this exploratory phase, the responses were not codified or recorded, but an open discussion 
was pursued to get a rich picture of how the respondents experienced the questionnaire. The 
major learnings during this phase were the following:  
 
1. Understanding statements. Generally, there was a positive reaction to the short and 
accessible style used for the items. However, various individuals remarked that the 
English used was a bit too complicated and that some words seemed to be jargon, 
indicating that more attention would need to go into checking the formulation of the 
items. The overall conclusion from the feedback was that despite all of the effort to 
formulate unambiguous items, it is difficult to anticipate how people might “misinterpret” 
an item and therefore that all items need to be thoroughly field-tested before being 
adopted.  
2. Recognizing the tension. The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that they 
recognized the tension represented by the two statements. In other words, in terms of 
external validity, these responses seemed to signal that the Strategy Profiler was 
measuring along meaningful dimensions. However, there were also quite a few people 
who indicated that they found it difficult to choose between the two statements, because 
they agreed with both, either because they did not recognize the tension, or more 
commonly because they felt that it depended on the circumstances. There were also 
people who agreed with both, because they felt that the two perspectives could be 
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reconciled with one another. Some of these individuals circled more than one number on 
the scale, while others chose the middle position. However, there were other people who 
chose the middle position because they agreed with neither statements, or didn’t know, or 
agreed a bit with each. In other words, the initial assumption that using a forced choice 
format would be more advantageous had to be reexamined. If some people felt that the 
forced choice was not legitimate, this should be a major concern. Furthermore, if circling 
the middle option could mean different things (i.e. agree with both, disagree with both, 
and agree a little with both), then the results of the measurement instrument would also be 
ambiguous. The conclusion from this feedback was that it would be better to drop the 
forced choice format and move to independent items. 
3. Representing the perspective. Almost all respondents felt that this simple Strategy Profiler 
gave them a reasonable picture of their strategy perspective. After a thorough explanation 
of all of the dimensions and strategy perspectives, most people recognized very clearly 
why they had selected a particular answer. However, it also became clear how vulnerable 
a measurement tool is, if it only uses one data point for each dimension. Where people 
had misunderstood the item (which happen most on the 6th, 7th and 8th dimensions), they 
were subsequently also likely to circle a response which they later thought to be 
inappropriate. The conclusion that was drawn from this feedback was that at least 5 to 6 
well-tested items would be needed to ensure the “correct” measurement of people’s 
perspectives.  
 
A last learning that should be mentioned was that a paper-based survey approach was 
extremely inefficient and impractical. Inefficient because creating an overview of a group’s 
score required a lot of manual work, not to mention what it would cost to enter all data into a 
database. Impractical, because handing out paper forms on the spot created the problem that 
the participants wanted to take their scores home with them, while it was the intention that all 
forms were to be handed in for processing and as a matter of record. It was clear that a user-
friendly psychometric instrument would have to be more efficient and flexible for 
respondents and administrators.  
 
13.4.3 Darwinian Phase 
The next step in constructing the measurement scales was to move from a 20 item paper-
based format to a 120 item web-based system. This required a significant effort in designing, 
building and testing dedicated software. To avoid reinventing the wheel, contact was sought 
with an experienced test-builder with a strong interest in designing software systems. This led 
to the creation of a software version of the Strategy Profiler, as described in section 13.3. 
 Besides the move to cyberspace, the two most important changes to the scale 
development approach were the shift to 6 items per construct and the use of 20 independent 
constructs, hence the need for 120 items in total. However, it was recognized that one major 
learning from the previous phase was going to be difficult to implement directly – 
formulating 120 unambiguous and discriminating items. As argued above, avoiding 
vagueness, imprecision, jargon and complicated English is difficult enough, but it is almost 
impossible to know upfront how certain items might be open to multiple interpretations. 
 To deal with this challenge, a two-pronged approach was taken. First, all newly-
formulated items were reviewed by a group of 18 academics and executives to identify as 
many potential faults as possible. Secondly, not the required 120 items were formulated, but 
240, so that there would be plenty of room for a “survival of the fittest” approach to arriving 
at a final set of 120 items. 
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 This Darwinian process was organized in three rounds. First, from March to 
September 2004 the first batch of 120 items (20 x 6 items) was tested on a sample of 153 
individuals. On the basis of the reliability tests and validity checks with respondents (see 
below) the most promising items were harvested from this batch. Then, from October 2004 
until March 2005 the second batch of 120 items was tested on a sample of 182 individuals. 
Again the reliability scores and validity checks were used to weed out the weaker items. 
Subsequently, the best items from both batches were added together and from April 2005 
until June 2006 data were collected using this third iteration of the Strategy Profiler. A total 
of 424 individuals were tested using this Strategy Profiler 3.0. 
 All 759 respondents to the Strategy Profiler received a detailed written report, 
outlining their strategy perspective preferences, often contrasting them with their colleagues 
who also filled out the survey. As part of this procedure, ‘debriefing meetings’ were held 
with 126 respondents by 4 researchers, primarily intended to discuss their “strategy profile” 
with them. From a research perspective, however, the objective was to check the external 
validity of the profiling outcomes. Respondents were asked whether they recognized 
themselves in the results and where they didn’t, their responses to the items were reviewed, to 
see why. This information was collated and used in interpreting the reliability scores of each 
scale at each step in the Darwinian process.  
 
13.4.4 Consolidation Phase 
Unfortunately, despite all the robustness built into the Darwinian process, not all of the 
constructs in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 met the reliability threshold of Cronbach α ≥ 0.70. 
Actually, of the 20 constructs, only 2 were higher than 0.70, while 9 others were between 
0.60 and 0.70 (see table 13.2). After more than two years of testing, this was a rather 
disappointing result. 
 There were two potential conclusions that could be drawn from the low reliability 
scores. On the one hand, it could be that an attempt was being made to measure something 
that didn’t exist. Although a lot of care had been placed on construct validity, it could be that 
the strategy perspectives did not exist in reality as clearly as was predicted from the 
theoretical framework. On the other hand, it was also possible that the items formulated were 
not capturing the strategy perspectives in the correct way.  
 To check what was going on, a factor analysis was performed on all 120 items in the 
Strategy Profiler 3.0 set (for a detailed description, see next chapter). What was found was 
that for quite a few constructs the items loaded on to different factors, indicating that these 
constructs were actually made up of two or three components, with a relatively weak level of 
correlation between them. In other words, a number of the constructs had been defined too 
broadly. This is a common problem in developing a valid and reliable measurement 
instrument (Kline, 1998).  
The general challenge when constructing an instrument is to balance between a 
construct that is too narrow and one that is too broad. In practice it is very easy to achieve a 
high level of reliability, by keeping the construct very narrowly defined – the more specific it 
is, the more all items will be largely identical, leading to a high Cronbach alpha. This is also 
referred to as a bloated specific – being very precise about something insignificant. If a 
construct is kept extremely simple and does not leave room for recognizing the various 
aspects of a particular phenomenon, the reliability of a measure will increase, but its 
relevance will be low and the construct validity will often be rather doubtful. However, at the 
same time, the opposite danger is also lurking – the ill-defined construct. If a construct is 
defined too broadly, sweeping together a number of phenomena that might be theoretically 
related, but in practice are not tightly-linked, then the reliability of the instrument will suffer; 
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the broader the construct, the more heterogeneity within its boundaries, the lower the 
reliability. So, while a broader construct often has the appeal of explaining more of reality 
and being more useful, this validity and relevance comes at a price.  
 
TABLE 13.2  
Reliability Scores Strategy Profilers 1-3* 
Strategy Perspective 
Version 1.0 α 
N = 153 
Version 2.0 α 
N = 182 
Version 3.0 α 
N = 385** 
Rational Reasoning (Logic) 0.70 0.58 0.68 
Generative Reasoning (Creativity) 0.40 0.38 0.51 
Strategic Planning (Deliberateness) 0.69 0.68 0.77 
Strategic Incrementalism (Emergence) 0.41 0.58 0.51 
Discontinuous Renewal (Revolution) 0.57 0.50 0.63 
Continuous Renewal (Evolution) 0.64 0.54 0.69 
Outside-In (Markets) 0.21 0.29 0.47 
Inside-Out (Resources) 0.56 0.28 0.55 
Portfolio Org (Responsiveness) 0.62 0.51 0.61 
Integrated Organization (Synergy) 0.53 0.59 0.59 
Discrete Organization (Competition) 0.48 0.51 0.51 
Embedded Organization (Cooperation) 0.48 0.46 0.55 
Industry Dynamics (Compliance) 0.36 0.42 0.38 
Industry Leadership (Choice) 0.16 0.50 0.47 
Organizational Leadership (Control) 0.58 0.69 0.66 
Organizational Dynamics (Chaos) 0.25 0.39 0.65 
Global Convergence (Globalization) 0.61 0.53 0.60 
International Diversity (Localization) 0.54 0.36 0.62 
Shareholder Value (Profitability) 0.69 0.69 0.71 
Stakeholder Values (Responsibility) 0.66 0.68 0.60 
* The darkest boxes are scores >0.70; the medium dark boxes are scores between 0.60 and 0.70. 
** Of the 424 respondents, 39 were filtered out for the analyses (see section 13.5) 
 
In the case of the Strategy Profiler, the factor analysis made clear that in balancing 
between narrow and broad constructs, the theoretical framework had leaned too far over to 
the side of broadness. In defining the strategy perspectives, the approach had been too 
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comprehensive and inclusive, attempting to cover too many views with one heading. In 
striving to reduce the complexity of strategy beliefs to 20 main perspectives, still too many 
differences had been lumped together. Obviously, when it comes to strategy beliefs, there is 
even more heterogeneity than the 20 strategy perspectives described in the theoretical 
framework. 
Unavoidably, this meant that an upgraded Strategy Profiler needed to be created. 
There were two ways to bring the reliability of this instrument to the desired level; 
perspectives could be split into a larger number of detailed ones, or the existing 20 could be 
more tightly defined. While it would have been possible to split some perspectives in two, 
leading to 25 or 30 strategy perspectives, a choice was made to stay with the existing 20 and 
ensure that they were more strictly delineated. This choice was based on a thorough analysis 
of the ‘dissident’ items that would have formed the core of a separate perspective. It was 
judged that the different beliefs that had been lumped into the 20 strategy perspectives were 
not fundamental enough to warrant an expansion of the measurement instrument at this 
moment (see the next chapter for a detailed discussion per construct). This does not mean that 
the current measurement instrument is totally comprehensive – new strategy dimensions and 
perspectives can be added in future – but only that the current 20 perspectives do cover the 
most fundamental differences in strategy beliefs found in the management literature. 
 
FIGURE 13.2 
Development steps of the Strategy Profiler 
Strategy
Profiler 1.0
March 2004 –
September 2004
N = 153
Items = 120
Strategy
Profiler 2.0
October 2004 –
March 2005
N = 182
Items = 120
Strategy
Profiler 4.1
September 
2006
N = on-going
Items = 120
Strategy
Profiler 4.0
July 2006 –
August 2006
N = 135
Items = 147
Strategy
Profiler 3.0
April 2005 –
June 2006
N = 424
Items = 120
94 Items
59 Item
s
61
 Ite
ms
120 Items
 
 
For the last major iteration of the measurement instrument, the Strategy Profiler 4.0, a total of 
53 new items were created and added to 94 existing items, leading to a total set of 147 items. 
This strange amount was due to the fact that again a bit Darwinism was built into the testing 
process. For construct scales were there was little worry only 6 items were included, but for 
scales that had been thoroughly revised, 7 or 8 items were incorporated, to allow for some 
pruning along the way. To speed up this final phase of instrument development, it was 
decided to avoid the lengthy process of acquiring respondents from a broad range of 
organizations, as was done for the first three Strategy Profilers. Instead, during the summer of 
2006 a group of 261 managers from one international company, Bank ABC, were asked to 
fill out the Strategy Profiler. This resulted in a group of 135 respondents who found time 
during the summer, which was sufficient to ascertain the reliability of the instrument. These 
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scores were also used to reduce the final set of items of the Strategy Profiler 4.1 to 120 (see 
figure 13.2).    
 
 
13.5 APPROACH TO SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
Building a ‘general purpose’ psychometric tool requires a totally different approach to sample 
selection than when testing hypotheses. In the latter case, it is extremely important to 
narrowly define the sample group, to ensure a high level of homogeneity among the 
respondents. The more similar the respondents on all characteristics except those being 
studied, the easier it is to ‘isolate’ the specific correlation between the independent and 
dependent variables. In the case of developing a general psychometric tool, this precision in 
sample selection is not required. However, it is necessary that the sample group is broadly 
representative of the group for which the measurement tool is later intended and that there is 
no systematic bias that might color the presumed usefulness of the instrument.  
 As this tool is intended to measure the strategy perspectives of a wide variety of 
business executives, it was seen as important from the outset to have a heterogeneous 
respondent group, largely made up of executives. This meant that focusing on the more easily 
accessible MBA students was not seen as an option, but rather that hundreds of executives 
needed to be found that would be willing to invest their time and energy in filling out the 
Strategy Profiler. Ideally, these executives would be as diverse as possible, not only to avoid 
a systematic bias in the responses, but also to test whether the instrument was understandable 
and useful to a broad range of executives. A number of dimensions along which diversity was 
sought were nationality, industry, organization, functional area and organizational level. 
 The approach used to achieve such sample diversity, while also having some 
motivational factor to get the executives to fill out the Strategy Profiler in a serious way, was 
to make the instrument a mandatory prerequisite for many of the executive training programs 
run by Strategy Academy during the last few years. This approach has led to 759 respondents 
to the first 3 versions of the Strategy Profiler. As can be seen in table 13.3, the harvest of this 
method has been a richly diverse group, ideally suited to the objective of instrument testing. 
As was mentioned earlier, the Strategy Profiler 4.0 was also tested on a diverse sample of 
executives, but all from one company, Bank ABC, to speed up the development process. 
 
13.5.1 Improving Response Rate 
To get the highest possible response rate, making the Strategy Profiler a mandatory part of an 
executive training program was a useful tactic. Although compulsory, the training 
participants did not feel forced into ‘filling out a survey’, as the Strategy Profiler was seen as 
a very useful introduction into the training course for which they had chosen. To make the 
‘bait’ even more attractive, all participants in the Strategy Profiler process were promised 
(and given) a 24-page personalized report, containing an analysis of their strategy profile. To 
avoid potential worries that their responses could be used for grading or assessment purposes, 
it was made very explicit that all data would be treated anonymously and that the 
personalized reports would only be sent to the respondents themselves.  
To make the entire process as convenient as possible, all participants were invited by 
email and only needed to click on the link to get to the appropriate webpage of the Strategy 
Profiler. This specific invitation was usually preceded by a personal email from the lecturer 
explaining what the strategy training was intended achieve and how the Strategy Profiler was 
a necessary preparation for the program. All respondents were given a month to complete the 
profiler, but if they had not completed it after 3 weeks, a reminder was sent to them.  
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TABLE 13.3 
Strategy Profiler Respondents 
Characteristics 
Version 1.0 
N = 153 
Version 2.0 
N = 182 
Version 3.0 
N = 424 
Version 4.0 
N = 135 
Organizations 16 64 168 1 
Industry Categories 9 14 18 1 
Nationalities 11 15 20 9 
Non-Dutch (%) 80  (52%) 99  (54%) 286  (67%) 124  (92%) 
Females (%) 47  (31%) 44  (24%) 99  (23%) 51  (38%) 
Non-students (%) 128  (84%) 180  (99%) 384  (91%) 135  (100%) 
≥ 10 Years Manager (%) 39  (25%) 52  (29%) 79  (19%) 27  (20%) 
Marketing / Sales (%)  12  (8%) 29  (16%)  68  (16%) 31  (23%) 
Operations / Logistics (%) 10  (7%) 14  (8%) 18  (4%)  41  (30%) 
Finance (%) 16  (10%) 20  (11%) 71  (17%) 27  (20%) 
General Management (%) 11  (7%) 71  (39%) 56  (13%) 7  (5%) 
Other Function (%) 69  (45%) 46  (25%) 92  (22%) 29  (21%) 
 
The result has been that approximately 85% of all the executives invited to participate in the 
Strategy Profiler have also done so (424 of the 508 invitees). The executives who have failed 
to fill out the Strategy Profiler have almost all given a lack of time as reason, which does not 
suggest any systematic bias. For the Strategy Profiler 4.0 the response rate was much lower 
(52%), as 261 people were contacted to participate without any directly linked management 
development program. These people were all past participants in a course and were asked to 
fill out the Strategy Profiler 4.0 on the basis of goodwill and with the incentive of an 
individual report. Given the date of receiving the invitation to participate (mid-July) and the 
deadline (end of August) the response rate was actually very good. There also didn’t seem to 
be a bias among the non-respondents, except lack of time. 
 
13.5.2 Ensuring Response Quality 
It is not only important to get participants to fill out the instrument, but it is also essential that 
they actually spend time and energy to do a thorough job. This is particularly important given 
the fact that the Strategy Profiler has 120 items, which means that participants have to stay 
concentrated during a period of 30 to 45 minutes. 
 Naturally, the best way to get high response quality is to make the instrument so 
interesting that remaining concentrated is easy. The web-based approach, the card-sort 
interface and the stimulating items are all intended to achieve this objective. Promising 
participants a personalized strategy profile report has also been intended to motivate them to 
do a good job, so as to get a meaningful result for themselves. 
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 Yet, just in case some participants were not really motivated and filled out the 
answers at random, or lost their concentration somewhere during the profiling process, two 
types of ‘consistency tests’ were developed and applied to identify the qualitatively poor 
responses: 
 
 Inter-item consistency tests. Some of the items used in the instrument are the absolute 
opposites of one another. If a participant agrees with one of the items, it is logically-
inconsistent to also agree with the opposite. Therefore, one would expect someone who 
scores a ‘5’ (fully agree) on the one item, to score a ‘1’ (fully disagree), and vice versa. If 
respondents are given a lot of leeway in responding ‘consistently’, most combinations 
would be allowed, except 1-1, 1-2, 4-5 and 5-5. If someone scores a ‘4’ on the one item 
and a ‘5’ on the other, they are being extremely logically-inconsistent. Given the 
background of the respondents, it seems unlikely that such inconsistence is due to a lack 
of reasoning skills and therefore it must be concluded that they were incapable or 
unwilling to use their reasoning capabilities when engaged in the Strategy Profiler. In 
total 4 pairs of items were used for the inter-item consistency test (items 3.9 and 4.9; 5.1 
and 6.1; 5.2 and 6.2; and 11.12 and 12.12) and each inconsistency resulted in one point. 
 Intra-scale consistency tests. The second check for measuring inconsistency was to 
calculate how inconsistent each person responded to the items of one scale. If the scale is 
reliable, yet the individual’s response to the six items is highly inconsistent, then this is 
further proof that this person seems to be answering ‘at random’ or at least is not trying to 
be well-reasoned. This intra-scale inconsistency was measured by looking at the standard 
deviation on the 3 most reliable scales (rational reasoning, strategic planning and 
shareholder value). Any person scoring higher than twice the standard deviation was 
considered inconsistent. These people were given one point per inconsistency.    
Any of participants who had 2 or more points in these tests was filtered out of the responses 
before further analyses were performed This procedure was only carried out from Strategy 
Profiler 3.0 and further. In the 3.0 version 39 respondents were deleted in this way (9%), 
while in the 4.0 version 8 respondents were dropped (6%). 
 A final way in which the response quality was protected was to ensure that the 
strategy course taught to the executives by a member of the Strategy Academy did not bias 
their answers. This was achieved simply by conducting all Strategy Profiling sessions in 
advance to the strategy training programs. In the case of the Bank ABC respondents, their 
previous course was not on the topic of strategy. 
 
13.5.3 Additional Data Collected 
Anticipating that it would be extremely valuable to correlate strategy perspective scores with 
personal attributes in later research, a module was added to the Strategy Profiler to collect 
this data. The difficulty was that without hypotheses, it is extremely difficult to determine 
which types of personal attributes might be of importance. Yet, in this research no hypotheses 
have been formulated, as there is very little literature describing strategy perspectives, let 
alone suggesting factors that might be an influence on which strategy perspective executives 
embrace. 
Therefore, a choice was made to select a number of very general attributes, with 
which a first exploratory scan could be made of the potential factors impacting strategy 
beliefs. Four categories of attributes were selected; demographic, positional, experiential and 
organizational (see table 13.4). All of these attributes are highly objective and could be 
recorded by means of a closed answer format, which made the data coding much simpler. 
259
Chapter 13: Developing the Measurement Instrument  
243 
More subjective and complex personal attributes (e.g. personality type, IQ, interest in 
strategy, political preference, leadership style and salary) were left out of the data collection. 
 
TABLE 13.4 
Personal Attributes Recorded 
Category Attribute Answers 
Gender Male - Female 
Age Linear 
Nationality All countries 
Education Level Primary, Secondary, Bachelors, Masters, Doctorate 
Demographic 
 
Education Area Law, Social Sciences, Engineering, Business Studies, Economics, 
Computing Science, Mathematics, Philosophy/Religion, Education, 
Biology/Chemistry/Physics, Languages, Medicine/Nursing, Other  
Function Not Employed, Student, Professor/Trainer, Consultant, Specialist/Staff, 
Manager, Executive Director, Non-Executive Director 
Sub-Function Unit of < 10 employees, Unit of 10 - 49 employees, Unit of 50 -99 
employees, Unit of 100 – 499 employees, Unit of 500 – 999 employees, 
Unit of 1000 – 9999 employees, Other top management position  
Positional 
Functional Area General Management, Human Resources, Marketing, Operations/Logistics, 
Information Management, Finance, Research/Development, Procurement, 
Sales, Strategy, Other Staff Function, Other 
Functional Area 
Experience 
< 1 year, 1 -3 years, 4 – 9 years, 10 – 19 years, 20 – 29 years, 30 – 39 
years, > 40 years 
Most 
Experienced 
Functional Area 
General Management, Human Resources, Marketing, Operations/Logistics, 
Information Management, Finance, Research/Development, Procurement, 
Sales, Strategy, Other Staff Function, Other 
Years at 
Organization 
< 1 year, 1 -3 years, 4 – 9 years, 10 – 19 years, 20 – 29 years, 30 – 39 
years, > 40 years 
Working 
Experience 
< 1 year, 1 -3 years, 4 – 9 years, 10 – 19 years, 20 – 29 years, 30 – 39 
years, > 40 years 
Experiential 
Management 
Experience 
< 1 year, 1 -3 years, 4 – 9 years, 10 – 19 years, 20 – 29 years, 30 – 39 
years, > 40 years 
Employer All companies 
Industry Agriculture, Oil/Mining/Gas, Chemicals/Materials, Pharmaceuticals, 
Construction/Infrastructure, Industrial and Professional Goods, Durable 
Consumer Goods, Fast-Moving Consumer Goods, Media and Software, 
Trade and Retail, Transportation and Distribution, Utilities and Telecom 
Services, Education, Government, Health Care Services, Financial 
Services, Professional Services, Tourism, Other Business Services, Other 
Consumer Services, Other 
Organizational 
Number of 
Employees 
< 10 employees, 10 - 49 employees, 50 -99 employees, 100 – 499 
employees, 500 – 999 employees, 1000 – 9999 employees, 10,000 – 
99,000 employees, > 100,000 employees 
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To ensure that people would not be discouraged by the need to first give all of their personal 
information before being allowed to start with the Strategy Profiler, this module was placed 
at the end of the session. Once participants complete the sorting of all the cards, they need to 
complete all of the personal information before they can save and exit the session. The 
‘threat’ of having sorted all of the cards ‘for nothing’ gives an extra motivation for those 
participants who would otherwise not be very enthusiastic to fill out the last few questions. 
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Chapter 14 
 
 
  
CONSTRUCTING THE MEASUREMENT 
SCALES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
While in the previous chapter the overall architecture of the instrument development was 
described, in this chapter the construction is taken to hand. The task is the hands-on work of 
crafting the measurement scales that make up the instrument, going into the details of 
reliability scores, inter-item correlations and item selection. The approach taken is to balance 
comprehensiveness and readability. One the one hand, it is important to specify the steps that 
have been taken to arrive at the final measurement scales, explaining the reasoning and 
precautions that have been taken. On the other hand, it is the intention to remain intelligible 
and accessible to the interested reader. Winston Churchill’s famous quip that “this report by 
its very volume guards itself against the threat of being read” should not be applicable to this 
book. 
 To make reading easier, the structure of this chapter will follow the order in which the 
theoretical constructs were presented in the previous chapters. In section 14.2 each of the 20 
scales will be reviewed and evaluated, with a focus on reaching an adequate level of 
reliability. Then in section 14.3 the correlation between the scales will be examined, to check 
whether they are sufficiently independent. This will be complemented by a factor analysis 
across all items, not only to confirm the separate nature of each scale, but also to see whether 
each pair of opposite scales can be collapsed into a ‘composite’ scale. Finally, a cluster 
analysis will be presented to see whether there are recurrent profiles across all of the scales, 
pointing towards more fundamental “strategy types”. This analysis of clusters of strategy 
perspectives will be presented in section 14.4. 
 
 
14.2 CONSTRUCTING THE STRATEGY PERSPECTIVE SCALES 
 
In the theoretical framework a total of 20 strategy perspectives were described and each was 
concluded with a set of 12 matching items, making a total of 240. Of these, the first 6 of 
every set were used in the Strategy Profiler 1.0 (20 x 6 = 120 in total), while the second 6 of 
each set were used in the Strategy Profiler 2.0. The intention of this procedure was to 
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evaluate the quality of the items and to merge the best ones into the Strategy Profiler 3.0. 
This evaluation was based on four complementary elements:  
 
1. Scale reliability. First, the Cronbach alpha of the set of items was calculated and it was 
assessed whether dropping any items would increase the scale reliability. 
2. Inter-item correlations. A second valuable piece of information was provided by the 
inter-item correlation coefficients, indicating which items had a high level of correlation. 
3. Mean and standard deviation per item. Items with a low standard deviation were also 
deemed to be less valuable to scale construction as they are less discriminant. This low 
deviation was usually linked to an extremely high or low mean, indicating that the item 
was too universally popular or unattractive to be sufficiently differentiating. 
4. Debriefing session feedback. Finally, to understand why some items were not showing the 
level of correlation expected, the feedback from the 126 debriefing sessions was used. 
This qualitative feedback from the participants (see section 13.4.3 for a description of the 
procedure) helped to clarify how the items were being interpreted.  
 
The items in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 were again tested and reviewed using the above 
elements. Furthermore, a factor analysis was performed to assess whether all items loaded on 
to the same factors as expected (see section 14.3.2 for a detailed description). This 
information about each item and set of items was used to select 94 items that were kept in the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0. To this group a further 53 new items were added and assessed a last 
time. These 147 items were finally reduced to a set of 120 items (Strategy Profiler 4.1) with a 
satisfactory reliability score.  
 In the following pages this five step process will be cycled through 20 times, to 
explain how each of the scales was finally constructed. Each section starts with three 
overview tables, in which the results of the Strategy Profiler 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 for each specific 
scale have been summarized. After these three tables, the development process is reviewed 
and changes to the Strategy Profiler 4.0 are discussed. To keep this entire compact, the tables 
have not been numbered. All item numbers in the tables correspond with those in the theory 
chapters. 
 
14.2.1 Rational Reasoning Perspective: Scale 1 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,70 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
1.1 
Item 
1.2 
Item 
1.3 
Item 
1.4 
Item 
1.5 
Item 
1.6 
Item 1.1 3,49 ,91 1,000 ,294 ,256 ,318 ,285 ,329 
Item 1.2 3,64 1,06 ,294 1,000 ,077 ,430 ,343 ,077 
Item 1.3 4,24 ,80 ,256 ,077 1,000 ,262 ,237 ,368 
Item 1.4 3,45 1,03 ,318 ,430 ,262 1,000 ,380 ,218 
Item 1.5 2,88 1,02 ,285 ,343 ,237 ,380 1,000 ,340 
Item 1.6 3,70 ,93 ,329 ,077 ,368 ,218 ,340 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient; 1.2 and 1.4 have the 
highest correlation coefficient; 1.1 also 
correlates significantly with them. 
Items 1.3 and 1.6 have a high mean, 
indicating less discrimination; 1.5 a low 
mean. 
Dropped items focus too much on 
objectivity and scientific approach, as 
opposed to rationality. 
Retained: 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,58 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
1.7 
Item 
1.8 
Item 
1.9 
Item 
1.10 
Item 
1.11 
Item 
1.12 
Item 1.7 3,25 1,03 1,000 ,380 ,096 ,140 ,350 ,222 
Item 1.8 3,61 1,01 ,380 1,000 ,055 ,181 ,247 ,279 
Item 1.9 3,76 ,99 ,096 ,055 1,000 ,181 ,154 ,020 
Item 1.10 3,40 1,11 ,140 ,181 ,181 1,000 ,183 ,044 
Item 1.11 3,36 1,22 ,350 ,247 ,154 ,183 1,000 ,253 
Item 1.12 3,34 1,11 ,222 ,279 ,020 ,044 ,253 1,000 
Alpha too low; 1.7 and 1.8 have the 
highest correlation coefficient; 1.11 also 
correlates significantly with this set. 
Items 1.9 and 1.10 have low correlation 
coefficients; 1.12 is acceptable. 
Dropped items focus too much on 
evaluation and information gathering, as 
opposed to rationality. 
Retained: 1.7, 1.8 and 1.11 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,68 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
1.1 
Item 
1.2 
Item 
1.4 
Item 
1.7 
Item 
1.8 
Item 
1.11 
Item 1.1 3,35 ,97 1,000 ,370 ,272 ,286 ,205 ,195 
Item 1.2 3,65 1,01 ,370 1,000 ,392 ,341 ,223 ,175 
Item 1.4 3,33 1,01 ,272 ,392 1,000 ,399 ,303 ,333 
Item 1.7 3,39 1,07 ,286 ,341 ,399 1,000 ,194 ,208 
Item 1.8 3,79 ,99 ,205 ,223 ,303 ,194 1,000 ,121 
Item 1.11 3,57 1,17 ,195 ,175 ,333 ,208 ,121 1,000 
No improvement to the alpha; all items 
correlate significantly; item 1.11 has the 
lowest coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
Retained: All except 1.11 
 
Although the rational reasoning scale scored an alpha of 0.70 in the Strategy Profiler 1.0, the 
construct still seemed a bit too broadly defined. Elements such as objectivity, scientific 
approach, information gathering and thorough evaluation seem to be closely associated with 
this perspective, given the reasonably high reliability scores, but are not at the heart of the 
construct. The actual core is the preeminence of rationality and an analytical approach. 
Therefore, one new item was formulated, to be inserted into the Strategy Profiler 4.0. It was 
anticipated that by focusing on the core concept and using a challenging formulation this item 
should add both to reliability and discrimination. 
 
Item 1.13 The best strategists are more analytical than creative. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,69 this scale 
seems to be very consistent, despite all variations tried out. The new item 1.13 does not 
contribute to a higher overall reliability (dropping it would push the reliability up marginally 
to 0,70) but it does load nicely on to the same factor as many of the other items, making it a 
valuable item for a composite scale (see section 14.3.2). Therefore it will be included with all 
others in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
1.1 
Item 
1.2 
Item 
1.4 
Item 
1.7 
Item 
1.8 
Item 
1.13 
Item 1.1 3,67 ,86 1,000 ,404 ,218 ,257 ,162 ,239 
Item 1.2 3,94 ,94 ,404 1,000 ,469 ,280 ,185 ,083 
Item 1.4 3,54 ,83 ,218 ,469 1,000 ,433 ,379 ,098 
Item 1.7 3,82 ,98 ,257 ,280 ,433 1,000 ,383 ,297 
Item 1.8 4,03 ,93 ,162 ,185 ,379 ,383 1,000 ,144 
Item 1.13 2,83 ,87 ,239 ,083 ,098 ,297 ,144 1,000 
Alpha is satisfactory. All items contribute 
to reliability except item 1.13. Without 
this item the reliability goes to 0,70. 
Still, 1.13 loads on to the same factor 
with 1.7 and many others from scale 2, 
and will therefore be retained. 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All 
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14.2.2 Generative Reasoning Perspective: Scale 2 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,40 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
2.1 
Item 
2.2 
Item 
2.3 
Item 
2.4 
Item 
2.5 
Item 
2.6 
Item 2.1 2,90 1,06 1,000 ,257 ,085 ,258 ,082 ,218 
Item 2.2 4,05 1,01 ,257 1,000 -,190 ,256 ,104 ,248 
Item 2.3 2,66 1,13 ,085 -,190 1,000 -,114 -,089 ,061 
Item 2.4 2,98 1,17 ,258 ,256 -,114 1,000 -,003 ,137 
Item 2.5 3,53 ,79 ,082 ,104 -,089 -,003 1,000 ,182 
Item 2.6 3,15 1,12 ,218 ,248 ,061 ,137 ,182 1,000 
Alpha is low; 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 have the 
highest correlation coefficients; these 
are also the natural opposites of the 
items in the rational reasoning set. 
Item 2.3 has a low mean, while 2.5 has 
low correlation coefficients. 
Dropped items focus too much on 
subjectivity and experience, as opposed 
to creativity. 
Retained: 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,38 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
2.7 
Item 
2.8 
Item 
2.9 
Item 
2.10 
Item 
2.11 
Item 
2.12 
Item 2.7 4,02 ,97 1,000 ,025 ,080 ,012 ,117 ,013 
Item 2.8 3,87 1,01 ,025 1,000 ,113 ,363 ,207 ,172 
Item 2.9 3,76 1,03 ,080 ,113 1,000 ,006 ,248 -,030 
Item 2.10 4,02 ,89 ,012 ,363 ,006 1,000 ,172 -,060 
Item 2.11 4,04 1,03 ,117 ,207 ,248 ,172 1,000 ,126 
Item 2.12 4,47 ,69 ,013 ,172 -,030 -,060 ,126 1,000 
Alpha also low; items 2.10 and 2.12 
need to be dropped, due to high mean 
and low SD, leaving 2.8 and 2.11 with 
the highest correlation coefficient. 
Items 2.7 has low coefficient with above 
items; 2.9 is acceptable. 
Dropped items focus too much on vision 
and overcoming existing opinions as 
opposed to creativity. 
Retained: 2.8, 2.9 and 2.11 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,51 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
2.1 
Item 
2.2 
Item 
2.4 
Item 
2.8 
Item 
2.9 
Item 
2.11 
Item 2.1 3,17 ,99 1,000 ,166 ,193 ,138 -,020 ,184 
Item 2.2 3,99 ,89 ,166 1,000 ,208 ,003 ,060 ,354 
Item 2.4 3,13 1,06 ,193 ,208 1,000 ,193 -,011 ,167 
Item 2.8 3,62 1,04 ,138 ,003 ,193 1,000 ,172 ,109 
Item 2.9 3,57 1,17 -,020 ,060 -,011 ,172 1,000 -,040 
Item 2.11 3,95 1,03 ,184 ,354 ,167 ,109 -,040 1,000 
Little improvement to the alpha; only 2.2 
and 2.11 have a high correlation 
coefficient. These two focus on 
creativity. 
Items 2.8 and 2.9 have low correlation 
coefficients, and therefore need to be 
dropped. 
 
Retained: All except 2.8 and 2.9 
 
With an alpha of only 0.51, this scale was still too widely defined. From the feedback of 
participants it became clear that this was due to the ambiguous nature of creativity, 
imagination and vision. Most people seem to have a shared notion of what should be 
understood as analytical or logical, but creative and imaginative have more scope to be 
understood differently. At the same time, elements such as subjectivity, experienced-based, 
visioning and challenging existing beliefs all seem to be somewhat associated with this 
perspective, but they are not at the heart of the perspective and there is even more room for 
interpreting them differently.  
The conclusion was that a tighter focus on the core concepts of creativity, originality 
and inventiveness is required. Therefore, the following three items were formulated, to be 
inserted into the Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7, leaving some room for trial and 
error: 
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Item 2.13 The best strategists are more creative than analytical. 
Item 2.14 In making strategy, original ideas are more important than the cold facts. 
Item 2.15 Successful strategizing is more about being inventive than about being analytical. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,77 this scale is 
now satisfactory. Furthermore, in the factor analysis all items except 2.4 now load on to the 
same factor, indicating that the refocusing of the construct has been successful. As deletion of 
item 2.4 has no negative influence on the alpha, this item will no longer be included in the 
Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,77 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
 
S 
D Item  2.1 
Item 
2.2 
Item 
2.4 
Item 
2.11 
Item 
2.13 
Item 
2.14 
Item 
2.15 
Item 2.1 3,18 1,04 1,000 ,315 ,234 ,198 ,336 ,274 ,324 
Item 2.2 3,94 ,90 ,315 1,000 ,226 ,553 ,336 ,325 ,370 
Item 2.4 2,72 1,09 ,234 ,226 1,000 ,296 ,220 ,191 ,329 
Item 2.11 4,10 ,95 ,198 ,553 ,296 1,000 ,230 ,258 ,439 
Item 2.13 3,24 1,12 ,336 ,336 ,220 ,230 1,000 ,421 ,572 
Item 2.14 2,94 1,10 ,274 ,325 ,191 ,258 ,421 1,000 ,513 
Item 2.15 3,15 1,05 ,324 ,370 ,329 ,439 ,572 ,513 1,000 
Alpha is very satisfactory. All 
new items have high 
correlation coefficients with 
other items. 
Deleting item 2.4 has no effect 
on reliability, but as it loads on 
to a different factor, it will be 
deleted.  
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 2.4 
 
 
14.2.3 Strategic Planning Perspective: Scale 3 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
3.1 
Item 
3.2 
Item 
3.3 
Item 
3.4 
Item 
3.5 
Item 
3.6 
Item 3.1 3,83 1,01 1,000 ,305 ,603 ,390 ,268 ,217 
Item 3.2 4,04 ,94 ,305 1,000 ,510 ,426 ,199 ,027 
Item 3.3 4,25 ,84 ,603 ,510 1,000 ,500 ,297 ,022 
Item 3.4 4,36 ,72 ,390 ,426 ,500 1,000 ,232 ,135 
Item 3.5 2,82 1,09 ,268 ,199 ,297 ,232 1,000 ,050 
Item 3.6 4,34 ,77 ,217 ,027 ,022 ,135 ,050 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; all items have 
high correlation coefficients, except item 
3.6. The second lowest is 3.5, which 
also has a low mean. Third lowest is 3.1. 
Item 3.6 focuses too much on internal 
consistency, as opposed to planning and 
thinking ahead. Item 3.5 is too 
ambiguous. 
 
Retained: 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,68 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
3.7 
Item 
3.8 
Item 
3.9 
Item 
3.10 
Item 
3.11 
Item 
3.12 
Item 3.7 3,58 1,04 1,000 ,099 ,412 ,207 ,334 ,242 
Item 3.8 3,77 1,08 ,099 1,000 ,137 ,036 ,144 ,181 
Item 3.9 3,34 1,05 ,412 ,137 1,000 ,400 ,377 ,345 
Item 3.10 3,21 1,10 ,207 ,036 ,400 1,000 ,474 ,140 
Item 3.11 3,42 1,12 ,334 ,144 ,377 ,474 1,000 ,127 
Item 3.12 4,22 ,86 ,242 ,181 ,345 ,140 ,127 1,000 
Alpha again almost sufficient; items 3.10 
and 3.11 have highest correlation 
coefficient. Item 3.9 fits well with this set. 
Item 3.8 has low coefficients, while 3.7 
and 3.12 are acceptable. 
Item 3.8 focuses on the threat of ad hoc 
management to justify strategic 
planning, which is not universally 
shared. 
Retained: 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,77 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
3.2 
Item 
3.3 
Item 
3.4 
Item 
3.9 
Item 
3.10 
Item 
3.11 
Item 3.2 3,84 1,00 1,000 ,379 ,363 ,271 ,332 ,388 
Item 3.3 4,22 ,82 ,379 1,000 ,387 ,282 ,276 ,410 
Item 3.4 4,19 ,73 ,363 ,387 1,000 ,189 ,234 ,316 
Item 3.9 3,55 1,06 ,271 ,282 ,189 1,000 ,515 ,548 
Item 3.10 3,37 1,11 ,332 ,276 ,234 ,515 1,000 ,542 
Item 3.11 3,56 1,06 ,388 ,410 ,316 ,548 ,542 1,000 
Alpha meets criterion. All items 
significantly correlated; none can be 
dropped without lowering the alpha.  
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All 
 
Of all of the scales, this one was defined the most clearly from the outset. At the center of the 
construct is the notion of looking ahead and detailed planning of activities and investments. 
Concepts associated with strategic planning, such as avoiding ad hoc management and 
creating internal consistency, are linked, but not strongly enough. The conclusion was that 
this scale did not need to be changed for the Strategy Profiler 4.0.  
In this ‘retest’ it again did well, although this time around item 3.4 did not contribute 
to the reliability. Dropping item 3.4 actually improves the reliability from an alpha of 0,68 to 
0,73. Moreover, in the factor analysis item 3.4 loads on to a different factor this time. The 
conclusion for the Strategy Profiler 4.1 is that item 3.4 will be left in provisionally, with the 
possibility of dropping it as a broader group of respondents have completed the instrument.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,68 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
3.2 
Item 
3.3 
Item 
3.4 
Item 
3.9 
Item 
3.10 
Item 
3.11 
Item 3.2 4,05 ,78 1,000 ,098 ,043 ,262 ,363 ,277 
Item 3.3 4,39 ,69 ,098 1,000 ,249 ,305 ,345 ,297 
Item 3.4 4,33 ,71 ,043 ,249 1,000 -,017 -,005 ,096 
Item 3.9 3,89 ,88 ,262 ,305 -,017 1,000 ,532 ,437 
Item 3.10 3,54 1,04 ,363 ,345 -,005 ,532 1,000 ,459 
Item 3.11 3,69 ,96 ,277 ,297 ,096 ,437 ,459 1,000 
With item 3.4 included the alpha is 0,68, 
but if this item is dropped then the alpha 
goes to 0,73.  
Item 3.4 also loads on to a different 
factor.  
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All (3.4 provisionally) 
 
 
14.2.4 Strategic Incrementalism Perspective: Scale 4 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,41 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
4.1 
Item 
4.2 
Item 
4.3 
Item 
4.4 
Item 
4.5 
Item 
4.6 
Item 4.1 2,92 1,04 1,000 ,144 ,394 ,134 -,001 ,184 
Item 4.2 1,82 1,09 ,144 1,000 ,189 -,011 ,085 ,077 
Item 4.3 3,40 1,02 ,394 ,189 1,000 -,130 ,040 ,106 
Item 4.4 4,45 ,72 ,134 -,011 -,130 1,000 ,085 ,084 
Item 4.5 3,90 ,94 -,001 ,085 ,040 ,085 1,000 ,079 
Item 4.6 2,99 1,23 ,184 ,077 ,106 ,084 ,079 1,000 
Alpha is low; 4.1 and 4.3 have a high 
coefficient, while all others are low. 
Items 4.2 and 4.4 are too extremely 
stated, leading to exceptionally low or 
high acceptance (see mean). 
Items 4.5 and 4.6 focus too much on 
unforeseen opportunities and competing 
initiatives, as opposed to flexibility and 
emergence. 
Retained: 4.1and 4.3 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,58 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
4.7 
Item 
4.8 
Item 
4.9 
Item 
4.10 
Item 
4.11 
Item 
4.12 
Item 4.7 3,54 1,07 1,000 ,248 ,393 ,304 ,334 ,314 
Item 4.8 3,77 1,05 ,248 1,000 ,153 -,039 ,138 -,066 
Item 4.9 2,67 1,27 ,393 ,153 1,000 ,365 ,397 ,182 
Item 4.10 4,16 ,97 ,304 -,039 ,365 1,000 ,493 ,041 
Item 4.11 4,32 ,78 ,334 ,138 ,397 ,493 1,000 ,153 
Item 4.12 3,74 1,04 ,314 -,066 ,182 ,041 ,153 1,000 
Alpha still low; 4.10 and 4.11 have the 
highest coefficient; 4.7 and 4.9 are also 
significantly correlated. 
Item 4.8 has low correlation coefficients 
and is stated somewhat ambiguously. 
Item 4.12 focuses too much on 
experimentation and learning, as 
opposed to flexibility. 
Retained: 4.7, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,51 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
4.1 
Item 
4.3 
Item 
4.7 
Item 
4.9 
Item 
4.10 
Item 
4.11 
Item 4.1 3,15 1,09 1,000 ,352 ,310 ,030 ,060 ,129 
Item 4.3 3,42 1,01 ,352 1,000 ,081 -,123 ,000 ,016 
Item 4.7 3,43 1,12 ,310 ,081 1,000 ,081 ,115 ,076 
Item 4.9 2,37 1,22 ,030 -,123 ,081 1,000 ,297 ,312 
Item 4.10 4,03 ,98 ,060 ,000 ,115 ,297 1,000 ,334 
Item 4.11 4,12 ,95 ,129 ,016 ,076 ,312 ,334 1,000 
Adding 4.1 and 4.3 from the Strategy 
Profiler 1.0 did not give the expected 
result; these two only have a high 
coefficient with each other, not with the 
rest. They both focus too much on 
experimentation and exploration, as 
opposed to setting the general direction.  
Surprisingly, all items have lower 
coefficients this time, particularly 4.7.  
Retained: 4.7, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 
 
Taking the best items from both versions and adding them together turned out to be a bad 
tactic in this case, as items 4.1 and 4.3 were focused on a different phenomenon than the 
items retained from the second set. While 4.1 and 4.3 emphasize step by step experimentation 
and gradual exploration, the other items in this scale accentuate the importance of only 
setting a general direction and flexibly filling in the details along the way. The fact that these 
two elements are viewed differently indicates that the strategic incrementalism perspective is 
too broadly defined – it covers both gradual experimentation and pragmatic flexibility. And 
those that favor gradual experimentation and pragmatic flexibility are not always the same. 
The gradually experimental dislike strategic planning because they believe that 
setting a course is impossible; the future must be explored and the direction will unfold while 
traveling. This position is extremely emergence-oriented, almost denying the possibility of 
deliberateness. The pragmatically flexible, on the other hand, dislike strategic planning 
because it is time-consuming, bureaucratic and creates rigidity; they believe it is much more 
productive to set a general direction and figure out the details along the way. This position is 
much less extreme in its emphasis on emergence over deliberateness. So, while both positions 
are against strategic planning, they are so for different reasons and favor a different approach 
to strategy formation. Yet, this distinction has not been clearly identified in the strategic 
management literature.     
This insight came from the feedback interviews, but was also corroborated by the 
factor analysis (see section 14.3). In the factor analysis, items 4.1 and 4.3 never loaded onto 
the same factor as the other strategic incrementalism items. Interestingly, however, they also 
were not negatively related to the strategic planning items, as one might expect, if they were 
accepted by anti-planners. Actually, these items, stressing experimentation and learning, 
grouped together with the continuous renewal items and were negatively related to the 
discontinuous renewal ones, which with hindsight seems quite logical.  
Given the extremely emergence-oriented position of the gradually experimental, it 
was decided to drop these items altogether and to focus the strategic incrementalist 
perspective solely on its ‘traditional core’ of being pragmatically flexible. This resulted in 
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three new items being added to the Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7, leaving room 
for some pragmatic trial and error. 
 
Item 4.13 A good strategy leaves plenty of room to make use of emerging opportunities. 
Item 4.14 Strategies should be flexible, allowing firms to respond to new circumstances. 
Item 4.15 Strategies should be broad guidelines, not rigid plans.  
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. Even after the deletion of item 
4.7, the alpha is only 0,53, which makes this scale still unsatisfactory. Already in the factor 
analysis of the Strategy Profiler 3.0, item 4.7 loaded on to a different factor, and as this is true 
again, its deletion is no great loss. The difficulty, however, is that the remaining items fall 
into two groups of three; 4.9, 4.10 and 4.15 load inversely on the same factor as the strategic 
planning perspective items, while 4.11, 4.13 and 4.14 load together on a separate factor. The 
first three focus on not planning too much in detail, while the second trio focuses on 
flexibility. While in the theoretical framework these two are strongly linked, in practice these 
views are not sufficiently aligned to be measured as one perspective. Therefore, a thorough 
theoretical revision of this perspective is required (see chapter 16). 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,53 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
4.7 
Item 
4.9 
Item 
4.10 
Item 
4.11 
Item 
4.13 
Item 
4.14 
Item 
4.15 
Item 4.7 3,35 1,03 1,000 ,002 ,030 ,230 -,031 ,184 ,053 
Item 4.9 2,02 1,08 ,002 1,000 ,252 ,190 -,014 ,044 ,189 
Item 4.10 3,82 1,03 ,030 ,252 1,000 ,276 -,022 ,090 ,355 
Item 4.11 4,11 ,85 ,230 ,190 ,276 1,000 ,165 ,132 ,188 
Item 4.13 4,25 ,77 -,031 -,014 -,022 ,165 1,000 ,414 ,074 
Item 4.14 4,44 ,70 ,184 ,044 ,090 ,132 ,414 1,000 ,135 
Item 4.15 4,27 ,76 ,053 ,189 ,355 ,188 ,074 ,135 1,000 
Alpha is still low; including item 
4.7 it is 0,51; if this item is 
dropped it is 0,53. Item 4.7 also 
loads on to a different factor. 
Items 4.13 and 4.14 have a low 
discriminant value and only have 
a high coefficient with each 
other. 
 
Scale Rejected 
Retained: 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 & 4.15 
 
14.2.5 Discontinuous Renewal Perspective: Scale 5 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,57 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
5.1 
Item 
5.2 
Item 
5.3 
Item 
5.4 
Item 
5.5 
Item 
5.6 
Item 5.1 2,87 1,14 1,000 ,282 ,187 ,104 ,389 ,260 
Item 5.2 2,65 1,12 ,282 1,000 ,169 ,064 ,405 ,034 
Item 5.3 2,10 1,02 ,187 ,169 1,000 ,216 ,284 ,015 
Item 5.4 2,89 1,09 ,104 ,064 ,216 1,000 ,224 -,038 
Item 5.5 2,55 1,18 ,389 ,405 ,284 ,224 1,000 ,096 
Item 5.6 3,27 1,16 ,260 ,034 ,015 -,038 ,096 1,000 
Alpha is too low; items 5.2 and 5.5 have 
the highest correlation coefficient. There 
coefficient with 5.1 is high, but with 5.3 is 
barely acceptable. The mean of 5.3 is 
also rather low.  
Item 5.6 is too ambiguous.  
Item 5.4 focuses too much on longer 
periods of stability between changes, 
which is not accepted by all. 
Retained: 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,50 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
5.7 
Item 
5.8 
Item 
5.9 
Item 
5.10 
Item 
5.11 
Item 
5.12 
Item 5.7 3,05 1,20 1,000 -,053 ,213 ,010 ,069 ,395 
Item 5.8 2,85 1,15 -,053 1,000 ,124 -,086 ,135 -,028 
Item 5.9 2,65 1,15 ,213 ,124 1,000 -,074 ,174 ,258 
Item 5.10 3,87 1,00 ,010 -,086 -,074 1,000 ,060 -,037 
Item 5.11 2,15 1,00 ,069 ,135 ,174 ,060 1,000 ,227 
Item 5.12 2,59 1,14 ,395 -,028 ,258 -,037 ,227 1,000 
Alpha is lower; only 5.7 and 5.12 have a 
high correlation coefficient. With item 5.9 
it is reasonable. 
Item 5.8 is stated too negatively. 
Items 5.10 and 5.11 focus too much on 
disruption, uncertainty and overthrowing 
regimes, as opposed to bold and 
decisive action. 
Retained: 5.7 and 5.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,63 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
5.1 
Item 
5.2 
Item 
5.3 
Item 
5.5 
Item 
5.7 
Item 
5.12 
Item 5.1 3,21 1,02 1,000 ,351 ,172 ,366 ,301 ,156 
Item 5.2 3,00 1,00 ,351 1,000 ,251 ,382 ,215 ,154 
Item 5.3 2,58 1,10 ,172 ,251 1,000 ,193 ,068 ,087 
Item 5.5 3,05 1,08 ,366 ,382 ,193 1,000 ,285 ,158 
Item 5.7 3,12 1,21 ,301 ,215 ,068 ,285 1,000 ,180 
Item 5.12 2,57 1,15 ,156 ,154 ,087 ,158 ,180 1,000 
Alpha is slightly higher, but still too low; 
items 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5 still have high 
coefficients with one another. Item 5.7 
also fits in this set.  
Item 5.12 has low coefficients and mean, 
but will be retained as extra item.  
Item 5.3 also has low coefficients and 
mean; too much emphasis on the use of 
crisis to achieve change.   
Retained: 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.7 and 5.12 
 
At the core of this perspective is the belief that bold and decisive organizational change is 
better than gradual and exploratory. However, there seems to be some variation in whether 
such radical change is seen as a necessary evil or a positive shake-up. The items which 
emphasized the ‘necessary evil’ side of revolution (‘crisis to undermine potential resistance’, 
‘disruption and uncertainty can be endured’ and ‘overthrowing old regimes’) were less well 
liked and produced more diffuse responses, than the more positively or neutrally formulated 
ones. Furthermore, the theoretical argument that discontinuous renewal allows for longer 
periods of intermediate stability (punctuated equilibrium theory) does not seem to have many 
supporters at all, not even among those inclined towards the discontinuous renewal 
perspective. Therefore, two new, more neutrally-formulated, items were added to the Strategy 
Profiler 4.0.  
 
Item 5.13 A revolutionary approach to organizational change is better than an evolutionary one. 
Item 5.14 A gradual approach to organizational change usually leads to very few changes at all. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. Both new items have high 
correlation coefficients with the other items, thus contributing to the scale reliability in the 
manner foreseen. With an alpha of 0,70, this scale is now satisfactory. As deletion of item 5.2 
leads to an alpha of 0,72, this item will no longer be included in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,70 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item 
5.1 
Item 
5.2 
Item 
5.5 
Item 
5.7 
Item 
5.12 
Item 
5.13 
Item 
5.14 
Item 5.1 2,94 ,97 1,000 ,271 ,325 ,163 ,201 ,325 ,306 
Item 5.2 2,83 1,02 ,271 1,000 ,194 ,000 ,028 ,100 ,154 
Item 5.5 2,76 ,96 ,325 ,194 1,000 ,242 ,279 ,466 ,399 
Item 5.7 3,09 1,15 ,163 ,000 ,242 1,000 ,129 ,313 ,334 
Item 5.12 2,57 1,13 ,201 ,028 ,279 ,129 1,000 ,360 ,383 
Item 5.13 2,87 ,96 ,325 ,100 ,466 ,313 ,360 1,000 ,445 
Item 5.14 2,81 1,06 ,306 ,154 ,399 ,334 ,383 ,445 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient; with all 
items included it is 0,70 and if 
5.2 is dropped it is 0,72. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 5.2 
  
14.2.6 Continuous Renewal Perspective: Scale 6 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,64 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
6.1 
Item 
6.2 
Item 
6.3 
Item 
6.4 
Item 
6.5 
Item 
6.6 
Item 6.1 2,90 1,09 1,000 ,273 ,110 ,289 ,421 ,262 
Item 6.2 3,29 1,08 ,273 1,000 ,135 ,348 ,254 ,087 
Item 6.3 3,71 1,07 ,110 ,135 1,000 ,155 ,065 ,183 
Item 6.4 3,60 1,14 ,289 ,348 ,155 1,000 ,238 ,161 
Item 6.5 3,12 1,07 ,421 ,254 ,065 ,238 1,000 ,388 
Item 6.6 3,89 1,11 ,262 ,087 ,183 ,161 ,388 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; items 6.1 and 
6.5 have the highest coefficient. Items 
6.2 and 6.4 complement the group. Item 
6.6 is quite acceptable. 
Only item 6.3 has low correlation 
coefficients; it focuses on the need for a 
crisis, which does not fit well.  
 
Retained: All except 6.3 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,54 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
6.7 
Item 
6.8 
Item 
6.9 
Item 
6.10 
Item 
6.11 
Item 
6.12 
Item 6.7 3,19 1,16 1,000 ,079 ,096 -,059 ,249 ,081 
Item 6.8 2,73 1,10 ,079 1,000 ,275 ,199 ,159 ,187 
Item 6.9 3,32 1,12 ,096 ,275 1,000 -,025 ,334 -,075 
Item 6.10 2,66 1,04 -,059 ,199 -,025 1,000 ,198 ,130 
Item 6.11 2,79 1,05 ,249 ,159 ,334 ,198 1,000 ,033 
Item 6.12 2,81 1,07 ,081 ,187 -,075 ,130 ,033 1,000 
Alpha is low; only 6.9 and 6.11 have a 
high coefficient. Item 6.8 is reasonable.  
6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 have high standard 
deviations; 6.8 and 6.10 a low mean. 
Item 6.7 and 6.12 are stated too 
negatively. 
 
 
Retained: 6.11 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
6.1 
Item 
6.2 
Item 
6.4 
Item 
6.5 
Item 
6.6 
Item 
6.11 
Item 6.1 2,95 1,03 1,000 ,437 ,389 ,403 ,138 ,188 
Item 6.2 3,24 1,10 ,437 1,000 ,427 ,291 ,108 ,150 
Item 6.4 3,65 1,00 ,389 ,427 1,000 ,316 ,197 ,172 
Item 6.5 3,06 1,01 ,403 ,291 ,316 1,000 ,219 ,298 
Item 6.6 3,76 1,05 ,138 ,108 ,197 ,219 1,000 ,168 
Item 6.11 2,80 1,04 ,188 ,150 ,172 ,298 ,168 1,000 
Alpha is almost acceptable; items 6.1, 
6.2, 6.4 and 6.5 have high coefficients. 
Item 6.11 also has reasonable 
coefficients.  
Item 6.6 is the most likely candidate for 
deletion, as it has the highest mean. It is 
too much about not making a mess, 
which everyone agrees with.  
   
Retained: All except 6.6 
 
At the core of this perspective is the belief that gradual and continuous organizational change 
is better than sudden and dramatic. The emphasis seems to be on what employees can handle; 
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allowing them to adapt their routines and embrace the changes voluntarily are key. The 
notion that continuous renewal requires constant pressure to keep up the pace of change is 
accepted, but not warmly. The threat that radical change will mess things up by changing too 
many things simultaneously is also acknowledged, but it is not a concern central to this 
perspective. Therefore, item 6.6 was dropped for the Strategy Profiler 4.0. Two new items 
were added, one more neutrally formulated and one stressing the importance of employee 
acceptance. In both cases, the evolutionary approach was positioned vis-à-vis a revolutionary 
approach to achieve a more discriminating effect. 
 
Item 6.13 An evolutionary approach to organizational change is better than a revolutionary one. 
Item 6.14 Pursuing revolutionary change usually creates huge resistance and low acceptance.  
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. Both new items have high 
correlation coefficients with the other items. With an alpha of 0,79, this scale is now 
satisfactory. As deletion of item 6.11 leads to an alpha of 0,78, but reduces the set of items to 
the intended maximum of 6, this item will no longer be included in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,79 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item 
6.1 
Item 
6.2 
Item 
6.4 
Item 
6.5 
Item 
6.11 
Item 
6.13 
Item 
6.14 
Item 6.1 3,01 1,00 1,000 ,482 ,389 ,384 ,258 ,370 ,226 
Item 6.2 3,21 1,02 ,482 1,000 ,477 ,481 ,320 ,471 ,308 
Item 6.4 3,71 ,93 ,389 ,477 1,000 ,383 ,130 ,392 ,183 
Item 6.5 3,05 ,93 ,384 ,481 ,383 1,000 ,355 ,430 ,307 
Item 6.11 2,69 1,03 ,258 ,320 ,130 ,355 1,000 ,316 ,295 
Item 6.13 3,22 ,94 ,370 ,471 ,392 ,430 ,316 1,000 ,348 
Item 6.14 3,27 ,98 ,226 ,308 ,183 ,307 ,295 ,348 1,000 
Alpha is satisfactory. All items 
contribute to the reliability.  
Dropping item 6.11 only 
reduces the alpha to 0,78 and 
therefore this item will be 
deleted. 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 6.11 
 
 
14.2.7 Outside-In Perspective: Scale 7 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,21 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
7.1 
Item 
7.2 
Item 
7.3 
Item 
7.4 
Item 
7.5 
Item 
7.6 
Item 7.1 3,65 1,05 1,000 ,135 ,237 -,026 ,084 ,144 
Item 7.2 2,55 1,04 ,135 1,000 ,076 -,140 ,271 -,008 
Item 7.3 4,16 ,86 ,237 ,076 1,000 -,034 -,014 ,134 
Item 7.4 2,69 1,16 -,026 -,140 -,034 1,000 -,155 ,097 
Item 7.5 3,16 1,00 ,084 ,271 -,014 -,155 1,000 -,036 
Item 7.6 3,93 ,79 ,144 -,008 ,134 ,097 -,036 1,000 
Alpha is very low; only items 7.2 and 7.5 
have reasonable correlation coefficient. 
Item 7.1 has the next highest. 
Items 7.3 and 7.6 are too generally 
formulated and lack discriminant value 
(see low SD and high mean). 
Item 7.4 focuses too much on building 
static market position, instead of 
responding to the market.   
Retained: 7.1, 7.2 and 7.5 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,29 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
7.7 
Item 
7.8 
Item 
7.9 
Item 
7.10 
Item 
7.11 
Item 
7.12 
Item 7.7 4,20 ,70 1,000 ,201 ,009 ,048 ,029 ,037 
Item 7.8 3,96 ,91 ,201 1,000 -,220 ,021 -,048 ,071 
Item 7.9 2,63 1,05 ,009 -,220 1,000 ,035 ,161 ,218 
Item 7.10 3,51 1,07 ,048 ,021 ,035 1,000 -,062 -,127 
Item 7.11 3,34 1,16 ,029 -,048 ,161 -,062 1,000 ,318 
Item 7.12 2,37 ,93 ,037 ,071 ,218 -,127 ,318 1,000 
Alpha is also very low; only 7.11 and 
7.12 have a high correlation coefficient. 
Item 7.9 has the next highest coefficient 
with these two.  
Item 7.7 seems too complex and low in 
discriminant value, while 7.8 is too 
ambiguous. 
Item 7.10 is too sweeping, leaving too 
much room for ambiguity. 
Retained: 7.9, 7.11 and 7.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,47 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
7.1 
Item 
7.2 
Item 
7.5 
Item 
7.9 
Item 
7.11 
Item 
7.12 
Item 7.1 3,86 ,95 1,000 ,006 -,062 ,059 ,092 -,055 
Item 7.2 2,71 1,05 ,006 1,000 ,224 ,093 ,151 ,360 
Item 7.5 3,24 1,06 -,062 ,224 1,000 ,230 ,069 ,136 
Item 7.9 2,70 ,99 ,059 ,093 ,230 1,000 ,113 ,171 
Item 7.11 3,21 1,28 ,092 ,151 ,069 ,113 1,000 ,015 
Item 7.12 2,11 ,94 -,055 ,360 ,136 ,171 ,015 1,000 
Alpha has not improved by much; there 
is a fundamental flaw in this scale.  
Items 7.2 and 7.12 are a pair, focusing 
on markets first. Next come 7.5 and 7.9, 
which are about straying from core 
competences.   
Item 7.1 has low coefficients and a high 
mean. Item 7.11 has a high SD and is 
too statically formulated.   
Retained:  7.2, 7.5, 7.9 and 7.12 
 
While the theoretical framework places considerable weight on the argument of building up 
defensible market positions, in practice the people who feel most attracted to this strategy 
perspective are those who believe that speed and adaptability to the market are the key 
ingredients of organizational success. At the core of the perspective is the idea of being 
market-driven and not wanting to get stuck exploiting aging competencies. However, this is a 
very difficult notion to capture, as being market-driven seems so close to being market-
oriented, which everyone will agree with.  
This struggle to find short, simple and clear-cut statements distinguishing between 
market-driven and market-oriented is visible in the poor reliability scores above. Item 7.1 is a 
good example; most executives agree with the need to flexibly respond to emerging market 
opportunities, making the item too weak as differentiator. The items that work the best are 
those that stress the need to respond to the market, despite the absence of the correct 
competences, such as 7.2 and 7.12. Therefore, three new items were formulated around the 
concept of not falling in the competence trap (see chapter 5). All three state the preeminence 
of the market as a driver, as opposed to the importance of core competences. These three 
were added to Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7 items for this scale. 
 
Item 7.13 Staying close to your core competences is a too conservative approach. 
Item 7.14 Successful firms are willing to throw away their core competences if market opportunities are 
better elsewhere. 
Item 7.15 Always follow the market, even when you don’t have the right technologies and capabilities yet. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,74, this scale 
is now satisfactory. All three new items have high correlation coefficients with the 4 retained 
items, although item 7.15 can be deleted without any reduction of the reliability. Therefore, 
this item will no longer be included in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,74 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
7.2 
Item 
7.5 
Item 
7.9 
Item 
7.12 
Item 
7.13 
Item 
7.14 
Item 
7.15 
Item 7.2 2,90 1,01 1,000 ,382 ,292 ,460 ,327 ,195 ,211 
Item 7.5 3,12 1,04 ,382 1,000 ,380 ,362 ,348 ,244 ,215 
Item 7.9 2,41 ,95 ,292 ,380 1,000 ,369 ,352 ,227 ,236 
Item 7.12 2,22 ,97 ,460 ,362 ,369 1,000 ,287 ,208 ,304 
Item 7.13 2,58 1,02 ,327 ,348 ,352 ,287 1,000 ,428 ,123 
Item 7.14 2,26 ,98 ,195 ,244 ,227 ,208 ,428 1,000 ,110 
Item 7.15 2,21 1,03 ,211 ,215 ,236 ,304 ,123 ,110 1,000 
Alpha is satisfactory. All items 
contribute to the reliability, but 
item 7.15 can be deleted 
without incurring a reduction in 
reliability. 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 7.15 
 
 
14.2.8 Inside-Out Perspective: Scale 8 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,56 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
8.1 
Item 
8.2 
Item 
8.3 
Item 
8.4 
Item 
8.5 
Item 
8.6 
Item 8.1 3,66 ,97 1,000 ,216 ,131 ,373 ,099 ,081 
Item 8.2 3,19 1,01 ,216 1,000 ,066 ,305 ,079 ,112 
Item 8.3 3,21 1,08 ,131 ,066 1,000 ,259 ,545 ,053 
Item 8.4 3,86 ,88 ,373 ,305 ,259 1,000 ,087 ,174 
Item 8.5 3,60 1,05 ,099 ,079 ,545 ,087 1,000 ,065 
Item 8.6 3,27 ,94 ,081 ,112 ,053 ,174 ,065 1,000 
Alpha is relatively low; items 8.3 and 8.5 
have the highest correlation coefficient. 
Item 8.4 has the next highest 
coefficients. 
Items 8.1, 8.2 and 8.6 are too generally 
formulated, emphasizing importance of 
competences; they lack discriminant 
value. 
 
Retained: 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,28 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
8.7 
Item 
8.8 
Item 
8.9 
Item 
8.10 
Item 
8.11 
Item 
8.12 
Item 8.7 2,93 1,01 1,000 ,016 -,146 ,143 -,077 ,160 
Item 8.8 2,36 1,15 ,016 1,000 ,022 -,093 -,060 ,075 
Item 8.9 2,98 1,09 -,146 ,022 1,000 -,061 -,007 ,292 
Item 8.10 3,49 1,09 ,143 -,093 -,061 1,000 ,007 ,270 
Item 8.11 3,01 1,05 -,077 -,060 -,007 ,007 1,000 ,109 
Item 8.12 3,05 1,27 ,160 ,075 ,292 ,270 ,109 1,000 
Alpha is very low; 8.9 and 8.12 have the 
highest correlation coefficient, and next 
comes the pair 8.10 and 8.12. But oddly 
8.9 and 8.10 are negatively correlated.  
Items 8.7 and 8.8 both seem too 
complex, while 8.11 is too ambiguous. 
 
 
Retained: 8.9, 8.10 and 8.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,55 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
8.3 
Item 
8.4 
Item 
8.5 
Item 
8.9 
Item 
8.10 
Item 
8.12 
Item 8.3 3,30 ,99 1,000 ,208 ,365 ,116 ,195 ,080 
Item 8.4 3,74 1,00 ,208 1,000 ,143 ,315 ,263 ,135 
Item 8.5 3,60 ,96 ,365 ,143 1,000 ,025 ,221 ,088 
Item 8.9 3,06 1,06 ,116 ,315 ,025 1,000 ,108 ,140 
Item 8.10 3,72 1,01 ,195 ,263 ,221 ,108 1,000 ,189 
Item 8.12 2,95 1,29 ,080 ,135 ,088 ,140 ,189 1,000 
Alpha has not improved by much; items 
8.3 and 8.5 still have the highest 
correlation coefficient, with 8.4 and 8.10 
also showing reasonable coefficients. 
Item 8.9 is just acceptable. 
Item 8.12 has low coefficients and a very 
high SD; probably because it is too 
complex. 
 
Retained:  All except 8.12 
 
The challenge here is the mirror-image of that faced when developing the scale for the 
outside-in perspective. Almost everyone readily acknowledges the importance of 
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competences, capabilities and technologies for establishing a competitive advantage (i.e. is 
competence-oriented), but the question is whether they believe a company should also be 
competence-driven. This emphasis on building distinct competences and looking for market 
opportunities to exploit these existing strengths is at the heart of the perspective. The struggle 
in the strategy profiler is again to find simple, short and unambiguous statements to represent 
this rather complex position.  
In a quest to improve the reliability of this scale, two new items were formulated 
around the concept of staying close to the organization’s strengths. These two were added to 
the Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7 items for this scale. 
 
Item 8.13 Firms should focus on the market opportunities closest to their core competencies. 
Item 8.14 Stay close to the firm’s current strengths, instead of chasing wild new market opportunities. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,60, this scale 
is still not entirely sound. The same message can be deduced from the factor analysis, where 
items 8.4, 8.9 and 8.10 all load on to different factors than the other four items that make up 
the core group. This seems rather odd, as items 8.4 and 8.10 did load on to the same factor as 
the others in the previous version of the Strategy Profiler.  
 
 
More positively, however, the new items do have high correlation coefficients with 8.3 and 
8.5, indicating that the tightening of the construct to concentrate around the concept of being 
competence-driven has been successful. This core group of four items has an alpha of 0,66, 
which is almost the level intended. Therefore, for the Strategy Profiler 4.1 only item 8.4 will 
be dropped permanently, while items 8.9 and 8.10 will retained on a provisional basis. After 
wider testing outside of the Bank ABC environment, it might be necessary to drop one or two 
of these items and introduce alternatives, again focusing on the concept of being competence-
driven.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,60 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
8.3 
Item 
8.4 
Item 
8.5 
Item 
8.9 
Item 
8.10 
Item 
8.13 
Item 
8.14 
Item 8.3 3,58 ,96 1,000 ,105 ,260 ,292 ,047 ,381 ,244 
Item 8.4 3,84 ,91 ,105 1,000 ,009 ,256 ,108 -,032 ,058 
Item 8.5 3,70 ,99 ,260 ,009 1,000 ,098 ,112 ,454 ,326 
Item 8.9 3,74 ,91 ,292 ,256 ,098 1,000 ,002 ,111 ,105 
Item 8.10 2,98 1,01 ,047 ,108 ,112 ,002 1,000 ,195 ,358 
Item 8.13 3,90 ,83 ,381 -,032 ,454 ,111 ,195 1,000 ,286 
Item 8.14 3,34 1,01 ,244 ,058 ,326 ,105 ,358 ,286 1,000 
Alpha still too low. Dropping 
item 8.4 brings the alpha up to 
0,62. Also dropping item 8.10 
brings the alpha to 0,64. Then 
dropping item 8.9 brings the 
alpha to 0,66. 
Items 8.10 and 8.9 will be left 
in provisionally, but can be 
dropped later. 
Scale Provisionally Accepted 
Retained: All except 8.4 
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14.2.9 Portfolio Organization Perspective: Scale 9 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,62 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
9.1 
Item 
9.2 
Item 
9.3 
Item 
9.4 
Item 
9.5 
Item 
9.6 
Item 9.1 1,58 ,87 1,000 ,140 ,139 ,201 ,323 ,374 
Item 9.2 2,68 1,09 ,140 1,000 ,142 -,016 ,274 ,349 
Item 9.3 2,81 1,18 ,139 ,142 1,000 ,358 ,134 ,343 
Item 9.4 2,61 1,09 ,201 -,016 ,358 1,000 ,088 ,187 
Item 9.5 2,07 1,05 ,323 ,274 ,134 ,088 1,000 ,244 
Item 9.6 2,57 1,05 ,374 ,349 ,343 ,187 ,244 1,000 
Alpha is relatively high; items 9.1 and 
9.6 have the highest correlation 
coefficient, but 9.2 and 9.5 also have 
high coefficients with this set. 
Interestingly, items 9.3 and 9.4 have a 
high coefficient with each other, but not 
with the other four. They stress the 
importance of financial performance and 
bonuses, as opposed to business unit 
autonomy. 
Retained: 9.1, 9.2, 9.5 and 9.6 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,51 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
9.7 
Item 
9.8 
Item 
9.9 
Item 
9.10 
Item 
9.11 
Item 
9.12 
Item 9.7 3,32 1,00 1,000 ,158 ,062 ,088 ,312 ,213 
Item 9.8 2,26 1,12 ,158 1,000 ,125 ,245 ,211 ,196 
Item 9.9 2,30 ,98 ,062 ,125 1,000 ,061 ,190 ,048 
Item 9.10 2,66 1,09 ,088 ,245 ,061 1,000 ,204 ,291 
Item 9.11 3,12 1,04 ,312 ,211 ,190 ,204 1,000 ,320 
Item 9.12 2,49 ,95 ,213 ,196 ,048 ,291 ,320 1,000 
Alpha is lower; 9.11 and 9.12 have the 
highest correlation coefficient, but 9.7 
also has a high coefficient with these 
two. The coefficients of item 9.10 are 
acceptable. 
Items 9.8 and particularly 9.9 have low 
coefficients and low means, as they are 
against cooperation, instead of pro-
autonomy. 
Retained: 9.11 and 9.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,61 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
9.1 
Item 
9.2 
Item 
9.5 
Item 
9.6 
Item 
9.11 
Item 
9.12 
Item 9.1 1,63 ,87 1,000 ,030 ,118 ,204 ,081 ,048 
Item 9.2 2,61 1,10 ,030 1,000 ,217 ,235 ,157 ,259 
Item 9.5 2,16 ,99 ,118 ,217 1,000 ,292 ,351 ,240 
Item 9.6 2,64 1,03 ,204 ,235 ,292 1,000 ,227 ,212 
Item 9.11 2,77 1,10 ,081 ,157 ,351 ,227 1,000 ,217 
Item 9.12 2,51 1,01 ,048 ,259 ,240 ,212 ,217 1,000 
Alpha has not improved by much; 
keeping 9.1 was not beneficial, as it is 
too extreme; see the low mean and SD. 
All other items have reasonable 
correlation coefficients, but just not high 
enough.  
Item 9.5 will be deleted, due to its very 
low mean; it is too extremely worded. 
Retained:  All except 9.1 and 9.5 
 
In selecting the items for the Strategy Profiler 3.0, a misjudgment was made and item 9.1 was 
inserted, although it was much too extreme (see low mean and standard deviation) and had 
only a moderate correlation coefficient with the other items. On the other hand, item 9.7 was 
filtered out, while it actually had better correlation coefficients. So, in the Strategy Profiler 
4.0, item 9.7 was reinserted. 
On a more fundamental basis, the low reliability score pointed to the need for a more 
restricted definition of the construct. What became clear from the feedback group was that, 
contrary to theory, no one was against synergy. Almost the entire population of respondents 
supported cooperation between business units in an effort to realize synergies. Where the 
major disagreement arose, however, was when this collaboration between business units had 
a negative influence on business unit autonomy. People who felt attracted to the portfolio 
organization perspective supported the idea of cooperation, as long as it had no consequences 
for the freedom of business units to pursue their own objectives. In other words, they were 
willing to advance the cause of synergies, but not to give up BU autonomy. Also contrary to 
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the theoretical framework, this autonomy was not justified by the need for responsiveness to 
the business environment, but by a pragmatic sense of decentralized responsibility, 
entrepreneurship and avoidance of bureaucracy.   
Therefore, in a quest to improve the reliability of this scale, two new items were 
formulated around this core concept of business unit autonomy. These two were added to the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7 items for this scale. 
 
Item 9.13 In strategy, the business units should lead and the corporate head office should facilitate. 
Item 9.14 In successful corporations, almost all key activities and decision-making is done in the business 
units. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. Both new items have high 
correlation coefficients with the other items, bringing the alpha to 0,65. If item 9.6 is 
dropped, the alpha even goes to 0,66, which is still just a bit short of the 0,70 target, yet 
acceptable, especially since all items load on to the same factor in the factor analysis. So, for 
the Strategy Profiler 4.1 all items will be retained, with the exception of 9.6. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,65 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
9.2 
Item 
9.5 
Item 
9.6 
Item 
9.11 
Item 
9.12 
Item 
9.13 
Item 
9.14 
Item 9.2 3,24 1,03 1,000 ,049 ,146 ,102 ,338 ,308 ,385 
Item 9.5 3,09 1,01 ,049 1,000 ,039 ,267 ,220 ,210 ,269 
Item 9.6 2,94 ,94 ,146 ,039 1,000 ,234 ,037 ,043 ,242 
Item 9.11 3,11 1,11 ,102 ,267 ,234 1,000 ,169 ,179 ,250 
Item 9.12 2,54 ,86 ,338 ,220 ,037 ,169 1,000 ,335 ,162 
Item 9.13 3,23 1,11 ,308 ,210 ,043 ,179 ,335 1,000 ,457 
Item 9.14 3,36 ,97 ,385 ,269 ,242 ,250 ,162 ,457 1,000 
Alpha is almost satisfactory; if 
item 9.6 is dropped, then the 
alpha is 0,66. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 9.6 
 
 
14.2.10 Integrated Organization Perspective: Scale 10 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,53 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
10.1 
Item 
10.2 
Item 
10.3 
Item 
10.4 
Item 
10.5 
Item 
10.6 
Item 10.1 4,33 ,75 1,000 ,134 ,026 ,136 ,064 ,393 
Item 10.2 4,05 ,89 ,134 1,000 ,091 ,179 ,212 ,362 
Item 10.3 2,71 1,21 ,026 ,091 1,000 ,340 -,086 ,199 
Item 10.4 2,92 1,18 ,136 ,179 ,340 1,000 ,060 ,236 
Item 10.5 3,27 1,15 ,064 ,212 -,086 ,060 1,000 ,251 
Item 10.6 4,10 ,88 ,393 ,362 ,199 ,236 ,251 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 10.1 and 10.6 have a 
high correlation coefficient, but 10.2 and 
10.5 also have high coefficients with this 
set. 
Just as in the portfolio scale, items 10.3 
and 10.4 have high coefficient with each 
other, but not to the others. They stress 
the importance of financial performance 
and bonuses, as opposed to corporate 
direction. 
Retained: 10.1, 10.2, 10.5 and 10.6 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,59 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
10.7 
Item 
10.8 
Item 
10.9 
Item 
10.10 
Item 
10.11 
Item 
10.12 
Item 10.7 3,80 ,93 1,000 ,489 ,256 ,148 ,165 -,079 
Item 10.8 3,63 ,94 ,489 1,000 ,275 ,201 ,118 ,009 
Item 10.9 4,09 ,80 ,256 ,275 1,000 ,233 ,098 ,017 
Item 10.10 2,68 1,11 ,148 ,201 ,233 1,000 -,011 -,048 
Item 10.11 3,26 1,07 ,165 ,118 ,098 -,011 1,000 ,242 
Item 10.12 3,56 ,97 -,079 ,009 ,017 -,048 ,242 1,000 
Alpha is higher; 10.7 and 10.8 have the 
highest correlation coefficient, but that is 
because they emphasize cooperation, 
just as 10.9; this is not discriminating 
(see mean and SD). 
Item 10.10 deals with the corporate 
composition, which no others do. 
Items 10.11 and 10.12 focus on the core 
issue and have a high coefficient. 
Retained: 10.11 and 10.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,59 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
10.1 
Item 
10.2 
Item 
10.5 
Item 
10.6 
Item 
10.11 
Item 
10.12 
Item 10.1 4,34 ,74 1,000 ,134 ,070 ,337 ,083 ,082 
Item 10.2 4,09 ,93 ,134 1,000 ,247 ,212 ,251 ,241 
Item 10.5 3,45 1,11 ,070 ,247 1,000 ,169 ,414 ,180 
Item 10.6 4,00 ,89 ,337 ,212 ,169 1,000 ,074 ,207 
Item 10.11 3,60 1,13 ,083 ,251 ,414 ,074 1,000 ,173 
Item 10.12 3,49 1,04 ,082 ,241 ,180 ,207 ,173 1,000 
Alpha is still too low; items 10.1 and 10.6 
have a high correlation coefficient, but 
again emphasize sharing, as opposed to 
central direction setting. 
All other items have a reasonable 
correlation coefficient, but just not high 
enough.  
 
Retained:  All except 10.1 & 10.6 
 
Similar to the portfolio organization scale, the problem here was that almost all the 
respondents reacted positively to the terms synergy, sharing and cross-business unit 
cooperation. In contrast to the theoretical framework, most respondents did not explicitly 
recognize that synergy can be at the cost of responsiveness. Likewise, cooperation was 
regarded by most executives as something that is always beneficial, without acknowledging 
that it might be to the detriment of business unit autonomy. In the feedback from the 
participants in the debriefing sessions this embrace of cooperation as a universal virtue 
became particularly clear; being cooperative was seen as desirable by almost all executives. 
To what extent they really believed it to be desirable, and to what extent it was just a socially 
desirable answer, was difficult for the researchers to determine.  
After some further questioning most debriefing participants indicated that the trade-
off they did recognize was between central direction-setting and decentralized initiative. In 
other words, while there was a large measure of agreement on the need to synergize, share 
and work together between business units in corporations, the respondents who favored the 
integrated organization perspective argued that synergizing required headquarters to take the 
lead in setting the strategic direction, while the respondents who leaned towards the portfolio 
organization perspective believed that the business units should be the drivers of any cross-
unit cooperation.  
It was therefore decided to tighten up the definition of the integrated organization 
perspective by focusing on the core concept of central direction-setting (as opposed to 
business unit autonomy). This is defined as headquarters taking the lead in setting the 
direction for the entire company, but does not automatically mean centralization of all 
decision-making, activities and/or resources. Elements such as synergy, cooperation and 
sharing are still closely associated with this perspective and pursued more vehemently than 
by supporters of the portfolio organization perspective, but they are no longer seen as the 
main distinguishing characteristic.  
This refocused definition was translated into three new items that were added to four 
older items, retained from the Strategy Profiler 3.0, bringing the total to 7 items for this scale. 
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Item 10.13 The corporate strategy should be leading and business units should follow very closely.  
Item 10.14 In successful corporations, a lot of key activities and decision-making is done centrally. 
Item 10.15 Business units should have only limited autonomy to deviate from corporate strategic plans.  
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,67, this scale 
is almost satisfactory. As deletion of item 10.14 leads to an alpha of 0,70, this item will no 
longer be included in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
It should be noted that in the factor analysis a number of the items load on to the same 
factor as the global convergence perspective items. However, this is probably due to the fact 
that the sample company, Bank ABC, has business units that are actually country units, 
which means that central direction and central decision-making are highly connected to 
global standardization in their specific situation. Yet, in the follow-up measurements of the 
Strategy Profiler 4.1 this issue needs to be rechecked. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,67 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
10.2 
Item 
10.5 
Item 
10.11 
Item 
10.12 
Item 
10.13 
Item 
10.14 
Item 
10.15 
Item 10.2 4,02 ,89 1,000 ,211 ,146 ,191 ,276 ,108 ,246 
Item 10.5 3,37 1,01 ,211 1,000 ,372 ,309 ,401 ,039 ,295 
Item 10.11 3,72 ,98 ,146 ,372 1,000 ,099 ,297 -,001 ,223 
Item 10.12 3,46 ,97 ,191 ,309 ,099 1,000 ,377 ,075 ,263 
Item 10.13 3,35 ,97 ,276 ,401 ,297 ,377 1,000 ,227 ,442 
Item 10.14 2,75 ,98 ,108 ,039 -,001 ,075 ,227 1,000 ,159 
Item 10.15 2,84 1,07 ,246 ,295 ,223 ,263 ,442 ,159 1,000 
Alpha is almost satisfactory; if 
item 10.14 is deleted, then the 
alpha climbs to 0,70. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 10.14 
 
 
14.2.11 Discrete Organization Perspective: Scale 11 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,48 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
11.1 
Item 
11.2 
Item 
11.3 
Item 
11.4 
Item 
11.5 
Item 
11.6 
Item 11.1 2,48 ,92 1,000 ,239 ,299 ,014 -,145 ,210 
Item 11.2 2,74 1,18 ,239 1,000 ,184 ,164 ,003 ,079 
Item 11.3 1,85 ,94 ,299 ,184 1,000 ,220 ,137 ,313 
Item 11.4 2,70 1,12 ,014 ,164 ,220 1,000 ,058 ,228 
Item 11.5 3,46 1,06 -,145 ,003 ,137 ,058 1,000 ,122 
Item 11.6 2,07 ,91 ,210 ,079 ,313 ,228 ,122 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 11.3 and 11.6 have 
the highest correlation coefficient, 
although both have a very low mean. 
Items 11.1 and 11.2 were seen as too 
complex and ambiguous. 
Items 11.4 and 11.5 focus too much on 
outsourcing relationships as opposed to 
partnerships in general. 
Retained: 11.3 and 11.6 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,51 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
11.7 
Item 
11.8 
Item 
11.9 
Item 
11.10 
Item 
11.11 
Item 
11.12 
Item 11.7 2,64 1,08 1,000 ,228 ,087 ,004 -,018 ,111 
Item 11.8 1,83 ,85 ,228 1,000 ,059 ,146 ,030 ,071 
Item 11.9 3,96 1,08 ,087 ,059 1,000 ,212 ,165 ,143 
Item 11.10 2,43 ,91 ,004 ,146 ,212 1,000 ,269 ,287 
Item 11.11 2,43 ,96 -,018 ,030 ,165 ,269 1,000 ,348 
Item 11.12 2,29 ,93 ,111 ,071 ,143 ,287 ,348 1,000 
Alpha is still low; items 11.11 and 11.12 
have the highest correlation coefficient, 
while 11.9 and 11.10 also have high 
coefficients with this set. 
Items 11.7 and 11.8 again focus on 
buyer-seller relationships as opposed to 
partnerships in general. 
None of the items has a good mean. 
Retained: 11.9, 11.10, 11.11 & 11.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,51 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
11.3 
Item 
11.6 
Item 
11.9 
Item 
11.10 
Item 
11.11 
Item 
11.12 
Item 11.3 1,94 ,91 1,000 ,138 ,029 ,313 ,207 ,225 
Item 11.6 2,03 ,91 ,138 1,000 ,039 -,007 ,051 ,090 
Item 11.9 4,07 ,97 ,029 ,039 1,000 -,058 ,000 ,107 
Item 11.10 2,32 ,93 ,313 -,007 -,058 1,000 ,196 ,369 
Item 11.11 2,43 ,93 ,207 ,051 ,000 ,196 1,000 ,346 
Item 11.12 2,29 ,93 ,225 ,090 ,107 ,369 ,346 1,000 
Alpha still low; 11.10 and 11.12 have the 
highest coefficient, while 11.11 also has 
high coefficients with this set. 
Item 11.9 has low coefficients and a high 
mean, indicating it is popular among all 
respondents, i.e. non-discriminant. Item 
11.6 also has low coefficients. 
Item 11.3 is stated too extremely (see 
mean) 
Retained:  11.10, 11.11 and 11.12 
 
The most obvious difficulty in developing this scale was that almost all items elicited an 
extreme response; they either have a very high or a very low mean. Based on the feedback 
from the debriefing sessions it became clear that this was probably due to two separate 
reasons. First, it seemed that the items had been formulated too resolutely and too negatively, 
which led quite a few people to give them a low score. The one item with a very high mean, 
item 11.9, was also too extremely stated, but then in a positive sense, making it too attractive 
to all respondents, lessening its discriminatory value. Secondly, it also seemed that the low 
means were affected by a slight bias in the sample. Given the high percentage of Dutch 
respondents and their preference against the discrete organization perspective, this appears to 
have had a lowering effect on the item scores. 
 Besides this difficulty, there was also a problem with the scope of the construct. In the 
theoretical framework it was anticipated that discrete organization perspective supporters 
would have the same basic attitude to buyer-supplier interaction as to other forms of inter-
organizational relationships. Therefore, quite a few of the items were formulated around the 
relationship between sellers and their customers. However, it became clear that many 
executives view these relationships differently than the topic of partnerships and alliances in 
general. This did not only emerge out of the debriefing sessions, but could also be seen in the 
factor analysis. The items in Strategy Profiler 3.0 that dealt with buyer-supplier interaction 
(items 11.6 and 11.9, but also 12.6 and 12.7) loaded onto a different factor than the items 
dealing with partnerships and alliances (items 11.1, 11.10, 11.11 and 11.12, but also 12.11 
and 12.12). In the feedback from the respondents it was often pointed out that they felt 
differently about non-voluntary relationships (i.e. those with buyers, suppliers, governments 
and regulators, which they must have) as opposed to voluntary relationships (i.e. ones they 
could engage in if they believed it could bring some advantage). In non-voluntary 
relationships firms must deal with the outside world, although they often have a choice which 
suppliers, customers and governments they want to deal with. In voluntary relationships firms 
have a choice whether to work independently or in unison with a partner. Managing non-
voluntary relationships involves another dynamic, coping with unavoidable dependencies, 
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while opting for voluntary relationships is a different type of choice, between independence 
and interdependence.  
 The conclusion was that the discrete organization perspective construct needed to be 
more tightly defined around one of the two factors. It was decided to focus on the voluntary 
relationships, as this is much closer to the core concept of organizational independence vs. 
interdependence. However, it must be pointed out that in future the topic of non-voluntary 
relationships, with its associated aspects such as vertical integration and outsourcing, could 
be a fruitful dimension along which differences of perspective could be mapped. 
 Given this thorough refocusing, it was judged that three items could be retained from 
the previous version of the Strategy Profiler, while another could also be reused if it was less 
extremely phrased (item 11.3). To be on the safe side, four new items were added to this set, 
bringing the total to 8 items for this scale.  
 
Item 11.3 In alliances between firms, partners should never be fully trusted. 
Item 11.13 Firms should only consider alliances if they lack the ability to accomplish things independently. 
Item 11.14 Alliances are for the weak; strong firms set their goals and achieve them independently. 
Item 11.15 In most so-called partnerships, both firms are largely focused on their own interests.   
Item 11.16 Firms should never accept being dependent on an alliance partner for their long term success. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. Unfortunately, due to a 
programming error, item 11.12 was deleted from the item set and therefore no data was 
collected about this item. The alpha for the other items was 0,66, with all of them 
contributing to the improved reliability, except the revised item 11.3. If this item is deleted, 
then the alpha improves slightly to 0,67, so it will no longer be included in the Strategy 
Profiler 4.1.  
 The overall conclusion is that this thorough refocusing of the construct seems to have 
been successful. The alpha falls just short of the intended level, but is still acceptable. It 
should be noted, however, that two of the items do not load on to the same factor as the other 
items. Item 11.13 aligns with the inside-out perspective items, as it also focuses on the 
importance of having a competence strength. Item 11.15 loads on to the same factor as the 
deleted items of the strategic incrementalism perspective, without it being very clear why. 
These two will need to be screened again, after more data-points have been collected outside 
of Bank ABC.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127  
α = 0,66 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
11.3 
Item 
11.10 
Item 
11.11 
Item 
11.13 
Item 
11.14 
Item 
11.15 
Item 
11.16 
Item 11.3 2,43 1,01 1,000 ,285 -,074 ,031 ,127 ,279 ,170 
Item 11.10 2,43 ,90 ,285 1,000 ,302 ,324 ,293 ,379 ,228 
Item 11.11 2,83 1,01 -,074 ,302 1,000 ,243 ,324 ,284 ,263 
Item 11.13 2,87 1,10 ,031 ,324 ,243 1,000 ,241 ,114 ,243 
Item 11.14 2,17 1,02 ,127 ,293 ,324 ,241 1,000 ,067 ,239 
Item 11.15 3,37 1,03 ,279 ,379 ,284 ,114 ,067 1,000 ,258 
Item 11.16 3,55 1,14 ,170 ,228 ,263 ,243 ,239 ,258 1,000 
Alpha almost sufficient; if item 
11.3 is deleted, then the alpha 
increases to 0,67. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 11.3 
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14.2.12 Embedded Organization Perspective: Scale 12 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,48 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
12.1 
Item 
12.2 
Item 
12.3 
Item 
12.4 
Item 
12.5 
Item 
12.6 
Item 12.1 3,43 ,92 1,000 ,104 ,232 -,064 ,224 ,096 
Item 12.2 3,57 1,00 ,104 1,000 ,073 ,248 ,122 ,119 
Item 12.3 4,50 ,83 ,232 ,073 1,000 ,141 ,077 ,122 
Item 12.4 3,22 1,15 -,064 ,248 ,141 1,000 ,068 ,168 
Item 12.5 4,07 ,83 ,224 ,122 ,077 ,068 1,000 ,330 
Item 12.6 3,61 1,08 ,096 ,119 ,122 ,168 ,330 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 12.5 and 12.6 have 
the highest coefficient, while 12.1 and 
12.5 also have a reasonable coefficient. 
Item 12.3 has a very high mean, 
indicating low discriminatory value. 
Items 12.2 and 12.4 only have a high 
coefficient with each other; later it 
became clear these should have been 
retained. 
Retained: 12.1, 12.5 and 12.6 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,46 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
12.7 
Item 
12.8 
Item 
12.9 
Item 
12.10 
Item 
12.11 
Item 
12.12 
Item 12.7 3,64 ,90 1,000 ,098 ,171 ,162 ,143 ,121 
Item 12.8 4,34 ,76 ,098 1,000 -,030 -,031 ,112 ,176 
Item 12.9 4,17 ,86 ,171 -,030 1,000 ,063 ,092 ,136 
Item 12.10 2,82 ,96 ,162 -,031 ,063 1,000 ,136 ,159 
Item 12.11 3,81 ,84 ,143 ,112 ,092 ,136 1,000 ,322 
Item 12.12 4,08 ,78 ,121 ,176 ,136 ,159 ,322 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 12.11 and 12.12 
have the highest correlation coefficient, 
while 12.7 has the next highest with this 
set. 
Items 12.8 and 12.9 have a high mean, 
low SD and low coefficients and are 
therefore dropped. 
Item 12.10 is too ambiguous. 
Retained: 12.7, 12.11 and 12.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,55 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
12.1 
Item 
12.5 
Item 
12.6 
Item 
12.7 
Item 
12.11 
Item 
12.12 
Item 12.1 3,49 ,88 1,000 ,105 ,038 ,012 ,174 ,160 
Item 12.5 4,03 ,80 ,105 1,000 ,249 ,179 ,276 ,134 
Item 12.6 3,69 ,97 ,038 ,249 1,000 ,375 ,172 ,153 
Item 12.7 3,44 1,00 ,012 ,179 ,375 1,000 ,093 ,049 
Item 12.11 3,58 ,89 ,174 ,276 ,172 ,093 1,000 ,313 
Item 12.12 3,90 ,86 ,160 ,134 ,153 ,049 ,313 1,000 
Alpha is still too low; items 12.6 and 12.7 
have the highest coefficient, but they are 
focused on buyer-supplier relations. The 
same is true for item 12.5. 
Item 12.1 has low coefficients with the 
remaining items. 
 
 
Retained:  12.11 and 12.12 
 
The difficulty here was exactly the same as with the discrete organization perspective; the 
construct was too broadly defined, mixing views on non-voluntary and voluntary 
relationships. The remedy here was also the same, namely the removal of all items focusing 
on buyer-supplier relationships (items 12.5, 12.6 and 12.7) and the insertion of 5 new items 
dealing with partnerships and alliances. Again, this brought the scale to a total of 7 items. 
 
Item 12.13 Partnerships between firms are a great way to combine competencies and achieve innovations. 
Item 12.14 In long-term partnerships with suppliers, firms should share the details of their weaknesses and 
their strategies. 
Item 12.15 Alliances are a great way to combine resources and attack a mutual rival. 
Item 12.16 There are many examples of mutually-beneficial long-term partnerships between firms. 
Item 12.17 It is strategically ok for two alliance partners to be mutually-dependent for their long term success.  
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The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,70, this scale 
has made a big step forward and is now satisfactory. Actually, if item 12.14 is deleted the 
alpha increases to 0,73, making this the logical choice for leaving out of the Strategy Profiler 
4.1. 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,70 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
12.11 
Item 
12.12 
Item 
12.13 
Item 
12.14 
Item 
12.15 
Item 
12.16 
Item 
12.17 
Item 12.11 3,23 ,90 1,000 ,443 ,481 ,053 ,324 ,353 ,182 
Item 12.12 3,75 ,88 ,443 1,000 ,418 ,166 ,281 ,323 ,301 
Item 12.13 3,85 ,90 ,481 ,418 1,000 ,121 ,339 ,563 ,134 
Item 12.14 3,08 1,03 ,053 ,166 ,121 1,000 -,001 ,182 ,081 
Item 12.15 3,46 ,94 ,324 ,281 ,339 -,001 1,000 ,257 ,158 
Item 12.16 3,58 ,92 ,353 ,323 ,563 ,182 ,257 1,000 ,254 
Item 12.17 2,94 1,07 ,182 ,301 ,134 ,081 ,158 ,254 1,000 
Alpha is satisfactory; if item 
12.14 is deleted the alpha 
increases to 0,73. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 12.14 
 
 
14.2.13 Industry Dynamics Perspective: Scale 13 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,36 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
13.1 
Item 
13.2 
Item 
13.3 
Item 
13.4 
Item 
13.5 
Item 
13.6 
Item 13.1 2,22 1,19 1,000 ,191 ,194 -,023 ,003 ,026 
Item 13.2 2,21 1,12 ,191 1,000 ,091 ,272 -,032 ,208 
Item 13.3 2,38 1,07 ,194 ,091 1,000 ,175 ,044 -,031 
Item 13.4 3,67 1,13 -,023 ,272 ,175 1,000 ,016 ,009 
Item 13.5 3,93 ,86 ,003 -,032 ,044 ,016 1,000 ,071 
Item 13.6 2,45 ,74 ,026 ,208 -,031 ,009 ,071 1,000 
Alpha is very low; items 13.2 and 13.4 
have the highest coefficient, while 13.3 
also has reasonable coefficients with 
these items. 
Item 13.1 has a low mean, high SD and 
low coefficients; stated too ambiguously. 
Item 13.5 has a high mean, low SD and 
low coefficients; stated too extreme. Item 
13.6 is also too extremely stated. 
Retained: 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,42 
 
M 
e 
a 
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S 
D Item  
13.7 
Item 
13.8 
Item 
13.9 
Item 
13.10 
Item 
13.11 
Item 
13.12 
Item 13.7 2,69 1,05 1,000 -,044 ,147 ,129 ,121 ,043 
Item 13.8 3,58 1,18 -,044 1,000 -,019 ,038 -,174 ,069 
Item 13.9 2,06 ,84 ,147 -,019 1,000 ,150 ,286 ,061 
Item 13.10 3,32 1,08 ,129 ,038 ,150 1,000 ,225 ,136 
Item 13.11 2,51 1,00 ,121 -,174 ,286 ,225 1,000 ,061 
Item 13.12 2,60 1,12 ,043 ,069 ,061 ,136 ,061 1,000 
Alpha is very low; items 13.9 and 13.11 
have the highest correlation coefficient, 
while 13.10 has the next highest with 
this set. Yet, 13.9 has a very low mean. 
Items 13.7 and 13.12 are too negative; 
too much about difficulty of innovation, 
instead of wisdom of following. 
Item 13.8 is too ambiguous. 
Retained: 13.9, 13.10 and 13.11 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,38 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
13.2 
Item 
13.3 
Item 
13.4 
Item 
13.9 
Item 
13.10 
Item 
13.11 
Item 13.2 2,58 1,14 1,000 ,325 -,024 ,053 ,018 ,088 
Item 13.3 2,40 1,03 ,325 1,000 ,029 ,114 ,037 ,067 
Item 13.4 3,82 ,98 -,024 ,029 1,000 ,032 ,168 -,020 
Item 13.9 1,92 ,82 ,053 ,114 ,032 1,000 ,130 ,243 
Item 13.10 3,26 1,05 ,018 ,037 ,168 ,130 1,000 ,035 
Item 13.11 2,42 ,99 ,088 ,067 -,020 ,243 ,035 1,000 
Alpha is still too low; items 13.2 and 13.3 
have the highest coefficient, but they are 
focused on the difficulty of innovation 
and differentiation.  
Item 13.4 is too broadly stated, 
emphasizing the importance of 
adaptability, instead of rule taking. 
 
 
Retained:  13.9, 13.10 and 13.11 
 
Of all of the scales, the industry dynamics perspective scale was the most problematic. With a 
reliability score of just 0,38 and very low correlation coefficients across all items, there were 
clear indications that something was amiss with this scale. The conjecture that the construct 
was much too broadly defined was further backed up by the factor analysis, in which the 
items loaded onto three separate factors. One factor (including items 13.2 and 13.3) had to do 
with the difficulty of innovating and differentiating in mature industries. A second factor 
(including items 13.9 and 13.11, but also 14.11) focused more on the danger of being an 
innovator, as opposed to a second or later mover. The third factor (including items 13.10, 
14.10 and 14.1) dealt with the difficulty of shaping the industry by any one firm. According to 
the theoretical framework all these factors should be aligned along the same dimension of 
industry malleability, or lack thereof, but in the empirical practice respondents reacted 
differently to each. 
 In the debriefing sessions with the respondents the main feedback was that the 
industry dynamics perspective seemed to be focused on everything that strategists cannot do 
– on the inability to actually strategize. Most of the items have been negatively formulated, 
pointing to the difficulty of innovating and shaping, due to the nature of industries. This 
“defeatist” angle, it was emphasized, held little appeal to executives, even to those who 
recognized themselves in the theoretical framework as industry dynamics thinkers. The 
positive “alter-ego” of the “inability to shape and innovate” is “the wisdom of following 
developments”; this would be a more representative way of putting forward the industry 
dynamics perspective, according to a number of respondents. Instead of dwelling on all of the 
potential impediments and difficulties created by the nature of industries, the items should 
offer a positively formulated way in which executives should respond to these conditions. 
After reviewing the theoretical framework and the formulated items, these comments were 
accepted as fair criticism – most of the theoretical contributions to the industry dynamics 
perspective do tend to be pessimistic in tone, throwing cold water on executives who think 
they can shape the world, instead of outlining an optimistic alternative to the industry 
leadership perspective. 
 Therefore, all negatively formulated items were dropped (in particular 13.2 and 13.3). 
Simultaneously, the construct was tightened to concentrate on the core concept of playing by 
the industry rules. Five new items were formulated centered on the wisdom of following 
trends instead of trying to set trends. Other elements such as being adaptable and shifting 
resources out of mature industries (items 13.4 and 13.6) seem associated with the industry 
dynamics perspective, but as they are not at the heart of it, they were also left out. The five 
new items were the following: 
 
Item 13.13 Successful firms follow trends; they don’t try to create them. 
Item 13.14 Firms following industry trends have a higher survival rate than radical innovators.  
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Item 13.15 Successful firms often copy the ideas of other firms.  
Item 13.16 It is a better strategy to give customers what they currently want, than to try to create a new need. 
Item 13.17 Successful strategists understand “the industry rules” and play by the rules; adapting their firm to 
what is possible. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,67, this scale 
has made a quantum leap and falls just short of the 0,70 goal. Two items can be deleted to 
bring the total number of items back to the 6 intended for the Strategy Profiler 4.1, without 
any negative impact on the reliability (items 13.11 and 13.15). A point of concern is the fact 
that the 6 items load on to 3 different factors; 4 items line up together (13.9, 13.13, 13.14 and 
13.17), while the other 2 are on separate factors. 
 
 
 
14.2.14 Industry Leadership Perspective: Scale 14 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,16 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
14.1 
Item 
14.2 
Item 
14.3 
Item 
14.4 
Item 
14.5 
Item 
14.6 
Item 14.1 3,65 1,14 1,000 ,038 ,040 ,086 -,020 ,038 
Item 14.2 4,34 ,94 ,038 1,000 ,005 ,154 ,075 ,063 
Item 14.3 3,27 1,25 ,040 ,005 1,000 ,133 -,016 ,003 
Item 14.4 3,64 1,06 ,086 ,154 ,133 1,000 ,064 -,088 
Item 14.5 2,99 1,23 -,020 ,075 -,016 ,064 1,000 -,058 
Item 14.6 3,08 1,10 ,038 ,063 ,003 -,088 -,058 1,000 
Alpha is very low; there are no 
correlation coefficients of interest. 
Item 14.2 has a very high mean; it is too 
general for further use. Items 14.3 and 
14.5 have a high SD, which is linked to 
their ambiguity. 
All items except 14.1 do not focus on 
core concept of breaking the industry 
rules. 
Retained: 14.1 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,50 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
14.7 
Item 
14.8 
Item 
14.9 
Item 
14.10 
Item 
14.11 
Item 
14.12 
Item 14.7 2,99 1,01 1,000 ,103 ,240 ,175 ,323 ,189 
Item 14.8 3,88 1,00 ,103 1,000 -,089 ,191 -,160 ,174 
Item 14.9 3,34 ,97 ,240 -,089 1,000 ,124 ,373 ,168 
Item 14.10 3,64 ,96 ,175 ,191 ,124 1,000 -,085 ,099 
Item 14.11 3,12 1,12 ,323 -,160 ,373 -,085 1,000 ,061 
Item 14.12 2,95 1,07 ,189 ,174 ,168 ,099 ,061 1,000 
Alpha is better; items 14.9 and 14.11 
have the highest correlation coefficient, 
while 14.7 has the next highest with this 
set. The coefficients of 14.12 are 
acceptable; those of item 14.10 just 
barely. 
Item 14.8 has a high mean, while it has 
a negative coefficient with 14.9 and 
14.11, so it has been dropped. 
Retained: All except 14.8 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,67 
 
M 
e 
a 
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S 
D Item  
13.9 
Item 
13.10 
Item 
13.11 
Item 
13.13 
Item 
13.14 
Item 
13.15 
Item 
13.16 
Item 
13.17 
Item 13.9 1,78 ,82 1,000 ,251 ,290 ,228 ,126 ,069 ,212 ,267 
Item 13.10 2,94 1,03 ,251 1,000 ,177 ,295 ,290 ,128 ,199 ,228 
Item 13.11 2,00 ,87 ,290 ,177 1,000 ,268 ,000 ,326 ,131 ,146 
Item 13.13 1,98 ,78 ,228 ,295 ,268 1,000 ,325 ,136 ,230 ,330 
Item 13.14 2,69 ,88 ,126 ,290 ,000 ,325 1,000 ,203 ,338 ,273 
Item 13.15 2,91 1,17 ,069 ,128 ,326 ,136 ,203 1,000 ,182 ,031 
Item 13.16 3,01 ,97 ,212 ,199 ,131 ,230 ,338 ,182 1,000 ,242 
Item 13.17 3,12 1,18 ,267 ,228 ,146 ,330 ,273 ,031 ,242 1,000 
Alpha is almost 
sufficient; items 13.15 
and 13.11 can be 
deleted without 
lowering the reliability. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
13.11 and 13.15 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,47 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
14.1 
Item 
14.7 
Item 
14.9 
Item 
14.10 
Item 
14.11 
Item 
14.12 
Item 14.1 3,98 ,91 1,000 -,038 -,120 ,178 -,057 -,002 
Item 14.7 3,02 1,05 -,038 1,000 ,306 ,262 ,258 ,040 
Item 14.9 3,52 ,98 -,120 ,306 1,000 ,136 ,202 ,149 
Item 14.10 3,56 1,06 ,178 ,262 ,136 1,000 ,164 ,039 
Item 14.11 3,26 1,03 -,057 ,258 ,202 ,164 1,000 -,038 
Item 14.12 2,81 1,10 -,002 ,040 ,149 ,039 -,038 1,000 
Alpha is still too low; items 14.7 and 14.9 
have the highest coefficient, but 14.10 
and 14.11 also have reasonable 
coefficients with these two.  
Items 14.1 and 14.12 have very low 
coefficients and are dropped. Both focus 
too much on the nature of industries, as 
opposed to what strategist should do. 
 
Retained:  14.7, 14.9, 14.10 and 14.11 
 
As with the industry dynamics perspective, this scale was also too broadly defined, sweeping 
in different aspects related to the concept of industry malleability, such as making a profit 
despite the industry structure, leading industry developments, rejecting industry maturity and 
ignoring industry opinion. Although the theoretical framework recognized the same 
fundamental assumption in all these concepts – that the environment can be shaped by 
individual firms – this was a much too abstract and loosely defined concept to be the red 
thread of a consistent perspective. As became clear in the debriefing sessions, respondents’ 
views on the nature of industries (malleable or not; restrictive or not; always potentially 
profitable or not) seemed to be only loosely linked to their views on whether firms should 
pursue a strategy of rule breaking or rule following. In other words, while executives might 
have certain ideas about the plasticity of industries and potential room for innovation, this 
was hardly correlated with their opinion on whether to be an industry leader or a follower.  
 Just as with the industry dynamics perspective, therefore, the industry leadership 
perspective was more tightly defined around the concept of industry rule breaking. All items 
oriented towards characterizing the nature of industries were dropped (items 14.1 and 14.12) 
and 4 new items were drawn up emphasizing the most successful way for strategists to 
respond to the industry context, namely by creating trends instead of following them. This 
brought the total number of items in this scale to 8. 
 
Item 14.13 Successful firms don’t follow the trends; they create them.  
Item 14.14 Successful firms avoid copying the ideas of other firms; they prefer to experiment and innovate 
themselves.  
Item 14.15 It is a better strategy to create a new customer need, than to focus on satisfying their current 
demands.  
Item 14.16 Successful strategists understand “the industry rules”, but try to break them, doing what no one 
had thought possible. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,76, this scale 
is now satisfactory. As deletion of items 14.15 and 14.16 has no negative impact on the 
reliability, these two will no longer be included in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
286
Part III: Capturing Different Views 
270 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,76 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
14.7 
Item  
14.9 
Item 
14.10 
Item 
14.11 
Item 
14.13 
Item 
14.14 
Item 
14.15 
Item 
14.16 
Item 14.7 3,27 1,00 1,000 ,427 ,359 ,260 ,306 ,414 ,288 ,191 
Item 14.9 3,55 ,93 ,427 1,000 ,300 ,434 ,461 ,244 ,227 ,223 
Item 14.10 3,69 ,98 ,359 ,300 1,000 ,275 ,459 ,374 ,279 ,315 
Item 14.11 3,65 1,04 ,260 ,434 ,275 1,000 ,363 ,269 ,132 ,150 
Item 14.13 3,99 ,86 ,306 ,461 ,459 ,363 1,000 ,351 ,157 ,194 
Item 14.14 3,10 1,21 ,414 ,244 ,374 ,269 ,351 1,000 ,192 ,062 
Item 14.15 2,55 ,92 ,288 ,227 ,279 ,132 ,157 ,192 1,000 ,117 
Item 14.16 4,06 ,86 ,191 ,223 ,315 ,150 ,194 ,062 ,117 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient; 
items 14.15 and 14.16 
can be deleted without 
the alpha deteriorating. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
14.15 and 14.16 
 
 
14.2.15 Organizational Leadership Perspective: Scale 15 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,58 
 
M 
e 
a 
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S 
D Item  
15.1 
Item 
15.2 
Item 
15.3 
Item 
15.4 
Item 
15.5 
Item 
15.6 
Item 15.1 2,40 1,11 1,000 ,338 ,328 ,140 ,081 ,062 
Item 15.2 3,43 1,14 ,338 1,000 ,235 ,095 ,255 ,256 
Item 15.3 3,72 1,21 ,328 ,235 1,000 ,101 ,331 ,015 
Item 15.4 2,46 1,07 ,140 ,095 ,101 1,000 ,202 ,103 
Item 15.5 3,60 1,06 ,081 ,255 ,331 ,202 1,000 ,248 
Item 15.6 3,35 1,08 ,062 ,256 ,015 ,103 ,248 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 15.1 and 15.2 have 
the highest correlation coefficient. Item 
15.3 has the next highest with this set. 
However, 15.1 and 15.4 have a low 
mean; they are formulated too sharply. 
The high SD of 15.2 and 15.3 point 
toward ambiguity. Items 15.5 and 15.6 
are both acceptable, in terms of mean, 
SD and coefficients. 
Retained: 15.5 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
15.7 
Item 
15.8 
Item 
15.9 
Item 
15.10 
Item 
15.11 
Item 
15.12 
Item 15.7 3,04 1,21 1,000 ,373 ,468 ,310 ,169 ,307 
Item 15.8 2,69 1,08 ,373 1,000 ,145 ,292 ,205 ,453 
Item 15.9 3,73 1,11 ,468 ,145 1,000 ,257 ,158 ,262 
Item 15.10 2,47 ,98 ,310 ,292 ,257 1,000 ,193 ,144 
Item 15.11 3,57 1,09 ,169 ,205 ,158 ,193 1,000 ,197 
Item 15.12 3,36 1,05 ,307 ,453 ,262 ,144 ,197 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; all items have 
high correlation coefficients with each 
other, suggesting this set should be 
largely retained. 
Item 15.11 has the lowest coefficients 
and the alpha increases slightly if it is 
dropped. 
 
Retained: All except 15.11 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,66 
 
M 
e 
a 
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S 
D Item  
15.5 
Item 
15.7 
Item 
15.8 
Item 
15.9 
Item 
15.10 
Item 
15.12 
Item 15.5 3,51 1,23 1,000 ,241 ,163 ,390 ,297 ,154 
Item 15.7 3,23 1,14 ,241 1,000 ,323 ,340 ,298 ,223 
Item 15.8 2,95 1,19 ,163 ,323 1,000 ,219 ,148 ,355 
Item 15.9 3,78 1,06 ,390 ,340 ,219 1,000 ,226 ,211 
Item 15.10 2,55 1,02 ,297 ,298 ,148 ,226 1,000 ,146 
Item 15.12 3,45 1,09 ,154 ,223 ,355 ,211 ,146 1,000 
Alpha has not improved; yet all items 
have high correlation coefficients with 
one another. 
Two sub-groups can be distinguished; 
15.8 and 15.12 have a high coefficient, 
as they both deal with the leader/CEO. 
The other items focus on top-down 
decision-making. 
 
Retained:  15.5, 15.7, 15.9 and 15.10 
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While this scale has a reliability-score that is almost sufficient, the factor analysis revealed 
that the items loaded on to two separate factors. Items 15.5, 15.7, 15.9 and 15.10 all nicely 
grouped together on one factor (together, but inversely, with items 16.4, 16.5, 16.7 and 
16.10), while items 15.8 and 15.12 loaded on to a different factor (together, but inversely, 
with item 16.8). This result was evaluated and compared to the feedback given by the 
respondents in the debriefing sessions. From this it could be deduced that the second set of 
items all had in common that they dealt with the role of the leader/CEO, while the first set of 
factors was focused on the concentration of strategy-making within the top management 
team. Stated differently, the second set was about the top person, while the first set was about 
the process of top-down strategizing. While these two factors are closely associated with each 
other, both in theory and in the responses of the participants, they are different concepts. And 
bringing them both together under the heading of the organizational leadership perspective 
creates just that level of heterogeneity amongst the items that the reliability of the scale 
remains under the desired level. 
 Therefore it was decided to tighten up the organizational leadership perspective 
construct, by zeroing in on the core concept of strategy-making concentration within the top 
management team. The organizational leadership perspective focuses on the interaction 
between the top management team and the rest of the organization, advocating top-down 
strategy-making, as opposed to wide-spread involvement and initiative throughout the 
organization. In this way, the term ‘organizational leadership’ has been more stringently 
defined as the executives at the head of the organization, without necessarily limiting this to 
only one person (the CEO). Of course, the CEO will have a particular role within the top 
management team, but this perspective does not detail what this role should be (e.g. 
autocratic vs. oligarchic).  
 The conclusion was that the four items about top-down strategizing could be retained, 
while item 15.6, which had been previously dropped, should be reinstated as fitting item. 
Further, three new items were formulated, to have enough room for error. This resulted in a 
total of 8 items for this scale in the Strategy Profiler 4.0.  
 
Item 15.13 In strategy-making, top management should be in the lead, with some support from lower levels. 
Item 15.14 In successful firms, a few top managers are the real strategists. 
Item 15.15 In successful firms, strategy is not made democratically; it is made and then sold by top 
management.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,80 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
15.5 
Item  
15.6 
Item 
15.7 
Item 
15.9 
Item 
15.10 
Item 
15.13 
Item 
15.14 
Item 
15.15 
Item 15.5 3,56 1,21 1,000 ,366 ,355 ,532 ,302 ,512 ,266 ,427 
Item 15.6 3,36 1,03 ,366 1,000 ,270 ,412 ,248 ,297 ,155 ,253 
Item 15.7 3,80 1,01 ,355 ,270 1,000 ,304 ,222 ,422 ,176 ,333 
Item 15.9 2,87 1,00 ,532 ,412 ,304 1,000 ,341 ,464 ,433 ,498 
Item 15.10 3,54 ,92 ,302 ,248 ,222 ,341 1,000 ,374 ,209 ,243 
Item 15.13 3,75 ,98 ,512 ,297 ,422 ,464 ,374 1,000 ,230 ,410 
Item 15.14 2,97 1,17 ,266 ,155 ,176 ,433 ,209 ,230 1,000 ,390 
Item 15.15 2,97 1,11 ,427 ,253 ,333 ,498 ,243 ,410 ,390 1,000 
Alpha is satisfactory; 
deleting items 15.6 and 
15.14 lowers the alpha 
just slightly to 0,79. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
15.6 and 15.14  
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found above. With an alpha of 0,80, it can be 
concluded that the measures taken to tighten the construct have been successful. All items 
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contribute to the reliability and all items load on to the same factor. As it was the intention to 
reduce the set of items to a maximum of 6 for the Strategy Profiler 4.1, items 15.6 and 15.14 
have been selected for deletion. Dropping these two only leads to a slight decrease in 
reliability to an alpha of 0,79. 
 
14.2.16 Organizational Dynamics Perspective: Scale 16 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,25 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
16.1 
Item 
16.2 
Item 
16.3 
Item 
16.4 
Item 
16.5 
Item 
16.6 
Item 16.1 2,14 1,04 1,000 -,118 ,423 ,004 ,042 -,033 
Item 16.2 4,23 ,91 -,118 1,000 -,084 -,064 -,018 -,022 
Item 16.3 2,25 1,13 ,423 -,084 1,000 -,075 ,001 ,008 
Item 16.4 3,26 ,94 ,004 -,064 -,075 1,000 ,222 ,179 
Item 16.5 3,15 1,35 ,042 -,018 ,001 ,222 1,000 ,251 
Item 16.6 4,07 ,86 -,033 -,022 ,008 ,179 ,251 1,000 
Alpha is very low; items 16.1 and 16.3 
have the highest correlation coefficient, 
but both have low means, as they are 
stated quite negatively. 
Items 16.5 and 16.6 have the next 
highest coefficient. Item 16.4 also has 
high coefficients with this set. 
Item 16.2 has a very high mean and has 
a negative coefficient with all others. 
Retained: 16.4, 16.5 and 16.6 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,39 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
16.7 
Item 
16.8 
Item 
16.9 
Item 
16.10 
Item 
16.11 
Item 
16.12 
Item 16.7 4,48 ,70 1,000 -,013 ,179 ,240 ,303 ,104 
Item 16.8 3,03 1,12 -,013 1,000 -,008 ,128 -,045 ,101 
Item 16.9 4,41 ,89 ,179 -,008 1,000 ,014 -,029 ,148 
Item 16.10 3,42 ,99 ,240 ,128 ,014 1,000 ,214 -,046 
Item 16.11 4,47 ,75 ,303 -,045 -,029 ,214 1,000 ,140 
Item 16.12 4,02 ,88 ,104 ,101 ,148 -,046 ,140 1,000 
Alpha is very low; items 16.7 and 16.11 
have the highest coefficient, but both 
have very high means. Item 16.10 has 
the next highest coefficient with this set. 
Items 16.9 and 16.12 also have very 
high means and low SDs, pointing to a 
lack of discriminant power. 
Item 16.8 should have been discarded, 
but 16.11 was due to high mean. 
Retained: 16.7, 16.8 and 16.10 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,65 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
16.4 
Item 
16.5 
Item 
16.6 
Item 
16.7 
Item 
16.8 
Item 
16.10 
Item 16.4 3,46 ,93 1,000 ,227 ,228 ,176 ,157 ,320 
Item 16.5 3,40 1,29 ,227 1,000 ,236 ,290 ,066 ,383 
Item 16.6 4,25 ,84 ,228 ,236 1,000 ,332 ,064 ,221 
Item 16.7 4,29 ,82 ,176 ,290 ,332 1,000 -,009 ,313 
Item 16.8 2,67 1,15 ,157 ,066 ,064 -,009 1,000 ,142 
Item 16.10 3,40 1,04 ,320 ,383 ,221 ,313 ,142 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; all items have 
high correlation coefficients with one 
another, except 16.8. 
The means of 16.6 and 16.7 are rather 
high, pointing to a potential lack of 
discriminant power. 
 
 
Retained:  All except 16.8 
 
Similar to the discussion surrounding the organizational leadership perspective, here too a 
distinction needs to be made between the role of the leader/CEO and the concentration of 
strategy-making within the top management team. As the factor analysis revealed, item 16.8 
was loading on to a different factor (the role of the leader) than the other items. Therefore the 
boundaries of the organizational dynamics perspective were slightly tightened to center on 
the core concept of widespread organizational involvement in strategy-making, leaving out of 
the discussion whether the organization can do without a strong central leader or not. 
 Yet, while dropping item 16.8 would be a good step towards developing a more 
clearly defined construct and a more reliable measurement scale, this would not have been 
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enough to reach the level of reliability desired. Therefore it was decided to add three new 
items, concentrating more clearly on the core concept of “bottom up participation in strategy-
making”. This resulted in a total of 8 items for this scale in the Strategy Profiler 4.0, leaving 
some room for Darwinian survival of the fittest during the process.  
 
Item 16.13 In strategy-making, top management should facilitate wide-spread involvement throughout the 
organization. 
Item 16.14 In successful firms, top managers know that the best strategies will emerge out of discussions 
throughout the organization. 
Item 16.15 In successful firms, strategy is not made autocratically by top management, but through more 
democratic participation. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. All three new items have high 
correlation coefficients with the other items, bringing the alpha to 0,79. To reduce the set of 
items for the Strategy Profiler 4.1, items 16.5 and 16.6 have been selected for deletion, as 
their absence only has a marginal impact on the reliability, bringing the alpha down to 0,78.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,79 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
16.5 
Item  
16.6 
Item 
16.7 
Item 
16.9 
Item 
16.10 
Item 
16.13 
Item 
16.14 
Item 
16.15 
Item 16.5 3,95 ,94 1,000 ,372 ,355 ,327 ,449 ,525 ,263 ,434 
Item 16.6 3,39 1,26 ,372 1,000 ,342 ,234 ,346 ,283 ,226 ,218 
Item 16.7 4,14 ,92 ,355 ,342 1,000 ,337 ,188 ,345 ,338 ,208 
Item 16.9 4,36 ,75 ,327 ,234 ,337 1,000 ,309 ,366 ,366 ,292 
Item 16.10 3,31 ,97 ,449 ,346 ,188 ,309 1,000 ,430 ,245 ,310 
Item 16.13 3,85 1,06 ,525 ,283 ,345 ,366 ,430 1,000 ,462 ,408 
Item 16.14 3,76 ,95 ,263 ,226 ,338 ,366 ,245 ,462 1,000 ,308 
Item 16.15 3,48 1,05 ,434 ,218 ,208 ,292 ,310 ,408 ,308 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient. 
Items 16.5 and 16.6 
can be deleted with 
only a marginal drop in 
the alpha to 0,78. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
16.5 and 16.6 
  
 
14.2.17 Global Convergence Perspective: Scale 17 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,61 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
17.1 
Item 
17.2 
Item 
17.3 
Item 
17.4 
Item 
17.5 
Item 
17.6 
Item 17.1 3,00 1,11 1,000 ,225 ,267 ,572 ,084 ,211 
Item 17.2 3,07 1,07 ,225 1,000 ,182 ,131 ,226 ,261 
Item 17.3 4,06 ,95 ,267 ,182 1,000 ,218 ,367 ,147 
Item 17.4 3,14 1,00 ,572 ,131 ,218 1,000 ,069 ,152 
Item 17.5 4,31 ,77 ,084 ,226 ,367 ,069 1,000 -,010 
Item 17.6 2,99 1,17 ,211 ,261 ,147 ,152 -,010 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; items 17.1 and 
17.4 have the highest correlation 
coefficient. Item 17.3 has the next 
highest with this set. 
Items 17.3 and 17.5 also have a high 
coefficient with each other, but 17.5 
doesn’t with 17.1 and 17.4. 
Items 17.2 and 17.6 have the lowest 
coefficients and are therefore dropped. 
Retained: 17.1 and 17.3 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,53 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
17.7 
Item 
17.8 
Item 
17.9 
Item 
17.10 
Item 
17.11 
Item 
17.12 
Item 17.7 1,97 1,12 1,000 ,159 ,095 ,173 ,218 ,301 
Item 17.8 3,38 1,09 ,159 1,000 ,024 ,110 ,122 ,137 
Item 17.9 2,55 1,09 ,095 ,024 1,000 ,240 ,189 ,158 
Item 17.10 3,29 1,07 ,173 ,110 ,240 1,000 ,106 ,120 
Item 17.11 2,40 1,04 ,218 ,122 ,189 ,106 1,000 ,206 
Item 17.12 2,74 1,24 ,301 ,137 ,158 ,120 ,206 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 17.7 and 17.12 have 
the highest coefficient together, while 
17.11 has the next highest with this set, 
followed by 17.10.  
Items 17.8 and 17.9 have the lowest 
coefficients, focusing too much on the 
nature of international markets and 
cross-border synergy. 
Item 17.7 has a very low mean. 
Retained: 17.7, 17.10, 17.11 and 17.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,60 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
17.1 
Item 
17.3 
Item 
17.7 
Item 
17.10 
Item 
17.11 
Item 
17.12 
Item 17.1 2,81 1,09 1,000 ,142 ,400 ,167 ,321 ,200 
Item 17.3 3,99 ,98 ,142 1,000 ,263 ,217 ,160 ,098 
Item 17.7 2,14 1,13 ,400 ,263 1,000 ,188 ,236 ,207 
Item 17.10 3,29 1,06 ,167 ,217 ,188 1,000 ,148 ,211 
Item 17.11 2,39 1,09 ,321 ,160 ,236 ,148 1,000 ,127 
Item 17.12 3,02 1,26 ,200 ,098 ,207 ,211 ,127 1,000 
Alpha has not improved; items 17.1 and 
17.7 have the highest coefficient with 
one another; 17.11 and 17.12 have the 
next highest with this set. 
Items 17.3 and 17.10 focus too much on 
the nature of international competition 
and cross-border synergizing, instead of 
on global standardization. 
 
Retained:  17.1, 17.7, 17.11 and 17.12 
 
In developing this scale, again the factor analysis revealed that the items were loading on to 
two separate factors. On the one hand, a large number of items grouped together that deal 
with the issue of global standardization of products and strategies (i.e. items 17.1, 17.7 and 
17.11, and inversely 18.1, 18.4 and 18.8). On the other hand, two other items aligned with 
each other that have to do with the issue of global coordination (i.e. items 17.3 and 17.10). In 
the theoretical framework, these two aspects of globalization – increased international 
similarity leading to global standardization and increased international integration leading to 
global coordination – are identified and treated separately, yet it is assumed that supporters of 
the global convergence perspective believe in both simultaneously. However, while views on 
the one issue are strongly linked to views on the other, they do not match entirely, resulting in 
a global convergence perspective construct that is not internally consistent enough. 
 In the feedback from the participants in the debriefing sessions it became clear that 
global standardization excited quite a bit more debate than the issue of global coordination. 
Similar to the discussion on the integrated organization perspective, most respondents held a 
rather positive view about cooperation across national boundaries within a firm (see items 
17.3, 17.5 and 17.10). Almost no executives were against synergizing, sharing and working 
together across borders. There was a bit more disagreement about the need for global 
centralized direction versus local autonomy, but this discussion was more or less a repetition 
of the portfolio organization – integrated organization debate. However, views really started 
to differ once the topic of global standardization was brought forward. A strong trade-off was 
recognized between, on the one hand, the simplicity and economies of scale offered by global 
standardization, and on the other hand, the adaptability and sensitivity of a local 
responsiveness approach.  
 Therefore, to acknowledge the importance of the international standardization-
adaptation issue, while not revisiting the autonomy-integration issue of scales 9 and 10, the 
definition of the global convergence perspective was tightened to focus on the core concept 
of global standardization of products, processes and strategies. Concepts such as increased 
international similarity, cross-border coordination, global centralization and the nationless 
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firm are all closely associated with this perspective, but are not at its heart. This meant that 
only four items could be retained from the Strategy Profiler 3.0. At the same time, this 
opportunity could be used to reinstate item 17.4 that had been accidentally dropped after the 
Strategy Profiler 1.0, due to a programming error. To ensure that a reliable set of items would 
emerge, three new items were created, centered on the core concept of global standardization. 
This resulted in a total of 8 items for this scale in the Strategy Profiler 4.0.  
 
Item 17.13 The most successful international firms use the same standardized approach everywhere around 
the world.  
Item 17.14 International firms should only adapt their products and processes if the foreign market conditions 
force them to.  
Item 17.15 First rule of international success: “Standardize, unless foreign market circumstances force you to 
localize”. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,73, this scale 
is now satisfactory. As two items need to be deleted for the Strategy Profiler 4.1, items 17.7 
and 17.11 have been selected. Dropping these two does not only have no impact on the 
reliability, but it also gets rid of the only two items not loading on to the same factor in the 
factor analysis.  
 
 
 
14.2.18 International Diversity Perspective: Scale 18 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,54 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
18.1 
Item 
18.2 
Item 
18.3 
Item 
18.4 
Item 
18.5 
Item 
18.6 
Item 18.1 3,76 ,98 1,000 ,117 ,105 ,459 ,318 ,066 
Item 18.2 3,45 1,24 ,117 1,000 ,010 ,106 ,177 ,269 
Item 18.3 2,16 ,96 ,105 ,010 1,000 -,076 ,051 ,176 
Item 18.4 3,65 1,01 ,459 ,106 -,076 1,000 ,287 ,094 
Item 18.5 3,09 1,04 ,318 ,177 ,051 ,287 1,000 ,114 
Item 18.6 3,26 1,18 ,066 ,269 ,176 ,094 ,114 1,000 
Alpha is low; items 18.1 and 18.4 have 
the highest correlation coefficient. Item 
18.4 has the next highest with this set, 
followed by 18.2. 
Item 18.3 has a very low mean and low 
coefficients; it is too extremely stated 
and should be dropped. 
Item 18.6 has low coefficients with the 
top two items. 
Retained: 18.1, 18.2, 18.4 and 18.5 
 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,73 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
17.1 
Item  
17.4 
Item 
17.7 
Item 
17.11 
Item 
17.12 
Item 
17.13 
Item 
17.14 
Item 
17.15 
Item 17.1 2,89 ,94 1,000 ,170 ,354 ,303 ,545 ,461 ,316 ,453 
Item 17.4 2,50 1,15 ,170 1,000 ,220 ,261 ,074 ,179 ,061 ,134 
Item 17.7 2,39 1,02 ,354 ,220 1,000 ,133 ,204 ,209 ,193 ,168 
Item 17.11 3,60 1,16 ,303 ,261 ,133 1,000 ,154 ,328 ,220 ,248 
Item 17.12 3,23 ,88 ,545 ,074 ,204 ,154 1,000 ,446 ,202 ,323 
Item 17.13 2,67 1,09 ,461 ,179 ,209 ,328 ,446 1,000 ,243 ,328 
Item 17.14 2,82 1,09 ,316 ,061 ,193 ,220 ,202 ,243 1,000 ,247 
Item 17.15 3,09 1,13 ,453 ,134 ,168 ,248 ,323 ,328 ,247 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient. 
Items 17.7 and 17.11 
can be deleted without 
any impact on the 
reliability. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
17.7 and 17.11 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,36 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
18.7 
Item 
18.8 
Item 
18.9 
Item 
18.10 
Item 
18.11 
Item 
18.12 
Item 18.7 4,09 ,92 1,000 ,169 -,056 -,022 ,004 ,019 
Item 18.8 4,12 ,86 ,169 1,000 ,095 ,080 ,158 ,222 
Item 18.9 3,38 1,09 -,056 ,095 1,000 ,111 -,013 ,126 
Item 18.10 3,01 1,11 -,022 ,080 ,111 1,000 ,163 ,052 
Item 18.11 2,70 1,12 ,004 ,158 -,013 ,163 1,000 ,063 
Item 18.12 3,67 1,01 ,019 ,222 ,126 ,052 ,063 1,000 
Alpha is very low; only items 18.8 and 
18.12 have a significant coefficient 
together. 
Items 18.7, 18.9 and 18.10 are too much 
about the international environment and 
organizational decentralization, instead 
of local adaptation.  
Item 18.11 is too ambiguously stated. 
Retained: 18.8 and 18.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,62 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
18.1 
Item 
18.2 
Item 
18.4 
Item 
18.5 
Item 
18.8 
Item 
18.12 
Item 18.1 3,87 ,87 1,000 ,153 ,561 ,189 ,230 ,312 
Item 18.2 4,02 ,96 ,153 1,000 ,162 ,021 ,328 ,078 
Item 18.4 3,84 ,84 ,561 ,162 1,000 ,203 ,273 ,392 
Item 18.5 3,42 ,92 ,189 ,021 ,203 1,000 ,024 ,182 
Item 18.8 4,13 ,83 ,230 ,328 ,273 ,024 1,000 ,070 
Item 18.12 3,70 1,03 ,312 ,078 ,392 ,182 ,070 1,000 
Alpha still too low; items 18.1 and 18.4 
still have the highest coefficient with one 
another; 18.8 also has high coefficients 
with this set. Item 18.12 also has high 
coefficients with the above set, but it 
loads on to a different factor. 
Items 18.2 and 18.5 have the lowest 
coefficients; they focus too much on the 
international environment and 
international organization. 
Retained:  18.1, 18.4 and 18.8 
 
As with the global convergence scale, the factor analysis revealed that not all items were 
loading on to the identical factor as was the intention. Three items (18.1, 18.4 and 18.8) were 
loading on to the same factor (but inversely) as the global standardization items 17.1, 17.7 
and 17.11. These items were all oriented towards the issue of local adaptation. The other 
three items were not loading on to any of the factors, indicating that they were insufficiently 
related to other items and even to each other.  
On the basis of the feedback from the respondents it became clear that the 
international diversity perspective scale was suffering from the same ambiguity as the global 
convergence scale. In both cases, people’s views on the two main aspects of globalization – 
similarity and integration – were not as strongly linked as expected. While the theoretical 
framework suggested that executives’ beliefs about international similarity/diversity would 
be aligned with their beliefs about international integration/fragmentation, in this group of 
respondents this connection was not strong enough to consider both elements as intricate core 
concepts of the same construct. Although there seems to be a significant correlation between 
people’s views on the need for local adaptation to international differences and the need for 
local autonomy for foreign subsidiaries, opinions on these two issues are still too varied to 
speak of one perspective that can be measured along one dimension. Therefore, this scale has 
been tightened to focus on the core concept of local adaptation of products, processes and 
strategies, to accommodate international diversity. This is consistent with the refocusing of 
the global convergence perspective scale in the previous section. 
This means that the three items dealing with local adaptability (items 18.1, 18.4 and 
18.8) can be retained, while items about the nature of the international environment (18.2) 
and the required level of local organization and autonomy (18.5 and 18.12) should be 
dropped. Five new items were formulated around the central concept of local adaptation, 
bringing the total number of items in the Strategy Profiler 4.0 to 8.   
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Item 18.13 International firms should allow the corporate culture to be diverse, adapting to the various 
countries of operation. 
Item 18.14 Successful international firms blend into foreign markets and act almost like local companies. 
Item 18.15 First rule of international success: “Localize, unless global scale advantages force you to 
standardize.”  
Item 18.16 The most successful international firms are masters at tailoring their products and processes to 
meet local conditions. 
Item 18.17 Even if a globally standardized product sells well, tailoring it to local needs could make it sell 
better. 
 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,68, this scale 
almost passes the 0,70 level which was set as the objective. To reduce the set of items to the 
six required for the Strategy Profiler 4.1, items 18.8 and 18.13 have been selected. Not only 
does their deletion have almost no impact on the reliability (a slight fall to an alpha of 0,67), 
but both items also load on to a different factor in the factor analysis. This scale can now be 
considered acceptable. 
 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,68 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
18.1 
Item  
18.4 
Item 
18.8 
Item 
18.13 
Item 
18.14 
Item 
18.15 
Item 
18.16 
Item 
18.17 
Item 18.1 4,04 ,78 1,000 ,484 ,158 ,245 ,201 ,250 ,393 ,374 
Item 18.4 3,94 ,76 ,484 1,000 ,308 ,407 ,261 ,252 ,387 ,274 
Item 18.8 4,15 ,82 ,158 ,308 1,000 ,122 ,038 ,155 ,184 ,192 
Item 18.13 3,72 1,18 ,245 ,407 ,122 1,000 ,168 ,140 ,193 ,099 
Item 18.14 3,89 1,01 ,201 ,261 ,038 ,168 1,000 ,212 ,250 ,179 
Item 18.15 3,36 1,07 ,250 ,252 ,155 ,140 ,212 1,000 ,187 ,124 
Item 18.16 4,06 ,85 ,393 ,387 ,184 ,193 ,250 ,187 1,000 ,146 
Item 18.17 4,39 ,74 ,374 ,274 ,192 ,099 ,179 ,124 ,146 1,000 
Alpha is almost 
satisfactory. Dropping 
18.8 and 18.13 lead to 
a marginal decline of 
the alpha to 0,67. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Accepted 
Retained: All except 
18.8 and 18.13 
 
 
14.2.19 Shareholder Value Perspective: Scale 19 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
19.1 
Item 
19.2 
Item 
19.3 
Item 
19.4 
Item 
19.5 
Item 
19.6 
Item 19.1 3,25 1,17 1,000 ,183 ,474 ,456 ,591 ,154 
Item 19.2 3,11 1,18 ,183 1,000 ,087 -,039 ,197 ,088 
Item 19.3 3,13 1,32 ,474 ,087 1,000 ,460 ,507 ,078 
Item 19.4 2,60 1,19 ,456 -,039 ,460 1,000 ,437 ,266 
Item 19.5 3,47 1,12 ,591 ,197 ,507 ,437 1,000 ,035 
Item 19.6 2,08 1,05 ,154 ,088 ,078 ,266 ,035 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; items 19.1 and 
19.5 have the highest correlation 
coefficient. Item 19.3 has the next 
highest with this set, followed by 19.4. 
Item 19.6 has a low mean and low 
coefficients; it is too extremely stated 
and should be dropped. 
Item 19.2 has low coefficients with all 
other items. 
Retained: 19.1, 19.3, 19.4 and 19.5 
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Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,69 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
19.7 
Item 
19.8 
Item 
19.9 
Item 
19.10 
Item 
19.11 
Item 
19.12 
Item 19.7 2,00 1,08 1,000 ,250 ,453 ,109 ,385 ,363 
Item 19.8 3,40 1,21 ,250 1,000 ,253 ,176 ,137 ,353 
Item 19.9 1,77 ,87 ,453 ,253 1,000 ,000 ,383 ,354 
Item 19.10 3,05 1,18 ,109 ,176 ,000 1,000 ,025 ,168 
Item 19.11 1,64 ,80 ,385 ,137 ,383 ,025 1,000 ,322 
Item 19.12 1,74 ,79 ,363 ,353 ,354 ,168 ,322 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; all items have 
high coefficients with each other except 
19.10, that is ambiguously formulated. 
As items 19.9 and 19.12 had the highest 
negative correlation with stakeholder 
values items, they were retained. 
All items have a low mean, but this could 
be due to a continental European 
sample bias. 
Retained: 19.9 and 19.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,71 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
19.1 
Item 
19.3 
Item 
19.4 
Item 
19.5 
Item 
19.9 
Item 
19.12 
Item 19.1 3,24 1,21 1,000 ,442 ,479 ,524 ,131 ,128 
Item 19.3 3,19 1,22 ,442 1,000 ,321 ,384 ,060 ,000 
Item 19.4 2,77 1,17 ,479 ,321 1,000 ,370 ,227 ,172 
Item 19.5 3,52 1,12 ,524 ,384 ,370 1,000 ,058 ,061 
Item 19.9 1,60 ,83 ,131 ,060 ,227 ,058 1,000 ,391 
Item 19.12 1,71 ,86 ,128 ,000 ,172 ,061 ,391 1,000 
Alpha is sufficient, but the items fall into 
two separate groups; 19.1, 19.3, 19.4 
and 19.5 have high coefficients with 
each other, while 19.8 and 19.12 also 
have a high coefficient with each other, 
but not with the others. 
The first group has very high SDs 
(potential ambiguity), the second group 
low means (unpopular). 
Retained:  19.1, 19.5, 19.9 and 19.12 
 
While this scale was one of the few reaching the reliability level intended, the factor analysis 
was again quite revealing. As could already be deduced from the correlation coefficients, the 
items loaded on to two separate factors. On the one hand, the top four items (19.1, 19.3, 19.4 
and 19.5) grouped together, as they all shared a strong view on the nature and purpose of 
firms. These items all focused on the fundamental character of firms as instruments for 
investors to make money. On the other hand, the two other items (19.8 and 19.12) loaded on 
the same factor, but inversely, as items 20.1, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11 and 20.12. These two items 
focused on the responsibilities and objectives of firms and made statements about the extent 
to which firms should pursue profitability over other objectives. As the factor analysis made 
clear, views along these two axes were not highly enough correlated for them to be regarded 
as one factor, which would require one of the two to be selected as the core concept around 
which the scale could be concentrated.  
 In the feedback from the respondents in the debriefing sessions it emerged that there 
were quite a few instances where these views did not coincide. Some executives who felt 
quite at ease arguing that the primary purpose of firms is to create shareholder value also 
strongly believed in setting objectives that balance the interests of all stakeholders. This again 
underlined the need to focus the shareholder value perspective construct on only one of these 
two concepts. The selection was not difficult, as the same criterion was used as with the 
previous scales: which belief has the biggest impact on executives’ actual behavior? This is 
usually also the issue that will trigger the most discussion between people. In this case, the 
discussion about the best way to view that nature and purpose of firms generally invoked 
some interested discussion, but was largely seen as a topic of armchair conceptualization; the 
real debate unfolded once the actual responsibilities and objectives were subsequently 
discussed. It was on these practical decisions that a sense of choice was acknowledged and 
that positions were defended. Therefore, it is on this core concept of organizational 
responsibilities and objectives that this scale will be centered. 
  The consequence has been that the two items in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 that focus on 
responsibilities and objectives should be retained and complemented by at least four more of 
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the same nature. And actually, in the Strategy Profiler 2.0 all but item 19.10 fit this 
description and can therefore be reinstated in the Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 5 
(19.7, 19.8, 19.9, 19.11 and 19.12).  Of the remaining items, the two that were the closest to 
objective-setting, 19.1 and 19.5, have also been retained, bringing the total number of items 
in the Strategy Profiler 4.0 to 7. 
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,59, this 
scale is still not satisfactory. In the factor analysis one of the reasons for this insufficient level 
of reliability becomes clear; the seven items still load on to two separate factors. Items 19.1, 
19.5 and 19.7 load on to one factor, as all seem to be stressing the concept of shareholder 
value. The other items load on to the same factor as most of the stakeholder values items, as 
they focus on a particular view concerning corporate responsibilities.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,59 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
19.1 
Item 
19.5 
Item 
19.7 
Item 
19.8 
Item 
19.9 
Item 
19.11 
Item 
19.12 
Item 19.1 3,59 1,04 ,267 ,326 ,105 ,014 ,132 1,000 ,428 
Item 19.5 4,00 ,94 ,271 ,073 ,069 ,028 ,041 ,428 1,000 
Item 19.7 2,13 1,03 1,000 ,123 ,000 ,046 ,166 ,267 ,271 
Item 19.8 3,05 1,27 ,123 1,000 ,224 ,217 ,347 ,326 ,073 
Item 19.9 1,59 ,85 ,000 ,224 1,000 ,322 ,196 ,105 ,069 
Item 19.11 1,51 ,89 ,046 ,217 ,322 1,000 ,194 ,014 ,028 
Item 19.12 1,66 ,83 ,166 ,347 ,196 ,194 1,000 ,132 ,041 
Alpha is still low. Dropping item 
19.5 results in an alpha of 0,58. 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale Provisionally Accepted 
Retained: All except 19.5 
 
Another issue could be the highly unbalanced means in this scale, not only in the Strategy 
Profiler 4.0, but also in the previous versions. It seems item 19.5 is overly popular, also with 
people who are not generally supporters of the shareholder value perspective, while items 
19.9, 19.10 and 19.11 are overly unpopular, potentially because they have been stated too 
negatively.  
 Despite all these attempts at explanation, however, what can not be clarified is why 
more or less the same set of items that were used in the Strategy Profiler 2.0 (all except 19.1 
and 19.5)  had an alpha of 0,69 there, while here they only had an alpha of 0,57. The only 
logical explanation is that the sample for the Strategy Profiler 2.0 was more balanced, while 
the Strategy Profiler 4.0 has a more one-sided sample. The only way to check this is to retain 
six of the seven items (except 19.5, with its exceptionally high mean) and test the Strategy 
Profiler 4.1 among a more diverse audience. It is expected that this scale should reach an 
alpha higher than 0,65 as in the Strategy Profiler 2.0. 
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14.2.20 Stakeholder Values Perspective: Scale 20 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 1.0 Evaluation N = 153 
α = 0,66 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
20.1 
Item 
20.2 
Item 
20.3 
Item 
20.4 
Item 
20.5 
Item 
20.6 
Item 20.1 3,80 1,20 1,000 -,012 ,331 ,256 ,326 ,216 
Item 20.2 3,21 1,14 -,012 1,000 ,037 ,041 ,049 ,152 
Item 20.3 3,68 1,25 ,331 ,037 1,000 ,443 ,178 ,384 
Item 20.4 3,77 1,19 ,256 ,041 ,443 1,000 ,095 ,286 
Item 20.5 3,37 1,18 ,326 ,049 ,178 ,095 1,000 ,251 
Item 20.6 3,64 1,08 ,216 ,152 ,384 ,286 ,251 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; items 20.3 and 
20.4 have the highest correlation 
coefficient. Item 20.1 has the next 
highest with this set, followed by 20.5 
and 20.6. 
Item 20.2 has low coefficients with all 
other items and should be dropped. 
Items 20.1 and 20.5 focus most on 
objectives. 
Retained: 20.1 and 20.5 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 2.0 Evaluation N = 182 
α = 0,68 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
20.7 
Item 
20.8 
Item 
20.9 
Item 
20.10 
Item 
20.11 
Item 
20.12 
Item 20.7 4,10 ,94 1,000 ,222 ,204 ,349 ,277 ,428 
Item 20.8 3,43 1,18 ,222 1,000 ,204 ,277 ,254 ,227 
Item 20.9 2,96 1,03 ,204 ,204 1,000 ,362 ,218 ,243 
Item 20.10 3,66 1,02 ,349 ,277 ,362 1,000 ,222 ,326 
Item 20.11 3,85 ,93 ,277 ,254 ,218 ,222 1,000 ,225 
Item 20.12 4,03 ,86 ,428 ,227 ,243 ,326 ,225 1,000 
Alpha is almost sufficient; all items have 
high coefficients with each other; item 
20.8 has the lowest coefficients. 
As item 20.7 has the highest mean and 
the lowest negative coefficients with the 
items of the opposite perspective, it has 
been dropped. 
 
Retained: 20.9, 20.10, 20.11 and 20.12 
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 3.0 Evaluation N = 385 
α = 0,60 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
20.1 
Item 
20.5 
Item 
20.9 
Item 
20.10 
Item 
20.11 
Item 
20.12 
Item 20.1 4,11 1,07 1,000 ,244 ,125 ,118 ,124 ,119 
Item 20.5 3,68 1,05 ,244 1,000 ,124 ,177 ,037 ,115 
Item 20.9 3,14 1,01 ,125 ,124 1,000 ,335 ,240 ,247 
Item 20.10 3,67 ,99 ,118 ,177 ,335 1,000 ,285 ,417 
Item 20.11 3,97 ,93 ,124 ,037 ,240 ,285 1,000 ,261 
Item 20.12 4,16 ,82 ,119 ,115 ,247 ,417 ,261 1,000 
Alpha is lower, as the items fall into two 
separate groups; 20.5 have high 
coefficients with each other, while 20.9, 
20.10, 20.11 and 20.12 also have a high 
coefficient with each other, but not with 
the first set. 
This is the same problem as in scale 19. 
 
Retained:  20.9, 20.10, 20.11 and 20.12 
 
The difficulty with this scale is the same as with the shareholder value perspective scale – the 
items do not load on to the same factor. The latter four items all have high coefficients with 
one another and load on to the same factor, as they are all concentrated on the issue of 
organizational responsibilities and objectives. Even item 20.1 loads on to this factor, although 
its coefficients are lower. Item 20.5, on the other hand, does not load on to any of the factors, 
as it is more concerned with the purpose of the firm (similar to items 20.3 and 20.4). 
 Therefore, the same approach is taken here as for scale 19 (shareholder value 
perspective): the definition of the construct is tightened, with at the center the concept of 
social responsibility and setting objectives that balance stakeholder interests. This means that 
the items in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 that were associated with this core concept – items 20.9, 
20.10, 20.11 and 20.12 – have been retained, while the other items in the Strategy Profiler 2.0 
(items 20.7 and 20.8) have also been reinstated. To build in some Darwinian redundancy, the 
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most closely associated item from the first set of items, 20.6, has also been added to the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0, bringing the total to 7.  
The scores of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 can be found below. With an alpha of 0,61, this 
scale does not do as well as it did in the Strategy Profiler 2.0. Therefore, just as with the 
previous scale, all items except 20.6 will be retained and retested on a broader audience. It is 
expected that this scale should reach an alpha above 0,65 as before.  
 
Inter-item correlations Strategy Profiler 4.0 Evaluation N = 127 
α = 0,61 
 
M 
e 
a 
n 
 
S 
D Item  
20.6 
Item 
20.7 
Item 
20.8 
Item 
20.9 
Item 
20.10 
Item 
20.11 
Item 
20.12 
Item 20.6 4,04 ,86 1,000 ,017 ,154 ,222 ,059 ,111 ,072 
Item 20.7 4,31 ,78 ,017 1,000 ,112 ,153 ,261 ,092 ,405 
Item 20.8 3,81 1,14 ,154 ,112 1,000 ,154 ,224 ,203 ,307 
Item 20.9 3,14 1,01 ,222 ,153 ,154 1,000 ,240 -,045 ,332 
Item 20.10 3,80 ,94 ,059 ,261 ,224 ,240 1,000 ,227 ,434 
Item 20.11 4,04 ,82 ,111 ,092 ,203 -,045 ,227 1,000 ,165 
Item 20.12 4,22 ,76 ,072 ,405 ,307 ,332 ,434 ,165 1,000 
Alpha still insufficient. Item 
20.6 can be deleted without 
affecting the reliability. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Provisionally Accepted 
Retained: All except 20.6 
 
In table 14.1 on the next page an overview is presented of all Cronbach alphas of the scales as 
they were in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 version, then in the 4.0 version and also after deletion of 
the items that will no longer be used in the Strategy Profiler 4.1. As can be seen, 12 of the 20 
scales are above the 0,70 objective, while a total of 17 out of 20 have an alpha above 0,65. 
Three individual scales do not meet the reliability criterion and will require further fine-
tuning.  
 
 
14.3 COMPARING THE STRATEGY PERSPECTIVE SCALES 
 
With the construction of the scales almost completed, the next question is whether these 
twenty scales are actually separate dimensions or not. Are they all measuring different 
phenomena, with hardly any relationship between the scales, or is there a high level of 
correspondence between a number of the scales, which would mean that they are measuring 
associated beliefs? 
In the theoretical framework it was argued that the twenty scales would be measuring 
along ten different dimensions, with pairs of opposite perspectives significantly correlated 
with each other. At the same time, it was expected that the ten dimensions would exhibit a 
low level of interrelationship with one another.  
To check whether the theoretical assumption is correct, two tests were carried out. 
First, a straight-forward bivariate correlation analysis was performed on all 20 scales. The 
results of this analysis for both the Strategy Profiler 3.0 and 4.0 are presented in section 
14.3.1. Subsequently, a more in-depth factor analysis was conducted, to check whether the 
items of the 20 scales loaded on to 20 factors, or on to 10 as was assumed up front. The 
results of the factor analysis for the Strategy Profiler 3.0 and 4.0 will be presented in section 
14.3.2. 
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TABLE 14.1 
Reliability Scores Strategy Profiler 3.0, 4.0 & 4.1 
 Strategy Perspective Version 3.0 α 
N = 385 
Version 4.0 α 
N = 127 
Version 4.1 α 
N = 127 
1. Rational Reasoning (Logic) 0.68 0.69 0.70 
2. Generative Reasoning (Creativity) 0.51 0.77 0.77 
3. Strategic Planning (Deliberateness) 0.77 0.68 0.73 
4. Strategic Incrementalism (Emergence) 0.51 0.51 0.53 
5. Discontinuous Renewal (Revolution) 0.63 0.70 0.72 
6. Continuous Renewal (Evolution) 0.69 0.79 0.78 
7. Outside-In (Markets) 0.47 0.74 0.74 
8. Inside-Out (Resources) 0.55 0.60 0.66 
9. Portfolio Organization (Responsiveness) 0.61 0.65 0.66 
10. Integrated Organization (Synergy) 0.59 0.67 0.70 
11. Discrete Organization (Competition) 0.51 0.66 0.67 
12. Embedded Organization (Cooperation) 0.55 0.70 0.73 
13. Industry Dynamics (Compliance) 0.38 0.67 0.67 
14. Industry Leadership (Choice) 0.47 0.76 0.76 
15. Organizational Leadership (Control) 0.66 0.80 0.79 
16. Organizational Dynamics (Chaos) 0.65 0.79 0.78 
17. Global Convergence (Globalization) 0.60 0.73 0.73 
18. International Diversity (Localization) 0.62 0.68 0.67 
19. Shareholder Value (Profitability) 0.71 0.59 0.58 
20. Stakeholder Values (Responsibility) 0.60 0.61 0.61 
* The darkest boxes are scores >0.70; the medium dark boxes are scores between 0.65 and 0.69. 
 
14.3.1 Correlation Analysis between the Strategy Perspective Scales 
In table 14.2 a matrix is depicted, showing the correlations between each of the 20 scales of 
the Strategy Profiler 3.0 (using the scale numbers of the previous section), on the basis of the 
385 respondents in the dataset. In table 14.3 the same correlation analysis is reported, but 
then on the basis of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 scales and sample. The cells in the matrix have
299
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been made white where the correlation coefficient is given between the two opposite 
perspectives.  
The first overall observation that can be made is that in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 the 
expected correlations between the opposite strategy perspectives are all significant, but not all 
as high as they ideally should be. In the Strategy Profiler 4.0 these correlations are much 
improved. 
The second overall observation is that in both the Strategy Profiler 3.0 and the 4.0 
there are quite a few other significant correlations between the twenty scales, but none that 
point to an unforeseen overlap between the scales. Both of these observations require some 
further examination.  
 
Correlations between Opposite Scales 
According to the theoretical framework, there are ten strategy dimensions, with two opposite 
perspectives per dimension. This means that one would expect a highly negative correlation 
coefficient between the opposite scales. As can be seen in table 14.2 and 14.3, all opposite 
scales have a highly significant negative correlation, with a coefficient of at least -0,2. These 
parts of tables 14.2 and 14.3 have been summarized in table 14.4. 
 
TABLE 14.4 
Correlations between Opposite Scales 
Scale Strategy Perspective 
Version 3.0 
N = 385 
Version 4.0 
N = 127 
1 - 2 Rational Reasoning  - Generative Reasoning  -0,30 -0,40 
3 - 4 Strategic Planning  - Strategic Incrementalism -0,54 -0,36 
5 - 6 Discontinuous Renewal - Continuous Renewal -0,41 -0,54 
7 - 8 Outside-In - Inside-Out -0,32 -0,37 
9 - 10 Portfolio Organization - Integrated Organization -0,45 -0,28 
11 -12 Discrete Organization - Embedded Organization -0,52 -0,48 
13 - 14 Industry Dynamics - Industry Leadership -0,20 -0,52 
15 - 16 Organizational Leadership - Organizational Dynamics -0,43 -0,61 
17 - 18 Global Convergence - International Diversity -0,23 -0,20 
19 - 20 Shareholder Value - Stakeholder Values -0,23 -0,41 
* The dark boxes are negative correlations >-0,40; the medium dark boxes are between -0,35 and -0,40. 
 
However, if each set of opposing strategy perspectives were truly two poles of one 
dimension, it could be expected that a negative correlation coefficient of more than -0,4 
would be found. In the Strategy Profiler 3.0, this was only the case in five of the ten 
dimensions. In the five other cases the pairs of theoretical opposites were not lining up along 
the same dimension to the extent anticipated. This conclusion fits with the findings of the 
previous section, where the reliability of the Strategy Profiler 3.0 scales for rational – 
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generative reasoning (scales 1 – 2), outside-in – inside-out (scales 7 – 8) and industry 
dynamics – industry leadership (scales 13 – 14) were not sufficient. As these scales were too 
broadly defined in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 (low internal consistency), it can be understood 
that they also showed a low level of consistency / alignment vis-à-vis their theoretical 
opposite.  
But also the scales for global converge – international diversity (scales 17 – 18) and 
shareholder value – stakeholder values (scales 19 – 20) do not have the negative correlation 
coefficients expected, even though the scales were (close to being) reliable. This could mean 
two things. Either the theoretical framework is faulty and the strategy perspectives are not 
truly each others’ opposites (internal validity error) or the Strategy Profiler 3.0 scales were 
not measuring the strategy perspectives well enough, despite the reasonable reliability score 
(external validity error). As became clear in the discussion about upgrading the scales in the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0 version, the latter seemed to be the case. This issue of almost reliable 
scales but too widely defined constructs will be further discussed in the factor analysis in the 
next section. 
In the Strategy Profiler 4.0 the overall picture is much improved. Of the five pairs of 
scales that didn’t have sufficiently high negative correlation coefficients, four are now at a 
satisfactory level of at least -0,35. Only two scales are not as negatively correlated as the 
theoretical framework suggests they should be, namely the scales for portfolio organization – 
integrated organization (scales 9 – 10) and global convergence – international diversity 
(scales 17 – 18) . However, all four scales have sufficient reliability scores, so something else 
must be going on. 
Again this could mean two things; either it must be accepted that the theoretical 
framework is incorrect (internal validity error) or the Strategy Profiler 4.0 scales are not 
adequately measuring the strategy perspectives (external validity error). What the source of 
the low correlation coefficient could be will be discussed further, after the presentation of the 
factor analysis. However, it is interest to note that the scale for portfolio organization – 
integrated organization was highly negatively correlated in the Strategy Profiler 3.0, so it 
seems odd that in the Strategy Profiler 4.0 this is suddenly different. This might point to a 
third source of “error”, namely the non-random nature of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 sample. As 
described in chapter 13, all Strategy Profiler 4.0 respondents are from one international 
organization, Bank ABC. It is a fundamental building block of this company’s strategy to 
manage two tensions: between responsiveness and synergy, as well as between globalization 
and localization – precisely the two that are not highly negatively correlated in their 
responses. In line with the approach advocated in De Wit and Meyer (1999, 2005), Bank 
ABC’s strategy is to resolve the tension between the opposite approaches by trying to find a 
way to do both at the same time. It is not unlikely that the explicit belief within the company 
that these two sets of theoretical opposites can be reconciled has had an impact on the 
negative correlation between the opposite perspectives. This possibility will need to be 
checked as soon as enough executives from different organizations have participated in the 
Strategy Profiler 4.1.  
 
Correlations between Scales along Different Dimensions 
Besides the expected significant correlations between the opposite perspective scales, there 
are quite a few other significant correlations to be found, both in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 and 
4.0. If these correlations are very high, then the various scales might be measuring along the 
same dimension, without this being theoretically anticipated. For the measurement 
instrument, a high level of overlap between the scales would mean that the two might be 
condensable to one compound scale.  
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However, as can be seen in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 correlation matrix, there is only 
one instance where the correlation coefficient is more than 0,4 or -0,4, and that is between the 
rational reasoning and the strategic planning perspectives. However, these two scales have 
different correlations with other scales, while they load on to different factors in the factor 
analysis, which both indicate that while the two perspectives are associated, they are distinct 
enough to warrant separate measurement.  
In the case of the Strategy Profiler 4.0 there are four instances were the correlation 
coefficients are more than (-)0,4. Yet, this result is much less meaningful than for the 
Strategy Profiler 3.0, as these correlations could be entirely due to the non-representative 
nature of the sample. As all respondents are from Bank ABC, the link between two 
perspectives might be completely due to the specific belief system within the company. 
Therefore, it is not possible to generalize the correlation between certain beliefs/perspectives 
within Bank ABC to the population at large.  
As for correlations between scales that are not high, but moderate, this could point to 
some higher level clustering of strategy perspectives around a smaller number of “strategy 
paradigms” or “strategy types”. In other words, the scales measure along different 
dimensions, but certain combinations between scores along the dimensions are more likely 
than others (e.g. those that score high on scale A, also score high on B and C). Given the high 
incidence of moderate correlations in tables 14.2 and 14.3, a cluster analysis was carried out 
on the Strategy Profiler 3.0 data to see if clear “meta-perspectives” could be identified. This 
was not done for the Strategy Profiler 4.0 data, as any meta-perspectives found would only be 
Bank ABC specific and not generalizable to the broader population. The results of this cluster 
analysis will be reported in section 14.4.   
 
14.3.2 Factor Analysis of the Strategy Perspective Scales 
Besides a straight-forward correlation analysis of the 20 strategy perspective scales, a factor 
analysis was also conducted to check whether the 20 scales were measuring along 10 separate 
dimensions as anticipated. For this reason the number of factors was set at 20 (the maximum 
expected number of factors if all scales would load on to a separate factor), while it was 
supposed that all items in the scales would load on to 10 factors. This analysis was carried out 
on the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset, which is presented in table 14.5, and on the Strategy 
Profiler 4.0 dataset, which is presented in table 14.6. In both cases, only the highest loadings 
are reported in the tables, while values between -0,25 and 0,25 are not shown.  
Besides checking whether the twenty scales could actually be grouped into 10 
principle components (inter-scale relationships), the second objective of the factor analysis 
was to provide extra insight into the extent to which individual items fit with the other items 
in each scale (intra-scale relationships). Where all items of a scale loaded on to the same 
factor, this pointed towards a high level of internal consistency within the scale. Where one 
or more items did not load on to the same factor, this pointed toward inconsistency and the 
necessity to reevaluate the item(s) in question. In the discussion below, both relationships 
will be touched on, although many of the conclusions about intra-scale inconsistencies have 
already reviewed and discussed in the scale construction section (14.2). 
 
Intra-Scale Relationships 
As can be seen in table 14.5, not all items in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 that make up the same 
scale load on to the same factors. In only two cases do all items behave as expected (scales 1 
and 3). In four cases there is one “stray” item (scales 6, 9, 16 and 20) and in six cases there 
are two items not loading on to the same factor (scales 2, 8, 11, 15, 18, 20). As discussed in 
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the scale construction section, these scales generally had a reasonably high reliability 
(Cronbach alpha > 0,60). Dropping the unsatisfactory items and replacing them with new 
ones was sufficient to bring the reliability to the intended level. 
 In eight other cases, however, the factor analysis showed that something more 
fundamental was needed to develop internally consistent measurement scales. Four scales had 
only three items loading on to the same factor (scales 4, 5, 7 and 17), while in four other 
cases the items were spread across three or four different factors (scales 10, 12, 13 and14). 
For these scales it was obvious that somewhere in the construct definition phase, or in the 
item formulation phase, an unintended level of heterogeneity had manifested itself in the 
items. Therefore, all eight of these scales were thoroughly examined and restructured in the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0. 
 In table 14.6 the results of the factor analysis on the Strategy Profiler 4.0 database can 
be seen. The number of scales with six items loading onto the same factor has risen to seven 
(scales 2, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16 and 17), while there are three scales with only one “stray” item 
(scales 3, 13 and 18). Furthermore, there are six other scales where two items are not loading 
onto the same factor (scales 5, 8, 11, 14, 19 and 20). These 16 scales all have a reasonably 
high reliability (alpha > 0,60), although scales 19 and 20 still seem somewhat questionable 
and need to be tested further on a broader sample. 
 In four remaining cases, however, the factor analysis points towards a potentially 
more fundamental inconsistency. The most obvious challenge is the strategic incrementalism 
scale (scale 4), which also did not have a high Cronbach alpha (0,53). The items belonging to 
this scale split into two groups, each consisting of three items, loading onto different factors. 
This might indicate the reason why the reliability of this scale is still so low (see chapter 16 
for a conclusion on further research). Less expectedly, the scales for the outside-in 
perspective (scale 7) and integrated organization perspective (scale 10) also have two equal 
groups of items loading onto different factors. However, both of these scales have a 
sufficiently high reliability score. For these scales, too, future research will need to determine 
why this pattern has been observed. The most puzzling result, however, is the rational 
reasoning perspective scale (scale 1), which had six items loading nicely onto one factor in 
the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset, while in the 4.0 dataset the items are suddenly spread over 
four different factors, although the items have hardly changed. Again, this could point to a 
peculiarity of the Bank ABC sample, so broader testing is required.    
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TABLE 14.5 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 3.0 
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.1 0.57          
2.1  0.36         
1.2 0.62          
2.2  0.65         
1.4 0.62          
2.4  0.37         
1.7 0.56          
1.8 0.46          
2.8           
2.9   0.49        
1.11 0.38          
2.11  0.60         
4.1     0.37      
3.2    0.53       
3.3    0.45       
4.3     0.47      
3.4    0.40       
4.7      0.44     
3.9    0.64       
4.9    -0.73       
3.10    0.72       
4.10    -0.44       
3.11    0.72       
4.11    -0.40       
5.1     -0.47      
6.1     0.66      
5.2     -0.35      
6.2     0.63      
5.3      0.55     
6.4     0.61      
5.5     -0.44      
6.5     0.61      
6.6   0.40        
5.7           
6.11     0.38      
5.12   0.28        
7.1           
7.2       -0.37    
8.3       0.59    
8.4       0.32    
8.5       0.52    
7.5       -0.62    
7.9       -0.40    
8.9           
8.10       0.43    
7.11           
7.12        0.32   
8.12           
9.1         -0.53  
10.1         0.56  
9.2        0.46   
10.2        -0.28   
9.5        0.54   
10.5           
9.6        0.60   
10.6         0.51  
9.11        0.52   
10.11           
9.12        0.56   
10.12        -0.37   
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TABLE 14.5 (continued from left page) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 3.0 
Factors 
Item 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.1           
2.1           
1.2           
2.2           
1.4           
2.4           
1.7           
1.8           
2.8           
2.9           
1.11           
2.11           
4.1           
3.2           
3.3           
4.3           
3.4           
4.7           
3.9           
4.9           
3.10           
4.10           
3.11           
4.11           
5.1           
6.1           
5.2           
6.2           
5.3           
6.4           
5.5           
6.5           
6.6           
5.7     0.52      
6.11           
5.12           
7.1   0.32        
7.2           
8.3           
8.4           
8.5           
7.5           
7.9           
8.9           
8.10           
7.11        -0.29   
7.12           
8.12   0.25        
9.1           
10.1           
9.2           
10.2           
9.5           
10.5      -0.26     
9.6           
10.6           
9.11           
10.11      -0.35     
9.12           
10.12           
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TABLE 14.5 (continued from previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 3.0 
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
12.1           
11.3           
12.5           
11.6          0.34 
12.6          -0.78 
12.7          0.81 
11.9          0.61 
11.10           
11.11           
12.11           
11.12           
12.12           
14.1           
13.2           
13.3           
13.4         0.38  
14.7      0.45     
13.9           
14.9           
13.10           
14.10           
13.11           
14.11           
14.12   -0.26        
16.4           
15.5           
16.5           
16.6           
15.7           
16.7           
15.8           
16.8           
15.9           
15.10           
16.10           
15.12           
17.1           
18.1           
18.2           
17.3           
18.4           
18.5        0.32   
17.7           
16.8           
17.10           
17.11           
17.12           
18.12         0.34  
19.1           
20.1           
19.3           
19.4           
19.5           
20.5           
19.9           
20.9           
20.10           
20.11           
19.12           
20.12           
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TABLE 14.5 (continued from left and previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 3.0 
Factors 
Item 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
12.1   0.47        
11.3 0.46          
12.5           
11.6           
12.6           
12.7           
11.9      0.42     
11.10 0.56          
11.11 0.53          
12.11 -0.49          
11.12 0.65          
12.12 -0.56          
14.1    0.43       
13.2   0.54        
13.3   0.54        
13.4           
14.7           
13.9  0.43         
14.9  -0.32         
13.10    -0.49       
14.10    0.60       
13.11  0.70         
14.11  -0.71         
14.12           
16.4      0.48     
15.5      -0.60     
16.5      0.64     
16.6      0.37     
15.7      -0.45     
16.7      0.48     
15.8     0.59      
16.8     -0.58      
15.9      -0.57     
15.10      -0.52     
16.10      0.58     
15.12     0.60      
17.1       -0.53    
18.1       0.56    
18.2       0.39    
17.3        0.46   
18.4       0.54    
18.5           
17.7       -0.44    
16.8       0.54    
17.10        0.58   
17.11       -0.54    
17.12     0.29      
18.12           
19.1          0.75 
20.1         0.42  
19.3          0.66 
19.4          0.66 
19.5          0.72 
20.5           
19.9         -0.63  
20.9         0.52  
20.10         0.61  
20.11         0.48  
19.12         -0.59  
20.12         0.60  
Note 1: Extraction Method: Principle Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser  
Normalization (rotation converged in 38 iterations); Only coefficients > 0,25 displayed  
Note 2: Shaded areas indicate items loading on to common factor as used for composite scale construction 
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TABLE 14.6 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.1  0626         
2.1 .436          
1.2  .441         
2.2 .551          
1.4           
2.4          .396 
1.7 -.375          
1.8           
2.11 .544          
1.13 -.566  0.49        
2.13 .644          
2.14 .537          
2.15 .707          
3.2   .455        
3.3   .358        
3.4           
4.7    .384       
3.9   .668        
4.9   -.691        
3.10   .687        
4.10   -.349        
3.11   .629        
4.11           
4.13           
4.14           
4.15   -.412        
5.1     .640      
6.1    .584       
5.2         .413  
6.2    .713       
6.4    .525       
5.5    -.532       
6.5    .632       
5.7    -.537       
6.10    .730       
6.11    .531       
5.12           
5.13    -.696       
5.14    -.543       
6.13    .710       
6.14    .519       
7.2     .540      
8.3      .497     
8.4  .468         
8.5      .656     
7.5      -.441     
7.9     .474      
8.9           
8.10       .680    
7.12     .581      
7.13      -.685     
7.14      -.403     
7.15     .518      
8.13      .641     
8.14      .525     
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TABLE 14.6 (continued from left page) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.1           
2.1           
1.2           
2.2          .331 
1.4           
2.4           
1.7  .361         
1.8           
2.11           
1.13           
2.13           
2.14           
2.15           
3.2           
3.3           
3.4    .512       
4.7           
3.9           
4.9           
3.10           
4.10           
3.11           
4.11       .328    
4.13       .415    
4.14       .300    
4.15           
5.1           
6.1           
5.2           
6.2           
6.4           
5.5           
6.5           
5.7           
6.10           
6.11           
5.12   .507        
5.13           
5.14           
6.13           
6.14           
7.2           
8.3           
8.4           
8.5           
7.5           
7.9           
8.9    -.375       
8.10           
7.12           
7.13           
7.14           
7.15           
8.13           
8.14           
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TABLE 14.6 (continued from previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9.2        .421   
10.2           
9.5        .390   
10.5        -.386   
9.6           
9.11        .442   
10.11         .379  
9.12        .518   
10.12        -.444   
9.13        .613   
9.14        .650   
10.13           
10.14   .430        
10.15           
 11.3           
12.5       .418    
11.10          -.543 
11.11          -.640 
12.11          .608 
12.12          .579 
11.13      .363     
11.14          -.518 
11.15           
11.16          -.395 
12.13          .662 
12.14  .332         
12.15          .385 
12.16          .568 
12.17          .551 
14.7           
13.9           
14.9           
13.10           
14.10           
13.11           
14.11           
13.13           
13.14           
13.15           
13.16           
13.17           
14.13           
14.14           
14.15         .668  
14.16           
16.4           
15.5           
16.5           
15.6           
16.6           
15.7           
16.7           
15.9           
15.10           
16.10           
15.13           
15.14           
15.15           
16.13           
16.14           
16.15           
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TABLE 14.6 (continued from left and previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
9.2           
10.2      .410     
9.5           
10.5           
9.6           
9.11          .372 
10.11           
9.12           
10.12           
9.13           
9.14           
10.13      .435     
10.14           
10.15      .413     
11.3           
12.5           
11.10           
11.11           
12.11           
12.12           
11.13           
11.14       .362    
11.15           
11.16           
12.13           
12.14           
12.15           
12.16           
12.17           
14.7 .596          
13.9  .323         
14.9 .342          
13.10   .426        
14.10 .588          
13.11    -.619       
14.11    .637       
13.13  .580         
13.14  .593         
13.15 -.640          
13.16 -.433          
13.17  .577         
14.13 .564          
14.14 .661          
14.15           
14.16   -.450        
16.4     -.591      
15.5     .630      
16.5     -.428      
15.6     .486      
16.6     -.367      
15.7     .398      
16.7     -.339      
15.9     .497      
15.10     .741      
16.10     -.586      
15.13     .603      
15.14     .522      
15.15     .635      
16.13     -.579      
16.14     -.455      
16.15     -.672      
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TABLE 14.6 (continued from left and previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
17.1           
18.1           
17.4           
18.4           
17.7       .327    
18.8           
17.11           
17.12           
17.13           
17.14           
17.15           
18.13           
18.14           
18.15           
18.16           
18.17           
19.1           
19.5           
20.6           
19.7           
20.7           
19.8           
20.8           
19.9           
20.9           
20.10           
19.11           
20.11           
19.12           
20.12           
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TABLE 14.6 (continued from left and previous pages) 
Factor Analysis of Items in Strategy Profiler 4.0  
Factors 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
17.1      .752     
18.1       .634    
17.4      .673     
18.4       .662    
17.7           
18.8       .441    
17.11       -.454    
17.12      .483     
17.13      .688     
17.14      .350     
17.15      .615     
18.13     -.339      
18.14  .503         
18.15       .347    
18.16       .582    
18.17       .430    
19.1         .683  
19.5         .565  
20.6       .283    
19.7         .530  
20.7          .696 
19.8        -.541   
20.8        .364   
19.9        -.349   
20.9        .482   
20.10        .571   
19.11        -.363   
20.11   .321        
19.12        -.618   
20.12           
Note 1: Extraction Method: Principle Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization (rotation converged in 41 iterations); Only coefficients > 0,25 displayed  
Note 2: Light shaded squares indicate deleted items. Dark shaded areas indicate items loading on to 
common factor that can be used for composite scale construction 
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Inter-Scale Relationships 
As mentioned above, it was expected that the items of the twenty scales would actually load 
on to ten factors, representing the ten dimensions discussed in the theoretical framework. The 
items of each pair of opposite strategy perspectives, it was anticipated, would be found on the 
same factor, with the items of one perspective having negative coefficients. In tables 14.5 and 
14.6 these groupings of items on one factor have been shaded, but only if at least two items of 
each of the strategy perspectives are represented. For the Strategy Profiler 3.0 this leads to 
eight groupings of items, with only scales 1-2 (rational vs. generative reasoning) and 13-14 
(industry leadership vs. industry dynamics) missing. 
 The fact that scales 1 and 2 load on to different factors was essential information for 
the reformulation of items for the Strategy Profiler 4.0. While both scales seemed to be 
almost satisfactory, the factor analysis uncovered an inconsistency with the theoretical 
framework, as the two strategy perspectives were assumed to be opposites, but did not load 
on to the same factor. This led to a thorough review of the generative reasoning items for the 
Strategy Profiler 4.0. As can be seen in table 14.6, the new generative reasoning items now 
load onto the same factor as a number of the rational reasoning items, but as discussed in the 
previous section, the latter scale is now unfortunately scattered across four factors. 
 The fact that scales 13 and 14 had items loading on to a variety of factors indicated 
that the scales were very unfocused and required a considerable amount of tightening up. The 
fact that the items of the two scales were also not loading on to the same factors was an 
additional concern, pointing to the need to direct the focusing of both scales towards a 
common core issue. This led to a major overhaul of the items in both scales (5 new items 
were added to scale 13 and 4 new items to scale 14) for the Strategy Profiler 4.0. As can be 
seen in table 14.6, the items of scale 13 now load more consistently onto one factor, while the 
items of scale 14 do the same onto another factor. However, they do not load on to the same 
factor. Yet, given the reliability of both scales and the highly negative correlation coefficient 
between them, this outcome of the factor analysis is not seen as an impetus to reconsider the 
scales once again.  
 As for the other 16 scales, it was found that for the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset there 
were a sufficient number of items loading onto eight common factors to make it possible to 
construct eight composite scales. In these composite scales all items from the two opposite 
strategy perspectives were merged into one scale by inverting the item scores of one of the 
two perspectives. As minimal requirement it was determined that each composite scale must 
contain at least two items from both of the opposite strategy perspectives. These composite 
scales are described in further detail in table 14.7 below. These scales will be referred to as 
strategy dimension scales, as they measure strategy beliefs ranging from one opposite 
strategy perspective to the other opposite strategy perspective along a strategy dimension – 
the dimensions described in the theoretical framework. 
These strategy dimension scales were subsequently checked for reliability. As 
anticipated, the reliability of these eight strategy dimension scales was higher than the 
reliability of the 16 individual strategy perspective scales. This is particularly important for 
the purpose of further exploratory research in the next chapter. There, the intention will be to 
investigate which personal attributes correlate to an individual’s strategy perspectives.  
While it would ordinarily be best to use the most reliable scales for this exploratory 
work (i.e. the Strategy Profiler 4.0 scales), the Strategy Profiler 3.0 database of 385 
respondents is so much richer in terms of personal attribute variety, that it is strongly 
preferred. Moreover, the Strategy Profiler 3.0 database comes closest to being a random and 
representative sample of executives, while the Strategy Profiler 4.0 database, with its focus 
on only one organization, is much too biased to be used to explore potentially generalizable 
correlations between personal attributes and strategy beliefs.  Therefore, the follow-up 
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research in the next chapter will only make use of the Strategy Profiler 3.0 database in 
combination with these 8 strategy dimension scales. For this reason, there was also no reason 
to construct any composite scales with the Strategy Profiler 4.0 items, although the loadings 
would have made this easily possible. 
It should be noted that not all of the strategy dimension scales in table 14.7 reach the 
intended alpha of at least 0,70, and therefore any conclusions, however exploratory, must be 
drawn with suitable caution. Yet, having said this, all eight scales have alphas higher than 
0,60, making them robust enough for such exploratory purposes. Only the scales for strategic 
thinking and the industry context (1, 2, 13 and 14) will have to be dropped for further 
research purposes on the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset, due to their insufficient reliability. Of 
course, as more data is collected using the Strategy Profiler 4.1, offsetting the bias of Bank 
ABC, these scales shall be preferred for further research. 
 
TABLE 14.7 
Description of the Strategy Dimension Scales in the Strategy Profiler 3.0 
No. Strategy Dimension Axis (High-Low) Items M SD α 
21 Strategic Programming Deliberateness – Emergence 
3.2; 3.3; 3.4; 3.9; 3.10; 3.11 
-4.9; -4.10; -4.11 
3,36 0,63 0,81 
22 Organizational Continuity Evolution – Revolution 
6.1; 6.2; 6.4; 6.5 
-5.1; -5.2; -5.5 
3,05 0,61 0,75 
23 Resource Leveraging Resources – Markets  
8.3; 8.4; 8.5;8.10 
-7.2; -7.5; -7.9 
3,40 0,58 0,61 
24 Business Unit Autonomy Responsiveness – Synergy 
9.2; 9.5; 9.6; 9.11; 9.12 
-10.2; -10.12  
2,44 0,60 0,67 
25 Firm Independence Competition – Cooperation 
11.3; 11.10; 11.11; 11.12 
-12.11; -12.12 
2,25 0,56 0,68 
26 Strategy-making Dispersion Chaos – Control 
16.4; 16.5; 16.7; 16.10 
-15.7; -15.9; -15.10 
3,40 0,59 0,71 
27 Local  Adaptation Localization – Globalization 
18.1; 18.2; 18.4; 18.8 
-17.1; -17.7; -17.11 
3,79 0,56 0,65 
28 Stakeholder Responsibility Responsibility – Profitability 
20.1; 20.9; 20.10; 20.11; 20.12 
-19.9; -19.12 
3,93 0,53 0,69 
 
As a last check, a straight-forward correlation analysis was carried out between the eight 
strategy dimension scales (see table 14.8). The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
analysis backs up the findings of the factor analysis; these eight strategy dimension scales 
have only a low correlation coefficient, which means that they can truly be seen as separate 
measurement dimensions. 
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TABLE 14.8 
Correlation Analysis of the Strategy Dimension Scales 
 Dimension Scale 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
21 Strategic Programming 1,000              
22 Organizational Continuity 0,044  1,000            
23 Resource Leveraging 0,238 *** 0,087 * 1,000          
24 Business Unit Autonomy -0,233 *** 0,025  -0,092 * 1,000        
25 Firm Independence -0,112 ** -0,184 *** -0,054  0,099 * 1,000      
26 Strategy-Making Dispersion -0,054  0,202 *** 0,024  0,194 *** -0,226 *** 1,000    
27 Local  Adaptation -0,136 *** 0,141 *** 0,075  0,132 *** -0,230 *** 0,195 *** 1,000  
28 Stakeholder Responsibility 0,078  0,171 *** 0,178 *** 0,051  -0,296 *** 0,196 *** 0,155 *** 
 
 
14.4 CLUSTER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE STRATEGY DIMENSION SCALES 
 
So far, the emphasis in this chapter has been on testing the reliability of each strategy 
perspective scale (and strategy dimension scale) and on determining whether they are 
sufficiently distinct. The conclusion has been that while there are significant correlations 
between some of the scales, none of the correlations is high enough to suggest that the scales 
are actually measuring a common phenomenon. The factor analysis also corroborated the 
conclusion that the scales can be retained as separate measures. 
Yet, while the scales measure clearly distinctive perspectives and dimensions, it is 
still possible that there might be more fundamental strategy paradigms influencing how 
executives view a number of seemingly separate strategy issues. In other words, there might 
be “meta-perspectives” that combine a number of perspectives into a more overarching view 
of strategic issues. For instance, it could be that there is one strategy paradigm that leads 
executives to score high on scales 21 and 23, intermediate on scale 26 and low on scale 22. If 
such a system of beliefs, values and norms has many adherents, one would be able to find a 
cluster of executives with the same “profile” on the strategy dimensions. By looking for 
clusters of executives with the same profile on more than one dimension, it would be possible 
to identify which distinctive strategy paradigms seem to exist. 
This is exactly what was done as the last step in developing the measurement 
instrument. The statistical method employed to find out whether the respondents can be 
clustered into groups of people with the same profile on multiple dimensions is appropriately 
called cluster analysis. The technique used here is the relatively standard two step approach 
of first applying a hierarchical clustering procedure to determine the appropriate number of 
clusters, as well as the cluster centers, after which a non-hierarchical clustering procedure is 
used to determine the exact cluster membership (Hair et al., 2006).  
In this first step the entire sample (in this case the 385 respondents to the Strategy 
Profiler 3.0) is “hierarchically” divided into two clusters, then three, then four, etcetera, by 
trying to keep the sum of the squared distances between points (respondents) as low as 
possible. At a certain moment in this process of splitting in to more and more clusters, the 
population should break up into a number of reasonably large “lumps”. If further splitting 
only leads to small “pieces” breaking off the big lumps, it is clear that the most appropriate 
level of clustering has been reached, as only large clusters are meaningful for further 
examination. If the total group of respondents stays together as one big lump and only very 
small clusters can be split off, then the conclusion must be drawn that there are no 
distinctively separate clusters of significance that can be identified.  
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If the clustering is successful, each cluster will have a mathematical center point, 
which is then subsequently used as the “cluster seed” in the second step of the procedure. In 
this step the number of clusters and their seeds are predetermined (“non-hierarchical”) and 
the procedure is intended to determine the optimal cluster membership (in practice, some 
respondents at the boundary between two clusters might fit better in the other cluster than 
determined in the first hierarchical clustering). 
This entire clustering process was first carried out using eight dimensions – the eight 
strategy dimensions discussed in the previous section. The intention was to check whether 
there are any strategy paradigms that run across the entire spectrum of strategy issues. If 
clusters of strategic thinkers could be found that have similar views on all eight strategy 
issues, this would point to a few fundamental strategy paradigms dominating peoples’ 
thoughts on a broad basis; there would be just a few types of overarching strategic views. 
This would lead to a much simpler typology of strategy views than the framework of ten 
dimensions and twenty perspectives presented in this study. However, the cluster analysis 
across these eight dimensions did not result in any meaningful division into sizeable sub-
groups. There were no discernable clusters, so the conclusion must be that this study has not 
been able to recognize any strategy paradigms (or if you prefer, meta-perspectives) 
influencing all major strategic problem-solving, within this particular group of respondents. 
As the sample is not entirely representative of the broader population of executives, this 
conclusion can not be immediately generalized. However, given the broad spread of the 385 
respondents in this sample, the notion that there might be a simple typology of overarching 
strategy paradigms has not gained any weight. As the Strategy Profiler 4.1 database is further 
filled, this cluster analysis should be repeated to see if clusters are found in a larger, more 
representative sample, but the study has so far created little basis to assume that such strategy 
paradigms exist. 
The next cluster analysis was performed one level of aggregation lower, namely on 
the three main strategy areas, strategy process, strategy content and strategy context:  
 
 Strategy process clustering. As there was no reliable scale for the rational – generative 
reasoning dimension, there were only two scales left here, the strategic planning – 
strategic incrementalism scale (the strategic programming dimension) and the continuous 
– discontinuous renewal scale (the organizational continuity dimension). However, in the 
theoretical framework it already became quite clear that the organization dynamics – 
organizational leadership scale (strategy-making dispersion dimension) is highly oriented 
towards the process aspect of strategy. Therefore it was included as a third dimension for 
the cluster analysis. The results of this cluster analysis will be reported in section 14.4.1. 
 Strategy content clustering. Here all three strategy content dimension scales were used: 
the inside-out – outside-in scale (the resource leveraging dimension), the portfolio – 
integrated organization scale (the business unit autonomy dimension) and the discrete – 
embedded organization scale (the firm independence dimension). As this cluster analysis 
did not lead to any meaningful result, it will not be further presented here. However, the 
conclusion should drawn, namely that when it comes to strategy content issues there were 
no distinctive strategist profiles among this group of respondents. This would suggest that 
it is unlikely that there are discernable, overarching, strategy content paradigms in the 
broader population of executives, but this hypothesis would need to be tested in follow-up 
research. 
 Strategy context clustering. As there was no reliable scale for the industry leadership – 
industry dynamics dimension, here too there were only two scales left, the organizational 
dynamics – organizational leadership scale (strategy-making dispersion dimension) and 
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the international diversity – global convergence scale (local adaptation dimension). 
However, even if the industry leadership – industry dynamics scale had been available, 
theoretically it seems quite unlikely that any one strategy paradigm would influence such 
divergent issues as dealing with the industry, organizational and international contexts. 
What could be hypothesized, though, is that executives might cluster around particular 
views on the nature of the “external environment”, as well as around views on the nature 
of the “internal environment”. A person’s “external environment profile” could be 
expected to have an impact on their industry context views (industry leadership – industry 
dynamics), international context views (international diversity – global convergence) and 
maybe even their network level views (discrete – embedded organization). But as the 
industry leadership – industry dynamics scale is missing (unreliable), this potential 
clustering was not further pursued in this study. On the other hand, a person’s “internal 
environment profile” could be expected to have an influence on their organizational 
context view (organizational dynamics – organizational leadership), the internal 
organization side of their international context view (international diversity – global 
convergence) and the internal organizational side of their corporate level strategy view 
(portfolio – integrated organization). In these two last cases, the theoretical framework 
already made clear that executives’ views on how much should be globalized and 
synergized had a lot to do with their views on what is organizationally viable, effective 
and efficient. Therefore, a cluster analysis was performed using these three dimensions. 
The results will be reported in section 14.4.2.  
Moving one level of aggregation lower, many more cluster analyses could be carried out 
using two dimensions. To be exact, there are 28 combinations possible (8 x 7 / 2 = 28). Each 
one of these might yield interesting results, giving insight into which combination of 
perspectives are commonly found in practice. It could also lead to the uncovering of strategy 
paradigms influencing only two perspectives. While extremely interesting, however, this 
research would move beyond the scope of this study. Here the objective has been to construct 
an instrument for measuring executives’ strategy views and in this section it has been the 
intention to check whether this instrument is not unnecessarily complex, given the existence 
of a few overarching strategy paradigms. The conclusion is that no traces have been found of 
such fundamental strategy paradigms and that therefore the existing scales seem to be defined 
at the most appropriate level of complexity. While there are some very exciting results 
coming out of some of the cluster analyses, and this arena represents a very rich environment 
for further research, it is beyond the scope of this study to pursue any of this here. Therefore, 
in chapter 16, the opportunity for further cluster analyses will be revisited, with some 
suggestions for promising combinations out of the 45 potential two dimension cluster 
analyses (10 dimensions x 9 / 2 = 45 permutations) and 120 potential three dimension cluster 
analyses (10 x 9 x 8 / 6 = 120 permutations). 
 
14.4.1 Strategy Process View Clusters 
In table 14.9 below, an overview is presented of the cluster analysis using the three 
dimensions with a strong strategy process aspect. The strategic programming dimension runs 
from an orientation towards the strategic planning perspective (5) to an orientation towards 
the strategic incrementalism perspective (1). The organizational continuity dimension runs 
from the continuous renewal (5) to the discontinuous renewal perspective (1), while the 
strategy-making dispersion dimension covers the spectrum from the organizational dynamics 
(5) to the organizational leadership perspective (1). 
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  It was found that the most analytically useful clustering turned up when the total 
sample was split into 11 clusters. Some of these clusters were extremely small groups of 
outliers (groups 8 through 11), but other relatively large clusters of executives emerged with 
a common profile. Any further splitting beyond 11 clusters only resulted in chipping off very 
small groups from these 11. 
Each one of these clusters has been given a descriptive name and will be briefly 
reviewed below. While the table gives a numerical value to each cluster’s average along the 
three dimensions, it is also possible to give a rougher characterization of each cluster by 
indicating whether it scores high (H), medium (M) or low (L) on each dimension, compared 
to the overall average. This letter code has been added to each cluster name as a general 
indication of the cluster profile. This has also made a rough visualization of the clusters 
possible, which is depicted in figure 14.1. 
 
TABLE 14.9 
Strategy Process View Clusters 
Cluster Cases 
Strategic 
Programming 
Organizational 
Continuity 
Strategy-Making 
Dispersion 
   Mean* Deviation Mean* Deviation Mean* Deviation 
1. Balanced Strategizing 157 3,56 0,20 3,03 -0,02 3,25 -0,15 
2. Participative Planning 68 3,87 0,41 3,30 0,25 3,96 0,56 
3. Revolutionary Leadership 53 3,29 -0,07 2,29 -0,76 2,71 -0,69 
4. Participative Exploration 36 2,61 -0,75 3,63 0,58 3,87 0,47 
5. Participative Innovation 28 2,44 -0,92 2,46 -0,59 3,83 0,43 
6.  Evolutionary Leadership 19 3,20 -0,12 4,12 1,41 3,04 -0,36 
7. Incremental Leadership 13 2,41 -0,95 3,25 0,20 2,82 -0,58 
8. Grass-roots Planning 5 3,89 0,53 4,35 1,30 4,50 1,10 
9.  Top-down Planning 3 4,04 0,68 2,38 -0,67 4,67 1,27 
10. Revolutionary Planning 2 4,56 1,20 1,56 -1,49 3,13 -0,27 
11. Top-down Innovation 1 1,22 2,14 1,88 -1,17 4,50 1,10 
Total 385 3,36  3,05  3,40  
* Note that the means are not meaningful in themselves, as the scales have not been “calibrated”. In 
other words, “3” is not an absolute point; not an empirical middle between the two opposite 
perspectives. That the mean for strategic programming for this sample is 3,36 could be because the 
respondents indeed are, on average, more oriented towards strategic planning, but it could also be due 
to the fact that the items used for this scale were more agreeably formulated. Therefore, it is more 
useful to measure how each cluster deviates from the overall mean.  
 
1. Balanced Strategizing (M-M-M). The description of the largest cluster (N=157; 41%) can 
actually be the shortest. This is the group staying close to the middle-of-the-road, taking a 
balanced view to strategizing. In the theoretical section of this study, no predictions were 
made of the distribution of views in the population at large, so here it is interesting to see 
that in this sample all dimensions have a “bulge” of respondents in the middle and “tails” 
towards the two poles, very similar to a normal distribution. In the next chapter this 
distribution will be examined in further detail, to hypothesize whether this is 
representative for executives in general. Here it suffices to say that the measurement 
instrument itself also biases people to take a middle position – if you need to give 12 
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items a score of 1 to 5 it is much less likely for respondents to have a cumulative score of 
60 (only possible with 12 x 5) than a cumulative score of 30 (many possible 
combinations). Hence, it is not surprising to see a large number of executives making up 
this centrist cluster.   
2. Participative Planning (H-M-H). The second largest cluster (N=68; 18%) is characterized 
by a higher than average score on strategic programming and strategy-making dispersion. 
These are the participative planners, who prefer a broad involvement of organizational 
members in the strategy development process and would like to do this in a planned 
manner. They do not have a specific preference for revolutionary or evolutionary change, 
but want a structured and participative process, as originally advocated by Ackoff (1980). 
3. Revolutionary Leadership (M-L-L). The third largest cluster (N= 53; 14%) is 
characterized by a lower than average score on organizational continuity and strategy-
making dispersion. These are the people who believe in revolutionary leadership – a 
strong person or group of people at the top of the organization who can push through 
radical strategic changes. While they do not have an inclination towards strategic 
planning or incrementalism, they clearly prefer a concentration of strategy-making 
activities at the top, presumably to have the power to push through the necessary strategic 
renewal measures as quickly and efficiently as possible, similar to the approach advocated 
by Hamel (1999).  
4. Participative Exploration (L-H-H). The fourth largest cluster (N=36; 9%) scores lower 
than average on strategic programming, but higher than average on organizational 
continuity and strategy-making dispersion. This preference for strategic incrementalism 
and continuous renewal points to a mentality of ongoing exploration, in which the future 
unfolds gradually through continuous experimentation and learning. In this process, these 
participative explorers believe that a broad range of executives within the organization 
should be involved, much as advocated by Beinhocker (1999).  
5. Participative Innovation (L-L-H). The fifth largest cluster (N=28; 7%) consists of 
executives with a similar profile to the participative explorers, but then much more 
revolutionary in their approach. They score higher than average on strategy-making 
dispersion, pointing to a participative inclination, while scoring lower than average on 
strategic programming, indicating a preference for an emergent approach. However, in 
their view the participation and emergence is necessary to realize the needed break-
through innovations. This is similar to the approach advocated by Stacey (1993). 
6. Evolutionary Leadership (M-H-L). One of the smaller clusters (N=19; 5%) is made up of 
people with a higher than average score on organizational continuity and a lower than 
average score on strategy-making dispersion. This is the group that believes in 
evolutionary leadership – a strong person or group of people at the top of the organization 
are needed, not to push through radical changes as the revolutionary leadership supporters 
argue, but actually to guide and guard an organization’s development over a prolonged 
period of time.  
7. Incremental Leadership (L-M-L). The last cluster that is big enough to mention (N=13; 
3%) is also made up of people that emphasize the concentration of strategy-making 
activities at the top of the organization. However, these people do not have an inclination 
towards evolution or revolution, but they do believe strongly in an incrementalist 
approach. This is like the entrepreneur as organizational leader – single-handedly finding 
the way forward for the organization. 
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FIGURE 14.1 
Visualization of the Strategy Process View Clusters 
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The overall conclusion of this cluster analysis, as stated before, is that there do not seem to be 
simple overarching strategy paradigms on the topic of the strategy process. Many different 
combinations of strategy perspectives are possible. What figure 14.1 does visualize, however, 
is that one strategy perspective does not combine well with others – the strategic planning 
perspective (higher than average on the strategic programming dimension) only seems to be 
popular in combination with the organizational dynamics perspective (higher than average on 
the strategy-making dispersion dimension). In other words, if you prefer strategic planning, 
you will most likely also want to plan in a participative way. 
 
14.4.2 Organization View Clusters 
In table 14.10 below, an overview is presented of the cluster analysis using the three 
“organizational dimensions”. These are the three dimensions with a strong view on the best 
way to structure strategy-making throughout the organization. Broadly speaking, all three run 
from decentralized to centralized strategy-making. The business unit autonomy dimension 
runs from an orientation towards the portfolio organization perspective (5) to an orientation 
towards the integrated organization perspective (1), which is an axis of decentralization – 
centralization across business units. The local adaptation dimension stretches from the 
international diversity perspective pole (5) to the global convergence perspective pole (1), 
which is the axis of decentralization – centralization across national borders. The strategy-
making dispersion dimension covers the spectrum from the organizational dynamics (5) to 
the organizational leadership perspective (1), which is the axis of decentralization – 
centralization across organizational levels. 
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  It was found that the most analytically useful clustering turned up when the total 
sample was split into 10 clusters. As with the previous cluster analysis, some of these clusters 
were extremely small groups of outliers (clusters 6 through 10), but other relatively large 
clusters of executives emerged with a common profile. Any further splitting beyond 10 
clusters only resulted in chipping off very small groups. 
Again, each one of the clusters has been given a descriptive name and will be briefly 
reviewed below. Each has also been given a letter code (high, medium, low) and is depicted 
in figure 14.2. 
 
TABLE 14.10 
Organizational View Clusters 
Cluster # 
Business Unit 
Autonomy 
Strategy-Making 
Dispersion 
Local 
Adaptation 
   Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation 
1. Balanced Organizing 171 2,41 -0,03 3,40 0 3,49 -0,30 
2. Participative Federation 69 3,07 0,63 3,63 0,23 4,14 0,35 
3. Participative Multinational 57 2,15 -0,29 3,98 0,58 4,31 0,52 
4. Local Leadership 48 2,00 -0,44 2,70 -0,70 4,22 0,43 
5. Global Leadership 22 1,79 -0,65 2,72 -0,68 2,89 -0,90 
6. Authoritative Federation 6 3,93 1,49 2,71 -0,69 4,31 0,52 
7. Democratic Federation 5 4,03 1,59 4,43 1,03 4,23 0,44 
8. Global Integration 4 1,57 -0,87 3,63 0,23 2,11 -1,68 
9. Global Business Leadership 2 3,50 1,06 2,44 -0,96 2,64 -1,15 
10. Participative Integration 1 2,00 -0,44 5,00 1,60 3,71 -0,08 
Total 385 2,44  3,40  3,79  
 
1. Balanced Organizing (M-M-M). As with the strategy process cluster analysis, the middle-
of-the-road cluster was the largest here (N=171; 44%). Again it must be noted that the 
means of this cluster (2,41; 3,40; 3,49) do not suggest that it is the center ground, but if 
you compare these scores to the overall group average, this cluster sits very firmly in the 
middle.  
2. Participative Federation (H-M-H). This second largest cluster (N=69; 18%) scores higher 
than average on business unit autonomy and local adaptation, while only slightly above 
average on strategy-making dispersion. In other words, the members of this cluster 
strongly emphasize decentralization in all of its aspects. They prefer a federation of 
autonomous business units and significant local responsiveness, with a mild amount of 
bottom-up participation in the strategy-making process.     
3. Participative Multinational (M-H-H). The third largest cluster (N=57; 15%) scores much 
higher on local adaptation and strategy-making dispersion, but much lower on business 
unit autonomy. In other words, they believe more strongly in working together in each 
country, across business units, in a participative way, but are strongly inclined to do this 
on multinational (country by country) basis.   
4. Local Leadership (L-L-H). The fourth largest cluster (N=48; 12%) consists of people who 
are also strongly in favour of local adaptability and considerable geographic 
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decentralization, but in each local unit they prefer a strong integration of businesses and 
strong concentration of strategic decision-making authority at the top of the unit. 
Characteristic for organizations with this type of profile is that they often have strong 
country managers. 
5. Global Leadership (L-L-L). The last of the significant clusters (N=22; 6%) consists of 
people with a strong inclination towards centralization along all dimensions. They prefer 
low levels of business unit autonomy, strategy-making dispersion and local adaptation, 
instead preferring cross-business and cross-border integration, as well as strategy-making 
concentration. Characteristic for organizations with this type of profile are strong global 
top management teams, directing international firms from the corporate center. 
 
FIGURE 14.2 
Visualization of the Organization View Clusters 
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Even more than with the strategy process clustering, here only a limited number of 
combinations seem to be popular. For instance, those people who have a preference for a 
globally standardized approach have a very strong chance of also being inclined to other 
forms of centralization (business unit integration and strategy-making concentration). Those 
who favor high strategy-making dispersion or high business unit autonomy, on the other 
hand, are more likely to lean towards local adaptiveness. 
 However, it must be emphasized again that generalizing these conclusions can only be 
done at one’s own risk. As the sample was not entirely representative for the population at 
large, for example containing an overrepresentation of Dutch executives, this cluster analysis 
should only viewed as an exploration of potential interrelations between the strategy 
dimensions. Only two really firm conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these analyses so 
far. First, that there do not seem to be traces of just a few overarching strategy paradigms that 
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could replace these three strategy dimensions. And secondly, that further research on these 
clusters seems promising, particularly if a broader, more representative dataset becomes 
available. Given its further research potential, this topic will be revisited in chapter 16.   
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Chapter 15 
 
 
USING THE MEASUREMENT 
INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
With 17 reliable strategy perspective scales completed, as well as eight composite strategy 
dimension scales, the primary research question has been answered. The similarities and 
differences in the key strategy perspectives held by business executives can be made 
measurable. It would now be valid to move to ‘conclusions and recommendations for further 
research’. Yet, such a step would miss out on the opportunity to ‘field test’ with the newly 
created measurement instrument, to see if it can contribute to answering some of the 
fundamental questions in the field of strategic cognition identified in chapter 1 (see figure 
15.1), such as “which personal attributes are determinants of executives’ strategy 
perspectives?” (A→B) and “how do executives’ strategy perspectives influence strategic 
decision-making processes” (B→C). 
 
FIGURE 15.1 
Exploring the link between personal attributes (A) and strategy perspectives (B) 
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With the first of these two questions in mind, the Strategy Profiler was designed to collect 
additional information on a number of personal attributes. The collection of this additional 
information was not theory-driven, but oriented towards the registration of a number of 
straight-forward and objective characteristics, such as age, education, nationality, functional 
area and experience. These are “the usual suspects” – personal attributes often included in 
research into cognitive maps (Porac and Thomas, 2002; Walsh, 1995). Given the existence of 
this information for the 385 people who filled out the Strategy Profiler 3.0, it would indeed be 
a missed opportunity if the relationship between personal attributes and strategy perspectives 
was not investigated. Therefore, in this chapter an additional research question will be 
considered, namely, what might be some of the factors influencing executives’ strategy 
perspectives (see figure 15.1). 
It must be reemphasized that this research question is exploratory in nature. As this 
study is a first attempt to develop a theory of strategy perspectives, much work still needs to 
be done on building theories to explain where executives’ strategy perspectives come from. 
The focus of this chapter is to review a range of ‘standard attributes’, as a first round of 
scouting, with the intention of contributing to the process of theory-building. It is the 
objective to come up with a number of empirically-derived leads that can be used in the next, 
final, chapter to formulate propositions with regard to the potential determinants of strategy 
beliefs. 
The richest dataset for this exploratory purpose is the Strategy Profiler 3.0 one, 
containing 385 respondents from a wide variety of backgrounds. The Strategy Profiler 4.0 
dataset is much narrower, containing only 127 respondents from one company. Therefore, for 
this research the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset will be used. However, it should be noted that 
using the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset also has a disadvantage. As was detailed in chapter 14, 
the reliability of the Strategy Profiler 3.0 strategy perspective scales was lower (only six of 
the twenty had an alpha above 0,65). Therefore, instead of focusing the discussion on the 
twenty strategy perspective scales, the eight reliable strategy dimension scales will be central 
in the following analyses. 
The research was conducted in three steps. First, for the linear variables, a correlation 
analysis was performed, comparing a number of personal attributes with the strategy 
perspective/dimension scales. The results of this analysis will be reported in section 15.3. 
Subsequently for the categorical variables, a one-way ANOVA analysis was carried out, 
which will be presented in section 15.4.  Thirdly, a regression analysis was done with most of 
the previously used variables, to judge the level of explanation these variables could provide. 
This material will be detailed in section 15.5. But before presenting these three analyses – all 
based on the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset – this chapter will start with a more detailed 
overview of the 385 respondents (section 15.2). 
 
 
15.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS 
  
As explained in chapter 13, the sample employed for the Strategy Profiler 3.0 was not defined 
upfront, but emerged along the way, depending on the executive education programs 
conducted by the Strategy Academy during the period from April 2005 until June 2006. A 
total of 508 participants in a variety of strategic management programs were invited to fill out 
the Strategy Profiler as part of the preparation for their course, of which 424 eventually did 
(83%). While this was a sample of convenience, the advantage of this approach was two-fold. 
First, in this manner a very high level of response could be ensured. Getting hundreds of busy 
executives to fill out a questionnaire is very difficult, but in this way there was a strong 
motivation for each individual to participate. The second advantage of this approach was that 
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it enabled a wide variety of executives, coming from 168 organizations, 20 countries and 18 
industries to be involved, giving a high level of richness to the dataset. And as there were no 
particular hypotheses to be tested, it was assumed that variety in the respondent population 
would be the best way of identifying which personal attributes might be of importance.  
 While the group of respondents was quite varied, it is not entirely representative of 
the population of executives at large. It is, therefore, important to review the composition of 
this group, to identify any biases it may contain. In this section, the group composition will 
be described on the basis of the most important independent variables used in the further 
analysis. It should be noted that, as argued in chapter 13, it is not likely that there is a 
significant bias in the group of non-respondents, compared to those that did respond. Most of 
the non-respondents mentioned lack of time, misunderstanding or technical difficulties as 
reasons for non-participation and it does not seem probable that any particular group was 
more beset by these troubles than others. 
 Furthermore, it should be noted that, just as in the previous chapter, the number of 
valid respondents (385) is lower than the overall number of respondents (424) due to the 
removal of those individual scores that did not meet the consistency tests. Unfortunately, for 
these 385 people not all personal information was always collected due to software problems. 
But as this software failure was totally random (making it hard to solve and forcing the entire 
program to be rewritten in a different programming language) it is unlikely that it has had a 
systematic bias on the respondent group.  
 
FIGURE 15.2 
Detailing of the independent and dependent variables recorded 
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The respondents can be described on the basis of the four general categories of personal 
attributes that were recorded; demographic, positional, experiential and organizational 
characteristics (see figure 15.2). Each of these will be reviewed in the sub-sections below. 
 
TABLE 15.1 
Gender distribution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Female 89 23,12 23,12 
Male 296 76,88 76,88 
Total 385 100,00 100,00 
 
TABLE 15.2 
Nationality distribution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Austria 4 1,04 1,63 
Belgium 5 1,30 2,03 
Canada 3 0,78 1,22 
China 8 2,08 3,25 
Croatia 5 1,30 2,03 
France 6 1,56 2,44 
Germany 24 6,23 9,76 
India 27 7,01 10,98 
Italy 3 0,78 1,22 
Malaysia 1 0,26 0,41 
Netherlands 129 33,51 52,44 
New Zealand 2 0,52 0,81 
Singapore 1 0,26 0,41 
Slovenia 5 1,30 2,03 
Surinam 1 0,26 0,41 
Sweden 3 0,78 1,22 
Switzerland 1 0,26 0,41 
United Kingdom 13 3,38 5,28 
United States 5 1,30 2,03 
Total 246 63,90 100,00 
Missing 139 36,10  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
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15.2.1 Demographic Attributes 
Five types of demographic attributes were recorded: gender, age, nationality, educational 
level and education area. These five variables were selected as they are often cited as 
important influences on the development of belief systems. In the tables below, the 
descriptive statistics on these five variables are given. All variables, except age, are 
categorical variables and therefore the frequency of each category is reported. However, 
educational level has also been converted into a linear variable (from lower education to 
high), making it possible to also report an average and standard deviation. 
What can be concluded from these tables is that, in terms of representativeness, the 
dataset is biased towards people with a Dutch nationality. While there is also a relatively high 
frequency of males, people with a Master’s degree and people having studied Business 
Administration, this does not seem at odds with their frequency in the broader population of 
business executives in most developed economies. In other words, only the overabundance of 
Dutch respondents is an important imbalance that needs to be kept in mind.  
 At the same time, in term of a sufficiently large sample size, the set of 385 
respondents is still much too small to be able to say much about any specific nationality 
(except the Dutch), or about the influence of most educational backgrounds, as most 
categories have a very low total.   
 
TABLE 15.3 
Age distribution 
 N Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 269 38,57 9,00 
 
TABLE 15.4 
Educational level distribution 
Mean 3,65 
S.D. 0,68 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
1. Primary education 2 0,52 0,74 
2. Secondary education 11 2,86 4,07 
3. Bachelor’s degree 81 21,04 30,00 
4. Master’s degree 161 41,82 59,63 
5. Doctorate degree 15 3,90 5,56 
Total 270 70,13 100,00 
Missing 115 29,87  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
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TABLE 15.5 
Education area distribution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Physical Sciences 14 3,64 5,20 
Business Studies 99 25,71 36,80 
Computer Sciences 8 2,08 2,97 
Economics 44 11,43 16,36 
Education 4 1,04 1,49 
Engineering 41 10,65 15,24 
Languages 2 0,52 0,74 
Law 15 3,90 5,58 
Mathematics 7 1,82 2,60 
Medicine/Nursing 4 1,04 1,49 
Philosophy / Religion 1 0,26 0,37 
Social Sciences 27 7,01 10,04 
Other 3 0,78 1,12 
Total 269 69,87 100,00 
Missing 116 30,13  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
 
 
15.2.2 Positional Attributes 
While the demographic attributes are characteristics that people have before coming into their 
careers, the positional attributes are characteristics of where people are currently “located” in 
their careers. The three attributes recorded were functional area (e.g. marketing, operations), 
function level (e.g. CEO, business unit manager) and size of functional responsibility (e.g. 
unit of 100 employees, unit of 100.000 employees).  
What became clear from the responses was that the variables ‘function level’ and 
‘size of functional responsibility’ were too open to misinterpretation to yield useful data. For 
the variable ‘functional level’ respondents were allowed to select between “Not Employed,” 
“Student,” “Professor/Trainer,” “Consultant,” “Specialist/Staff,” “Manager,” “Executive 
Director,” “Non-Executive Director”. What had not been foreseen was that some “executive 
directors” turned out to be the head of a one man company, while some “managers” ran 
business units with thousands of employees worldwide. Therefore, these categories turned 
out to be rather meaningless. It was also reported back by many respondents that they were 
confused because they fell into multiple categories, e.g. manager of a consulting firm or a 
manager currently not employed. Given these difficulties, this variable was dropped for the 
further analysis. For the Strategy Profiler 4.0 two important changes were made. Respondents 
were allowed to fill in more than one category if applicable and the variable “executive 
director” was dropped, as the term manager is sufficient. 
Many respondents also had difficulty defining how many people they had in “the 
unit” they were leading. They were allowed to choose between “Unit of <10 employees,” 
“Unit of 10-49 employees,” “Unit of 50-99 employees,” “Unit of 100-499 employees,” “Unit 
of 500-999 employees,” “Unit of 1000-9999 employees,” and “Other top management 
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position”. However, some people were confused by the term unit. For instance, one CEO of a 
company with thousands of employees reported leading a unit of 50-99 employees, probably 
only referring to the headquarters staff. Here too, the manner in which the data was collected 
for the Strategy Profiler 4.0 was improved. The question was changed to “how many people 
fall under your direct or indirect authority?” But for the Strategy Profiler 3.0 dataset only the 
functional area variable offers reliable data for further analysis purposes (see table 15.6).  
 
TABLE 15.6 
Functional area distribution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
General Management 48 12,47 18,90 
Finance 28 7,27 11,02 
Human Resources 11 2,86 4,33 
Information Management 13 3,38 5,12 
Marketing 38 9,87 14,96 
Operations / Logistics 16 4,16 6,30 
Procurement 2 0,52 0,79 
Research & Development 16 4,16 6,30 
Sales 21 5,45 8,27 
Strategy 2 0,52 0,79 
Other Staff 20 5,19 7,87 
Other 39 10,13 15,35 
Total 254 65,97 100,00 
Missing 131 34,03  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
 
What can be concluded from this table is that the sample size is not large enough to be able to 
draw any firm conclusions about the correlation between functional position and strategy 
perspectives. For most functional areas the number of respondents is simply too low to do 
more than scout for potential correlations. 
 
15.2.3 Experiential Attributes 
While the positional attributes reflect a person’s current position, the experiential variables 
capture what a person has done before coming to their current position. Five variables were 
recorded: most experienced functional area (just in case this is different than their current 
functional position), years of experience in current functional area, years at the organization, 
overall working experience and overall management experience. In tables 15.7 through 15.11 
an overview is given of these five variables. While all have been recorded as categorical 
variables, all except the most experienced functional area can also be transformed into linear 
variables. Of course, these four variables measuring length of experience are all highly 
correlated with each other, as they all increase with age. In table 15.12 an overview is 
presented of the correlations between all linear independent variables recorded. 
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 What can be concluded from these overviews is that this sample is somewhat biased 
towards people in the middle of their careers – with 10-19 years of work experience, of which 
4-9 in a management position. Obviously, this is the primary audience for executive 
education and therefore they are somewhat overrepresented in this sample compared to the 
population at large. 
 
TABLE 15.7 
Most experienced functional area distribution 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
General Management 20 5,19 19,80 
Finance 11 2,86 10,89 
Human Resources 3 0,78 2,97 
Information Management 4 1,04 3,96 
Marketing 10 2,60 9,90 
Operations / Logistics 15 3,90 14,85 
Procurement 0 0,00 0,00 
Research & Development 8 2,08 7,92 
Sales 11 2,86 10,89 
Strategy 1 0,26 0,99 
Other Staff 5 1,30 4,95 
Other 13 3,38 12,87 
Total 101 26,23 100,00 
Missing 284 73,77  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
 
 
TABLE 15.8 
Years of experience in functional area distribution 
Mean 2,88 
S.D. 1,03 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
1. <1 years 8 2,08 7,92 
2. 1-3 years 30 7,79 29,70 
3. 4-9 years 35 9,09 34,65 
4. 10-19 years 22 5,71 21,78 
5. 20-29 years 6 1,56 5,94 
Total 101 26,23 100,00 
Missing 284 73,77  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
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TABLE 15.9 
Years at the organization distribution 
Mean 3,04 
S.D. 1,10 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
1. <1 years 9 2,34 8,91 
2. 1-3 years 18 4,68 17,82 
3. 4-9 years 46 11,95 45,54 
4. 10-19 years 18 4,68 17,82 
5. 20-29 years 8 2,08 7,92 
6. >30 years 2 0,52 1,98 
Total 101 26,23 100,00 
Missing 284 73,77  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
 
TABLE 15.10 
Years of work experience distribution 
Mean 4,06 
S.D. 0,91 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
1. <1 years 2 0,52 1,98 
2. 1-3 years 1 0,26 0,99 
3. 4-9 years 21 5,45 20,79 
4. 10-19 years 45 11,69 44,55 
5. 20-29 years 29 7,53 28,71 
6. >30 years 3 0,78 2,97 
Total 101 26,23 100,00 
Missing 284 73,77  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
 
 
TABLE 15.11 
Years of management experience distribution 
Mean 2,76 
S.D. 1,22 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
1. <1 years 57 14,81 21,19 
2. 1-3 years 45 11,69 16,73 
3. 4-9 years 94 24,42 34,94 
4. 10-19 years 54 14,03 20,07 
5. 20-29 years 18 4,68 6,69 
6. >30 years 1 0,26 0,37 
Total 269 69,87 100,00 
Missing 116 30,13  
Ultimate Total 385 100,00  
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TABLE 15.12 
Correlations between linear variables 
 Personal Attribute 1  2  3  4  5  6  
1 Age 1,000  -0,001  0,436 *** 0,478 *** 0,751 *** 0,833 *** 
2 Educational Level -0,001  1,000  -0,157  -0,136  0,073  -0,292 *** 
3 Functional Experience 0,436 *** -0,157  1,000  0,311 *** 0,337 *** 0,569 *** 
4 Years at Organization 0,478 *** -0,136  0,311 *** 1,000  0,380 *** 0,493 *** 
5 Mgmt Experience 0,751 *** 0,073  0,337 *** 0,380 *** 1,000  0,619 *** 
6 Work Experience 0,833 *** -0,292 *** 0,569 *** 0,493 *** 0,619 *** 1,000  
***: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,01 
 
 
15.2.4 Organizational Attributes 
The last category of attributes was organizational, focusing on the type of firm environment 
in which the respondent is currently working. Three types of variables were recorded: 
employer (the name of the company for which the respondent is working), industry and size 
of company. The reasoning was that corporate and industry culture are often mentioned as 
important influences on the belief systems of executives (e.g. Tyler and Steensma, 1997; 
Porac et al, 1995), and that an important aspect of corporate culture is the size of the firm.      
 Due to a programming error, however, the Strategy Profiler 3.0 did not register the 
organizational characteristics of the respondents’ employers, but of the university, business 
school or training firm organizing the strategic management course the respondents were 
participating in. This glitch has been rectified for the Strategy Profiler 4.0; for the Strategy 
Profiler 3.0 all respondents’ employers and industries were recovered by hand afterwards, 
based on the email addresses of the respondents. This led to the conclusion that the 424 
original respondents (before sifting out the inconsistent responses) came from approximately 
168 organizations, which were most likely operating in 18 of the 21 industry categories 
possible. However, given the imprecision of this ‘data recovery process’, this data will be left 
out of the further study.  
 
15.2.5 Conclusions about the Dataset 
In the last few pages, it has become clear that the group of respondents to the Strategy 
Profiler 3.0 is not entirely representative of the broader population of executives around the 
world. This sample, and the resulting dataset, is slightly biased towards Dutch respondents in 
the middle of their careers. This is important to keep in mind, but not a real impediment for 
the exploratory research intended in this chapter. 
However, a second limitation of this dataset also needs to be pointed out. As is made 
clear in table 15.12, the various linear variables are not independent of one another, as almost 
all of them are linked to age. When it comes to the categorical variables, they too are not fully 
independent of one another, as can be seen in the Pearson’s Chi-Square tests reported in table 
15.13. This means that caution is required in interpreting the one-on-one relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, as there is an increased chance of co-linearity. 
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TABLE 15.13 
Chi-square test between categorical variables 
Gender Nationality Educational Area Functional Area 
Variable 
Χ2 dF Χ2 dF Χ2 dF Χ2 dF 
Nationality 29,88 ** 18      
Educational Area 24,72 ** 12 198,66  216     
Functional Area 29,77 *** 11 229,71 * 198 353,50 *** 132   
Most Experienced Function 21,64 ** 10 107,49  90 172,43 ** 110 386,41 *** 100
***: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,01 
 **: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,05 
  *: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,10 
 
 
15.3 EXPLORATORY CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
  
The objective in this section is to empirically explore which linear independent variables are 
correlated to the strategy perspectives and strategy dimensions. The driving question is 
‘where do the strategy perspectives of executives come from?’ But as explained before, there 
are no hypotheses to be tested. In this phase of the research cycle, induction is still dominant; 
this analysis is intended to uncover leads which can be used for the theory building process. 
Therefore, all of the significant correlations discovered in this analysis will be shortly 
discussed, to field as many potential explanations as possible, as inputs for future theory 
development efforts (see also chapter 16).   
In figure 15.2, eight linear independent variables were identified among the personal 
attributes recorded. As explained, two of these have been dropped from this study (size of 
unit managed and size of organization), leaving the six variables reviewed in table 15.12.: 
age, education level, experience in functional area, years in organization, management 
experience and work experience. In table 15.14 the correlations between these variables and 
the strategy perspective scales are reported. It should be noted that while the correlations with 
all strategy perspective scales are reported in this table, only six of these scales have a 
Cronbach alpha higher than 0,65 (see table 14.1) justifying their inclusion in the following 
discussion. These six reliable scales are shown in the white cells in table 15.14. 
In table 15.15 the correlations between the six linear variables and the strategy 
dimension scales are presented. As all of these scales have an acceptable reliability 
coefficient (seven of eight are above a Cronbach alpha of 0,65; only ‘resource leveraging’ has 
a score of 0,61), these correlations are much more meaningful and important for further 
research.  
In the following sub-sections, the significant correlations between the six independent 
variables and the strategy perspective/dimension scales will be reviewed in turn. 
 
15.3.1 Strategy Perspectives and Age 
In the sample of 385 executives, age is negatively correlated with the continuous renewal 
perspective, organizational leadership perspective and the strategic programming dimension. 
Hence, on average, the older the person is, the less they believe in evolutionary change, top-
down strategizing and strategic programming: 
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TABLE 15.14 
Correlations between linear independent variables and the strategy perspective scales 
 Perspective Scale Age EducationalLevel 
Functional 
Experience
Years at 
Org. 
Mgmt 
Experience 
Work 
Experience
1 Rational Reasoning -0,058  -0,048  0,026  -0,040  -0,055  0,004  
2 Generative Reasoning 0,100  0,006  0,148  0,060  0,078  0,182 * 
3 Strategic Planning -0,065  -0,132 ** 0,089  -0,037  -0,022  -0,015  
4 Strat. Incrementalism 0,059  0,038  0,040  0,122  0,043  0,114  
5 Discontinuous Renewal -0,070  0,016  0,100  0,148  -0,034  0,134  
6 Continuous Renewal -0,175 *** -0,106 * -0,069  -0,011  -0,155 ** -0,030  
7 Outside-In -0,019  -0,087  0,086  0,303 *** -0,033  0,048  
8 Inside-Out -0,059  -0,058  -0,019  -0,075  -0,042  0,077  
9 Portfolio Organization 0,016  -0,091  -0,098  -0,051  0,012  0,145  
10 Integrated Organization -0,100  -0,063  0,134  -0,068  -0,049  -0,131  
11 Discrete Organization -0,100  0,049  -0,032  0,032  -0,120 ** -0,002  
12 Embedded Org. 0,085  -0,178 *** 0,185 * -0,086  0,060  0,084  
13 Industry Dynamics 0,005  0,027  0,038  0,050  0,047  0,150  
14 Industry Leadership -0,066  -0,094  0,011  0,087  -0,092  0,034  
15 Org. Leadership -0,130 ** 0,013  -0,016  0,038  -0,025  -0,091  
16 Org. Dynamics 0,010  -0,025  0,101  -0,042  0,059  0,127  
17 Global Convergence 0,057  -0,152 ** 0,119  0,054  0,051  0,029  
18 International Diversity -0,006  0,088  0,150  -0,216 ** 0,031  0,063  
19 Shareholder Value -0,053  -0,068  -0,162  -0,008  -0,037  -0,129  
20 Stakeholder Values -0,103 * -0,012  0,108  0,125  -0,055  0,105  
Scales with α ≥ 0,65 are depicted in white cells (see table 14.1). 
***: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,01 
 **: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,05 
  *: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,10 
 
 
TABLE 15.15 
Correlations between linear independent variables and the strategy dimension scales 
 Dimension Scale Age EducationalLevel 
Functional 
Experience
Years at 
Org. 
Mgmt 
Experience 
Work 
Experience
21 Strategic Programming -0,111 * -0,147 ** 0,061  -0,094  -0,082  -0,042  
22 Org. Continuity -0,084  -0,091  -0,082  -0,064  -0,087  -0,085  
23 Resource Leveraging -0,027  0,036  -0,058  -0,142  0,017  0,027  
24 BU Autonomy 0,008  -0,048  -0,138  -0,033  -0,005  0,134  
25 Firm Independence -0,015  0,032  -0,011  0,094  -0,063  0,098  
26 StratMaking Dispersion 0,067  -0,037  0,083  -0,054  0,036  0,146  
27 Local Adaptation 0,037  0,174 *** 0,011  -0,199 ** 0,073  0,051  
28 Stakeholder Respons. -0,095  -0,009  0,100  0,109  -0,052  0,072  
***: Correlation is significant at the level p<0,01; **: at the level p<0,05; *: at the level p<0,10 
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 Age and continuous renewal perspective (-0,175; p<0,01). Of all of the high correlation 
coefficients, the highly negative one between age and the continuous renewal perspective 
is one of the most eye-catching. It seems that with age, people are less inclined to believe 
that change can be gradual and continuous. It could be speculated that these older 
executives have learned from experience that continuous renewal is less effective (there is 
also a highly negative correlation between management experience and the continuous 
renewal perspective), but it is also possible that older executives are less patient to 
achieve strategic changes, either because they will not be around very much longer, or 
because they are in higher positions within their organizations and are experiencing 
stronger pressure for quick results. To check this last conjecture, more precise data on 
each individual’s management level would be very useful. Interestingly, these older 
executives do not show, as matter of compensation, a positive inclination towards the 
discontinuous perspective. For this reason, age also does not have a significant correlation 
with the organizational continuity dimension. Obviously, believing less in evolutionary 
change has not made them stronger believers in revolutionary change. It could be that 
they are just less inclined to believe that any approach to strategic change will work at all. 
 Age and organizational leadership perspective (0,130; p<0,05). Older executives also 
tend to believe less in the value of top-down strategizing. This does not seem due to their 
length of experience (both work experience and management experience are not 
significantly correlated), but only age, possibly suggesting that older executives, being 
closer to the end of their careers, believe that the next generation should develop strategy 
less top-down. It might also be that the older executives are higher up in the hierarchy. 
Yet if this is the case, it would mean that the higher level managers believe less strongly 
that they should be creating the strategy top-down than lower level managers. However, 
here again, older executives do not believe significantly more in the opposite perspective, 
of bottom-up participation in the strategizing process. For this reason, age also has no 
significant correlation to the strategy-making dispersion dimension. This could mean that 
the older executives are less inclined to think that any approach to strategy making will 
work at all. 
 Age and strategic programming (0,111; p<0,10). The older the executive, the less likely 
he/she is to view strategy formation as a deliberate process. This negative correlation 
coefficient is not high, but still significant. It would seem that, in general, work and 
management experience make executives more inclined to lean over to the emergence 
side of the spectrum, even though these correlations are not significant. But it might be 
life experience, or their management level within the organization that compound this 
tendency to make them more oriented towards strategic incrementalism than average. 
 
15.3.2 Strategy Perspectives and Educational Level 
Of the six variables, educational level produced the most significant correlations. There are 
negative correlations with the strategic planning, continuous renewal and strategic 
programming dimension. There is also a highly significant positive correlation with the local 
adaptation dimension.  Hence, on average, the higher the level of education of individuals, 
the more they will favor local adaptation over global synergies and emergence over 
deliberateness, while believing less in evolutionary change: 
 Educational level and strategic programming (-0,147; p<0,05). It seems that people with 
a higher level of education tend to be less inclined to believe that strategy formation 
should be approached in a highly deliberate way. On both relevant scales, the strategic 
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planning perspective scale and the strategic programming dimension scale, there is a 
significant negative correlation with deliberate strategizing. It could be hypothesized that 
people with a higher level of education are generally more capable of overseeing the 
complexity and dealing with the ambiguity inherent in a more emergent approach, while 
people with a lower level of education prefer the structure and predictability of a more 
deliberate approach. Or putting it more positively, people with a lower level of education 
might be in less need of making things complex and are more inclined to keep it simple 
and predictable. A related argument is that people with a higher level of education might 
be more confident that they are capable of learning along the way, making them more 
inclined to experiment and explore. 
 Educational level and local adaptation (0,174; p<0,01). People with a higher level of 
education are also less likely to believe in the value of a globally-integrated and 
standardized approach. On the global convergence scale a clear negative correlation was 
found, while on the overall dimension of global convergence vs. international diversity 
(local adaptation dimension) the correlation coefficient was even higher. A possible 
explanation is similar to the explanation given above: people with a higher level of 
education are more equipped to deal with the complexity and ambiguity inherent in the 
international diversity perspective, while people with a lower level of education are more 
attracted to the structure and simplicity of the global convergence perspective. 
Furthermore, people with a higher level of education generally have more knowledge 
about the global environment, accumulated during their studies, but potentially also from 
the media they employ.  
 Educational level and continuous renewal perspective (-0,106; p<0,10). At first glance, 
this correlation seems odd – why are people with a higher education less inclined to 
subscribe to the continuous renewal perspective? Shouldn’t they be oriented to gradual 
learning, as also discussed in the context of the strategic programming dimension? Yet, 
some potential explanations are still possible. First, people with a higher level of 
education might feel that an evolutionary approach to change is not ambitious enough and 
they might feel more confident to take on more complex renewal projects in a limited 
period of time. Secondly, people with a lower level of education might be more inclined 
to believe the continuous renewal perspective because they are often on the “receiving 
end” of strategic change processes and feel more comfortable if it goes at a pace that they 
can keep up with.        
 
15.3.3 Strategy Perspectives and Experience     
Four separate variables were used to measure different aspects of experience, but as they are 
all closely linked, they will be discussed together in this sub-section. Interestingly, years of 
functional area experience and years of work experience had no significant correlations with 
either the strategy perspectives or the strategy dimensions. Years experience within the 
current organization and management experience both had one significant correlation: 
 
 Years at organization and local adaptation dimension (-0,199; p<0,05). Earlier it was 
discussed that executives with a higher level of education were more inclined towards the 
localization side of the local adaptation dimension. When it comes to years at the current 
organization, the opposite is the case; on average, experience in the firm is linked to a 
more globalized approach to international strategy. It can be hypothesized that this is due 
to insight into the market and/or the firm’s business system – the more an executive 
knows about the functioning of international markets and the nitty-gritty of the firm’s 
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international activities and product offerings, the more he/she has come to believe that 
more cross-border standardization and integration will pay off. In other words, 
localization is the default when an executive has insufficient insight, but as experience 
increases, the global synergy opportunities become more self-evident. In addition to 
seeing the synergy potential, long-time employees might also gain a better understanding 
of how cross-border synergizing can be organized efficiently and effectively in the firm. 
An alternative explanation is that newer employees have more experience outside the firm 
and are better at recognizing diversity in the international market, while long-time 
employees might be more inclined to view the international environment through the 
corporate lens, seeing the international uniformity they want to see, which allows them to 
impose a one size fits all approach. 
 Management experience and continuous renewal perspective (-0,155; p<0,05). The last 
significant correlation in table 15.14 is a negative one between management experience 
and the continuous renewal perspective. On average, the more management experience, 
the less likely executives will be inclined to believe in an evolutionary approach to 
strategic change. The possible explanations are very similar to the arguments given in 
sub-section 15.3.1 on the correlation with age.     
   
15.3.4 Correlation Analysis Conclusions  
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from these correlation analyses is that these six 
variables seem to play only a minor role in determining the strategy perspectives held by 
executives. Two of the six show no significant correlations at all (functional area experience 
and work experience), while the other four only show a limited number of significant 
correlations. At the same time, many of the strategy perspectives and strategy dimensions 
actually have no significant correlations with these variables at all. Of course, it might be 
possible that these variables have an impact on the missing strategy perspectives and strategy 
dimensions, but overall they do not seem to be the main factors determining the views held 
by executives. 
 Hence, while these variables might be a small part of the overall picture, for theory 
building purposes their importance is limited. Other variables will need to be sought to 
understand the variety of strategic beliefs. 
 
 
15.4 EXPLORATORY ONE-WAY ANOVA ANALYSIS 
  
For the categorical independent variables, the initial test to establish whether they might be 
linked to the dependent variables is by means of a one-way ANOVA analysis, which assesses 
the equality of means across the various categories. As with the correlation analysis, the 
intention here is to explore which variables might be potential determinants of executives’ 
strategic beliefs and, therefore, of importance for further research.  
 In figure 15.2, eight categorical variables were mentioned, of which three were 
dropped for this exploratory analysis (function level, employer and industry), leaving five 
relevant variables to be discussed: gender, area of studies, functional area, past functional 
area and nationality. In the sub-sections below the results of the one-way ANOVA tests for 
these variables will be reported and discussed. In each case, the results for all strategy 
perspective scales and strategy dimension scales will be displayed, although only a limited 
number of the strategy perspective scales are reliable. As before, the reliable scales will be 
shown in distinctive white cells. 
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15.4.1 Strategy Perspectives and Gender 
The gender of the respondents was the first variable recorded, although strictly speaking it is not one 
of the “usual suspects”, since it has not often been cited as a factor influencing strategic beliefs. 
Interestingly, however, in this sample there is one strategy perspective were gender seems to play a 
role. As can be seen in table 15.16, the women score significantly higher on the organizational 
dynamics perspective than the men (F = 4,05; p<0,05 level). This effect is somewhat less pronounced 
on the strategy-making dispersion dimension, but still significant at the p<0,10 level (see table 15.17). 
This lower F score along this dimension is due to the fact that the male and female respondents do not 
have significantly different scores on the opposite strategy perspective, namely the organizational 
leadership perspective – it is only their views on the amount of bottom-up involvement in strategy-
making that is significantly different. 
 
 
TABLE 15.16 
One-way ANOVA for gender and the strategy perspective scales 
 Perspective Scales 
Female 
(N=89) 
Male 
(N=296) 
Total 
(N=385) 
F 
1 Rational Reasoning 3,43 3,54 3,51 1,77  
2 Generative Reasoning 3,62 3,56 3,57 0,78  
3 Strategic Planning 3,78 3,79 3,79 0,01  
4 Strategic Incrementalism 3,44 3,41 3,42 0,16  
5 Discontinuous Renewal 3,00 2,99 2,99 0,02  
6 Continuous Renewal 3,22 3,12 3,14 1,40  
7 Outside-In 2,80 2,79 2,79 0,00  
8 Inside-Out 3,36 3,40 3,39 0,44  
9 Portfolio Organization 2,53 2,54 2,54 0,05  
10 Integrated Organization 3,90 3,81 3,83 1,92  
11 Discrete Organization 2,26 2,18 2,20 1,29  
12 Embedded Organization 3,61 3,71 3,69 2,77 * 
13 Industry Dynamics 2,51 2,52 2,52 0,04  
14 Industry Leadership 3,11 3,27 3,23 5,23 ** 
15 Organizational Leadership 3,19 3,27 3,25 0,85  
16 Organizational Dynamics 3,88 3,73 3,76 4,05 ** 
17 Global Convergence 2,86 2,96 2,94 1,92  
18 International Diversity 3,77 3,80 3,79 0,17  
19 Shareholder Value 2,78 2,89 2,86 1,35  
20 Stakeholder Values 3,77 3,79 3,79 0,09  
Scales with α ≥ 0,65 are depicted in white cells (see table 14.1). 
All F tests with (1,383) degrees of freedom 
*** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10 
 
 
 
 
 
345
Chapter 15: Using the Measurement Instrument  
287 
TABLE 15.17 
One-way ANOVA for gender and the strategy dimension scales 
 Dimension Scales 
Female 
(N=89) 
Male 
(N=296) 
Total 
(N=385) 
F 
21 Strategic Programming 3,37 3,36 3,36 0,04  
22 Organizational Continuity 3,09 3,04 3,05 0,33  
23 Resource Leveraging 3,40 3,40 3,40 0,00  
24 Business Unit Autonomy 2,43 2,45 2,44 0,10  
25 Firm Independence 2,30 2,24 2,25 0,83  
26 Strategy-making Dispersion 3,51 3,37 3,40 3,79 * 
27 Local Adaptation 3,79 3,79 3,79 0,00  
28 Stakeholder Responsibility 3,95 3,92 3,93 0,20  
All F tests with (1,383) degrees of freedom 
*** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10 
 
The obvious question is why this result was found. Before jumping to the conclusion that 
women in general might be more inclined towards the organizational dynamics perspective 
than men, it should be noted that the women in the sample were not equally distributed across 
all other categories. In table 15.13 it can be seen that gender distribution is significantly 
linked to the distribution of educational area, functional area and nationality. Therefore, what 
might seem to be a link between gender and a specific strategy perspective might be due to 
the different nationalities, studies and functional areas of the male and female segments of the 
sample. 
 Having stated this reservation, it is still interesting to speculate why on average 
women might be more strongly oriented towards the organizational dynamics perspective 
than men. The possible explanations can be found on both the “nature” and the “nurture” side 
of the debate on gender differences. On the “nature” side, it is possible that in general women 
have a more inclusive orientation towards decision-making than men, due to their desire to 
build strong group relationships and a preference for more group consensus. The “average” 
man, on the other hand, might feel more at ease with a clearer “pecking order” that leaves 
some group members outside of the decision-making process. On the “nurture” side, it might 
be that women tend towards a more bottom-up, inclusive orientation because they believe this 
works better for them in their current situation, which is that of working in mostly male-
dominated organizations. Instead of competing for decision-making power with men, they 
might tend to defuse internal competition by advocating a more cooperative joint decision-
making approach. 
 The intention of this speculation is not to field testable hypotheses, as a much deeper 
knowledge of the huge literature on gender differences would be required to do so. Rather, 
this speculation is only meant to provide ‘face validity’ to the findings – on the face of things 
it is not strange to find that gender is linked to people’s preference for the organizational 
dynamics perspective. Therefore, further research into this link would be justified. However, 
the overall conclusion about the importance of gender for executives’ strategy perspectives is 
that gender seems to play only a very minor role. 
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15.4.2 Strategy Perspectives and Educational Area 
Educational background is often cited as a factor influencing the cognitive map of executives 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Walsh, 1995). In table 15.18 the one-way ANOVA test for 
educational area and the strategy perspectives is presented. This analysis yields only one 
significant result; the shareholder value perspective has a measurably different level of 
support across the different educational areas (F=2,05; p<0,05). Executives with a 
background in the physical sciences, engineering and economics are more inclined to look 
favorably on the shareholder value perspective, while executives who studied social sciences 
and law were much less supportive. This significant result was not found when looking at the 
strategy dimension scales (table 15.19). This is understandable, as the strategy dimension 
scale contains only 2 of the 6 shareholder value perspective items (see for more details 
section 14.3.2). 
 In interpreting this result, it is again difficult to isolate the educational area aspect, as 
there is a strong correlation between educational background, functional area and gender in 
this sample. Having said this, the link between a ‘hard sciences’ education (physical sciences, 
engineering and economics) and more support for the shareholder values perspective doesn’t 
require a stretch of the imagination. People schooled with a focus on quantitative modeling, 
as well as a mechanistic view of systems, are more likely to feel an affinity with the 
instrumentalist view of organizations advocated by the shareholder value perspective. In the 
same vein, executives with a background in the social sciences and law should find the idea 
of organizations as coalitions held together by social contracts, as propagated by the 
stakeholder values perspective, more intuitively appealing. But again, this is initial 
speculation, based on a relatively small and biased sample. Yet, further research into this 
linkage does seem justified. 
 The other significant result in table 15.18 is for the global convergence perspective (F 
= 2,07; p<0,05), but this outcome needs to be looked at with caution, as the scale has a low 
reliability score (Cronbach alpha = 0,60). However, a similar result is found for the local 
adaptation dimension (F = 1,62; p<0,10), which is a reliable scale. Executives who studied 
physical sciences and engineering tend to lean over more to the global convergence side of 
the scale, while the social scientists lean more strongly towards the international diversity 
pole.  
 Again this result might be influenced by the fact that executives with a certain 
educational background are found more in certain functional areas. However, the finding still 
has considerable face validity. It could be argued that people with a physical sciences and 
engineering background pay more attention to the technological aspects of business, which 
are easier to standardize and integrate across borders, while the social scientists have been 
primed to identify social, political and cultural differences in the international environment. 
Additionally, it might also be the case that the technically-educated executives have been 
more trained at problem-solving, making them more attuned to seeing the opportunities in 
cross-border synergizing. Social scientists, on the other hand, might be more oriented towards 
analysis and coping with complexity, making them keener to accommodate the local 
differences.  
 The overall conclusion regarding the importance of educational background for 
strategic beliefs is that it seems to play only a minor role in shaping views on one or two 
dimensions. This does justify further research, but does not suggest that the impact of 
educational background is an overlooked major new area requiring significant attention. 
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15.4.3 Strategy Perspectives and Functional Area 
While in the managerial cognition literature the variables gender and educational background 
are rarely put forward as key influences on executives’ beliefs, functional background is often 
mentioned (e.g. Beyer et al., 1997; Markóczy, 1997; Waller, Huber and Glick, 1995). 
Sometimes the emphasis is on the functional area in which an executive has had the most past 
experience, based on the notion that executives unconsciously receive a functional 
conditioning (Chattopadhyay et al., 1999) that can have a long term impact on their belief 
system. Other researchers place more emphasis on an executives’ current functional area, 
based on the assumption that its day-to-day requirements and related political interests (i.e. 
functional demands) more acutely influence an executive’s cognitive map. As both arguments 
are convincing assumptions, the Strategy Profiler included questions to ascertain each 
respondent’s most experienced functional area, as well as their current one.    
In tables 15.20 and 15.21 the results of the one-way ANOVA tests are presented for 
the respondents’ current functional area, while tables 15.22 and 15.23 show the results for 
their most experienced functional area. It should be noted that for some functional areas there 
were only a few respondents, while the number of respondents reporting their most 
experienced functional area was relatively low (N=90), as this question was only inserted half 
way through the research process. 
What can be derived from these analyses is that functional background seems to be 
linked to quite a few strategic beliefs. Significant differences in average scores across the 
various functions can be found for the strategic programming, strategy-making dispersion and 
local adaptation dimensions. Each will be reviewed separately in the following sub-sections.   
   
Functional Background and Strategic Programming Dimension 
When looking at the respondents’ current functional area, a moderately significant link can be 
identified with the strategic planning perspective (F=1,75; p<0,10) and the overall strategic 
programming dimension (F=1,82; p<0,10). Executives working in the areas of human 
resource management, research and development, and other staff departments are on average 
less inclined to support the strategic planning perspective, while executives in the area of 
marketing and information management lean more over to the strategic planning pole. 
Executives in sales, finance and operations, as well as general managers, are in between these 
two groups. This linkage is not found when looking at the respondents’ most experienced 
functional area (see table 15.22 and 15.23), which would suggest that the influence is not due 
to functional conditioning, but to the current functional demands experienced by executives. 
Their views seem to be influenced by their current position, not by a previous one (i.e. 
“where you sit determines where you stand”).  
One explanation for the link between current functional area and strategic 
programming orientation could be that executives who need to plan their own functional 
activities years ahead in considerable detail will have a more positive view of strategic 
planning than executives who do not experience this pressure in their functional area. 
Typically, new activities in the area of information management (e.g. new IT systems) and 
marketing (e.g. new products) demand more of such detailed forward planning, while new 
activities in the area of human resources and other staff functions do not require such long 
term planning horizons, but rather short term responsiveness to unfolding circumstances. 
Following this logic, it is not surprising to see that executives in the area of R&D score the 
lowest on the strategic programming dimension, as they cannot develop long term plans for 
their functional activities either, but rather need to build on the discoveries they make in an 
incremental way.  
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An additional explanation is that executives in functions that are ‘future opportunity creating’ 
have a stronger need for structured strategic planning than executives in functions that are 
more ‘future opportunity responding’. Marketing and information management executives 
might feel more need/pressure to create new opportunities and competitive advantage, 
making them more in favor of strategic planning, while finance, operations and sales 
executive might be more inclined to follow this lead, with HR and staff executives even 
further behind. In this logic, the more executives implicitly define their own role as 
‘following’, the lower they will score on the strategic programming dimension.  
 
Functional Background and Strategy-making Dispersion Dimension 
Of all of the one-way ANOVA tests for functional background, the strategy-making 
dispersion dimension (as well as the underlying organizational leadership and organizational 
dynamics perspective scales) shows the highest F-values. When looking at the respondents’ 
current functional area, a moderately significant link can be identified with the organizational 
leadership perspective (F=1,78; p<0,10), but a highly significant link can be seen with the 
organizational dynamics perspective (F=2,63; p<0,01) and the overall strategy-making 
dispersion dimension (F=2,69; p<0,01). On average, executives working in the areas of 
finance and sales lean over more towards the organizational leadership pole, while executives 
in the areas of marketing, human resources and R&D are further over to the organizational 
dynamics pole of the scale. Executives in operations and information management, as well as 
general managers, are in between these two groups.  
This linkage is also found when looking at the respondents’ most experienced 
functional area. Executives with most experience in sales and finance lean towards the 
“control side”, while those with most experience in marketing, R&D and HR lean more 
towards the “chaos side”. There is an even higher F-score for the organizational dynamics 
perspective (F=2,76; p<0,01), but their score for the organizational leadership perspective 
scale is just short of being significant (F=1,58). Therefore, the overall strategy-making 
dispersion scale has a slightly lower score for the most experienced functional area, than for 
the current functional area (F=2,16; p<0,01). This relatively high consistency between most 
experienced functional area scores and current functional area scores would seem to suggest 
that here there might be some functional conditioning taking place. 
An explanation for why the average finance and sales executives in this sample are 
significantly less enthusiastic about broad participation in strategy-making than their 
colleagues in marketing, HR and R&D, could lie in a different experience of the value of 
employee input. In the areas of marketing and R&D new ideas and insights are generally not 
the exclusive domain of top management and therefore the involvement of a broader range of 
employees in developing new strategies can yield a richer assortment of options and better 
informed decisions. In other words, participation pays. Executives in the area of HR might 
experience the same effect first hand, but their appreciation of employee input into strategy-
making can also be based on their strong people-orientation (“human resources are key”) and 
their political interests (if good employees are important, so is the HR department). HR 
executives might also be supportive of bottom up strategizing because of its contribution to 
their goal of employee development. In finance and sales, on the other hand, the potential for 
co-creation seems to be lower. Executives might feel that employees can be a rich source of 
information, but not of insights, ideas and new opportunities. Therefore, their experience 
might be that involving more people in strategy-making adds extra complexity, without 
adding much extra value. 
An additional argument is that finance and sales executives might actually feel that 
broader employee participation in strategy-making has a potentially negative effect beyond 
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extra complexity, as these employees might focus more on trying to negotiate their financial 
and sales targets downwards than on developing new opportunities. For finance and sales 
executives setting targets and deciding on budgets is always a tough job, involving a lot of 
political horse-trading and arm-twisting. For these executives, having strategies and general 
objectives set by top management makes the process of translating these into controllable 
targets and budgets much simpler than in a more “democratic” and “chaotic” approach.   
 
Functional Background and Local Adaptation Dimension 
The third dimension along which significant differences can be found for executives with 
different functional backgrounds is the local adaptation dimension. When looking at the 
respondents’ current functional area, a moderately significant link can be identified with the 
local adaptation dimension (F=1,71; p<0,10), which is also found in the underlying global 
convergence perspective scale (F=1,71; p<0,10) and the international diversity perspective 
scale (F=2,02; p<0,05). On average, executives working in the areas of information 
management and sales and in staff functions lean over more towards the global convergence 
pole, while executives in the areas of finance and R&D are further over to the international 
diversity pole of the scale. Executives in operations, marketing, HR, and general management 
positions are in between these two groups. This significant result was not found for the most 
experienced functional area, suggesting that the executives’ cognitive map for this issue 
seems to be shaped more by current demands than by past conditioning. 
 Finding a potential explanation for these results is even more speculative than for 
these previous results. It could be argued that some functions generally experience a strong 
pressure for global standardization and none more so than information management. In 
international companies there is no issue as complex as bridging different IT systems that 
have been developed according to local requirements, so it is not surprising to see executives 
in the area of information management with a stronger orientation towards globalization. In 
the same way, executives in other staff functions, such as legal, PR, risk management and 
corporate social responsibility, typically experience the advantages of one consistent policy 
throughout an international firm, explaining their position as less local adaptation oriented. 
Yet, following the same logic one might expect executives in operations and logistics to also 
be more globalization-minded, but in this sample they are not. On the other hand, one might 
expect that the functions needing the most flexibility to adapt to local conditions would be 
marketing, sales and HR. Yet, none of these scored higher than average on the local 
adaptation dimension; actually, sales executives in this sample were much more 
globalization-minded than their colleagues from other functions. It could be that executives in 
sales see more opportunity and efficiency in selling to large international clients and 
segments, and are less interested in fragmenting their efforts on a country-by-country basis. 
But again, all of this is highly speculative, given the small sample size, co-linearity of 
variables and overrepresentation of middle-aged Dutch respondents.     
Explaining why R&D and finance executives are the most oriented towards local 
adaptation is even more difficult. Could it be that R&D executives by the nature of their 
research work are more primed to seeing differences, oddities and exceptions in a precise 
way, instead of looking for the broad common denominator? Or maybe people who go into 
R&D work tend to be more individualistic and extra respectful towards distinctiveness? Or 
perhaps it is in the interest of R&D executives to develop different products for different 
countries, bringing them extra budget and status? As for financial executives, could it be that 
they do not feel in a position to judge the viability of global standardization because they do 
not know the details of international market differences well enough? And could it be that 
they therefore have a preference for localized responsibilities and accountability?   
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Conclusion on the Importance of Functional Background 
While gender and educational background could be categorized as relatively minor influences 
on executives’ strategic beliefs, the exploratory analyses done on this sample group suggest 
that functional background is a much more important factor. Amongst those surveyed, 
significant differences have been found between executives from different functional areas 
along three of the eight strategy dimensions (strategic programming, strategy-making 
dispersion and local adaptation), implying that a person’s current functional area could be a 
factor shaping their strategic cognitive map. Along the strategy-making dispersion dimension 
it was also found that executives most experienced functional area was linked to their 
strategic beliefs, indicating that their cognitive maps are not only shaped by current 
functional circumstances (functional demands), but also by past experiences and learnings 
(functional conditioning). 
 What the precise functional circumstances or experiences are that have an impact on 
belief formation remains to be researched. In the discussion above, a number of arguments 
have been put forward that could be the building blocks of proper hypotheses, but much 
needs to be done to gain a clear understanding of the influence of functional area on the mind 
of the strategist. But what can be concluded is that functional area is a promising variable for 
further research. 
 
15.4.4 Strategy Perspectives and Nationality 
The last categorical variable for which a one-way ANOVA test has been carried out is 
nationality. Country of origin has often been cited as a factor influencing the cognitive map 
of executives (e.g. Bigoness and Blakely, 1996; Kotha et al., 1995; Markóczy, 2000; 
Schneider and de Meyer, 1991). It is argued that growing up in a particular national culture 
has a long term conditioning effect on a person’s beliefs and behavior (i.e. cultural imprinting 
or cultural programming; e.g. Hofstede, 1994; Trompenaars, 1993). Similar to the discussion 
on functional conditioning and functional demands, some researchers place less emphasis on 
a person’s cultural conditioning, but more on the institutional demands of the national 
environment that a person is currently working in (e.g. Hitt et al, 1997; Scott, 1995; Welsh et 
al, 1993). These demands include formal institutions such as laws, governments and 
organizations, as well as informal institutions such as cultural beliefs, values, norms, habits 
and networks. Strictly speaking, then, the two best variables here would have been ‘most 
lived in national environment during formative years’ (to capture cultural conditioning) and 
‘current national work environment’ (to capture the dominant institutional demands). 
However, following convention only the nationality of the respondent was recorded, as this is 
easier to ask and for most people is the same as where they grew up and are currently 
working.  
In table 15.25 the one-way ANOVA test for nationality and the strategy perspectives 
is presented, while table 15.26 shows the results for nationality and the strategy dimensions. 
Both tests yield a large number of significant results, suggesting that nationality is an 
important factor in understanding differences in cognitive maps between executives. 
Significant results can be recorded for the strategic programming dimension (F=3.00; 
p<0,01), the resource leveraging dimension (F=1,48; p<0,10), the strategy-making dispersion 
dimension (F=1,84; p<0,05), the local adaptation dimension (F=1,90; p<0,05) and the 
stakeholder responsibility dimension (F=2,52; p<0,01). Furthermore, for the rational 
reasoning perspective (for which no reliable strategy dimension could be created) there is 
also a significant result (F=2,01; p<0,05). 
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However, given the limited number of respondents per country, speculation regarding 
the link between an individual country and an individual strategy perspective is rather 
useless. All that can be concluded from this exploratory analysis is that this track of research 
seems to be a very promising avenue for further work. Nationality seems important as 
determinant of strategic beliefs, although it remains to be established whether the effect is 
due to cultural conditioning or national institutional demands. And if national institutional 
demands are important, which ones shape beliefs most – e.g. legal systems, national business 
systems, educational systems, fiscal systems, informal networks or cultural beliefs and 
values.  
One last exploratory analysis that can be conducted to check whether ‘national 
culture’ in the narrow sense of the word (joint beliefs, values and norms) is the important 
factor behind the observed differences in strategic beliefs across nationalities, is presented in 
table 15.24. In this analysis, each of the countries is placed on Hofstede’s five cultural 
dimensions, using their cultural indices from past research (these scores are published on the 
website www.geert-hofstede.com). In this manner, the categorical variable ‘nationality’, with 
19 separate countries and only a few entries per category, can be transformed into five linear 
variables, representing the five major cultural distinctions identified by Hofstede (1994)4. By 
then correlating these five cultural variables with the eight strategy dimensions, the results in 
table 15.24 have been found. Each of the four strategy dimensions with highly significant 
results will be discussed below.   
 
TABLE 15.24 
Correlations between Hofstede culture scales and the strategy dimension scales 
 Dimension Scale Power Distance Individualism Masculinity 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Long Term 
Orientation 
21 Strategic Programming 0,227 *** -0,224 *** 0,293 *** -0,024  0,043 
22 Organizational Continuity 0,096  -0,086  0,044  0,018  0,097 
23 Resource Leveraging 0,189 *** -0,148 ** 0,158 ** -0,055  0,091 
24 Business Unit Autonomy -0,025  0,076  0,021  0,001  -0,100 
25 Firm Independence -0,125 * 0,092  -0,051  0,037  -0,061 
26 Strategy-Making Dispersion 0,053  0,055  0,045  -0,092  -0,039 
27 Local Adaptation -0,015  0,128 ** -0,202 *** 0,014  -0,062 
28 Stakeholder Responsibility 0,251 *** -0,178 *** 0,040  -0,180 *** 0,104 
*** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10  
 
Nationality and Strategic Programming Dimension 
In table 15.26 the result of the one-way ANOVA test is reported for strategic programming 
across all 19 countries. This F-score of 3.00 is high and highly significant (p<0,01). In table 
15.26 it can be seen that the differences across countries tend to be significantly correlated to 
cultural differences in power distance, individualism and masculinity: 
 
                                                     
4 Power distance refers to the level of inequality seen as normal within a society. Individualism is 
the degree to which people prefer to act as individuals as opposed to groups. Masculinity is the 
degree to which a culture promotes tough values such as competition, assertiveness, performance 
and success. Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which people prefer structured over 
unstructured situations. Long term orientation is the degree to which future-looking values such as 
saving and persistence are promoted over action and results. 
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TABLE 15.25 
One-way ANOVA for nationality and the strategy perspective scales 
 Perspective Scales 
A
ustria 
(N
=4) 
B
elgium
 
(N
=5) 
C
anada 
(N
=3) 
C
hina 
(N
=8) 
C
roatia 
(N
=5) 
France 
(N
=6) 
G
erm
any 
(N
=24) 
India 
(N
=27) 
Italy 
(N
=3) 
M
alaysia 
(N
=1) 
1 Rational Reasoning 3,96 3,77 3,17 3,40 3,80 4,00 3,86 3,59 2,94 4,00 
2 Generative Reasoning 3,55 3,00 3,87 3,63 4,08 3,27 3,51 3,70 3,53 4,00 
3 Strategic Planning 3,75 3,97 3,61 3,65 3,87 4,42 4,15 4,14 3,22 4,33 
4 Strategic Incrementalism 3,25 3,44 3,47 3,40 3,52 2,93 3,43 3,27 4,47 3,80 
5 Discontinuous Renewal 2,40 2,60 3,47 3,25 3,56 3,17 3,13 3,30 2,53 3,80 
6 Continuous Renewal 3,05 3,20 2,47 3,25 3,40 3,13 3,10 3,49 3,60 4,00 
7 Outside-In 2,45 2,56 2,20 3,03 3,08 2,80 2,91 2,81 3,07 3,80 
8 Inside-Out 3,17 3,63 3,39 3,33 3,57 3,86 3,42 3,86 3,22 4,33 
9 Portfolio Organization 2,40 2,28 3,00 2,40 2,84 2,77 2,64 2,70 3,60 3,40 
10 Integrated Organization 3,79 4,20 3,50 4,13 3,90 3,86 3,91 4,09 2,83 4,00 
11 Discrete Organization 3,67 3,90 3,72 3,79 4,07 3,86 3,55 3,90 3,61 3,67 
12 Embedded Organization 2,00 2,08 2,27 2,28 2,36 2,03 2,30 2,10 2,67 2,80 
13 Industry Dynamics 2,25 2,64 2,53 2,48 2,20 2,83 2,53 2,33 2,33 3,00 
14 Industry Leadership 2,85 2,92 3,13 3,40 3,64 2,93 3,46 3,64 3,20 3,60 
15 Org. Leadership 3,38 3,47 2,72 3,29 3,47 3,33 3,40 3,29 2,17 3,67 
16 Organizational Dynamics 3,45 3,64 3,60 3,65 3,80 3,70 3,58 4,19 4,33 4,20 
17 Global Convergence 2,83 3,37 2,56 3,44 3,13 3,14 3,22 2,89 3,00 3,83 
18 International Diversity 3,70 3,80 4,20 3,65 3,92 4,10 3,83 4,30 3,67 3,60 
19 Shareholder Value 2,95 3,64 2,40 3,13 3,28 3,17 2,96 2,87 3,33 3,80 
20 Stakeholder Values 3,33 3,50 4,00 3,65 4,13 3,75 3,76 4,38 3,11 4,00 
All F tests with (18,227) degrees of freedom; *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10 
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TABLE 15.25 (continued from left page) 
One-way ANOVA for nationality and the strategy perspective scales 
 Perspective Scales 
N
L 
(N
=129) 
N
Z 
(N
=2) 
Singapore 
(N
=1) 
S
lovenia 
(N
=5) 
Sw
eden 
(N
=3) 
S
w
itzerl. 
(N
=1) 
U
K
 
(N
=13) 
U
S
 
(N
=5) 
Total 
(N
=246) 
F 
1 Rational Reasoning 3,37 3,17 2,00 3,37 3,56 3,67 3,35 3,90 3,48 2,01 ** 
2 Generative Reasoning 3,63 4,00 3,20 3,56 4,13 4,20 3,58 3,48 3,62 1,08  
3 Strategic Planning 3,59 3,50 4,50 3,87 3,67 4,00 3,68 3,97 3,76 2,56 ***
4 Strategic Incrementalism 3,54 3,50 2,60 3,64 3,60 2,80 3,28 3,24 3,46 1,39  
5 Discontinuous Renewal 2,96 3,10 2,80 2,64 3,13 1,80 2,75 2,52 3,00 1,61 * 
6 Continuous Renewal 3,04 2,50 3,20 3,76 3,13 3,20 2,86 2,80 3,12 1,47  
7 Outside-In 2,73 2,90 3,20 2,84 3,27 2,60 2,89 2,52 2,78 0,87  
8 Inside-Out 3,32 2,83 3,67 3,60 2,89 4,00 3,42 3,67 3,42 2,57 ***
9 Portfolio Organization 2,56 2,90 2,00 2,72 2,67 1,80 2,82 2,96 2,63 1,01  
10 Integrated Organization 3,72 3,42 3,83 3,90 3,61 4,50 3,87 3,83 3,81 1,61 * 
11 Discrete Organization 3,69 3,08 4,00 3,87 3,67 4,67 3,85 3,93 3,73 1,11  
12 Embedded Organization 2,17 2,60 1,40 2,28 2,33 1,00 2,22 2,24 2,19 0,89
13 Industry Dynamics 2,61 2,20 1,80 2,64 2,27 2,00 2,51 2,16 2,52 1,18
14 Industry Leadership 3,17 3,40 3,40 3,04 2,93 3,20 3,17 2,96 3,25 1,75 ** 
15 Org. Leadership 3,21 2,33 4,00 3,27 2,94 2,67 2,96 2,97 3,21 1,39
16 Organizational Dynamics 3,76 4,30 2,60 3,44 3,60 4,80 4,09 4,00 3,80 1,86 ** 
17 Global Convergence 2,75 3,00 2,17 3,20 3,11 3,83 3,12 2,67 2,90 2,11 ***
18 International Diversity 3,79 4,10 4,20 3,72 2,80 4,40 3,71 4,08 3,85 2,35 ***
19 Shareholder Value 2,71 3,20 2,80 3,12 2,80 3,00 3,03 3,00 2,86 1,17  
20 Stakeholder Values 3,77 3,50 4,67 3,53 3,50 3,33 3,65 3,80 3,80 3,07 ***
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TABLE 15.26 
One-way ANOVA for nationality and the strategy dimension scales 
 Dimension Scales 
A
ustria 
(N
=4) 
B
elgium
 
(N
=5) 
C
anada 
(N
=3) 
C
hina 
(N
=8) 
C
roatia 
(N
=5) 
France 
(N
=6) 
G
erm
any 
(N
=24) 
India 
(N
=27) 
Italy 
(N
=3) 
M
alaysia 
(N
=1) 
21 Strategic Programming 3,36 3,33 3,26 3,31 3,40 4,00 3,61 3,77 2,70 3,44 
22 Organizational Continuity 3,25 3,30 2,29 3,14 2,95 2,96 2,95 3,15 3,50 3,25 
23 Resource Leveraging 3,46 3,43 3,56 3,50 3,13 3,72 3,48 3,81 3,33 3,83 
24 Business Unit Autonomy 2,29 2,11 2,71 2,23 2,57 2,52 2,52 2,53 3,62 2,86 
25 Firm Independence 2,17 2,17 2,33 2,25 2,13 2,03 2,33 2,05 2,72 2,50 
26 Strat-making Dispersion 3,19 3,23 3,33 3,20 3,30 3,35 3,21 3,66 4,04 3,63 
27 Local Adaptation 3,61 3,83 4,52 3,41 3,71 3,83 3,61 3,92 3,57 3,29 
28 Stakeholder Responsible 3,56 3,73 4,00 3,80 4,15 3,94 3,88 4,44 3,29 4,00 
All F tests with (18,227) degrees of freedom; *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10 
 
 
TABLE 15.26 (continued) 
One-way ANOVA for nationality and the strategy dimension scales 
 Dimension Scales 
N
L 
(N
=129) 
N
Z 
(N
=2) 
Singapore 
(N
=1) 
S
lovenia 
(N
=5) 
Sw
eden 
(N
=3) 
S
w
itzerl. 
(N
=1) 
U
K
 
(N
=13) 
U
S
 
(N
=5) 
Total 
(N
=246) 
F 
21 Strategic Programming 3,13 3,17 4,00 3,27 3,19 3,78 3,37 3,58 3,32 3,00 ***
22 Organizational Continuity 3,01 2,63 3,13 3,65 3,00 3,38 2,99 3,05 3,04 0,89  
23 Resource Leveraging 3,38 3,08 3,67 3,37 2,89 4,00 3,41 3,73 3,45 1,48 * 
24 Business Unit Autonomy 2,50 2,86 2,00 2,54 2,62 1,57 2,63 2,77 2,52 1,06  
25 Firm Independence 2,27 2,83 1,33 2,30 2,50 1,17 2,19 2,17 2,24 0,99  
26 Strat-making Dispersion 3,42 4,13 2,38 3,10 3,50 4,38 3,74 3,73 3,44 1,84 ** 
27 Local Adaptation 3,95 3,64 4,29 3,57 3,24 3,43 3,64 3,89 3,84 1,90 ** 
28 Stakeholder Responsibile 3,89 3,56 4,75 3,73 3,79 3,25 3,81 3,98 3,93 2,52 ***
 
 
 Power distance and strategic programming dimension (0,227; p<0,01). The more a 
culture is built on the principle of inequality, the more emphasis there will be on strategic 
programming. This correlation could be explained in two ways. First, in more hierarchical 
cultures strategy-making doesn’t need to be top-down (see the lack of correlation between 
power distance and the strategy-making dispersion dimension), but there does need to be 
top-down control. The strategic planning pole of the dimension emphasizes the controlled 
character of the strategy formation process, in which everyone knows his role and plans 
can be implemented by means of a plan-do-check cycle. In less hierarchically-oriented 
cultures the top-down control offered by strategic planning is less important. A second 
explanation is that in cultures with high power distance employees look to the boss to 
make a decision which they can then implement, which is a clear hierarchical split of 
duties that fits well with a strategic planning approach. In low power distance cultures 
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employees expect to be involved in decision-making and feel more at ease without a plan 
sanctioned by the boss, which fits more with the strategic incrementalism approach.  
 Individualism and strategic programming dimension (-0,224; p<0,01). The more a 
culture is built on the principle of individual action, the less emphasis will be placed on 
strategic programming. This result can be explained by the fact that executives from more 
collectivist cultures like the quality of strategic planning to coordinate and optimize 
actions throughout the firm. Strategic planning is seen as highly effective way to get the 
firm to move as one. In cultures that encourage individual entrepreneurship and initiative 
such strategic planning can be seen as stifling, as collective coordination is experienced as 
bureaucracy. Strategic incrementalism, with its emphasis on experimentation, parallel 
initiatives and blending of successful ideas along the way is seen as an appealing 
approach for getting individuals to excel to the benefit of the company as a whole.  
 Masculinity and strategic programming dimension (0,293; p<0,01). The more a culture is 
built on the principle of assertiveness and performance, the more emphasis will be placed 
on strategic programming. This correlation might be explained by the fact that a strategic 
planning orientation towards strategy formation gives a sense of being ‘in control’; it 
offers the executives making strategy a feeling that they are taking charge of their own 
destiny and shaping their own future. In masculine cultures this type of assertive “plan or 
be planned for” attitude encourages executives to opt for the strategic planning approach. 
In more feminine cultures that emphasize cooperation, harmony and adaptiveness, 
strategic incrementalism is more popular, due to its more flexible approach to shaping the 
future.     
Maybe just as important as the significant correlations that were found, are the correlations 
that turned out not to be significant. Neither uncertainty avoidance nor long term orientation 
were correlated to the strategic programming dimension in this sample. Of course, no hard 
conclusions can be drawn on this basis, but it is interesting that wanting to avoid uncertainty 
does not lead to more strategic planning and that a culture’s time orientation also has no 
correlation with its preference for strategic planning or strategic incrementalism.  
 
Nationality and Resource Leveraging Dimension 
In table 15.26 the result of the one-way ANOVA test is reported for resource leveraging 
across all 19 countries. This F-score of 1.48 is just significant at the p<0,10 level. In table 
15.24, however, much stronger linkages are found between nationality and the resource 
leveraging dimension. It can be seen that the differences across countries tend to be 
significantly correlated to cultural differences in power distance, individualism and 
masculinity: 
 
 Power distance and resource leveraging dimension (0,189; p<0,01). The more a culture 
is built on the principle of inequality between people, the more emphasis will be placed 
on resource leveraging (i.e. the inside-out perspective will be given more weight, to the 
detriment of the outside perspective). This correlation can be explained using more or less 
the same type of argument as above, to explain the correlation between power distance 
and strategic programming (note that the resource leveraging dimension and strategic 
programming dimension have a strong positive correlation with one another; see table 
14.8). Taking an inside-out perspective means staying close to the organization’s current 
core competences, even at the risk of losing touch with the market developments. This 
approach to developing business level strategy is generally easier to plan and control, 
which makes it more suitable for cultures where power in organizations is concentrated at 
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the top. Taking an outside-in perspective means questioning the current organizational 
competences and therefore also the current power structure; in that sense, an outside-in 
approach is potentially more disruptive and undermining regarding the status quo, which 
is generally disliked in cultures with a higher power distance. To stray from the current 
organizational strengths and respond to new market developments requires considerable 
flexibility, entrepreneurship and empowerment, which all fit better with a culture of more 
equality and less centralization of decision-making power. A further factor might be that 
in low power distance cultures customers are also taken more seriously, while in high 
power distance cultures top management sees itself as more important than customers.   
 Individualism and resource leveraging dimension (-0,148; p<0,05). The more a culture is 
built on the principle of individual action, the less it will emphasize resource leveraging. 
This result is consistent with the previous discussion, as well. Taking an inside-out 
perspective is not only more plannable and controllable, it also builds on the strengths of 
the current group of people in the organization. Leveraging current resources means using 
the collective abilities of the group, which fits well in collectivist cultures. Taking an 
outside-in perspective means rebelling against the current organizational skill set and 
taking the side of the market opportunity; it is about the visionary breaking away from the 
status quo, which works well in cultures with an individualist mentality. Not only are the 
more individualist cultures more inclined to encourage entrepreneurship and break-away 
initiatives, but they are also less worried about the disruptive impact that major shifts will 
have on the rest of the people in the company. 
 Masculinity and resource leveraging dimension (0,158; p<0,05). The more a culture is 
built on the principle of assertiveness and performance, the more emphasis will be placed 
on resource leveraging. This result is very interesting, but somewhat more difficult to 
explain. One possibility is that more masculine cultures have a tendency to value 
“imposing/shaping” over “receiving/adapting”, while they also accentuate “doing” over 
“listening”. The inside-out perspective takes an organization’s current strengths as a 
starting point and looking for opportunities of imposing these on the environment, which 
fits more with a masculine culture. The outside-in perspective, on the other hand, listens 
more attentively to external demands and is willing to adapt the organization to outside 
requirements, which fits more with a feminine culture.  
Again, two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation, did not 
correlate with the strategy dimension being reviewed, but in this case the lack of correlations 
was not as surprising. However, with some speculation one could envision how high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures would prefer to adapt inside-out than in the more 
discontinuous outside-in way, but this correlation was totally absent.  
 
Nationality and Local Adaptation Dimension 
In table 15.26 the result of the one-way ANOVA test is reported for local adaptation across 
all 19 countries. This F-score of 1.90 is significant at the p<0,05 level. In table 15.24 it can be 
seen that the differences across countries tend to be significantly correlated to cultural 
differences in individualism and masculinity: 
 
 Individualism and local adaptation dimension (0,128; p<0,05). The more a culture is 
built on the principle of individual action, the more emphasis will be placed on local 
adaptation when developing international strategies. This correlation might be explainable 
in two ways. First, as individualistic cultures have more respect for differences between 
people and allow individuals the freedom to pursue their own goals, it is likely that they 
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will extend this principle to other countries as well, respecting their differences. In more 
collectivist cultures, on the other hand, where there is more emphasis on shared goals, 
views, tastes and interests, there is generally less awareness of, and tolerance towards, 
differences. Therefore, this might also be reflected in a lower score on the local 
adaptation dimension. A second explanation is that executives from more individualistic 
cultures have a preference for giving local executives a free hand at adapting to the local 
environment, not because the local environment is so different, but because they respect 
the principle of individual action by local executives. Conversely, executives from more 
collectivist cultures will prefer to coordinate an organization’s activities across borders, 
thus lowering the freedom to locally adapt.   
 Masculinity and local adaptation dimension (-0,202; p<0,01). The more a culture is 
based on the principle of assertiveness and performance, the less emphasis will be placed 
on local adaptation. This correlation coefficient is actually quite high. The potential 
explanation that fits best with the previous discussion is that the whole principle of 
“masculinity” is at odds adaptation. More masculine cultures have a tendency to value 
“imposing/shaping” over “receiving/adapting”, which makes them strongly sympathetic 
to the global convergence creed. The very definition of “feminine” cultures is that they 
are sympathetic to the idea of “giving way”, cooperating and adapting, which makes them 
strongly inclined towards the international diversity perspective.   
Interestingly, in this sample power distance was not correlated with local adaptation, although 
one could have speculated that higher power distance would make a culture less open to 
seeking local adaptation. For the other two culture dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and 
long term orientation, the lack of correlation is more easily understood; neither globalization 
or localization creates more uncertainty, while neither of the two  is  more long term in 
orientation either. 
 
Nationality and Stakeholder Responsibility Dimension 
In table 15.26 the result of the one-way ANOVA test is reported for stakeholder 
responsibility across all 19 countries. This F-score of 2.52 is high and significant at the 
p<0,01 level. In table 15.24 it can be seen that the differences across countries tend to be 
significantly correlated to cultural differences in power distance, individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance: 
 
 Power distance and stakeholder responsiveness dimension (0,251; p<0,01). The more a 
culture is based on the principle of inequality among people, the more emphasis is placed 
on stakeholder responsiveness. This very strong correlation can be explained by looking 
at the paternalistic streak that is prevalent in high power distance cultures. Generally, in 
societies power comes with rights and duties; the more power a person or organization 
has, the more it is expected that they wield their power wisely and protect the weak. 
Therefore, in such high power distance cultures it is more common to expect that top 
management will be responsive to the needs of all stakeholder groups and will strive 
towards the common good. In lower power distance societies, on the contrary, this 
paternalistic value is less pronounced, as it is assumed that each individual or group has 
more means to assertively look after their own interests. In such low power distance 
cultures, outcomes are the consequence of negotiation between stakeholders, not the 
result of top management taking on the responsibility for the stakeholders’ well-being.       
 Individualism and stakeholder responsiveness dimension (-0,178; p<0,01). The more a 
culture is based on the principle of individual action, the less emphasis will be placed on 
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stakeholder responsiveness. This intuitively appealing correlation seems easy to explain; 
if everyone is thinking of themselves first, they are less inclined to worry about the 
neighbors. Stated more formally, in cultures in which individual freedom and interests are 
promoted over and above collective interests and collaboration, it is less likely that 
executives will feel that it is their responsibility to serve all stakeholders equally. In more 
collectivist cultures, on the other hand, executives are more likely to embrace the value of 
pursuing a shared purpose, thus more strongly supporting the stakeholder values 
perspective.        
 Uncertainty avoidance and stakeholder responsiveness dimension (-0,180; p<0,01). The 
more a culture is based on the principle of clear rules and structures, the less emphasis is 
placed on stakeholder responsiveness. A potential explanation for this finding is that 
cultures with high uncertainty avoidance dislike the vagueness of “social responsibility”. 
In such cultures there is a strong preference to define relationships, set rules and clarify 
expectations, so that everyone knows what they are responsible for. The idea of 
stakeholder responsibility implies a moral obligation to work towards the interests of all 
stakeholders, even where there is no legal necessity to do so. However, for executives 
from high uncertainty avoidance cultures this is all rather vague and uncertainty inducing, 
making them less supportive of this way of thinking. 
In light of the ongoing discussion regarding the alleged short-termism of shareholder value 
thinking (e.g. Blair, 1995; Charkham, 1994; Sternberg, 1997) it is interesting to note that no 
correlation was found in this sample between long term orientation and stakeholder 
responsiveness. This is definitely an area that justifies further research. 
  
Conclusion on the Importance of Nationality 
As the above exploratory discussions make clear, nationality is clearly the most promising 
independent variable reviewed in this chapter. Using a one-way ANOVA test, five of the 
eight strategy dimensions showed a significant result, while correlating the strategy 
dimensions with the Hofstede culture dimensions produced significant results on four of these 
dimensions (only the strategy-making dispersion dimension didn’t show up in Hofstede 
analysis).  
As mentioned throughout, these analyses are only exploratory in nature and the 
dataset is not ideal. However, the purpose of this first sweep has been to scout for variables 
that show promise for further research; variables that seem to have an important impact on 
the strategic cognitive maps of executives. In that perspective, the results presented in the 
previous pages clearly underline the conclusion that international differences, in particular 
regarding national culture, are one of the most – if not the most – promising variables for 
further research on the determinants of strategy belief formation.   
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Chapter 16 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this last chapter, it is the intention to look back and to look forward. In looking back, the 
objective is to answer the question ‘what can be concluded out of all the research done?’. To 
draw these conclusions, first a summary of the main findings will be presented, followed by a 
review of the implications of these findings for theory. Both the summary and the 
implications can be found in section 16.2.  
In looking forward, the question is how researchers and executives should respond to 
these findings. In section 16.3, the most promising avenues for future research will be 
presented. Attention will be paid to follow-up research directed at improving the strategy 
perspective measurement instrument, but mostly towards further research made possible by 
the existence of the instrument.  
 
 
16.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research project has been about mapping the mind of the strategist. That executives have 
strategy-related belief structures has already been demonstrated in a variety of research 
studies (for overviews see Walsh, 1995; Porac and Thomas, 2002). Yet, this past work has 
been mostly qualitative and emic, focused on giving a rich understanding of the cognitive 
maps that executives have about specific strategic situations. Where the research has been 
quantitative and etic, it has been directed at measuring executives’ beliefs about a very 
narrow range of strategic issues. What has been missing is a mapping instrument that could 
identify the most important strategic assumptions in executives’ cognitive maps and could be 
used across all organizations, industries and nations. In their contribution to the Handbook of 
Strategy and Management, Porac and Thomas (2002) stated: “It is very clear that we need to 
identify mapping methods with a less qualitative researcher-driven orientation and with a 
design which can prove to be applicable and reliable across a range of cognitive studies.” 
This project has been about developing this mapping method. It has been the aim of this 
study to create a universal measurement method for quantifying executives’ core strategy 
beliefs along a limited number of dimensions, to make individual and cross-group 
comparisons simple. 
The first step of this research project was to develop a comprehensive conceptual 
framework about differing core strategy beliefs. The resulting strategy perspectives 
framework (published earlier by De Wit and Meyer, 2004) predicted that executives can have 
differing strategy beliefs along ten specific dimensions. In this framework, the twenty poles 
of these ten dimensions are referred to as strategy perspectives. The second step was to 
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translate these twenty qualitatively-described strategy perspectives into twenty quantitative 
strategy perspective scales. These measurement scales were brought together in a web-based 
survey instrument, the Strategy Profiler, which was used to quantitatively map individual 
executive’s strategy beliefs. Of the 20 strategy perspective scales, 17 have proven to be 
reliable (Cronbach alpha > 0,65), while the other 3 require some further research, but show 
considerable promise (see section 16.3 for more on this issue).  
The third and last step was to explore the distribution of strategy beliefs among the 
population. Although the sample used was not entirely representative of the general 
population of executives, a first scan of the relative frequency of each strategy perspective 
among different groups was made. By taking certain personal attributes of the executives as 
independent variables, it could be analyzed whether some strategy perspectives were more 
frequent among some groups than among others. For categorical variables this was done by 
means of a one-way ANOVA analysis, while for the linear variables a straightforward 
correlation analysis could be performed. The results of this analysis for the 20 strategy 
perspectives are summarized in figure 16.1. It should be noted that these analyses were 
carried out with an earlier version of the Strategy Profiler (the 3.0 version), because this 
dataset was richer. As many of the scales were not reliable in this version of the instrument, 
they have not been employed in the analysis (and have been shown in the figure as light 
gray).  
 
FIGURE 16.1 
Linkages between personal attributes and strategy perspective scales 
Strategy Perspectives
1. Rational Reasoning 
2. Generative Reasoning 
3. Strategic Planning 
4. Strategic Incrementalism 
5.Discontinuous Renewal 
6. Continuous Renewal 
7. Outside-In 
8. Inside-Out 
9. Portfolio Organization 
10. Integrated Organization 
11. Discrete Organization 
12. Embedded Organization 
13. Industry Dynamics 
14. Industry Leadership 
15. Organizational Leadership 
16. Organizational Dynamics 
17. Global Convergence 
18. International Diversity 
19. Shareholder Value 
20. Stakeholder Values 
Personal Attributes
Correlation Analysis
One-Way ANOVA Test
Gender 
Age 
Educational Area 
Educational Level 
Nationality 
Functional Area 
Most Experienced Functional Area 
Functional Experience 
Management Experience 
Work Experience 
Years at Organization 
-
-
-
-
-
 
Note: The personal attributes in light gray did not yield any significant results. The strategy perspectives in light 
gray were not used in the analysis because their Cronbach alpha was below 0,65. 
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As so many of the strategy perspective scales could not be used in this analysis, ‘composite’ 
strategy dimension scales were constructed, bringing together each pair of opposite strategy 
perspectives into one strategy dimension. Of these 10 strategy dimension scales, 8 were 
judged to be sufficiently reliable (Cronbach alpha > 0,65). The linkages between the personal 
attributes and these 8 strategy dimension scales is presented in figure 16.2 (the two non-
reliable ones are also light gray). 
 
FIGURE 16.2 
Linkages between personal attributes and strategy dimension scales 
Strategy DimensionsPersonal Attributes
Correlation Analysis
One-Way ANOVA Test
Gender 
Age 
Educational Area 
Educational Level 
Functional Area 
Most Experienced Functional Area 
Functional Experience 
Management Experience
Work Experience 
Years at Organization
Strategic Programming
Organizational Continuity
Resource Leveraging
Business Unit Autonomy
Firm Independence
Strategy Making Dispersion
Local Adaptation
Stakeholder Responsibility
Nationality 
Nationality: Individualism 
Nationality: Masculinity
Nationality: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Nationality: Long Term Orientation
Nationality: Power Distance
+
-
-
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Rational – Generative Reasoning
Industry Dynamics - Leadership
  
Note: The personal attributes in light gray did not yield any significant results. The strategy dimensions in light 
gray were not used in the analysis because their Cronbach alpha was below 0,65. 
 
Of course, all these ‘linkages’ do not necessarily signify causation. What they suggest is that 
the strategy beliefs are not spread at random across the population of executives, but that 
there is a pattern (either a ‘correlation’ or an ‘uneven distribution of means’). Recognizing 
these patterns, and inductively identifying the factors that seem to be linked to the variation 
among respondents, has been intended as the stepping stone towards theory building and a 
next phase of hypothesis-driven theory testing. 
 Given this summary of the research findings, the question remains what can be 
concluded on the basis of this material. In the following subsections the three most important 
implications for theory building will be put forward and discussed. First, it will be reviewed 
what can be concluded about the structure of executives’ strategic beliefs (mapping the mind 
of the strategist). Second, it will be assessed what can be concluded about the content of 
executives’ strategic beliefs (understanding the mind of the strategist). Finally, some building 
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blocks will be discussed that could be used in constructing a theory on the development of 
executives’ strategic beliefs (influences on the mind of the strategist).  
 
16.2.1 Mapping the Mind of the Strategist: The Structure of Belief Structures 
The first main conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that there are a number of 
key dimensions along which executives’ strategic beliefs often differ. There are not hundreds 
of dimensions, nor are there only two or three. This means that when we try to look into the 
mind of the strategist, we should not expect to find an extremely complex belief structure, 
with hundreds of ways in which strategists can have fundamentally different perspectives, nor 
should we expect to encounter fairly simple belief structures, where all strategic thinking is 
rooted in one or two overarching paradigms. The main structure of executives’ belief 
structures is characterized by at least ten relatively independent dimensions, and while there 
might be more dimensions, these ten capture a large part of the differences of view between 
executives.  
 The assertion that there are at least 10 dimensions along which strategic belief 
structures differ is based on both the theoretical framework and on the various empirical 
analyses carried out in chapter 14. In the theoretical chapters, it was argued that there are ten 
key strategic issues faced by executives, each of which is characterized by a tension that can 
be managed differently. On the basis of this framework, it was expected that the ten strategic 
issues would translate into ten “dimensions of disagreement”. This theoretical expectation 
was subsequently substantiated by three empirical tests. First, after measuring the executives’ 
strategic beliefs along the ten theoretical dimensions, a correlation analysis was performed to 
check whether the dimension scales were sufficiently independent of one another (see section 
14.3.1). While it was concluded that they were not entirely uncorrelated, the level of 
correlation was not such that two dimensions could be collapsed into one. This conclusion 
was supported by a second test, a factor analysis of the survey items (see section 14.3.2). As 
the items belonging to each different dimension actually loaded onto different factors, this 
was further reinforcement of the separateness of the ten dimensions. Finally, a third empirical 
test that was carried out was a cluster analysis (see section 14.4). In this analysis, no simple 
clusters of beliefs could be identified across the ten dimensions, indicating that there are no 
overarching paradigms informing choice across all dimensions. Even when looking at only 4 
dimensions at a time, no simple clustering of views could be found, underlining the 
conclusion that the differences of views can not be simplified to a more limited set of strategy 
paradigms. Given the outcome of these three empirical tests, therefore, the conclusion can be 
drawn that the belief structures of executives can differ along at least ten dimensions. 
 Yet, why not along 50 or 100? This was not empirically researched, but here the 
strategy perspectives framework suggests that it is theoretically implausible that executives 
will have different beliefs along so many dimensions. It was argued that different strategy 
perspectives are rooted in fundamentally different assumptions about how to deal with 
challenging balancing acts (strategy tensions). Based on a broad scan of the strategic 
management literature, these ten core strategy tensions were identified. At the same time, the 
literature was scanned for different normative points of view – academics’, consultants’ and 
gurus’ prescriptions of the best approach to go about strategizing. These ‘strategy 
perspectives’ were linked to the identified strategy tensions, leading to a largely consistent set 
of tensions and perspectives. A few missing perspectives (underrepresented points of view in 
the literature) needed to be added to complete the strategy perspectives framework, but no 
normative authors needed to be left out. Of course, this does not mean that the set of ten 
strategy tensions and twenty strategy perspectives is comprehensively exhaustive – a few 
important strategy tensions might have been missed, while some normative authors might 
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also have been overlooked. Yet, it is unlikely that many important differences of opinion in 
the literature have been neglected, while at the same time it is unlikely that many important 
differences in strategic beliefs between executives have not made their way into the strategic 
management literature. 
 Therefore, it can be concluded that these ten separate dimensions capture a large part 
of the differences in cognitive perspective between strategizing executives. And given this 
structure of executives’ beliefs, this means that the measurement instrument developed in this 
research study indeed does what it was intended to do – to provide a universal mapping 
methodology for the most important strategic beliefs held by executives.   
 
16.2.2 Understanding the Mind of the Strategist: Content of Belief Structures 
After concluding that there are ten key dimensions along which executives’ strategic beliefs 
differ, the second, linked conclusion is that almost all executives have largely consistent 
beliefs along each of these dimensions. Each executive’s responses to a variety of statements 
coming from one strategy perspective were very reliable – they either steadily agreed or 
disagreed. Only a very small minority of respondents to the Strategy Profiler answered in an 
inconsistent way. This means that executives have internally coherent strategy perspectives. 
Executives have recognizable sets of beliefs, or ideologies, with which they interpret and 
react to strategic issues.     
Interestingly, during the research project most participating executives at first did not 
see themselves as being driven by an ideology, but rather as down-to-earth pragmatists. 
However, once the strategy perspectives were explained and presented as differing strategy-
making styles, acceptance was almost immediate. Often they could indicate their preferences 
before reading the results of the Strategy Profiler survey. Many could even map the positions 
of their colleagues on various scales and explain how these differing views often lead to 
disagreement.  
Yet, while these executives had little difficulty embracing the concept of differing 
strategy perspectives and recognizing how this impacts strategy development, little attention 
is paid to this topic in the strategic management literature. During the last ten years, the field 
of managerial cognition has flourished immensely, but the focus has been on the process side 
– the way cognition works, how executives learn and how beliefs impact decision-making 
and action. Far less attention has been paid to the content side of managerial cognition – what 
executives believe. And where the content side has been examined, there has not been the 
ambition to uncover a typology of strategy perspectives. Hence, while such terms as 
‘cognitive map’ and ‘dominant logic’ have made their way into the strategic management 
vocabulary, there are few ‘maps of the cognitive maps’ and few ‘logical typologies of 
dominant logics’5.   
The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the strategy perspectives framework 
developed in this research study does offer a typology of strategic beliefs, one that is both 
theoretically and empirically robust. As such, this framework represents a good starting point 
for further work into the content of executives’ strategic beliefs.  
 
                                                     
5 Actually, much more attention has been paid to the differing beliefs of strategy researchers as 
opposed to strategizing executives, as can be seen in the discussions in the literature about various 
‘schools of thought’ (e.g. Mintzberg, 1998; Volberda and Elfring, 2001). 
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16.2.3 Influences on the Mind of the Strategist: The Key Role of Learning 
The third main conclusion that can be drawn from this research study is that executives’ 
strategy perspectives do not seemed to be shaped by one, or just a few, simple factors. On the 
contrary, as can be seen in figures 16.1 and 16.2, quite a few personal attributes seemed to be 
associated with various strategic preferences, while each one of them seems to have only 
small to moderate impact on what executives believe. This means that in any follow-up 
research, it does not make sense to look for the ‘key driver’ of strategy belief formation, but 
that a broader set of influencing factors needs to be taken into consideration. 
 Having said this, the exploratory analysis carried out in chapter 15 did identify some 
factors that seemed to be much more influential than others. In particular, current functional 
area, most experienced functional area and nationality came forward as factors of importance, 
while other personal attributes such as gender, educational background, age, work experience 
and years in the company were much less influential. While it would go too far to draw any 
firm conclusions based on this exploratory research, these results do invite reflection, 
discussion and conjecturing on why some factors seem to be more important than others, as a 
contribution to theory development.  
 When reflecting on the empirical results, the first question is what the variables 
‘current functional area’, ‘most experienced functional area’ and ‘nationality’ might have in 
common that makes them relatively influential. Initially, the personal attribute measures were 
selected as ‘the usual suspects’ and categorized into four clusters; demographic, positional, 
experiential and organizational. There was no model or hypotheses behind the selection or 
categorization of the variables. But in retrospect, it can be seen that ‘current functional area’, 
‘most experienced functional area’ and ‘nationality’ all identify certain cognitive communities 
and operational environments in which executives must operate. A cognitive community is a 
group of people who influence each others’ cognitive maps by interacting and exchanging 
ideas, views, methodologies, stories, habits and examples (Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller, 
1989; Porac and Thomas, 2002). A broader way of stating that there is a cognitive 
community is to say that a group of people share a common culture (which is, after all, a 
shared set of beliefs, values and norms). Cognitive communities can be small groups of 
interacting individuals, such as functional departments, but also larger groups such as 
companies, industries or even nations. Being part of these cognitive communities means that 
executives will be exposed to the strategy perspectives prevalent in these groups, which can 
lead to adoption of these beliefs as well. One way of summarizing this effect is to say that in 
cognitive communities ‘learning is by talking’ – cognitive maps are formed by the sharing of 
beliefs.  
At the same time these functional, organizational, industry and national surroundings 
are operational environments that place specific demands on executives that need to be met. 
Each environment poses different challenges and requirements, leading executives to view 
the strategic issues they face in a particular way. This effect can be summarized as ‘learning 
by experiencing’ – cognitive maps are formed as response to environmental demands and the 
results achieved by acting in this environment. Generally, being part of a particular cognitive 
community and operational environment go hand in hand (e.g. being part of the marketing 
community and working in marketing, or being French and working in France), but 
sometimes people shift to a new operational environment while only slowly growing into a 
new cognitive community (e.g. a marketer moving to the finance department or a French 
person going to work in Britain). 
While these cognitive community / operational environment variables seem to be 
quite influential, a number of other variables seem to have less impact. However, in 
retrospect these variables also have something in common. Gender, educational background, 
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age, work experience and years in the company all do not influence learning directly, but 
only indirectly. They do not drive the sharing of ideas or the gaining of experience, but rather 
have an indirect impact by facilitating or inhibiting learning. For instance, age can have an 
impact on how open an executive is to sharing ideas or what is learnt from experience, and as 
such is a facilitating or inhibiting influence. The educational background of an executive 
initially shapes his/her cognitive map, which later influences how he/she will learn by talking 
about or experiencing strategic issues. This distinction between direct and indirect influences 
on strategy belief formation has been summarized in figure 16.3.  
 
FIGURE 16.3 
Direct and indirect influences on strategy belief formation 
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For theory building this distinction suggests that future emphasis should be placed on the 
relationship between various environments (functions, organization types, industries and 
countries) and a preference for particular strategy perspectives. For future empirical research 
this distinction underlines the importance of collecting data about each executive’s 
organizational and industry background, in addition to the information about functional area, 
nationality and country of employment.   
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16.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
To paraphrase Bertrand Russell, as our island of knowledge about strategy perspectives has 
grown, so has the length of its shores with the unknown. After this research project we know 
a bit more, but we are even more acutely aware of all we still know little about. This study 
has been able to make a small contribution, but it has its limitations, both in scope and 
approach, and there is still much to be explored. 
 
FIGURE 16.4 
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Hence, when it comes to moving the research agenda forward, the first step is to revisit the 
limitations of this study, as they have been discussed throughout this study. An overview of 
these limitations will be presented in section 16.3.1. The next step is to explore and evaluate a 
number of the most important and promising research opportunities. These avenues of further 
research will be divided into three categories. First, in section 16.3.2, future research directed 
at improving our understanding of strategy dimensions, strategy perspectives and ways of 
measuring them will be discussed (in figure 16.4 this is coded as ‘B’). Then in section 16.3.3 
it will be reviewed what the possibilities are for follow-up research into the specific 
influences on the formation of executives’ cognitive maps (in figure 16.4 this is the influence 
of A, C, D and E on B). Finally, in section 16.3.4 the options for researching the influence of 
strategy perspectives on strategic decision-making, organizational action and performance 
will be reviewed (in figure 16.4 the influence of B on C, D and E). 
 
16.3.1 Limitations 
Key to any research project is to make limiting choices, but then to acknowledge these 
limitations. In this study many research design choices have been made, both in terms of 
methodology and scope. The main design choices were introduced in chapter 1 and then 
discussed in detail in chapter 13. Here they will be briefly reviewed as a precursor for the 
discussion on future research: 
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  Etic approach. The strategy perspective measurement instrument is based on an etic 
approach, whereby the focus is on finding the common denominator across a wide variety 
of observations (“gesetz” instead of “gestalt”-oriented). Strategy beliefs are not studied in 
depth, in all their richness and variety, but broadly along a limited number of dimensions, 
in order to identify underlying structures and commonalities. The result is a relatively 
simple, universal tool for measuring complex strategy belief structures across individuals, 
organizations, industries and cultures. The key limitation of this focus on condensing data 
and looking for underlying “laws” or “principles”, is that much of the diversity and 
richness is filtered out – complexity is reduced to simple dimensions, which doesn’t do 
full justice to the strategic thinking of each individual. 
 Deductive approach. The strategy perspective measurement instrument is based on a 
conceptual framework that was derived from theory, not one that was directly induced 
from practice. In this sense, the instrument is “hypothesis-driven”, basing the items on 
theory-derived assumptions about what executives might believe. The result is a relatively 
simple and internally-consistent conceptual framework and measurement tool. The key 
limitation is that some strongly held strategic beliefs among executives that have not 
received much attention in the strategic management literature might have been missed 
while developing this framework.   
 Self-assessment approach. The strategy perspective measurement instrument is based on 
a data collection method whereby individual executives report on their own beliefs. 
Statements are presented to executives for their evaluation, with the intention of eliciting 
their underlying strategy belief structures. Caution is taken to get to their actual beliefs 
and to avoid receiving socially-desirable answers. The result is a relatively simple web-
based tool that can be administered to executives at a distance throughout the world. The 
key limitation is that a self-administered survey is susceptible to misunderstanding, 
socially-desirable answers and wishful thinking. Particularly the latter point is a concern – 
executives can only report on what they “believe that they believe” (their “espoused 
theories”), but these might not be the actually beliefs on which they act (their “theories-
in-use”). 
 One-off approach. The strategy perspective measurement instrument is based on a single 
measurement moment, assuming that executives’ beliefs are relatively stable over time. 
The result is a relatively simple testing approach, in which executives only have to 
complete the Strategy Profiler once. The key limitation is that the assumption of stability 
of belief structures over time has yet to be proven. 
 Sample of convenience. In developing the strategy perspective measurement instrument it 
was not necessary to define the sample of participating executives upfront, as long as the 
overall group was sufficiently diverse in terms of functions, organizations, industries and 
countries. However, the resulting sample of convenience is not the best possible sample 
when testing specific potential correlations. Hence, the exploratory work carried out in 
chapter 15 needs to be seen as only that – exploratory. All future research will need to pay 
explicit attention to the appropriateness of the sample for testing specific hypotheses. 
 Unreliable scales. While all of the previous limitations are inherent to the research design 
chosen, it must also be pointed out that in the Strategy Profiler 4.1 there are still three 
scales that do not meet the reliability threshold set in advance. The scales for the strategic 
incrementalist perspective, the shareholder value perspective and the stakeholder values 
perspective still have a Cronbach alpha below 0,65. Therefore, caution is required when 
these scales are used for any exploratory research.  
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The last “limitation” that needs to be mentioned doesn’t actually belong on the above list, 
because it does not refer to a constraint or a deficiency of the research study. The last 
limitation is the restricted scope of the project. The focus has been on developing a strategy 
perspective measurement instrument (element ‘B’ in figure 16.4), not on researching the 
factors influencing strategy belief formation (‘A’) or on the consequences of having certain 
strategy beliefs for decision-making (‘C’), behavior (‘D’) and performance (‘E’). However, 
now that a valid and reliable measurement instrument is available, new horizons for future 
research have been opened, as will be discussed in the following sections.   
 
16.3.2 Future Research into Strategy Perspectives 
While there are many different ways to build on this research into strategy dimensions, 
strategy perspectives and instruments by which to measure them, here are five key areas 
where more attention would be of value. The first three are ways to compensated for the 
limitations of the current research study, as outlined above, while the next two are new 
avenues for future research:   
 
1a. Additional dimensions of strategy beliefs. As was argued in section 16.2.1, it is not likely 
that dozens of strategy dimensions have been overlooked in this research study. Yet, on 
the other hand, it also seems unlikely that the existing set of ten dimensions is entirely 
complete. For example, during the research process the tension between exploitation 
(optimal use of existing resources/investments) and exploration (search for future 
opportunities) came forward as balancing act which seemed to evoke differences of 
opinion (see March, 1991). In discussions some executives emphasized the importance of 
stability and optimization, while expressing caution about new innovative adventures. 
Other executives were very vocal about the need to invest heavily in renewal and 
innovation, while willing to accept short term instability and lose of revenue. Such a 
strategic tension, with convincing arguments on both sides, has all of the characteristics 
of an additional strategy dimension, with differing strategy perspectives at each pole. 
Research should be directed at uncovering such potential new dimensions, measuring 
whether executives actually have consistently different beliefs about the issue and then 
checking whether this dimension does not coincide with another dimension. 
1b. Clarifying underdeveloped strategy perspectives. Some of the strategy perspectives 
identified in the previous chapters have not been fully developed in the strategic 
management literature and therefore they needed to be pieced together in this study. So, 
for example, while the strategic planning, global convergence and industry leadership 
perspectives could be found in both the scientific and popular literature, the strategic 
incrementalism, international diversity and industry dynamics perspectives needed to be 
deduced out of a wide variety of sources. This meant that much conceptual fine-tuning 
work needed to be done based on the responses to the first three versions of the Strategy 
Profiler. In chapter 14, many new insights were derived that can be used to further 
strengthen our understanding of these strategy perspectives, yet much still can be done. In 
particular, the strategic incrementalism, shareholder value and stakeholder values 
perspectives require further conceptual work, before they can be turned into reliable 
measures.   
1c. Retest stability. The current measurement instrument is a reliable measure of executives’ 
current strategic beliefs. However, it cannot be ascertained how stable these beliefs are 
over time. Yet, the assumption made at the beginning of this research project was that it 
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was valuable to measure an executive’s strategy perspectives, because these beliefs are 
relatively stable and will influence future decision-making. If, on the contrary, an 
executive’s belief structures are not stable, but very fluid or changeable, then determining 
an executive’s current state of mind is of fleeting value. Therefore, checking the 
assumption of stability over time, by retesting a number of respondents, would be a 
valuable confirmation for the whole approach taken. 
1d. Distribution analysis. In the Strategy Profiler sample of 385 executives, preferences were 
generally not divided equally long each strategy dimension. In some cases, there was 
clearly a skewed distribution, as one side of the spectrum was much more popular than 
the other side (e.g. the international diversity pole). Besides this imbalance, the 
distributions also showed different peaks and troughs, in some cases peaking in the 
middle and tapering off to the poles (e.g. outside-in and inside-out perspectives), while in 
other cases showing separate peaks on both sides of the spectrum (the organizational 
leadership and organizational dynamics perspectives). However, these distributions were 
not researched here, because they would be much too dependent on the composition of 
the research sample. And as the research sample was a sample of convenience, not 
selected to be representative of any particular population, any results would have been 
meaningless. Yet, the question how prevalent the various strategy perspectives among 
executives are remains a very important one. Furthermore, are opinions highly divided or 
do they stay close to the middle ground? 
1e. Cluster analysis. In section 14.4 a number of cluster analyses were presented, initially to 
check whether there are any overarching strategy paradigms consistently influencing 
executives’ choices across four or more dimensions. There was no simple clustering 
found across all strategy dimensions, but more complex clusterings across three 
dimensions were identified in two cases. What was not done was to look at all clusters 
across three or even two dimensions, because of the sheer number of possibilities (45 
possible two-dimensional clusterings and 120 possible three-dimensional ones). However, 
as a follow-up to the distribution analysis mentioned earlier, this analysis of how 
respondents are distributed across two or three dimensions simultaneously should be very 
interesting. It could give insight into common combinations of strategy perspectives that 
do not clearly show up in a simple linear correlation analysis. The most promising 
‘suspects’ to review first are the strategy dimensions that already exhibit a correlation 
with one another (see table 14.8), as this suggests that they are linked together in some 
form. Of course, as remarked with the distribution analysis, it is important to base this 
analysis on a representative sample, otherwise it will be impossible to generalize the 
results.      
 
16.3.3 Future Research into the Influences on Strategy Perspectives 
As part of this research study, an exploratory scan was made of the potential influences on 
the formation of strategic beliefs. This first review of possible influencing factors showed that 
functional area and nationality seemed to be strongly related to the strategy perspectives of 
executives. This result would suggest that these two factors would be the most interesting 
direction for further research into the influences on strategy perspectives: 
 
2a. Link between nationality & strategy perspectives (A→B). As was argued in section 
16.2.3, it can be hypothesized that the most important impact on the strategic perspectives 
held by executives should be sought in the ‘learning environments’ in which executives 
currently operate or have operated in the past. These learning settings form both the 
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cognitive communities in which executives exchange beliefs, values and ideas, as well as 
the operational environments in which they need to act and achieve results. One of the 
most significant learning environments would seem to be the nation in which an 
executive has been raised and works – executives are shaped by the national culture and 
national conditions in which they function. To check whether strategy perspectives are 
indeed influenced by national environments, a simple research design would be required 
in which a representative group of executives from two or more countries filled out the 
Strategy Profiler. With a sufficiently high sample size per nation, a country profile could 
be derived, which could be compared to other country profiles, to spot similarities and 
differences. Using the variable ‘nationality’ would not be sufficient, however, as some 
people with a passport from one country actually grow up in a second and work in a third. 
Therefore, besides nationality, two other variables should be collected, namely, ‘most 
lived in country’ and ‘currently country of employment’. An interesting question here 
would be to measure whether past cultural conditioning is the most formative when it 
comes to strategy perspectives, or that the current cultural conditions facing ex-pat 
executives are a more dominant influence. At the same time, important theoretical work 
remains to be done, to explain why certain strategy perspectives are more prevalent in 
certain countries. 
2b. Link between functional area & strategy perspectives (A→B). In the same way, an 
executive’s functional area is an essential learning environment, priming his/her strategic 
beliefs. In this study, a first step was made towards collecting enough respondents per 
functional area, to be able to deduce a particular ‘functional area profile’. In follow up 
research into this variable, it will be important, however, to isolate the effect of functional 
area influence by ensuring the representativeness of the sample on all other variables. 
Furthermore, as was introduced half way through this research study, it is also important 
to collect information on which functional area the respondents have the most experience 
in, as it might be different than their current functional area, but still extremely important 
for past conditioning.    
Besides these two factors, that both came forward in the exploratory empirical work, some 
other directions for continued research can be deduced from the theoretical frameworks in 
figures 16.3 and 16.4:  
 
2c. Link between other learning environments & strategy perspectives (A→B). In section 
16.2.3 it was argued that executives operate in various learning environments at the same 
time. Not only are they part of a functional area and a national environment, but they are 
also part of a company and an industry. In the exploratory research, no data was available 
for these variables, but from a theoretical perspective, they do seem very promising for 
future research. When it comes to industries, a similar approach could be taken as for 
countries, whereby ‘industry profiles’ could be drawn up and compared to each other. 
Theoretically one might expect that different industries would have different strategy 
perspective preferences, given the often suggested differences of culture and operating 
demands (Porac and Thomas, 2002). However, sufficient numbers of respondents are 
needed per industry to be able to draw conclusions about structural differences in industry 
profiles. When it comes to differences in strategic beliefs between companies, it is 
probably more interesting to compare different categories of companies than individual 
companies themselves. So, it might be promising to compare strategy perspectives in 
small and large companies, local and international organizations, family-owned and 
publicly-owned firms, and market leaders and challengers. Another way of looking at 
learning environments is to distinguish various management levels (lower or higher 
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management) and locations within the firm (central or decentral). As these dissimilar 
environments will also exhibit diverse demands and draw executives into separate 
cognitive communities, differences in strategy perspectives might also be found. 
2d. Link between other individual attributes & strategy perspectives (A→B). Besides these 
learning environments themselves, in which executives directly acquire ideas and 
experiences that shape their cognitive maps, there are various surrounding conditions that 
indirectly play a role by facilitating, inhibiting or coloring the learning process. These 
factors do not drive the process of strategic belief formation, but can indirectly influence 
the process. In section 16.2.3 these individual attributes were divided into three 
preliminary categories: cognitive abilities, other cognitive maps and personal conditions. 
In the category ‘cognitive abilities’ all aspects of the human mind can be placed that are 
linked to the ‘hardware’ of our brains, such as personality, intelligence and learning 
styles. These are the types of things that evoke a debate about nature and nurture, as at 
least parts of our cognitive abilities are determined by biology. Although it is difficult to 
measure such things as personality and intelligence, these constructs can be 
operationalized by using simple tests, like an MBTI for personality, or by using surrogate 
measures, like educational level for intelligence. In the second category, ‘other cognitive 
maps’, all related belief structures can be measured that might influence the learning of 
the executive. These can include other beliefs internalized via education (‘area of study’), 
political activities (‘political affiliation’) or even one’s religion. The third category is 
personal conditions and includes elements such as age, gender, status, income and work 
experience. All of these factors might have an impact on the learning of executives, but 
how and to what extent remains to be determined.  
2e. Link between decision-making & strategy perspectives (C→B). Besides looking at the 
general influence of functional area, organization, industry and country, as suggested in 
2a-c, it is also interesting to look more specifically at the influence of different strategic 
decision-making settings on the development of strategy perspectives. The question is 
how different types of strategic decision-making have an impact on the formation of 
strategic beliefs. Three categories of decision-making setting variables can be mentioned 
as particularly promising; group composition, decision-making process and decision-
making situations. When looking at group composition, the issue is how the involvement 
of various people in the strategic decision-making processes can over time influence an 
executive’s thinking. Variables can include the number of executives involved, the 
diversity of the group (in various ways), the role of the non-executive board members, the 
role of employees and workers’ council and the role of external stakeholders and/or 
consultants. When it comes to the strategic decision-making process, the issue is how the 
structure of the strategy formation process in the organization influences executives’ 
strategy perspectives. Variables can include the level and detail of strategic planning, the 
amount of participation and discussion throughout the organization and the use of certain 
methods and tools (e.g. portfolio matrix or balanced scorecard). When looking at the 
impact of strategic decision-making situations, it is particularly interesting to see whether 
certain crucial events actually have a lasting influence on executives’ strategic beliefs. 
The archetype of such a situation is the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the decision-making 
situation left a lasting impression on the cognitive maps of all involved (see Allison, 
1971). One way of researching this is to ask executives whether they have experienced 
certain types of decision-making situations (e.g. an acquisition, being acquired, a major 
restructuring), while a longitudinal approach would be to measure executives’ strategy 
perspectives before and after a major strategic decision.   
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2f. Link between organizational action / performance & strategy perspectives (D/E →B). 
Executives learn by doing and experiencing the results of their actions, so it is also logical 
to research the impact of this learning on their strategic beliefs. One direction for further 
research could be to look at organizations implementing certain types of plans (e.g. an 
acquisition, a restructuring, a repositioning, a major foreign adventure, an alliance), to see 
how the strategy perspectives of executives change. Another research possibility is to see 
how executives respond to good or bad performance. Here, Miller’s (1991) research into 
the effect of success on companies’ long term behavior is an example of how success and 
failure can have an impact on the shaping of strategic beliefs.   
 
16.3.4 Future Research into the Influence of Strategy Perspectives 
What was not researched in this study at all was whether strategy perspectives actually have 
an influence on behavior. Do they matter? Or do executives make decisions and take actions 
without much regard for their stated beliefs? And if they act on their beliefs, what is the 
impact? Here, four areas for further research can be identified: 
 
3a. Link between strategy perspectives and organizational performance (B→E). Independent 
of the management field being studied, the ultimate question lurking in the background is 
whether the object of study has an impact on organizational performance. Here, too, this 
question can be put forward. The straightforward way of looking at this issue is to 
research whether having one strategy perspective, or a cluster of strategy perspectives, is 
associated with better performance than others. The key complexity, however, is as 
always that it all depends on who’s performance is being measured, what type of 
performance is being measured and on what type of time scale. Strategy perspectives are 
measured by individual, but most performance measures are at a much higher level of 
aggregation. It is rare that performance measures are available per team or department, 
and only occasionally are they available per business unit or geographic unit. Most 
performance data is only available for an entire corporation, making it necessary to focus 
on the link between the overall corporate ‘strategy profile’ and corporate performance. 
When it comes to selecting a measure of performance, relatively simple variables can be 
used such as profitability, growth, earnings per share, stock market value or market share, 
but also as more intricate measures such as innovativeness, competitive position, 
corporate sustainability or stakeholder value creation. And the time scale could vary from 
zero (strategy perspectives and performance are measured simultaneously) to infinity. 
However, as longitudinal research is generally much more difficult to carry out, there 
might be a preference to take a short time interval, but then there would be an issue of 
causation – if a strategy perspective and a certain measure of performance were 
correlated, which would be causing which? The lure of this avenue of research is huge, as 
it could lead to insights that could be translated into management prescriptions. Yet, the 
methodological issues brought up should not be underestimated.  
3b. Link between strategy perspectives and organizational action (B→D). Instead of 
attempting to link strategic beliefs to performance, a more moderate ambition would be to 
try to link strategic beliefs to organizational behavior. This type of research would seem 
to have a higher probability of yielding robust results, as all three previously mentioned 
research difficulties are less problematic. First, on the issue of level of analysis, it is 
generally easier to measure organizational action at different levels of aggregation than 
performance. From individual and team, all the way to the entire corporation, behaviors 
can be measured per aggregation level, while aggregating executives’ strategy profiles in 
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the same manner. This makes it possible to compare strategy perspectives to 
organizational action at any level of analysis the research wants. On the second issue, type 
of measures used, deciding what type of organizational actions to look at is also less 
problematic than deciding on the right performance measure. Each strategy perspective 
suggests a certain type of behavior, so it is this behavior that should be measured. For 
example, the embedded organization perspective advocates engaging in a variety of 
strategic alliances, so it is interesting to measure whether business units or firms in which 
this perspective is dominant have more and longer lasting alliances than others. The 
discontinuous renewal perspective promotes revolutionary strategic change, so it would 
follow that the best variables to track would be such things as changes in product 
portfolio, changes in management positions, changes in organizational structure and the 
number and length of change programs, to see whether units with this perspective exhibit 
a more revolutionary pattern of change. For each strategy perspective this question – do 
the executives act in accordance with their strategic beliefs – would be very interesting to 
research. On the third issue, time scale used, research designs also do not need to be 
complex, as long as the organizational actions measured take place after the strategy 
perspectives of the executives are measured. 
The link between executives’ strategy beliefs and their strategic decisions (B→C) has been 
saved for last, as it contains two critical issues that emerged during this study that fell just 
outside of the research scope, but that require further attention: 
3c. Link between strategy perspectives and acted-on beliefs (B→C). The first issue was 
already brought up in section 13.2.2, where it was discussed whether there is a strong link 
between executives’ espoused beliefs and their acted-on beliefs. Espoused beliefs are 
what executives say they believe, while acted-on beliefs are those actually used in 
practice. It could be that these two are exactly the same, but it is also possible that 
executives ‘believe they believe’ something, but that in reality they act on other beliefs. 
With any survey instrument, like the Strategy Profiler, it is the intention to get as close as 
possible to a person’s fundamental beliefs, by attempting to circumvent socially desirable 
answers and by offering questions as close to practical decision-making as possible. 
However, all of this mapping is still a priori, while the acted-on beliefs can only be 
measured during the decision-making process or a posteriori. Therefore, a valuable 
research contribution would be in the comparison of a priori measured strategy 
perspectives and a posteriori measurement of acted-on beliefs. If the differences found 
were large, this would mean that executives have difficulty knowing or admitting what 
they believe in at the deepest level, which would be in itself an interesting finding. 
However, it would also mean that the Strategy Profiler mapping methodology would have 
to be fundamentally reviewed.  
3d. Link between strategy perspectives and decision-making processes (B→C). Even if 
executives act on their espoused beliefs, it remains to be seen how having certain strategy 
perspectives impacts the strategic decision-making process. One of the most interesting 
questions begging to be researched is how the decision-making process is affected by the 
fact that executives have the same or different strategy perspectives. If the decision-
making group is homogeneous / heterogeneous when it comes to their strategic beliefs, 
what are the consequences in terms of speed of decision-making, acceptance, rigor and 
innovativeness? And if there are similarities / differences between the decision-makers, 
which decision-making methods can be used to improve speed, acceptance, rigor and 
innovativeness?   
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For all of these research opportunities, being able to quantitatively measure strategy beliefs is 
essential. The Strategy Profiler measurement instrument offers this possibility. It is freely 
available to all researchers who wish to pursue any of these research opportunities.    
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SAMENVATTING 
 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Deze studie gaat over het in kaart brengen van het denken van de strateeg – het kwantitatief 
meten van de denkbeelden van leidinggevenden over de beste manier waarop strategische 
vraagstukken zouden moeten worden benaderd. De doelstelling was om een betrouwbaar 
instrument te ontwikkelen waarmee deze strategische denkbeelden zouden kunnen worden 
gemeten, op een wijze dat het herbruikbaar zou zijn in een brede scala van cognitieve 
onderzoeken. Het zou een Hofstede-achtig, universeel instrument moeten zijn, dat 
strategische denkbeelden in kaart zou kunnen brengen over branche- en landsgrenzen heen. 
 
Om dit te bereiken werd een conceptueel kader geconstrueerd, bestaand uit tien afzonderlijke 
dimensies waarlangs de strategiepercepties van leidinggevenden kunnen verschillen. Voor 
elke dimensie werden de twee polen (ook wel strategie perspectieven genoemd) kwalitatief 
beschreven en daarna omgezet in kwantitatieve meetschalen. Tijdens de studie werden deze 
twintig schalen bijeengebracht in een internet-gebaseerd enquête instrument, de Strategy 
Profiler, die gebruikt werd om de percepties van enkele honderden managers te meten. 
 
Als afronding van de studie werd ook exploratief gekeken naar de mogelijke samenhang 
tussen allerlei persoonlijke karakteristieken en het hebben van specifieke strategie-
perspectieven. Er werd gevonden dat enkele contextuele variabelen van managers zoals hun 
functioneel gebied en nationaliteit, significant gecorreleerd waren met een brede scala 
strategische denkbeelden. Dit resultaat geeft aan dat verder onderzoek naar de invloed van 
omgevingsfactoren (functie, organisatie, industrie en nationaliteit) op de strategievoorkeuren 
van leidinggevenden gewenst is. 
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Mapping the Mind of the Strategist 
A Quantitative Methodology for Measuring
the Strategic Beliefs of Executives
This study is about mapping the mind of the strategist – quantitati-
vely measuring the core beliefs that executives have about the best
way to approach strategic issues. The objective is to develop a reliable
instrument for measuring these strategy beliefs, which can be reused
across a broad range of cognitive studies. The intention is to create a
Hofstede-like universal instrument for quantitatively capturing strategic
beliefs of executives across any range of industries and cultures. 
To achieve this, a comprehensive conceptual framework is presented
consisting of ten distinct dimensions along which executives can have
differing cognitive preconceptions. For each of the ten dimensions,
the opposite poles (referred to as strategy perspectives) are qualita-
tively described and then translated into quantitative measurement
scales. During the study, these twenty scales were brought together
in a web-based survey instrument, the Strategy Profiler, which was
used to quantitatively map hundreds of individual executives’ strategy
beliefs.
The study concludes with some exploratory research into the factors
correlated with specific strategy beliefs. It is found that contextual
variables such as functional and national background are significantly
correlated with a large number of strategic beliefs. This suggests that
further research into the impact of executives’ environments (functio-
nal area, organization, industry and national context) on their strategic
beliefs seem very promising. 
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-141-3 
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